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Abstract 
 
This thesis attempts to study how human capital and social capital affect political 
elite upward mobility in China. The analysis of human capital or social capital has 
long been at the crux of the studies on status attainment, career mobility and social 
stratification. Previous literature has emphasized the notable career returns to 
either capital. Yet little is understood about whether the effect of either capital can 
be also observed in upward mobility for political leaders, to what extent either 
capital is rewarded in promotion dynamics over different career stages or how both 
capitals interrelate in the process of career mobility. This thesis attempts to answer 
the first two research questions and leaves the third issue unresolved for future 
research. Thus, it develops promotion models for Chinese provincial leaders from 
1990 to 2013. The promotion analyses in this thesis addresses two specific research 
questions: how do human capital and social capital affect promotion outcomes? And 
how do these effects change across administrative ranks and over different historical 
periods?  
 
Based on education and career histories of a sample of 1,891 provincial leaders 
drawn from 31 provincial-level administrations in China, this thesis extends the 
understanding of provincial leadership transformation from 1990 to 2013 and the 
role of human capital and social capital in the promotion dynamics. By applying 
event history analysis, this thesis also contributes to the empirical studies of Chinese 
elite mobility and stratification by providing insights into the promotion dynamics 
from a life course perspective and through historical comparisons of promotion 
models in the pre-Jiang era (before 1990) and under the Jiang period (1990-2002).  
 
The major findings in this thesis show that Chinese provincial leadership 
transformation is characterized by the emergence of technocrats in the 1990s and 
the rise of career bureaucrats since 2000. In the investigation of political upward 
mobility processes, provincial leaders are considered as fast runners in mobility 
competitions across administrative ranks. In the analyses of promotion dynamics, 
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both human capital and social capital are responsible for upward mobility in Chinese 
politics. Specifically, relative to high school or below, higher education is significantly 
rewarded in career advancement within the political hierarchy. The impact of 
specific educational degrees on promotion differs modestly. Political officials trained 
in science and engineering are not distinguished from those majoring in humanities 
and social sciences in promotion dynamics. Public service seniority plays an 
important role in political upward mobility. Social capital contributes to the 
promotion dynamics towards different administrative ranks in a similar way. In 
addition, the promotion analyses also demonstrate the historical persistence and 
changes in the career rewards for either human capital or social capital. There are 
significant variations in the impact of educational levels between the rank-specific 
promotion dynamics before and under Jiang. However, the rank-specific promotion 
dynamics before and under Jiang tend to be similar regarding the effects of 
academic disciplines, public service seniority and social capital. 
 
Based on these findings, the provincial leadership transformation in this thesis is 
interpreted by the institutional mechanisms of leadership selection and cadre 
management. Individual life chances for political leaders--such as education and 
career opportunities--are shaped by the macro-sociopolitical transformation and the 
state policy shifts in China.  
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
 
The post-Deng era has witnessed peaceful power transfers and regime stability for 
two decades in China. At the time when this research project was conceived in 2011, 
a new wave of personnel reshuffling at the local levels was initiated. There were a 
total of 31 provinces, 361 cities, 2,811 counties and 34,171 townships choosing their 
new party leaders and completing the handover of power between 2011 and the 
first half of 20121. Such large-scale leadership selection increasingly caught the eyes 
of China observers who were not only interested in who ultimately rose to power, 
but also in how they were chosen and succeeded in the mobility competitions in the 
party-state of China.  
 
That is the subject of this thesis: how do political officials in China climb from the 
bottom to the top within the political hierarchy and what are the key assets for their 
career success in the reform-era China? Such questions help to open the black box of 
leadership selection in Chinese elite politics by asking who is running China. To seek 
the answers to these questions, this thesis examines the processes of political 
upward mobility in the Chinese context and traces career trajectories for individual 
political leaders and for cohorts of leaders from a life course perspective. Despite the 
proliferating research on Chinese political elite mobility due to the growing 
availability of leadership biographies, the empirical study pertaining to the 
promotion dynamics across administrative ranks is still in its infancy. This thesis 
attempts to fill this research vacuum by examining the variations in the way in which 
promotion opportunities are distributed over different career stages. The study of 
rank-specific promotion dynamics in this thesis—the attainment of higher 
administrative ranks for political officials or the process of assigning viable 
candidates to elite status and positions for the party-state—provides a sound basis 
                                                        
1  See the website of “neidi dangwei huanjie wancheng” (The Completion of 
Leadership Changes in Mainland China, 内地党委换届完成), ifeng.com (凤凰网), 
accessed on 12 June, 2015 at 
http://news.ifeng.com/mainland/special/dangweihuanjie/.  
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for explaining the promotion patterns and understanding the dependence of 
individual life chances on the state, particularly the shifts of state policies.  
 
A wealth of current academic literature on Chinese political elite mobility generally 
follows three research lines: the factionalism model (Dittmer, 1978, 1995, 2003; 
Huang, 2000; Nathan, 1973; Nathan & Tsai, 1995; Tsou & Nathan, 1976), the 
performance approach (Bo, 2002; Chen, Li & Zhou, 2005; Choi, 2012; Landry, 2008; 
Landry, Lu & Duan, 2015; Li & Zhou, 2005; Shih, Adolph & Liu, 2012) and the human 
capital theory or the meritocratic argument (Lee, 1991; Lin, 2012; Huang, 2009; Shih, 
Adolph & Liu, 2012; Walder, 1995; Walder, Li & Treiman, 2000; Zang, 2001; Zeng, 
2013; Zhang, 2014; Zhou, Tuma & Moen, 1996, 1997). The recent and ongoing 
empirical studies along the above three strands of literature not only separately 
incorporate factional ties, economic performance or human capital variables into the 
promotion determination dynamics, but also take impressive efforts to develop 
mixed analytical models (Choi, 2012; Jia, Kudamatsu & Seim, 2015; Lin, 2012; Shih, 
Adolph & Liu, 2012; Zhang, 2014).  However, these quantitative endeavors are still in 
their early stages. They produce mixed empirical results to explain the dynamics of 
political selection in China. There is little intellectual consensus or conclusive 
evidence as to whether and how factional ties, economic performance or the 
accumulation of human capital bolsters the promotion chances in Chinese politics. 
For example, family connections or princeling status guarantee political rewards with 
career advancement in Zhang’s (2014) study of provincial party chiefs from 1990 to 
2007 whereas exert no significant impact on upward mobility for both provincial 
party secretaries and governors from 1989 to 2009 (Choi, 2012)2. As another 
example, regarding the career returns to economic performance, the contribution of 
provincial GDP growth does not exist in the empirical studies as to provincial 
leadership selection from Bo (2002) and Zhang (2014).  However, as observed by 
Chen, Li and Zhou (2005) along with Li and Zhou (2005), provincial leaders with 
                                                        
2 Zhang (2014) discusses the divergence between his finding on the role of princeling 
ties and Choi’s (2012). He notes that both results “are not conflicting because Choi’s 
research covered more recent years when princelings have lost their political 
advantage” (Zhang, 2014: 262). 
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better economic growth records are more likely to get ahead along the political 
ladder. Likewise, the bulk of the meritocratic models reaches different conclusions 
and warrants careful interpretation over the association of human capital with 
political career success.  In Bo’s (2002) examination of provincial leaders from 1949 
to 1998, earning a college degree generates a lower promotion rate. On the 
contrary, college graduates are favored in the political elite mobility competition by 
studying the career trajectories of the Central Committee members from 1982 
through 2002 (Shih, Adolph & Liu, 2012). Strikingly, according to the empirical 
evidence from Zhang (2014), there is no significant linkage between educational 
qualifications and upward mobility. In summary, a substantial body of the existing 
literature on Chinese leadership selection present inconsistent or even opposing 
findings.  It is, thus, premature to conclude how elite upward mobility is affected by 
factional or social connections, economic achievement and human capital.   
 
Drawing on the existing academic literature pertaining to Chinese elite mobility, this 
thesis grounds the leadership promotion analyses on the personal resources 
possessed by individual political officials, rather than their interactions with factional 
ties, their positions in power struggles, their economic performance records or the 
vacancy-chain effects from a structural perspective. Specifically, this thesis focuses 
on the competitive advantages of career advancers by analyzing how their 
accumulation of human capital and social capital creates promotion opportunities in 
Chinese politics. Human capital and social capital are universal norms in 
understanding status attainment and career mobility. This provides a solid 
foundation for comparing the promotion patterns and dynamics in different 
societies and cultures. As elaborated in Chapter 2 below, human capital is assessed 
in light of educational levels, academic majors and public service seniority. Social 
capital is concerned with the fundamental characteristics of social networks 
developed from formal work relationships, including network size, network diversity 
and upper reachability (i.e. the highest rank accessible). It is worth noting that social 
capital here by no means touches on whom political officials interact with or which 
group or faction they belong to. Instead, it gives special attention to the 
configuration of social networks under the assumptions that: (1) social networks 
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expand with the changes in workplaces, organizations, occupations, the job shifts 
from the leadership post to the non-leadership post, and so forth; (2) social 
networks become diverse when political officials work across varying career 
patterns, e.g., from finance/budgeting to public security, or from party work to 
government administration; and (3) upper reachability grows with the accessibility of 
the superiors at higher administrative ranks  through work connections.  
 
By comparing three research lines as introduced previously, on one hand, the above 
analytical framework in this thesis shows the remarkable consistency in evaluating 
the effect of human capital on promotion in China. It provides additional evidence 
with respect to the role of human capital in Chinese promotion dynamics. Besides, it 
extends the earlier empirical work by considering the variations in the promotion 
determination patterns over different career stages. On the other hand, this study 
departs from the existing literature in terms of the incorporation and the 
measurement of social capital in the promotion models. A strong body of the current 
scholarly research locates the study of Chinese political mobility in the context of 
factional politics. Accordingly, it focuses analytic attention on the factional affiliation 
with specific factional camps or superior leaders (Choi, 2012; Li, 2002; 2012; Li & Pye, 
1992; Lin, 2012; Zhang, 2014), family backgrounds or blood ties (Choi, 2012; Tanner 
& Feder, 1993; Zeng, 2013; Zhang, 2014), and social connections accumulated 
through shared birthplaces, educational institutions or work units (Jia, Kudamatsu & 
Seim, 2015; Li, 1994; Shih, Adolph & Liu, 2012; Zhang, 2014). In comparison, as 
mentioned above, social capital in this thesis is related to the configuration of social 
network arising from formal work contacts. Such an analysis implicitly assumes that 
the acquisition of network resources hinges on the expansion of network size, the 
increase in network diversity and social ties to dominant leaders. In this way, this 
thesis goes beyond the focus on informal politics, factional conflicts and specific 
interpersonal relationships. Instead, it situates the promotion analyses within the 
framework of institutionalization and individual-oriented personal resources in 
reform-era China. This offers an important contribution to the previous academic 
literature on Chinese elite mobility, which will be emphasized once again in the 
concluding chapter.  
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To understand the leadership promotion dynamics in terms of human capital and 
social capital, more specific research questions arise. For example, how are human 
capital and social capital rewarded in the opportunity structure of leadership upward 
mobility? Is there any variation in the way in which either capital contributes to 
career advancement across administrative ranks? How has the role of either capital 
in the promotion dynamics evolved over time? To address these vital questions, this 
thesis develops the temporal dynamics of political upward mobility processes by 
studying 1,891 provincial leaders from 1990 to 2013, including party secretaries, 
provincial governors, deputy party secretaries and vice governors. This sample 
accounts for 85.10% of the total provincial leadership from 1990 to 2013.  
 
Why are provincial leaders from 1990 to 2013 an appropriate group for the 
leadership promotion analyses? The reasons for this are threefold. First, provincial 
leaders are competitive political players in the fierce rivalry for national power and 
top leadership positions in the power center. The leadership experience as provincial 
leaders has been increasingly considered as a pivotal stepping-stone or an essential 
prerequisite to become prominent central leaders thus far (Lin, 2012: 5-7; Naughton 
& Yang, 2004: 12). In addition, provincial leaders constitute a group of political actors 
who exercise substantial control over policy making and personnel decisions at the 
local levels in response to the trend of power decentralization to provinces (Bo, 
2002: 3). At the same time, they prove to be adept at implementing public policies, 
enhancing economic performance and maintaining social stability. Given all of these 
factors, it is worthwhile to study provincial leaders who play a crucial role in Chinese 
politics.  
 
 Second, the sample of provincial leaders provides an ideal data source for the 
promotion analyses and fits readily into the research purposes in this thesis. As 
mentioned earlier, the primary focus of this thesis is on the paths to the top within 
the political hierarchy and the possible differentiated promotion dynamics across 
administrative ranks for political leaders. On one hand, the career histories of 
provincial leaders allow for a systematic analysis of occupational upgrading from the 
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grassroots level to the vice-provincial/ministerial level or the provincial/ministerial 
level. On the other hand, although they have occupied the authority positions in the 
party or government systems at the provincial level, there still exists noticeable 
variance in the highest administrative rank they have ultimately reached throughout 
their political careers. Only a very small number of provincial leaders successfully rise 
to state power. This makes it possible to observe the differences in the level cap in 
the processes of career progress. Meanwhile, the accumulated possession of human 
capital and social capital can be compared between career advancers and stayers for 
the promotions towards a given rank. To summarize, the selection of provincial 
leaders satisfies the indispensible prerequisites as to the sufficient career moves 
from the lower levels to the upper levels and the variations in the promotion 
opportunities in terms of the highest rank obtained and the timing of promotion 
events occurring.  After considering the strengths of choosing provincial leaders 
under study, this thesis comes to recognize the relative limitations of selecting the 
other leadership groups as compared to provincial leaders. As to the municipal- and 
county-level cadres, they fail to provide complete and sufficient longitudinal career 
data describing the paths to the top positions. This is because of their short tenure 
or limited promotion chances in public service. As to the central leaders, there exists 
little variance in the highest rank they assume within the organizational hierarchy. 
However, as indicated in Chapter 9, a study of central leaders will provide 
supplementary empirical data for the leadership promotion analyses in the future.  
 
Last but not least, the pragmatic consideration of data availability is another 
compelling reason for studying provincial leaders from 1990 to 2013. It is widely 
recognized that elite studies are effectively challenged by the limited access to the 
“hard-to-reach” political elite for interviews or questionnaires. In addition, this thesis 
is based on the retrospective data related to educational and career histories, which 
makes it more difficult to arrange social surveys and collect data. This is because 
some of political officials passed away or lost contact. In this thesis, the empirical 
data for promotion analyses are generally drawn from online published leadership 
biographies. In this regard, a crucial issue arises with respect to whether and when 
the biographic data are available. Considering the accuracy and completeness of 
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biographic information, this thesis prefers to study provincial leaders partially 
because their leadership profiles can be perfectly collected. A large portion of them 
contains necessary information as to demographic attributes, educational 
backgrounds and career paths. In sharp contrast, a large number of leadership 
profiles for the municipal- and county-level cadres are fragmentary and unavailable. 
In terms of the second consideration associated with the time dimension of data 
collection, the biographic data are gathered for provincial leaders from 1990 to 2013 
for two important reasons. One is that the development of e-government and the 
system of government information sharing in the reform era promotes the 
accessibility of provincial leadership biographies. The other is that a time span of 
1990-2013 allows a closer look at how the far-reaching institutionalization of 
leadership selection since the 1990s affects provincial leadership transformation and 
a historical comparison of promotion dynamics before the Jiang period, under Jiang 
and under Hu.  
 
For the above substantive reasons, this thesis focuses on a sample of provincial 
leaders from 1990 to 2013. Chapter 3 explicitly introduces diverse data sources 
where biographic information comes from, the general strategy of data input for 
event history analysis, and the measurement of both outcome variables and 
predictor variables in the promotion models. On this basis, a Chinese provincial 
leadership dataset is developed. This is the most updated and comprehensive 
dataset of provincial leaders, which is considered as one of the conspicuous 
contributions of this thesis as pointed out in Chapter 9.  The leadership dataset 
provides a solid empirical foundation for the promotion analyses of provincial 
leaders in reforming China. The following pages will further summarize the 
methodological issues in Chapter 3. 
 
As noted earlier, the major tasks of the promotion analyses in this thesis are to 
examine how human capital and social capital affect political upward mobility and 
how these promotion dynamics evolve across administrative ranks and over 
different historical periods. For these research purposes, the leadership dataset 
consist of such biographic information as demographic characteristics, educational 
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degrees awarded, the corresponding academic disciplines, the duration time in 
public service, social network size, network diversity, the highest rank accessible 
from formal work contacts and promotion trajectories. The operational definitions 
and the measurement of these variables are specified in Chapter 3. In terms of the 
educational and occupational experience for provincial leaders, the leadership 
dataset incorporates not only the events of educational attainment, social network 
expansion and promotions, but also the timing of these events occurring. In this way, 
the leadership dataset puts strong emphasis on the time-varying patterns of human 
capital and social capital and describes how either capital changes over time.  
 
It is important to note that there were a total of 1,891 provincial leaders with known 
biographic information from 31 provincial-level administrations during the period of 
1990-2013 in this thesis. This empirical data permits an in-depth quantitative 
assessment of provincial leadership transformation, namely the demographic 
analysis in Chapter 4, human capital in Chapter 5 and social capital in Chapter 6. The 
analysis of provincial leadership composition exclusively centers on their job 
experience as provincial chiefs and examines how the related leadership 
characteristics changed in such particular career episodes. In this case, it is possible 
that individual provincial leaders are counted more than once if they receive job 
transfers or hold concurrent jobs across such elite positions as party secretary, 
provincial governor, deputy secretary and vice governor. However, such double-
counting issue no longer exists in the empirical studies of the growth of social capital 
across administrative ranks in Chapter 6, the political upward mobility processes in 
Chapter 7 and the promotion dynamics in Chapter 8. These studies extensively look 
at the career trajectories from the section-head level to the state-leader level. They 
give more attention to the administrative ranks obtained than the specific jobs or 
the leading positions held. Each provincial leader is treated as only one research 
subject. A single event-history observation is created for each provincial leader every 
year. In this way, the full career histories are traced by taking into account the job 
changes among four leading posts as provincial chiefs. Thus, the sample size in these 
studies is reduced to 1,260 provincial leaders. The elimination of a portion of the 
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leadership sample is due to the double-counting issue. All the relevant 
methodological considerations will be further articulated in Chapter 3.  
 
With the intriguing research questions and the Chinese leadership dataset as 
introduced above, this thesis is organized into nine chapters. Chapter 1 raises 
research questions, explains why provincial leaders are selected for promotion 
analyses, describes the sample and the major variables of interest included in the 
dataset and outlines the thesis structure.  
 
Returning to the research interest in human capital and social capital in the creation 
of promotion opportunities, Chapter 2 reviews a wealth of literature on the roles of 
either capital in status attainment and career mobility. On one hand, the flourishing 
literature on the effect of human capital is divided into two parts, namely education 
and work experience.  The investigation of career returns to education is traced back 
to the Blau-Duncan model (Blau and Duncan, 1967) and the Wisconsin model (Haller 
and Sewell, 1967; Sewell, Haller and Portes, 1969) in the late 1960s. An enormous 
body of empirical studies shows strong support for education as a salient 
determinant of occupational status.  Along with the research literature on education 
in career mobility, another strand of literature is concerned with the payoffs of work 
experience by evaluating the effects of job tenures or specific career trajectories and 
the correlation between early and later career attainment (Forbes, 1987; 
Rosenbaum, 1979a, 1979b). However, it remains obscure as to whether and in which 
way work experience is rewarded in career development. On the other hand, the 
study of social capital in occupational achievement is grounded in three lines of 
sociological work, namely weak tie argument (Granovetter, 1973), social resources 
theory (Lin, 1999b, 2001) and structural hole argument (Burt, 1992). The current 
literature provides the initial confirmation that social capital contributes to the 
creation of career opportunities.  
 
Based on this critical review of literature, Chapter 2 observes the three research gaps 
and subsequently proposes the hypotheses tested in Chapter 8. First, the study of 
career returns to human capital and social capital for political elites is scant. Second, 
 
 
25 
the changes in these returns over different career stages are inadequately examined. 
Third, there is also a dearth of empirical research on the interplay of human capital 
and social capital in career mobility. This thesis aims at narrowing the first two gaps 
in knowledge and accordingly puts forth the research questions at the beginning of 
this chapter. In terms of the third research gap, it remains unanswered due to the 
space limitations in this thesis and will be closed in the future research. The 
hypotheses guiding the promotion analyses in Chapter 8 are developed. According to 
the hypotheses, the promotion analyses identify the impacts of human capital and 
social capital in political upward mobility in four respects. The first step is to identify 
how either capital affects promotion as a whole. The second step is based on a 
longitudinal study of the overall effect of either capital on promotion. The third step 
is to look at the possible inter-rank variations in the extent to which either capital 
affects career advancement. In this step, the events of promotion are categorized by 
the administrative rank where the promotion occurs.  The final step is to compare 
the rank-specific promotion dynamics over different historical periods, particularly 
those before and under the Jiang period.  
 
Chapter 3 introduces the methodological advances in this thesis by exploiting event 
history analysis.  This statistical technique provides an essential methodological 
guide in how the biographic data are organized and structured. This chapter starts by 
providing a detailed rationale justifying and explaining why event history analysis is 
appropriate for this thesis. This explication originates from the advantages of event 
history analysis in analyzing social processes and changes, that is, handling the 
censoring issue and accommodating time-varying predictor variables. After 
delineating the appropriateness of this statistical method used, Chapter 3 turns to 
describe the processes of data collection.  It answers three important questions of 
why the empirical data are drawn from leadership biographies, why the biographic 
data range from 1990 to 2013 and why provincial leaders are selected for the 
promotion analyses.  It formulates the detailed procedures of leadership biographic 
data collection by introducing the authoritative data sources and the sample 
selection. Collecting a complete set of original leadership profiles from scattered 
sources provides a powerful starting point for biographic data input and analysis in 
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the next step. In line with event history analysis, Chapter 3 outlines the definition of 
observation periods and the calendar year as a time unit in dividing the observation 
periods.  Subsequently, it articulates the operational definitions and the coding of 
outcome variables, explanatory variables and control variables. On this basis, the 
Chinese provincial leadership dataset is established in the person-year structure 
where individual provincial leaders have multiple event-history observations. The 
number of observational records for individual provincial leaders is contingent upon 
how many years they are under observation. After creating the person-year record 
file, the correlation of human capital or social capital to upward mobility is 
calculated in logistic regression analyses.  
 
Although the primary focus of this thesis is on developing the promotion models, 
based on the above well-structured leadership dataset, Chapter 4, Chapter 5 and 
Chapter 6 draw a broad picture of provincial leadership transformation. All these 
chapters give considerable attention to a basic question: Who are provincial leaders 
from 1990 to 2013 in China? After answering this question, Chapter 7 and Chapter 8 
ask a more sophisticated question: How do these provincial leaders climb the 
political ladder from the bottom to the top? They seek the answers to this question 
from different perspectives. Chapter 7 provides a descriptive account of political 
upward mobility by analyzing the distribution of career duration and the 
corresponding promotion probability across administrative ranks. Chapter 8 goes a 
step further to examine whether and how human capital or social capital is 
translated into promotion opportunities. In the following, this thesis continues to 
give an overview of the remaining chapters.  
 
Chapter 4 delineates the historical continuities and changes in the demographic 
characteristics of provincial leaders in terms of age, gender, ethnicity, provincial 
origins and party membership. The provincial leadership transformation is compared 
against the historical trend of provincial leadership characteristics from 1949 to 1998 
(Bo, 2002). The interpretation of the data analysis results shows the link between 
the provincial leadership formation and the ongoing institutional transformation of 
leadership selection since the 1990s. For example, the stability in the average age is 
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related to the institutional arrangements of age limits, term limits, term integrity and 
step-by-step promotion. A relatively low proportion of native leaders from 1990 to 
2013 are partially the consequence of the institutionalized cadre exchange and 
avoidance systems. Furthermore, Chapter 4 sheds new light on the historical 
evolutions of the recruitment of female provincial leaders and provincial leaders 
without membership of Chinese Communist Party (CCP) as well as the 
representation of ethnic minorities in provincial politics. In the concluding section, 
Chapter 4 highlights the rise of the Cultural Revolution Generation (hereafter, the CR 
generation) who, as we will see, are highly homogeneous in demographic attributes 
and whose life journeys are significantly shaped by the outbreak of the Cultural 
Revolution (CR).  
 
Chapter 5 portrays human capital in terms of educational levels, academic majors 
and public service seniority. The education analysis in this chapter contains two 
salient features. One is to distinguish formal education from final education because 
the growing interest in improving educational credentials and the questioning of the 
quality of the on-the-job educational advancement. The other is to provide a 
dynamic analysis of education changes throughout the higher-education histories. 
The final section of Chapter 5 measures the proportion of technocrats and career 
bureaucrats in Chinese provincial leadership. It delineates the emergence of 
technocratic leadership in the 1990s and its decline since 2000 along with a rise of 
career bureaucrats, which is further analyzed in Chapter 9.  
 
It is worth noting that Chapter 5 not only describes the historical trends of 
educational levels and academic majors for provincial leaders, but also reveals such 
shifting education policies as educational expansions and faculty restructuring 
behind these trends. For example, with respect to formal education, Chapter 5 
observes an increase in college-educated provincial leaders in the 1990s and during 
the period of 2011-2013. It links this observation to two waves of educational 
expansions in the 1950s and in the late 1970s after the CR. As opposed to the above 
rapid-growth episodes, there was a decline in the percentage of college graduates in 
provincial leadership in the 2000s. Chapter 5 attributes this result to the shutdown 
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of colleges and universities in the middle of the CR. Moreover, Chapter 5 points out 
the predominance of provincial leaders trained in natural science and engineering in 
formal education from 1990 to 2005. This is closely related to the faculty 
restructuring in 1952 intended to nurture a highly specialized and science-oriented 
labor force for industrialization and state building3.  
 
Chapter 6 sketches the accumulation of social capital for provincial leaders and the 
changes in social capital across administrative ranks. As social capital in this thesis is 
defined as the characteristics of social networks developed from work relationships, 
the value of social capital depends heavily upon the occupational experience. 
Chapter 6 emphasizes that network size and network diversity share similar patterns. 
Firstly, by comparing both the average network size and the average network 
diversity among four groups of provincial chiefs, they are positively associated with 
the political power and authority, in a descending order of party secretaries, 
provincial governors, deputy party secretaries and vice governors. Secondly, from a 
longitudinal perspective, both network size and network diversity for provincial 
leaders remained steady in the 1990s and substantially increased since 2000. As to 
the former, it is primarily the consequence of recruiting professionals-turned-
politicians to the leadership positions at the provincial level. As to the latter, it 
results from the institutionalized cadre exchange systems. Finally, on average, both 
network size and network diversity grow with the career progression from the 
section-head level to the state-leader level.  
 
Chapter 7 formulates the processes of political upward mobility for provincial 
leaders by analyzing the average age at promotion, the duration time between 
promotions and the life-table analysis of the promotions across ranks. The average 
age at promotion is compared with the upper age limits at each administrative rank. 
                                                        
3 The specific policy related to the faculty restructuring in 1952 is “State Council’s 
Decision on Reforming Educational Institutions” (zhengwuyuan guanyu gaige xuezhi 
de jueding, 政务院关于改革学制的决定) in 1951, “Reforming the Faculties in 
Colleges and Effectively Training Cadres for National Building” (zuohao yuanxi 
tiaozheng gongzuo youxiao de peiyang guojia jianshe ganbu, 做好院系调整工作，
有效地培养国家建设干部) . 
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In this way, the striking age advantages for provincial leaders are found. In addition, 
the duration time at the previous rank seems to be longer at the upper ranks than at 
the lower ranks. In the remainder of Chapter 7, the statistical technique of life table 
analysis is adopted for describing how promotion opportunities change with the 
duration time across administrative ranks. The results clearly demonstrate provincial 
leaders as faster runners in mobility competitions at the lower ranks than at the 
higher ranks. Furthermore, promotions occur more rapidly towards the deputy 
positions than towards the succeeding full positions.  
 
After presenting a detailed picture of provincial leadership transformation and 
political upward mobility processes, the research attention in Chapter 8 is directed 
towards the promotion analyses. Chapter 8 examines the career rewards for human 
capital and social capital in separate promotion models. For either capital, the 
promotion analyses are performed in four steps. The first step is to assess the effect 
of human capital or social capital on promotion as a whole. In this step, all the event-
history observations are pooled together irrespective of the specific administrative 
ranks where the promotions occur. The second step is to identify whether these 
overall promotion models differ by historical periods.  The third step is to develop 
rank-specific promotion models by investigating how human capital or social capital 
affects upward mobility across administrative ranks from the deputy-division-head 
level to the vice-state-leader level. The final step is to conduct a comparative study 
of the rank-specific promotion dynamics across three historical periods. According to 
the above four steps of the analytical process, the central issues of this thesis are 
addressed and the hypotheses are tested by the promotion models in Chapter 8. The 
data analysis results lend strong support for the salient role of human capital and 
social capital in both the overall promotion model and the rank-specific promotion 
model. Besides, the promotion analyses show the historical persistence and changes 
in the promotion dynamics before Jiang, under Jiang and Hu.  
 
Chapter 9 summarizes and integrates the main findings from the previous chapters. 
It shows how these findings provide satisfactory answers to three important 
questions raised in this thesis. First, this thesis displays two distinctive patterns of 
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provincial leadership transformation from 1990 to 2013, which is also described in 
Chapter 5. One is the emerging technocratic leadership in the 1990s. The other is the 
rise of career bureaucrats from 2000 onwards. It is argued that the outbreak of the 
CR shaped individual life chances for technocrats in the 1990s and career 
bureaucrats since 2000 in different ways. Second, this thesis captures two striking 
features of the processes of political upward mobility, namely the rapid promotions 
at the lower ranks relative to the upper ranks, and a longer waiting time before 
advancing to the full positions than to the deputy positions. Finally, by interpreting 
the findings from the promotion models, this thesis supports the notable status 
returns to human capital and social capital in Chinese politics. The continuing effect 
of education on promotions across ranks is demonstrated and the assumption of 
education as a screening or filtering device is rejected. In addition, although higher 
education, for the most part, plays an important role in political upward mobility, it 
does not mean that receiving higher education necessarily leads to higher promotion 
rates. Along with human capital, social capital undoubtedly exerts significant effects 
on promotion. After summarizing all these major findings, Chapter 9 discusses the 
contributions and limitations of this thesis and suggests future research directions.  
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Chapter 2 Review of Literature 
 
The research purpose of this thesis centers on the effects of human capital and 
social capital on elite selection and stratification. The first two sections of this 
chapter are conceptually organized around two strands of literature pertaining to 
human and social capital theories, respectively. On this basis, the third section will 
point to the theoretical gaps inherent in the past literature. The fourth section will 
frame the research hypotheses by taking insights into the promotion dynamics in 
relation to human capital and social capital.  
 
The first substantial body of literature examines the role of human capital in the 
creation of occupational outcomes. Based on the statement of Becker (1964), human 
capital generally comprises the investment in health, education, training and work 
experience (Bodenhofer, 1967: 434). This section exclusively focuses on the 
pertinent literature of education and work experience (Becker, 1994: 17). The 
argument of education can be traced to the pioneering studies of the Blau-Duncan 
basic model (Blau and Duncan, 1967) and the Wisconsin model (Haller and Sewell, 
1967; Sewell, Haller and Portes, 1969). The decisive role of education is emphasized 
in both models and reconfirmed in the subsequent outpouring of literature on social 
mobility and status attainment. This strand of literature endeavors to extend and 
modify either model, providing insight into the structuralist analysis, along with the 
elaborate explanations of education-occupation linkage. In addition to career returns 
to education, this section will explicitly introduce Rosenbaum’s (1979b) tournament 
model that reflects the influence of work experience in career success.  
 
The second bulk of literature concentrates on the impact of social capital on career 
mobility. The emerging research interest in social capital dates back to the 1970s and 
1980s (Bourdieu, 1986; Burt, 1992, 1997a, 1997b, 2001; Coleman, 1988; 
Granovetter, 1973, 1983; Lin, 1999a, 1999b, 2000, 2001; Putnam, 2001). From the 
interpersonal and network perspective, the bourgeoning of work on social capital 
and labor market outcomes is essentially grounded in the strength of weak ties 
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(Granovetter, 1973, 1995), social resources theory (Lin, 1999b, 2001; Lin, Ensel and 
Vaughn, 1981) and structural hole argument (Burt, 1992). At the core of these 
significant strands of research is “how competition works when players have 
established relations with others” (Burt, 1992:1). Departing from human capital 
mentioned in the first section, social capital literature takes insight into the way in 
which individuals are connected with social contacts. 
 
Figure 1 displays the basic structure of this chapter. By linking the abundant studies 
on human capital and social capital, the final section of this chapter attempts to 
propose an original analytical framework and hypotheses under the unique 
institutional context of Chinese elite politics.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1 Structure of Literature Review 
 
2.1 Human Capital Affecting Career Mobility Outcomes 
 
To delineate career dynamics, it is first necessary to evaluate the pertinent literature 
as to how human capital is associated with career outcomes (Anderson, 1961; Bills, 
2.1HUMAN CAPITAL 
2.1.1 Education 
2.1.2 Work Experience 
2.2 SOCIAL CAPITAL 
2.2.1 Weak Tie Argument 
2.2.2 Social Resources Theory 
2.2.3 Structural Hole Argument 
2.3 RESEARCH GAPS 
A. Is human capital or social capital rewarded in upward 
mobility for political elites? 
B. How does the effect of human capital or social capital 
on promotion change over different career stages? 
C. How are human capital and social capital interplayed 
to affect career mobility? 
 
2.4 RESEARCH HYPOTHESES 
2.4.1 Human Capital in Promotion Dynamics 
2.4.2 Social Capital in Promotion Dynamics 
 
 
 
33 
2003; Breen and Jonsson, 2005; Bodenhofer, 1967; Buchmann and Hannum, 2001; 
Ganzeboom, Treiman and Ultee, 1991; Hauser et al., 2000; Kerckhoff, 1974a, 1976, 
1995, 2001). The conceptualization of human capital primarily rests upon the 
influence of education and work experience. Since the landmark models from Blau 
and Duncan (1967), Sewell and his colleagues (1969), and Rosenbaum (1979b), 
researchers have cast little doubt on the pivotal role of human capital in predicting 
career mobility rewards. In the following, this section concretely reviews the line of 
literature as to the specific contribution of education and work experience. In the 
concluding remarks, the weaknesses of the earlier arguments will be clarified, 
providing further justification for the career mobility mechanism proposed in this 
thesis.  
 
2.1.1 Education in Career Mobility 
 
The status returns to education originated from the second generation of 
stratification research, specifically the Blau-Duncan model and the Wisconsin model 
(Dessens et al., 2003: 64; Kerckhoff, 1976: 368, 1995: 324). In The American 
Occupational Structure, Blau and Duncan (1967: 5) observe “the stratified hierarchy 
of occupations” and develop a path analysis to explore the early stratification 
positions. The model incorporates the variables of father’s educational and 
occupational status, son’s education, the first occupation and the occupation in 1962 
when the survey was carried out. The analysis is virtually based on the nationwide 
survey of American men aged between 20 and 64. Interestingly, education turns out 
to be the strongest and direct determinant of occupational status, simultaneously 
mediating the relationship between origin status and occupational achievement. 
Since then, the focus of research interest has been oriented toward the educational 
effects in the career determination, other than the status transmission across 
generations4 (Sewell and Hauser, 1972: 851).  
                                                        
4  A rich body of literature extensively replicates the Blau-Duncan model by 
considering cross-societal variations (Jones, 1971; Kerckhoff, Campbell and Trott, 
1982; Krymkowski, 1991; Treiman and Terrell, 1975). These studies have arrived at a 
consensus that education is a vigorous variable in social mobility and stratification.  
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In parallel, the Wisconsin model analyzes occupational standings by considering the 
influences of family background, education and social psychological factors, such as 
mental ability, academic performance, and educational and occupational aspirations 
(Sewell, Haller and Portes, 1969: 84-86; Sewell, Haller and Ohlendorf, 1970: 1019, 
1023).  The data for the Wisconsin model was initially confined to 929 farm-reared 
males from Wisconsin high school seniors and later extended to 4,388 high school 
seniors from diverse family origins and different sizes of community. Compared with 
the Blau-Duncan model, not only has the Wisconsin model recognized the dominant 
predictor of education, but also highlighted the direct effect of occupational 
aspiration on the early status attainment. It links mental ability, academic 
performance and influences of significant others to educational attainment. The 
extension and refinement of the Wisconsin model encompass the socialization-
related factors of conformity and ambitions (Porter, 1976: 24) as well as the family 
background variable of the number of siblings (Hauser et al., 2000).  
 
Both the Blau-Duncan model and the Wisconsin model conspicuously “offer different 
theoretical interpretations of the same observations” (Kerckhoff, 1976: 370). The 
ongoing research has moved beyond the above models by understanding the cross-
societal structural effects of industrialization levels (Cummings and Naoi, 1974; 
Currie, 1977; Grusky, 1983; Holsinger, 1975; Lin and Yauger, 1975; Treiman and Yip, 
1989) and educational systems (Allmendinger, 1989; Baker, 1982; Kerckhoff, 1974a; 
Konig and Muller, 1986; Krymkowski, 1991; Treiman and Terrell, 1975; Meyer, Tuma 
and Zagorski, 1979). With few exceptions, the robustness of education in the above-
cited articles has definitely been acknowledged. For example, the meritocratic 
emphasis on education increases with industrialization levels because of the changes 
in occupational structures and educational expansion (Cumming and Naoi, 1974: 
266). In industrialized societies, the sophisticated technical development and 
increasing job specialization result in the growing demands of highly educated 
manpower (Holsinger, 1975: 271). The rapid organizational expansion enables 
employers to reward the investment in education and training. Furthermore, “the 
institutionalization of public-supported education” virtually enhances educational 
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equality and university enrollment (Grusky, 1983: 495; Lin and Yauger, 1975: 545). 
Given both, industrialization strengthens educational aspirations and status returns, 
and weakens the reliance on financial support and status transmission from families. 
 
To summarize, as Grusky (1983: 503) observed simply, “status returns to human 
capital are conditioned by the structural context within which the individual is 
located”. Nonetheless, although well established, most of the empirical observations 
specified above fail to adequately explain why education leads to higher positions in 
the opportunity structure. To answer this question, both economists and sociologists 
have generally focused on the competing and somewhat overlapping theories from 
two perspectives (Bills, 1988: 52-53, 2003: 443-456). First, education is assumed to 
be commensurate with the job-specific skills and productive performance (Spilerman 
and Lunde, 1991: 692-696). It can be legitimately and rationally rewarded in the 
workplace (Shambaugh, 2001: 110). Human capital theory postulates that general 
skills and abilities can be transferred to specialized expertise on the basis of 
trainability and rational choices (Becker, 1994: 19-20; Blossfeld, 1986: 211). The 
control theory emphasizes the crucial role of schools in training and preparing 
students for future job specification and requirements. Rather, cultural capital 
theory is concerned with interpersonal competence and social skills derived from 
educational experience (Bills, 2003: 451).  
 
Second, given the information asymmetry and uncertainty in the labor market (Bian 
and Huang, 2009: 257-258), educational attainment can function as “a screening 
device” of expected qualities for employers or “a signal” of capabilities for 
employees, as explicitly portrayed in the screening, signaling and filtering theories 
(Bills, 2003: 445-448; Hurley and Sonnenfeld, 1998: 174-175; Kerckhoff, Raudenbush 
and Glennie, 2001: 2; Sheridan, Slocum, Jr., and Buda, 1997: 374). This statement 
prevails particularly in the job seeking and recruitment process, where the actual 
abilities and on-the-job performance are unavailable. Once the actual performance 
records are accessible, the credentialist theory posits that employers can adjust and 
reward job-person matches (Sheridan, Slocum & Buda, 1997: 374). Regardless of the 
school learning, the institutional and chartering theories, instead, stress that 
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educational degrees or qualifications legitimize the job-assignment decisions (Bills, 
2003: 451-452). Central to this statement is the standardized educational allocation 
dynamics (Bills, 2003: 451). In this sense, education is an efficient selection criterion 
in the filtering process. The above insight will be exploited when developing the 
hypotheses about elite mobility later in this chapter.  
 
Consequently, the career literature pertaining to education is abundant. The linkage 
between education and career mobility is dynamic and complex. The above 
literature has reached a consensus on education as a salient antecedent of 
occupational standings. For the purpose of this thesis, the proposed promotion 
model will reexamine the role of education by studying the effect of education on 
political upward mobility and the changes in this effect over different career stages 
and across different historical periods.  
 
2.1.2 Work Experience in Career Mobility 
 
In principle, work experience bears a positive correlation to career mobility 
outcomes in numerous literature. To operationalize, it can be measured by the 
indicators of years of work experience (Forret and Dougherty, 2004; Metz and 
Tharenou, 2001; Stroh, Brett and Reilly, 1992; Whitely and Coetsier, 1993), 
organizational seniority (Bamberger, Admati-Dvir and Harel, 1995; Judge et al., 1994; 
Nkomo and Cox, Jr., 1989, 1990), job duration (Cao, 2001; Ng et al., 2005), prior 
positions (Bian, 1994a; Nkomo and Cox, Jr., 1989, 1990) and prior management 
experience (Erickson, 2001). By distinguishing line and staff positions, employees in 
line positions tend to directly contribute to organizational goals and objective 
performance through functional workflows and marketing services (Nkomo and Cox, 
Jr., 1990: 43-44). As a result, work experience in line positions improves the 
likelihood of promotions (Nkomo and Cox, Jr., 1990: 48-50; Whitely and Coetsier, 
1993: 431). In the study of 676 MBA degree holders in the United States, Schneer 
and Reitman (1997: 414) identify early career interruption as detrimental for mid-
career paths because it can be viewed as lack of “organizational commitment or 
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personal ability”. All evidence in a limited sense supports the crucial importance of 
work experience. Yet it remains unresolved how the historical and cumulative effects 
of career histories operate in the mobility analysis.  
 
Rosenbaum (1979a, 1979b) conceptualizes the tournament model, arguing whether 
early work experience affects later career success. Central to this conceptual 
framework is the reliability of work histories and path dependence for career 
progress. The underlying reasoning is that work experience is closely related to the 
prior socialization, professional training experience and managerial potential, 
combined with discernible performance records (Forbes, 1987: 112-113; 
Rosenbaum, 1979b: 222). Work experience, particularly the timing of promotions, 
signals occupationally relevant skills and productivity. The current position and early 
career success to some degree can promote the employees’ exposure to the 
decision makers (Dreher and Bretz, Jr., 1991: 393; Forbes, 1987: 112-113). Thus, it is 
hypothesized that employees receiving early career success are permitted to 
compete for higher statuses along the career ladder.  
 
To empirically verify this hypothesis, Rosenbaum (1979b), studying 13-year 
longitudinal data from a large corporation, traced level mobility in 1962, 1965, 1969, 
1972 and 1975. He found that promotions in every early career significantly 
improved career futures and led to higher career ceilings and career floors. Career 
outcomes benefit more from early than later promotions because the losers in the 
early competitions are more likely to be eliminated from the successive career 
contests. Furthermore, Rosenbaum notes that early career progress and positions do 
not necessarily guarantee later promotions. The tournament model rigorously 
supports the signaling effect of work experience, although the relationships 
presented in the model are noncausal analysis (Rosenbaum, 1979b: 225, 237).  
 
In line with Rosenbaum’s analytical framework, Forbes (1987) reexamines the 
degree of enduring effects of early career movement. Such signals are taken into 
account as early career attainment, functional background and number of different 
jobs. Firstly, the recent positions yield strong predictive power for final career 
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success. Inconsistent with the tournament model, early career experience by no 
means has enduring effects on later career mobility (Forbes, 1987: 121; Ishida, Su 
and Spilerman, 2002: 192). Forbes (1987: 122) argues that the deviation of career 
patterns between two studies is due to the differences in economic conditions and 
business strategies. The enduring effects of early promotions are probably in the 
stable, other than fast-changing, environment. Secondly, in terms of functional 
background, technical skills are essential for core values in organizational strategies 
and competitive advantages in the oil company under study. Technical employees, 
however, tend to move slowly into managerial positions because it generally takes 
longer for them to express technical capabilities and managerial expertise. Thus, 
administrative incumbents are overrepresented in the lower management levels, 
whereas those from technical entry positions have better promotion chances in the 
later stages. Finally, final occupational attainment is positively contingent upon the 
number of different jobs as a result of the breadths of experience and networking 
(Forbes, 1987: 113). After recognizing the observed contribution of technical entry 
positions and job diversity, this analysis merely provides limited evidence for the 
tournament model. Alternatively, it better responds to the concept of horse race, 
where later position outweighs early position for career prospects.  
 
Sheridan et al. (1990) extend the above discussion by considering the influence of 
trainee programs and the power of functional departments on career trajectories. It 
is necessary to indicate that this study focuses on how fast managers move along the 
organizational hierarchy. As specified in the research findings, management trainees 
have fast upward mobility. In contrast, slow career starters will stay longer in the 
same positions.  Managers from powerful functional departments are more likely to 
move to another department with high power. They are inclined to advance their 
careers on a fast track. It can be inferred that starting careers as trainees or assigning 
to a core department enables employees to be rapidly socialized within 
organizations (Sheridan et al., 1990: 581, 583). In the regular interactions with upper 
echelons, they have better chances to expose technical abilities, efforts and 
potentials (Sheridan et al., 1990: 579). The socialization strategy is in accordance 
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with organizational cultures as well as practices of investment in human resources 
and networking.  
 
In conclusion, the tournament model provides constructive implications for studying 
pathways to higher status. The signaling role of work histories is well observed. 
Nevertheless, it remains ambiguous as to how every past success in the long run 
associates with later career attainment. In this vein, work experience comprises such 
multiple dimensions as years of public service experience, main career patterns and 
specific functional background in education/cultural activities, manufacturing, 
finance, military, police/court, and so on. This thesis will focus on public service 
seniority and evaluate its impact on political career advancement.  
 
2.1.3 Summary of Human Capital 
 
As previously highlighted, the current literature stresses the dramatic evidence of 
education and work experience in analyzing career mobility outcomes. The pervasive 
statement is that both indicators yield signaling effects and effectively reinforce the 
promotion rates. As formulated by Bills (1988: 58), “educational credentials enhance 
careers most directly by getting people through organizational gates and onto 
organizational ladders”. Yet the advantaged positions in opportunity structures are 
partially shaped by instrumental relations. Specifically, social resources from alumni 
and university networks vigorously exist in the school-work transitions (Ishida, 
Spilerman and Su, 1997: 867-868). Individuals possibly obtain higher occupational 
status and prestige if they can approach potential helpers and seek developmental 
assistance. As noted in Section 2.1.2, working in the corporate headquarters or 
fundamental departments with power will lead to higher visibility to decision 
makers, information advantages or even the inclusion of strategic networks. In this 
respect, occupational returns to human capital may be exaggerated if the influence 
of social resources or interpersonal relationships is overlooked. Accordingly, this 
chapter will continue to address the extent to which social capital affects career 
 
 
40 
outcomes in Section 2.2. Section 2.3 will specify the core intellectual puzzles of 
human and social capital in career mobility studies.  
 
2.2 Social Capital Affecting Career Mobility Outcomes 
 
The flourishing literature on social capital coherently links the macro- and micro-
level exploration of career mobility from social networking perspective.  The concept 
of social capital emphasizes “resources embedded in social networks” and 
instrumental consequences (Borgatti, Jones and Everett, 1998: 27-28; Bourdieu, 
1986: 51; Burt, 1998: 7, 2000: 347-348, 2001: 32; Coleman, 1988: 98; Lin, 1999a: 29, 
1999b: 467-468, 2000: 786; Lin, Fu and Hsung, 2001: 58; Lin et al., 2009: 226; Portes, 
1998: 6, 2000: 2; Putnam, 2001: 41; Schuller, Baron and Field, 2000: 1; Sobel, 2002: 
139). It has directed the focus of analysis from personal resources derived from 
human capital towards interpersonal relationships and network resources (Lin, 
1999b: 468; Lin et al., 2009: 228-229; Metz and Tharenou, 2001: 313). The 
theoretical underpinning and empirical evidence of social capital have scattered 
across arguments of Granovetter’s (1973, 1983; 1995) strength of weak ties, Lin’s 
(1999a, 1999b, 2001) social resources and Burt’s (1992) structural holes. Before 
reviewing this significant literature, it is first of all important to address a basic 
question: why does social capital affect mobility outcomes? 
 
First, in view of information asymmetry, social capital produces information 
advantages in the process of job matching (Coleman, 1988: 104; Jia, Kudamatsu & 
Seim, 2015; Lin, 1999a: 30-31; McDonald, Lin and Ao, 2009: 387-388; Seibert, 
Kraimer and Liden, 2001: 230; Simon and Warner, 1992: 306-307). It can improve the 
efficiency of information dissemination in the web of social contacts. It can 
effectively reduce uncertainty and the risk of counterselection, by verifying the 
accuracy and reliability of information (Burt, 2000: 353-354; Marsden, 2001: 107-
109). Second, influences from social connections result in expected occupational 
returns. Future employers of the organizations or the potential helpers may get 
acquainted with a specific job applicant through kin ties, friends, work colleague and 
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the like (Bian, 1994a: 994). They learn the applicant’s educational background, 
abilities and occupational aspirations from contact persons’ detailed introduction. In 
this way, social capital affects screening or selection results. Finally, social 
interactions enhance expressive support and psychosocial functions, such as 
trustworthiness, recognition, mutual reciprocity as well as self- and group identity 
(Coleman, 1988: 102-104; Dominguez and Watkins, 2003: 112-114; Putnam, 2001). 
Individuals are entitled to access to the embedded resources by virtue of “social 
credentials” (Lin, 1999a: 31, 2001: 20). Given the foregoing explanations as to the 
functioning of social capital, the differences in the subsequent arguments lie in the 
sources of social capital and the way in which it ultimately operates in career 
determination.  
 
2.2.1 Strength of Weak Ties 
 
Granovetter (1973:1361-1363) distinguishes strong and weak ties by identifying “the 
amount of time, the emotional intensity, the intimacy (mutual confiding), and the 
reciprocal services which characterize the tie” (Lin, Ensel and Vaughn, 1981: 394). 
Weak ties generally refer to the infrequent social interactions with lower degree of 
intensity and intimacy. The advantages of weak ties over strong ties arise from the 
information and influence accessible. The major reason is that weak ties extensively 
generate nonredundant information and influence by bridging across wide-ranging 
and disconnected networks (Campbell, Marsden and Hurlbert, 1986: 98; 
Granovetter, 1983: 203). In sharp contrast, strong ties connect individuals with 
homogeneous attributes. They tend to provide redundant information and limited 
influence from dense and overlapped social circles (Granovetter, 2005: 34-35).  
 
Mixed evidence is provided in terms of information transmission and the efficacy of 
weak ties. Murray, Rankin and Magill (1981: 122-123), for example, acknowledge the 
broader sources of information for weak ties. On this basis, they study the actual 
utilization of information after questioning that the weak tie argument solely rests 
upon information acquisition. They conceive of strong ties, other than weak ties, as 
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the prevailing sources of pertinent information to be used. It is mainly because 
strong ties maintain stable mutual trust and reciprocal relationships (Bian and Ang, 
1997: 983). Furthermore, the influence of weak ties on career outcomes is 
marginally disputed. Weak ties are expected to enhance the reachability of diverse 
positions in occupational structures (Lin and Dumin, 1986: 377-379). In the labor 
markets of German Democratic Republic (GDR) and Russia, weak ties, in particular 
acquaintances, are more pronounced in finding jobs (Yakubovich, 2005: 416), or 
even obtaining highly prestigious positions (Volker and Flap, 1999: 26-27). 
Nonetheless, Marsden and Hurlbert (1988: 1047) claim that weak ties yield 
insignificant effects on occupational prestige. 
 
Given the inconsistent empirical results, skepticism stems from the oversimplified 
dichotomy of strong and weak ties. It is argued that the existing investigation of 
weak ties overlooks prior job statuses and multifaceted social ties.  Wegener (1991: 
64) conducts a factor analysis and classifies social ties into intimate, formality and 
leisure focus. It is assumed that the strength of social ties operates differently for 
individuals with distinctive prior job prestige. Wegener (1991: 68) observes that low-
status job seekers have more reliance on strong intimate ties for prestigious 
occupations, for they have limited social relations and the potential helpers of high 
prestige are mostly within-network. In comparison, high-status job seekers, who can 
reach beyond a wide variety of social networks, will benefit more from weak 
intimate ties and formal relationships with contact persons (Wegener, 1991: 68-69).  
 
As this thesis centers on elite mobility of Chinese provincial leaders, the detailed 
statistical data of social capital will be primarily drawn from leadership biographies. 
Given the limited data sources, it is impractical to delineate such social connections 
as family, relatives, friends and acquaintances for each political elite. Neither is the 
assessment of strong or weak ties possible by studying the birthplace, educational 
experience and career trajectories. Therefore, the strength of social ties in this thesis 
will not be investigated when constructing the analytical model. 
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To look into the complex career dynamics, more research efforts have been devoted 
to social resources, such as socioeconomic status of social contacts (Bian, 1994a; 
Bian and Ang, 1997; Bian and Huang, 2009; Lin, 1999a, 1999b; Lin, Ensel and Vaughn, 
1981). This perspective moves beyond the one-to-one interpersonal relationships in 
the weak tie argument and instead points to networks as resources. As stated in the 
provocative work of Lin, Ensel and Vaughn (1981: 396), the direct linkage between 
weak ties and occupational status is challenged (Lin, 2001: 94). It suggests that the 
use of weak ties is indirectly linked to occupational attainment through the 
mediating variable of contacts’ statuses (Campbell, Marsden and Hurlbert, 1986: 98-
99). The next section will proceed with a more explicit analysis of social resources 
theory. 
 
2.2.2 Social Resources Theory 
 
Granovetter’s weak tie argument fundamentally focuses on the nature of social ties 
by which individuals connect with contact persons. Social resources theory extends 
this argument to the examination of macro-social structures and the family-school-
work transitions in a more comprehensive way (Lin, 1999b: 470, 2001: 94-95). Lin 
(1999a: 35; 2001: 82-83) defines social capital as “resources embedded in social 
structure which are accessed and/or mobilized in purposive actions”. In the basic 
social capital model of status attainment (Lin, 2001: 83), a variety of possible paths 
to attained statuses exist in two major processes, involving access to and 
mobilization of social capital. The following analysis will reflect the general paths 
relevant to original statuses, network resources and career outcomes.   
 
One of the empirical questions to be addressed is who are more likely to access to 
and mobilize social resources. To answer this question, researchers turn to 
education and initial statuses in the forms of family origins, prior jobs and income 
(Lin, 2001: 82). The underlying assumption is the homophily principle, that is, similar 
people are more likely to become friends (Ibarra, 1997: 92-93). Individuals with 
homophilous socioeconomic standings or demographic characteristics are well 
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integrated into the same network (Lin and Ao, 2008; Marsden and Hurlbert, 1988: 
1054). For instance, men tend to use the same-sex contacts in the job-searching 
process and in turn obtain male-dominant occupations (Straits, 1998: 201). The 
foregoing assumption has been confirmed in a series of empirical examinations. 
Initial statuses or educational attainment are positively related to the network size 
(Campbell, Marsden and Hurlbert, 1986: 108-109), network centrality (Brass, 1985: 
335-336), resources diversity (Lin and Ao, 2008), reachability (Lin and Dunmin, 1986: 
375-376) and higher status of contact persons (Lin and Dumin, 1986: 375-376; Lin, 
Ensel and Vaughn, 1981: 400-401; Marsden and Hurlbert, 1988: 1046; Volker and 
Flap, 1999: 29).  
 
The above formulations are organized around original statuses and social resources. 
An alternative path to be discussed here is more straightforward, directly linking 
network resources to attained statuses. Network resources are disaggregated into 
instrumental and expressive resources (Bozionelos, 2003: 45-46, 2008: 252; 
Bozionelos and Wang, 2006: 1532). The former emphasizes the potentially career-
related assistance in upward mobility and the latter focuses on the social-emotional 
support. Bozionelos conducted two surveys of 264 white-collar workers from three 
British universities and 316 MBA students from a British business school. Both 
studies confirm that either extrinsic or intrinsic career success is attributed to 
network resources (Bozionelos, 2003: 57, 2008: 259). More importantly, 
instrumental network resources are advantaged over expressive resources in 
predicting current organizational grades because of the differentiated functions of 
both resources (Bozionelos, 2003: 54).  
 
For the purpose of this thesis, the central interest is focused on career competitions 
of political players in Chinese authority structures that are unquestionably 
hierarchical. Under this condition, the analysis of social resources in the networking 
fashion predictably fits well into the theoretical framework in this thesis, because 
social resources theory assumes social structures as pyramidal in terms of rank-order 
locations, authority, power and the like (Lin, 1999b: 470; 2001: 56-57). To 
operationalize, the systematic information as to network compositions is readily 
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available on the work-history basis. The variables of network size, network diversity 
and upper reachability5 will be incorporated into the social capital analysis later.  
 
Overall, to analyze competitive success in the stages of job seeking, changing or 
promotions, the weak tie argument clarifies the impact of strength of social ties. 
Social resources theory focuses on network characteristics and prestige of both 
players. As indicated by Burt (1992: 4), “competition is a matter of relation, not 
player attributes”. He argues that competitive advantages are based on the network 
structures and the network locations of social contacts. In this way, the research 
interest is shifted away from network locations of egos in social resources theory. 
The following section will move to the literature on structural hole argument, 
examining structural constraints and entrepreneurial opportunities from a broader 
network perspective.  
 
2.2.3 Structural Hole Argument 
 
Burt (1992: 27-30) grounds the creation of social capital in structural holes that 
bridge and broker across disconnected social contacts or cliques (Podolny and Baron, 
1997: 674; Xiao and Tsui, 2007: 1). He expands the knowledge of social networks by 
considering weak ties as “a correlate, not a cause” of information benefits (Burt, 
1992: 27). As stated in Section 2.2.1, weak ties are advantaged over strong ties in 
providing nonredundant information. However, Burt argues that it is social networks 
                                                        
5 The measurement of network-related variables focuses on social networks that are 
knitted in the workplace. Network size is evaluated via the number of social 
networks reachable across different places, organizations, divisions or departments. 
Network diversity is assessed regarding how many career patterns the provincial 
leaders have worked, such as budgeting lines and party lines. Upper Reachability is 
defined as “the resource of an uppermost position ego can reach in the hierarchical 
structure through social ties” (Lin, 2001: 62). In the China-specific study, the criterion 
of upper reachability exclusively reflects the uppermost administrative level the 
provincial leader can access to. 
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rich in structural holes that generate information and control benefits irrespective of 
tie strength6 (Granovetter, 2005: 35; Podolny and Baron, 1997: 674-675).  
 
Information benefits are derived from “access, timing and referrals” (Breiger, 1995: 
127-128; Burt, 1992: 14). By spanning structural holes, there are varied information 
sources from a diversity of social connections. Among them, the authoritative source 
is readily accessible from which accurate information is disseminated. In terms of 
timing, information flows efficiently over structural holes. Personal contacts in social 
networks may be aware of specific changes earlier or in the timely way. The early 
warning allows for adequate preparations for available strategies or rational 
investment (Burt, 1992: 14). The referrals from decision makers or highly prestigious 
contact persons are more persuasive and legitimate. Burt (2001: 39-45) provides 
network evidence of managers from five prior studies and empirically confirms the 
advantages of structural holes.  In other words, beyond-group structural holes are 
indeed accompanied with the diversity of information, influence and resources 
(Gabbay and Zuckerman, 1998: 212-213). For control benefits, Burt (1992: 30-31, 
2001: 36) points to the bargaining power for brokers between conflicting demands in 
social networks, which is labeled as tertius gaudens. Because of chasm and tension, 
both players heavily depend on the tertius for favorable negotiation results. Thus, 
the tertius has control benefits in this competitive arena. By virtue of information 
and control benefits, social networks rich in structural holes are expected to induce 
more rewarding opportunities (Burt, 2000: 358-362, 2001: 41-45; Tharenou, 1999a: 
112-113).  
 
The relevant research endeavors to explain who ultimately succeeds by studying the 
correlation between structural holes and rewarding opportunities. The structural 
hole argument postulates higher occupational returns for individuals with social 
networks rich in structural holes. According to the information and control benefits, 
these players are presumed to acquire job-related information faster and earlier 
(Fernandez and Weinberg, 1997: 899). They are highly responsive to job vacancies 
                                                        
6 Burt (1992: 18) defines structural holes as “the separation between nonredunant 
contacts” and exclusively focuses on network benefits arising from disconnection.  
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and selection procedures. They are aware of when and how to submit job 
applications (Fernandez and Weinberg, 1997: 891). They have better chances to 
secure visibility to decision makers and display desirable qualities. To empirically 
examine the above articulation, Burt (1992: 118-140) studied social networks and 
promotion dynamics of 284 top managers from a largest high-technology firm in the 
United States. It is illustrated that managers positioned in networks rich in structural 
holes are more likely to advance their careers early and fast (Burt, 1997a: 367-368; 
Podolny and Baron, 1997: 684-687). This argument is generalized to the comparative 
study of the United States and France, and is consistently supported (Burt, Hogarth 
and Michaud, 2000: 133).  
 
To summarize, the structural hole argument moves beyond the egocentric 
perspective in analyzing competitive advantages for individual players. Not only is 
the strategy for career success “who you are”, “what you know”, “where you are 
located within networks” and “how you are connected with contacts”, but also “how 
your social contacts are connected”. In this regard, the construct of structural holes 
plays a far-reaching role in the research community. Further merits of the structural 
hole argument are derived from the discussion on promotion mechanisms, because 
most career studies are confined to status, income attainment or job-seeking 
outcomes (Podolny and Baron, 1997: 673).  In studying the hole effect on upward 
mobility, structural holes display “the structure of the group’s relationships to 
outsiders”, analyzing relation duration, frequency of interactions or emotional 
intensity between contact persons (Borgatti, Jones and Everett, 1998: 29; Burt, 1992: 
19, 1997a: 361). In this thesis, data limitations arising from the leadership 
biographies potentially undermine the measurement of nonredundancy of social 
contacts in elites’ networks. Thus, The association between structural holes and 
political mobility outcomes will not be exploited when structuring the career model 
and hypotheses later.  
 
2.2.4 Summary of Social Capital  
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The significant literature under review has remarkably represented spectacular 
mainstreams in social capital theory.  These mainstream arguments substantially 
delineate how social capital is created and rewarded for career success. The 
emphasis is placed on information, influence and control benefits. How are these 
benefits realized? The weak tie argument provides the initial answer by emphasizing 
the strength of social ties regardless of personal resources. The social resources 
theory primarily relies on networks where resources are embedded and the personal 
resources possessed by contact persons. The structural hole argument is interested 
in the way in which social contacts are interconnected. As summarized by Seibert, 
Kraimer and Liden (2001: 221), “weak tie theory and structural hole theory each 
focuses on the structure of a network; social resources theory focuses on content of 
a network”. Despite the variations in explaining how social capital is generated, 
these arguments have inevitably reached a consensus, that is, social capital works in 
achieving career success (Gerber and Mayorova, 2010: 900).  
 
After reviewing the bulk of literature pertaining to human capital and social capital in 
career mobility, Section 2.3 will point out three research gaps. On this basis, the 
research hypotheses will be proposed in Section 2.4 and tested by the promotion 
models developed in Chapter 8.  
 
2.3 Human Capital and Social Capital in Career Mobility: Research Gaps 
 
To summarize the preceding accounts of human and social capital, both significantly 
determine career mobility outcomes in independent studies. Social capital is viewed 
as “the contextual complement to human capital” (Burt, 1998: 7, 2001: 32). As Burt 
(1997b: 339) states, “while human capital refers to individual ability, social capital 
refers to opportunity”. The reasoning of varying perspectives behind either human 
or social capital theory is fundamentally similar. Human capital primarily exhibits the 
effects of screening and gatekeeping. Social capital is virtually linked to information 
and influence benefits. However, to apply either construct to career mobility 
models, some basic issues remain unresolved.  
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First, the empirical studies of human capital and social capital in leadership selection 
and promotion for political elites are scant in the current literature. Given the 
prevalence of status attainment studies, the data are primarily drawn from adult or 
employed populations with heterogeneous background across distinct industries and 
organizations (Bian, 1994a, 1997; Zhou, Tuma and Moen, 1996, 1997; Bian and Ang, 
1997; Walder, Li and Treiman, 2000; Cao, 2001; Li and Walder, 2001; Zhou, 2001; 
Zhao and Zhou, 2004; Cao and Hu, 2007; Bian and Huang, 2009; Lin et al., 2009). 
Only a line of promotion studies is generally concentrated on life and work histories 
of managers. Elite composition is characterized by greater homogeneity of human or 
social capital (Jackson et al., 1991: 682-683). For instance, as education may be a 
well-defined and baseline criterion for leadership selection, elites are 
overwhelmingly well educated. Upper echelons are inclined to   interact with and 
recruit new team members of personal similarity, as formulated in the similarity-
attraction paradigm (Schaubroeck and Lam, 2002: 1121; Tsui and O’Reilly, 1989: 403-
405; Turban and Jones, 1988: 228-229). With comparison of these two lines of 
literature, a critical question arises as to the possible differences in career rewards 
for either capital between general populations and elites, particularly political elites. 
In this thesis, the analysis will be grounded in the data of Chinese political elites who 
are disproportionately college graduates and party members. This provides a sound 
basis for comparing career returns to human capital and social capital for political 
leaders with those for general citizens in the future research.   
 
Second, there are few empirical studies regarding how the effect of human capital 
and social capital on promotion changes over different career stages. The existing 
literature predominately focuses on status attainment in the job-matching process 
or the early promotion outcomes, other than intra-organizational mobility dynamics 
(Podolny and Baron, 1997: 673; Rosenbaum, 1979a: 22; Spell and Blum, 2000: 299). 
Most studies fall in line with a static or semi-static approach, viewing the aggregate 
human or social capital as relatively stable or employing cross-sectional data from a 
time-constant perspective (Blossfeld, 1986: 209). The lack of mobility investigations 
leads to neglect of changes in the investment of both types of capital, especially the 
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changes in the amount of social resources after college graduation. Another problem 
is whether human or social capital maintains the same occupational returns after 
entry or early promotions (Sheridan et al., 1990: 589-591).  
 
Last but not least, the interplay of human and social capital for career success is 
inadequately investigated. In social resources theory, the correlative relation 
between the two is preliminarily discussed, by understanding the effects of prior 
statuses, education and social resources on destinations positions. This implies that 
human capital could be transformed into social capital (Bian, 1994a; De Graaf and 
Flap, 1988; Lin, 1999b, 2001; Lin, Vaughn and Ensel, 1981; Marsden and Hurlbert, 
1988). It is far more complicated to place both types of capital in a single study to 
analyze career outcomes. For example, how does human and social capital 
interrelate in the process of career mobility (Tharenou, 1999a: 113)? The fact is that 
scarce evidence is available to address this important question.  
 
Lin and Huang (2005: 194-195) present two models pertaining to the correlation 
between human and social capital. They are the meditation model in the first place 
and the moderation model in the second. As for the mediation model, human capital 
is presumably converted into social capital. As specified in Section 2.1, the diversity 
in educational and work experience can span across different social networks. The 
investment in human capital signifies knowledge, professional skills and abilities.  
Individuals with high human capital are more likely to connect with supervisors or 
peers by providing counseling, coaching and assistance (Lin and Huang, 2005: 195). 
Alternatively, in the moderation model, individuals positioned in the network 
centrality are advantaged in opportunities to display their abilities and potentials, as 
compared to those in peripheral locations. Therefore, social capital derived from 
strategic network positions is expected to result in higher career returns to the 
equivalent human capital.  
 
By studying approximately 112 employees from financial institutions in Taiwan, Lin 
and Huang lend support to the mediation model. Social capital mediates the linkage 
of developmental potential to managerial rank and tenure. Friedman and Krackhardt 
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(1997: 327) in another study indicate that occupational return to education is 
mediated by network centrality for European Americans at the computer service 
division. Given the above-cited studies, the measurement of social capital and career 
mobility is similar. Career mobility is measured by the subjective evaluation of 
developmental potentials, whereas social capital focuses on network centrality. 
Although the above studies have provided initial and limited evidence on the 
mediation model, this research question still deserves further exploration in the 
future research, as indicated in Chapter 9. 
 
As a consequence, this thesis attempts to fill the first two research gaps and leave 
the third issue unresolved for the future research. For this purpose, the following 
section will return to the specific research questions, which has been already noted 
in Chapter 1. For example, how is human capital or social capital rewarded in upward 
mobility for provincial leaders in China? How does the role of human capital or social 
capital in the promotion dynamics change across different administrative ranks 
within the political hierarchy?  
 
2.4 Theoretical Framework and Research Hypotheses 
 
The past career mobility research provides optimistic answers to the vital role of 
human capital and social capital. The central issues to be addressed in this thesis are 
concerned with the career returns to either capital exclusively in political upward 
mobility and the possible variation in these returns across administrative ranks. To 
seek the answers to these issues, this section therefore proceeds to develop the 
theoretical framework. It proposes the research hypotheses for an independent 
study of the promotion rewards for either capital in elite selection and mobility 
models. To operationalize, human capital is measured by educational levels, 
academic majors and public service seniority for political elites. In view of scarce 
empirical data on social capital of Chinese elites, this thesis examines access to 
instead of mobilization of social capital.  The indicators comprise network size, 
network diversity and upper reachability as specified in Section 2.2.2. The 
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operational definitions and measurement of all these variables will be formulated in 
Chapter 3.  
 
For either human capital or social capital, the hypotheses are generally structured 
along four dimensions in Figure 2, which will be again specified at the beginning of 
Chapter 8. First, Hypothesis H1a, H1e, H1f and H2a are interested in the effect of 
either capital on promotion as a whole, regardless of the specific career stage over 
which the promotion occurs. Second, the overall effect of either capital is further 
studied by comparing the overall promotion models across different historical 
periods in Hypothesis H1b, H1e, H1f and H2b. Third, special attention is given to the 
inter-rank variations in the payoffs of either capital in the promotion dynamics in 
Hypothesis H1c, H1e, H1f and H2c. Finally, Hypothesis H1d and H2d undertake a 
historical comparison of the role of either capital in the rank-specific promotion 
dynamics before the Jiang period, under Jiang and under Hu.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2 Theoretical Framework and Research Hypotheses 
 
PROMOTION DYNAMIC MODELS 
H1: HUMAN CAPITAL IN 
PROMOTION DYNAMICS 
 Educational Levels 
 Academic Majors 
 Public Service Seniority 
H2: SOCIAL CAPITAL IN 
PROMOTION DYNAMICS 
 Network Size 
 Network Diversity 
 Upper Reachability 
FOUR DIMENSIONS 
 The Overall Effect 
 The Overall Effect across Historical Periods 
 The Rank-Specific Promotion Dynamics 
 The Rank-Specific Promotion Dynamics 
across Historical Periods 
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2.4.1 Human Capital in Promotion Dynamics  
 
Section 2.1 has explained why human capital affects career mobility and provided 
substantial empirical evidence. The primary reason is rooted in the signaling and 
filtering effects. The rationale of human capital can be readily applied to the Chinese 
elite mobility. Since the Deng era, meritocratic criteria have increasingly conformed 
to the advocates of industrialization and economic orientation (Walder, 1995: 311; 
Zang, 2001: 190-191). In the Chinese state-level cadre recruitment in 20127, all the 
target positions within party systems or government divisions are open to the 
candidates graduated from some college or above. The graduates from some college 
are eligible to apply for 1,105 positions, approximately 10.5% of all the target 
positions. The positions available to undergraduate degree holders comprise a major 
share, amounting to 84.6%. As for those awarded master or doctoral degrees, the 
proportions of vacant positions open are 66.8% and 56.4%, respectively. In addition 
to education credentials, there has been a trend of persistent emphasis on work 
experience, in particular two-year grassroots experience. In 2012 cadre selection, 
previous career experience is an essential requirement in 18.3% out of 10,486 
positions, as compared to the proportions of 19.7% in 2011 and 18.2% in 2010. The 
above statistics illuminate the preeminence of college education, coupled with an 
increasing value of past occupational attainment.  
 
Apart from the recruitment mechanisms for political elites, it is instructive to take 
insight into the elite composition along party apparatus and governmental 
bureaucracy across varying levels. At the central level, there is a dramatic rise in 
college-educated full and alternate members from the 8th to 18th Central Committee 
(CC), with exceptions of the political turmoil during the CR (Li and Bachman, 1989: 
74; Li and White, 1988: 379, 1998: 248, 2003: 578, 580; Zang, 1993: 796). Since the 
15th CC, members receiving college education or above have constituted over 90% of 
                                                        
7 The 2012 guidance of job vacancies and application procedures for state-level 
cadre recruitment was published on 13th October 2011. The technical support unit 
and the editorial board of National Civil Service Exam analyzed the cadre selection 
criteria. The website for statistical data available is National Civil Service Network: 
http://www.gjgwy.org/2011/1014/21114.html [18th July 2012].  
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the leadership groups. Similar to the central leadership characteristics, elite positions 
at both the provincial and the municipal levels are increasingly occupied by the 
highly educated political leaders (Bo, 2002: 51-52; Chen, 1998: 682-683; Li and 
Bachman, 1989: 74, 77-78; Zang, 1991b: 518, 520). 
 
Alongside the predominance of college-educated political elites, only a small body of 
empirical research turns to ask to what extent college education affects elite 
mobility. For instance, Zhou, Tuma and Moen (1996: 781) indicate that college 
education increases the odds of assuming professional occupations and entering into 
public organizations across historical periods from 1949 to 1993 (also see Walder’s 
(1995: 322-323) analysis based on 1986 Tianjin Survey)8. Likewise, the baseline 
argument of dual career paths in China implies that education is more pronounced 
for attaining professional careers (Walder, 1995: 318-319; Walder, Li and Treiman, 
2000: 199; Zang, 2001: 194). Besides, college education has become a significant 
predictor of recruitment into and job shifts in governments since 1980, when the 
cadre selection policies increasingly favored educational achievements (Zhou, Tuma 
and Moen, 1996: 780-781, 1997: 355). It also functions as a powerful and positive 
predictor in political competitions (Lin, 2012; Shih, Adolph & Liu, 2012). In the study 
of 906 political elites, Zang (2001: 198-200) states that educational credentials are 
salient vehicles to select qualified government administrators. Besides, receiving 
college education effectively facilitates upward mobility within the CCP hierarchy.  
 
Despite the close linkage between educational levels and elite recruitment and 
promotion as analyzed above, it is expected that the contribution of educational 
levels to promotion opportunities persist across administrative ranks within the 
political hierarchy. This primarily results from the continuing emphasis on higher 
                                                        
8 Zhou, Tuma and Moen (1996, 1997) categorize organization types into government 
agencies, public organizations, state-owned firms, collective firms, private firms and 
hybrid firms, and village in rural areas. Public organizations, or shiye danwei (事业单
位) are defined as “nonprofit organizations in the public domain; not administrative 
organs of the state but usually closely linked to the central government or local 
bureaucracies” (Zhou, Tuma and Moen, 1997: 347).  
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education in leadership selection and the allocation of education and career 
opportunity under party sponsorship. As will be stated in Chapter 5, the attainment 
of higher education has been increasingly underlined in the regulations of cadre 
recruitment and appointment since 1995. For example, in 1995, the educational 
level of some college generally became a basic meritocratic criterion for leadership 
selection in both the party and government systems. For the most part, one of the 
prerequisites for the promotion towards the vice-provincial/ministerial level or 
above is the completion of college education. Furthermore, the educational 
requirement of college education extensively applied to the political leaders at the 
deputy-bureau/director level or above in 2002 and those assuming the full positions 
at the county level in 2006. Therefore, it is expected that educational credentials 
play a critical role in leadership selection at varying administrative ranks. Political 
leaders are highly motivated to improve their educational levels. In this context, on-
the-job educational advancement, particularly party-school education, turns out to 
be an ideal option for political leaders, which will be delineated in detail in the 
following and in Chapter 5.  
 
The preceding account has shown the notable effect of education on career 
advancement towards different administrative ranks. To go a step further, it is 
assumed that this effect differs by historical periods. The above-noted historical 
changes in the educational requirements and the growing emphasis on higher 
education provide supporting evidence for the different role of educational 
attainment in the rank-specific promotion dynamics over time.  
 
In conclusion, drawing upon the statistics from elite recruitment practices and the 
pertinent empirical studies, it can be inferred that education indeed has tremendous 
impacts on recruitment and career mobility outcomes. It is anticipated that 
educational levels are responsible for elite selection and promotion outcomes. The 
effects of educational levels endure across administrative ranks. The career rewards 
for educational levels in the rank-specific promotion dynamics change over time. On 
this basis, the hypotheses related to educational levels are proposed in the 
following.  
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H1a: Overall, educational levels are an important promotion criterion. Political 
officials with higher educational credentials are more likely to get promoted.  
H1b: Overall, educational levels are significantly associated with upward mobility 
across three historical periods.  
H1c: Educational levels are significantly associated with upward mobility across 
administrative ranks. 
H1d: The role of educational levels in the rank-specific promotion dynamics differs 
over three historical periods.  
 
Alongside educational levels, as Ishida, Spilerman and Su (1997: 869) suggest, “the 
effect of college major can be interpreted as a proxy for specialized training and 
knowledge or as an indicator of commitment to business activities and other 
noncognitive characteristics”. In China, top leadership biographies captured a 
tendency of technocratic dominance, which will be further explored in Chapter 5 (Li 
and Bachman, 1989: 75; Zang, 1993: 797; Li and White, 1998: 250-251, 2003: 581). 
At the empirical level, Chinese political leaders are interested in selecting science 
and engineering as major fields of study. In essence, this observation originates from 
the CCP’s efforts in producing highly trained specialists for national building and 
industrialization in the early 1950s. At the empirical level, Lin (2012: 105) shows that 
the effect of academic disciplines is significant on promotion chances for 264 mayors 
in 2006. Specifically, those majoring in science are more likely to get ahead than 
those trained in arts.  
 
By analyzing the elite stratification of leading cadres in 1994, Zang (2001: 200) 
observes that college graduates majoring in engineering or management tend to 
work in the government system rather than the party apparatus.  Among them, 
those from the prestigious universities are more likely to advance high in the 
government bureaucracy. As for party leaders, those studying in engineering or 
management tend to be rewarded in the career progression. In this thesis, it is 
expected that political officials studying science and engineering are distinguished 
from those trained in humanities and social sciences in the process of climbing to the 
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top. Besides, this distinction is possibly observed in the promotion dynamics across 
administrative ranks or over different historical periods.  
 
H1e: Academic majors significantly affect political upward mobility as a whole, 
across three historical periods or across administrative ranks.  
 
In the Chinese context, education and work experience are explicitly stipulated in 
the cadre recruitment guidance. Both criteria produce objective and clear-cut 
yardsticks to compare candidates’ differences, which in turn to a large extent 
reduces selectivity biases. Public service seniority can be conceived as not only a 
measure of human capital or work experience but also a dimension of time or age. It 
is well understood that political officials are positioned disadvantageously in the race 
for upward mobility if they stay on the same position or at the same rank for a long 
time. Rather, steering their careers into the fast track confers age advantages for 
political officials in Chinese politics. Therefore, the hypothesis in relation to public 
service seniority is developed as follows.  
 
H1f: Public service seniority imposes a significant impact on political upward mobility 
as a whole, across three historical periods or across administrative ranks 
 
2.4.2 Social Capital in Promotion Dynamics 
 
In order to assess the effect of social capital in political upward mobility, Section 
2.4.2, first of all, returns to the phenomenon of party patronage as discussed earlier. 
Li and Walder (2001) elaborate the influence of selection dynamics and macro-
political processes. Party monopolizes power and privileges over resource allocation 
and life chances (Cao, 2001: 686-688; Li and Walder, 2001: 1372; Walder, 1988: 88-
102, 1995: 309-310; Walder, Li and Treiman, 2000: 192-195). Early entry into party 
and cadre occupations is rewarded for adult college education under party 
 
 
58 
sponsorship systems9, which in turn drastically increases promotion rates for elite 
positions. At the central level, nine Politburo members (36%) of the 17th CC 
completed their final degrees after working10.  
 
In 2012, every province in China underwent personnel reshuffles in the Standing 
Committee of CCP. In terms of educational background, Table 1 illustrates the 
number of provincial leaders with adult education and receiving educational degrees 
in Party Schools. Out of 402 new Provincial Standing Committee members of CCP11, 
333 cases or approximately 82.84% of members attained further education after 
working in the government agencies, among which 162 members (40.30%) have 
received educational credentials in Party Schools. All the members in Guizhou, 
Ningxia and Shaanxi were awarded final educational degrees after obtaining 
administrative positions. With the exception of Liaoning, 30 provinces have over a 
                                                        
9 Adult education is defined as the alternative educational avenues to regular 
educational systems. The Chinese adult further education consists of all-level 
educations, distance education, illiterate education and Night College as well as 
training courses for adults after their first jobs (Li and Walder, 2001: 1396). In this 
thesis, adult education for political elites exclusively indicates educational 
experience after working for the sake of qualifications equivalent to formal 
educational degrees or diplomas.  
10 Nine Politburo members are respectively Xi Jinping (习近平), Wang Lequan (王乐
泉), Hui Liangyu (回良玉), Liu Yunshan (刘云山), Liu Yandong (刘延东), Li Keqiang (
李克强), Li Yuanchao (李源潮), Wang Yang (汪洋) and Guo Boxiong (郭伯雄). 
Among them, five members held educational degrees in Party School. Wang Lequan 
(王乐泉), Liu Yunshan (刘云山), Li Yuanchao (李源潮) and Wang Yang (汪洋) 
received further education after working in Central Party School, whereas Hui 
Liangyu (回良玉) studied in Jilin Provincial Party School. In terms of educational 
levels, Hui Liangyu (回良玉) and Guo Boxiong (郭伯雄) had the final degree of some 
college. Liu Yunshan (刘云山) and Wang Yang (汪洋) received adult college 
education. For a detailed account of leadership biographies, please refer to the 
website of People: http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/104019/104101/6415237.html 
[18th July, 2012]. 
11 Given the different schedules of personnel replacement among provinces, some 
provincial leadership changes occurred. Wang Sanyun was elected deputy secretary 
of Anhui provincial committee of the CCP on 30th October 2011, and later assumed 
the post of party secretary of Gansu provincial committee of the CCP on 28th April 
2012. In May 2012, Lu Jianping was removed from the post of the standing 
committee member of Hunan Provincial CCP and replaced by Xu Yousheng. In June 
2012, Cao Zhenghai, originally appointed as the standing committee member of 
Inner Mongolia CCP, became the standing committee member in Anhui.  
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half of members with adult education. The party sponsored education is not only 
characterized by studies for educational certificates or degrees, but also by training 
courses in the Party School of the CC of the CCP (hereafter, Central Party School, 中
央党校). Consider Guangdong provincial leaders as an example. Eleven out of 
thirteen members (84.6%) had adult continuing education12. For these members, six 
were graduated from Central Party School. For all the members, ten leaders have 
attended the training courses in Central Party School, among whom six took the 
courses designed for young and middle-aged cadres. As Li and Walder (2001) 
observe,  
 
“While party sponsorship produces a strong correlation between education 
and elite occupation, such a correlation cannot be interpreted as a 
straightforward indicator of meritocratic principles, for it is partially the 
result of prior political selection processes.” (pp. 1405) 
 
Table 1 Distribution by Adult Education and Educational Experience in Party Schools  
for Provincial Leaders, 2012 
Province 
Adult Education Party Schools 
N % N % 
Anhui 12 92.31 3 23.08 
Beijing 9 69.23 4 30.77 
Chongqing 9 69.23 3 23.08 
Fujian 9 69.23 3 23.08 
Gansu 12 92.31 6 46.15 
Guangdong 11 84.62 6 46.15 
Guangxi 10 76.92 3 23.08 
Guizhou 13 100.00 7 53.85 
Hainan 11 91.67 7 58.33 
Hebei 11 84.62 8 61.54 
Heilongjiang 9 69.23 4 30.77 
Henan 10 76.92 5 38.46 
Hubei 12 92.31 6 46.15 
                                                        
12 Eleven members received final master or doctoral degrees via adult education. 
Among them, Wang Yang, Zhu Xiaodan, Zhu Mingguo, Li Yumei and Huang Shanchun 
obtained college education after working in party organs or government apparatus. 
For more details, refer to the website of Xinhua Net: 
http://news.xinhuanet.com/local/2012-05/14/c_123125872.htm [18th July, 2012]. 
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Hunan 11 84.62 4 30.77 
Inner Mongolia 12 92.31 4 30.77 
Jiangsu 8 57.14 3 21.43 
Jiangxi 11 84.62 7 53.85 
Jilin 11 84.62 3 23.08 
Liaoning  6 46.15 4 30.77 
Ningxia 13 100.00 6 46.15 
Qinghai 12 85.71 9 64.29 
Shandong 9 69.23 5 38.46 
Shanghai 9 75.00 2 16.67 
Shaanxi 12 100.00 6 50.00 
Shanxi 12 92.31 4 30.77 
Sichuan 10 83.33 4 33.33 
Tianjin 10 76.92 5 38.46 
Tibet 13 86.67 7 46.67 
Xinjiang 14 93.33 8 53.33 
Yunnan 12 92.31 7 53.85 
Zhejiang 10 76.92 6 46.15 
Total 333 82.84 162 40.30 
Source: Author’s database13.  
Note: The biographies of Zhang Jiang (张江) and Zhang Lin (张林) in Liaoning 
Provincial leadership are missing.  
 
In this sense, education is strictly incompatible with the investment argument. 
Rather, it is a reward for political trustworthiness through party patronage. So is the 
practice of job transfers as training rewards in the expectation of career 
advancement. It is not the individuals with higher human capital that are considered 
getting recruited or promoted under party sponsorship. Precisely, the selected 
future political elites tend to have more training and educational chances. This 
corresponds to Turner’s (1960: 866) sponsored mobility model14.In the party-
                                                        
13  All the elite biographies come from the official website of Xinhua Net: 
http://news.xinhuanet.com/local/2012-07/04/c_123369232.htm#天津  [18th July, 
2012].  
14 In 1960, Turner developed a framework for distinguishing the contest-mobility 
dynamic in the United States and the sponsored-mobility system in Great Britain.  
Turner (1960: 857) explicitly maintains that “the governing objective of contest 
mobility is to give elite status to those who earn it, while the goal of sponsored 
mobility is to make the best use of the talents in society by sorting persons into their 
proper niches”. 
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sponsored mechanism, party leaders, particularly superiors in the workplace, 
exercise control over the allocation of developmental opportunities. Individuals are 
granted further education, periodic job rotation and promotions via superiors’ 
referrals and favorable performance evaluation (Cannings, 1988: 86). It is therefore 
beneficial to develop social connections with leaders because better superior-
subordinate relationships lead to interpersonal trust and performance satisfaction 
(Farh et al., 1998: 477).  Social interactions and networks foster information diffusion 
and subordinates’ exposure to decision makers, as articulated in Section 2.2.  
 
In job deployment systems, bureaucratic control pervaded the pre-reform China. In 
the relatively immobile society, the job-assigning authority monopolized the 
allocation of labor quotas and specific implementation (Bian, 1994a: 971-972, 1997: 
370; Bian and Ang, 1997: 985-986). The individual preferences and autonomy were 
highly restricted. Under these circumstances, a salient career strategy was to 
activate personal contacts and deliberately influence the authorities for favor 
exchanges. Since 1980, labor market and traditional state planning have overlapped 
(Bian, 2009: 178-179, 188-189). During the market transition periods, the rising 
meritocracy and declining hierarchical intervention occurred in the emerging labor 
market (Bian and Huang, 2009: 182-184). These remarkable sociopolitical 
transformations invite a significant debate, concerning whether the growing 
importance of education undermines the use of personal contacts in career mobility. 
The 1988 Tianjin job placement data illustrates that the use of guanxi (关系) 
between 1977 and 1988 was an important factor in 57% of the first-job attainment 
(Bian, 1994a: 973). Huang (2008: 481) identifies the widespread influence of guanxi 
for job-matching results in the 1990s. It is partially consequences of the eroding 
hierarchical control, the continuing information asymmetry, the lack of recruiting 
procedural rationality, and “the slow growth of market institutions” (Bian, 1994a: 
979, 986; Bian, 2009: 179; Huang, 2009: 471). As a result, the second possible 
pattern of recruitment and advancement postulates that, social capital is apparently 
predictive of career success. Besides, social capital yields a continuing influence in 
upward mobility across administrative ranks or over time.  
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H2a: Overall, social capital is an important promotion criterion and is significantly 
related to political upward mobility. 
H2b: Overall, the significant effect of social capital persists across three historical 
periods. 
H2c: The significant effect of social capital persists across administrative ranks. 
H2d: The significant effect of social capital in the rank-specific promotion dynamics 
persists across three historical periods.  
 
The subsequent chapters will proceed to draw an entire picture of provincial 
leadership transformation from 1990 to 2013 before testing the above hypotheses 
and devising an appropriate career mobility model in Chapter 8. Chapter 3 about 
methodology will specify how the data is collected and analyzed. Chapter 4 will 
describe the historical persistence and changes in provincial leadership composition 
in terms of age, gender, ethnicity, provincial origins and CCP membership. Chapter 5 
and Chapter 6 will elaborately report human capital and social capital of Chinese 
provincial leaders, respectively. On this basis, Chapter 7 will delineate the processes 
of political upward mobility of Chinese provincial leaders since 1990. Chapter 8 will 
provide quantitative evidence and address how both human and social capitals are 
rewarded in achieving career success. The concluding chapter will revisit the 
important research questions, summarize the major findings, point out the 
contributions and limitations of this thesis and suggest the future research directions. 
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Chapter 3 Research Methodology 
 
This thesis addresses the research question and tests the above hypotheses in a 
quantitative study of Chinese provincial leaders since 1990. More specifically, event 
history analysis will be employed to trace the career trajectories and the changes in 
human capital and social capital across the observation period. Chapter 3 will 
explicitly explain why event history analysis is an appropriate method in Section 3.1. 
On this basis, Section 3.2 and Section 3.3 will provide a detailed formulation of how 
to conduct the research, including data collection and data input. Finally, Section 3.4 
will briefly introduce how to analyze data in the logistic regression model.  
 
3.1 Why Use Event History Analysis? 
 
Event history analysis is defined as “the modeling of events occurring over time using 
a set of explanatory variables” (Agresti & Finlay, 2009: 524). It incorporates not only 
whether or not the events occur but also the timing of event occurrence (Allison, 
1982: 62; Box-Steffensmeier & Jones, 2004: 1; Eerola, 1994: 2; Freedman & et al., 
1988: 38; Mills, 2010: 1; Tuma, 1994: 138; Yamaguchi, 1991: 1). Although no 
panacea, event history analysis is increasingly recognized as a superior breakthrough 
in analyzing social processes and changes. It is an appropriate instrument in the 
dynamic models, as compared with the static analysis and equilibrium assumptions 
in the ordinary statistical modeling (Blossfeld & Rohwer, 2009: 24; Box-Steffensmeier 
& Jones, 1997: 1414; Carroll, 1983: 425; Elliott, 2002: 108-109; Tuma, Hannan & 
Groeneveld, 1979: 820-821).  
 
This thesis attempts to address how the influence of human and social capital in 
upward mobility evolves across career journeys for Chinese political leaders. The 
temporally sequenced promotion outcomes are therefore recorded in terms of the 
timing at promotion and the ordering of career trajectories. In this regard, it is 
tempting to apply event history analysis in this thesis because this statistical 
technique measures time to event and fits the promotion dynamics analyses 
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perfectly concerning whether and when the promotion event occurs. The 
extraordinary strengths of event history analysis essentially lie in the longitudinal 
records of leadership biographies readily available.  More importantly, it effectively 
handles censoring and time-varying explanatory variables, which will be specified in 
the following (Allison, 1982: 62).  
 
3.1.1 Censoring 
 
As for the sample of Chinese provincial leaders, the timing of promotion at each 
administrative rank is largely well-defined in the leadership biographies. 
Nevertheless, the statistical difficulties of censoring arise when promotion outcomes 
are unspecified at the end of the observation period until October 201315 (Allison, 
1984: 56; Courgeau & Najim, 1996: 192; Elliott, 2002: 108; Guo, 1993: 218; Mills, 
2010: 5; Tuma & Hannan, 1979: 236, 1984: 154). This group of political leaders is 
censored in the statistical modeling. For instance, in Chinese leadership dataset, 
3.97% of the provincial leaders unexpectedly or prematurely quit from the posts. 
Specifically, 19 observations dropped out of the study because of death or fatal 
medical problems, together with 31 cases due to criminal behaviors. In addition, 597 
out of 1260 provincial leaders (47.38%) continue serving in the government 
bureaucracy or party apparatus after October 2013. It is interesting to note that, 
among them, 68 political leaders were born after 1963 and take up the senior party 
and government positions. Undoubtedly, this club of political leaders, approximately 
5.40%, is potentially rising political stars to occupy authority positions in Chinese 
power structures. It is, however, difficult to identify whether and when these 
political leaders will advance to the top over the observation period.   
 
                                                        
15 Yamaguchi (1991:3) defines censoring in the circumstance “when incomplete 
information is available about the duration of the risk period because of a limited 
observation period”. To be specific, right censoring exists if the event of interest has 
not occurred when the observation is terminated (Yamaguchi, 1991:5; Blossfeld & 
Rohwer, 2007: 39-41). Left censoring refers to the cases whose “entry into the risk 
period occurs prior to the observation period” (Yamaguchi, 1991: 7).  
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To solve the censoring issues, three analytical strategies are generally taken into 
account in the traditional statistical analysis (Tuma & Hannan, 1979: 213). The first 
one is to remove 647 political leaders (51.35%) whose complete career histories 
remain unknown from the leadership dataset. This “solution” is far from ideal 
because it enhances the sampling bias and loss of information in the modeling 
(Agresti & Finlay, 2009: 525; Box-Steffensmeier & Jones, 2004：19). As Box-
Steffensmeier and Jones (1997: 1416-1417) point out, “if the factors producing 
censoring are completely unrelated to factors promoting an event’s occurrence, 
then truncating the sample may be a solution; however, censored observations are 
often influenced by precisely the same factors uncensored observations are. Under 
such conditions, truncating the sample to include only uncensored observations 
would produce a biased sample because only observations initially prone to 
experience an event would be included. States with ‘staying power’ would be 
eliminated from the sample. Truncating the sample would induce selection bias into 
the data and the implications of this problem are well-known”. A typical example is 
the censored provincial leaders with non-occurrence of promotion until the last 
point of observation. With the increasing educational attainment for Chinese 
leadership group, they largely receive higher education that is presumably regarded 
as a positive predictor of upward mobility. Therefore, the career returns to 
education may be well observed for both the censored and uncensored provincial 
leaders. By eliminating the censored provincial leaders, the sample under study is 
restricted to the uncensored leaders who are likely to get promoted. In comparison, 
the effect of education on upward mobility for the censored leaders is accordingly 
ignored. As a result, the direct removal of the censored observations may bias the 
estimates of the role of education in political career advancement.   
 
The second option is to develop a dichotomous indicator of whether or not the 
Chinese political leaders experience successful promotions across the observation 
period in a logit model (Allison, 1984: 10; Petersen, 1991: 273). It is to some extent 
arbitrary to draw a dividing line of “winners” and “losers” by simply answering an 
“either/or” question. This logic basically ignores the variability in the length of 
duration time before advancing to upper levels (Box-Steffensmeier & Jones, 1997: 
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1417, 2004: 19; Singer & Willett, 1993: 159). For example, Li Changchun (李长春),  
former Politburo member, spent twelve months moving from the bureau/director 
level to the vice-provincial/ministerial level16. That is, he successfully assumed the 
position of party secretary of Shenyang City in 1983, after working as vice mayor for 
just one year. It then took two years for Li to become deputy party secretary of 
Liaoning Province in 1985, one year to work as acting provincial governor between 
1986 and 1987, and one year to obtain the high-ranking position of provincial 
governor in 1987. After 1990, he was transferred to Henan Province as a top 
provincial leader and ultimately ascended to the Politburo in 1997.  
 
Another provincial leader, Ou Guangyuan (欧广源) was promoted in 1993 to vice 
provincial governor of Guangdong, one year after working as party secretary of 
Foshan City. In 2002, he was elected Guangdong’s deputy party secretary and then 
deputy director of Standing Committee of Guangdong Provincial People’s Congress 
(PPC) in 2007. After 2008, he moved to the provincial/ministerial level as director of 
PPC and served in the Agriculture and Rural Affairs Committee of National People’s 
Congress (NPC). Despite the same duration time of twelve months from the 
bureau/director level to the vice-provincial/ministerial level, Li Changchun climbed 
much faster to the provincial/ministerial level and was positioned advantageously as 
compared to Ou Guangyuan. It is by no means scientific and realistic to draw any 
causal understanding of leadership promotion by simply asking, “is the political 
leader promoted?” 
 
Regarding the above differentiated career paths, as Petersen (1991: 273) illustrates, 
“being promoted after six months is a different career trajectory from being 
promoted after six years”. In this sense, this strategy fails to distinguish fast runners 
within the Chinese hierarchy. The waiting time at each administrative rank is 
precluded here. It appears to be oversimplified in essence. The complexity of 
promotion mechanisms of Chinese leadership is understated.  
                                                        
16 For a detailed description of administrative ranks, Section 3.3.2 will introduce how 
to define dependent variable of promotion outcomes in the Chinese hierarchical 
context.  
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In addition to the above two approaches, the third “solution” is to convert 
nonpromoted into promoted observations, by assigning the duration values to the 
political leaders without promotion experience at the end of data collection. In this 
case, the promotion outcomes actually remain unknown for these political leaders 
until the last observation. They may move ahead towards a higher level sometime 
after the observation ends.  Therefore, the actual length of duration time 
undoubtedly exceeds the assigned values. This solution seems to be problematic and 
generates erroneous estimations (Allison, 1984: 11; Singer & Willett, 1993: 158-159). 
 
However, event history analysis possesses the methodological advantages over the 
standard statistical models in handling censoring issues17 (Box-Steffensmeier & 
Jones, 1997: 1430). Given the clear-cut censoring points, it seems very likely that the 
censoring observations could be included in this analysis (Box-Steffensmeier & Jones, 
2004: 18). Tuma and Hanna (1979) have demonstrated that maximum likelihood 
estimation overcomes the censoring limitations in a sound way (Box-Steffensmeier & 
Jones, 1997: 1430; for detailed statistical procedures, see Tuma & Hanna, 1979: 217-
228). They discuss that, “an important advantages of the maximum likelihood 
approach to the censoring problem is that it is easily extended to different data 
structures and different models, including those with multiple kinds of events, causal 
effects on rates, and time-dependent rates” (Tuma & Hanna, 1979: 237). 
 
3.1.2 Time-Varying Covariates 
 
                                                        
17  The event history analysis adopts the term of “a failure” to identify the 
observations experiencing the event of interest, and meanwhile “a success” to refer 
to nonevent observations  (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones, 1997:1430). The 
corresponding mathematical functions are f(t)=h*exp-h*t and S(t)=exp-h*t  . The hazard 
function h(t)=f(t)/S(t). On this basis, Box-Steffensmeier and Jones (1997:1430) 
suggest that, “using maximum likelihood estimation provides some leverage on the 
issue of censoring. Censored observations are treated differently from uncensored 
observations, as they should be. Furthermore, all information on the length of the 
duration is used with maximum likelihood estimation. Thus, we avoid the problems 
associated with traditional regression-based techniques”.  
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Alongside the censoring solution introduced above, event history analysis effectively 
accommodates time-varying covariates in statistical modeling (Allison, 1982: 62; 
Mills, 2010: 11). The ordinary statistical techniques fail to address “how” and “why” 
questions in relation to social changes over time. Social phenomena and processes 
are interpreted in a static and time-stationary manner (Box-Steffensmeier & Jones, 
1997: 1417, 2004: 19; Elliott, 2002: 109). They give little attention to variability in 
time dependencies, particularly on the basis of cross-sectional data (Blossfeld, 
Golsch & Rohwer, 2007: 10-12). They rarely provide satisfactory answers to such 
questions as how changes are created and experienced. For instance, when did the 
political leaders obtain their bachelor’s, master’s or even doctoral degrees? Do the 
career returns to educational achievement vary over time? To what extent is social 
capital cumulated in job transfers? To what extent and in what way does social 
capital affect political upward mobility? And so forth.  
 
In sharp contrast, event history analysis prominently provides an alternative for 
modeling the changing status and predictors at discrete or continuous time points. 
For the provincial leaders under study in this thesis, this statistical technique records 
the growth in administrative ranks coupled with the process of improving 
educational levels and accumulating social capital. It also grounds the promotion 
analyses in the changing historical conditions by analyzing the period effect on 
promotion, which will be explored in Chapter 8. With respect to the construction of 
data input and rigorous analytical strategies, as Allison (1984: 19) emphasizes, “time-
varying explanatory variables are easily included because each year at risk is treated 
as a distinct observation”. Particularly, they fit well into the person-period data 
structure that will be discussed and operationalized in Section 3.3.5 (Tarling, 2009: 
187).  
 
Consider Li Keqiang (李克强) and Xu Fushun (徐福顺) as prominent examples. 
Premier Li Keqiang received his Bachelor’s degree in law from Peking University at 
the age of 27. After staying in the CC of Chinese Communist Youth League (CCYL), he 
graduated with a doctoral degree in economics in 1994, at the age of 39. He 
completed the educational and professional training before joining the upper 
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echelons. In comparison, Xu Fushun is currently serving as vice chairman of State-
owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC). After graduating 
from Liaoning University of Finance and Economics in 1984, Xu spent 19 years in 
state-owned China Nuclear Engineering Corporation between 1984 and 2003. 
However, he studied sociology and obtained a doctoral degree in 2013 from 
Huazhong University of Science and Technology. Comparing the educational profiles 
of Li and Xu, both of them received full-time undergraduate education and were 
awarded the doctoral degrees after entering the workforce. It is worth noting, 
however, that the timing of receiving the doctoral degrees is different. 
Correspondingly, the role played by educational credentials can be distinctively 
different. As for Xu, it is unreasonable to assert that a doctoral degree received in 
July 2013 would significantly affect his career mobility to vice provincial governor of 
Qinghai in September 2003, or to vice chairman of SASAC in May 2013. To avoid the 
misleading causal inferences as such, event history analysis brings together the 
levels and the timing of educational credentials.  
 
Similar to changes in human capital, social capital varies dramatically over time. A 
majority of Chinese political elites experience job shifts across the full course of 
career, either frequently or occasionally. Social capital growing out of the viable 
work relationships will change accordingly. For instance, Linghu An (令狐安), former 
deputy head of the Bureau of Auditing, began to worked for a Dalian machine 
factory in 1970. In 1977, he made a vital transition from a factory worker to a party 
cadre in the Municipal Bureau of Machine-building Industry in Dalian. He held the 
position of deputy secretary in the CCYL of Dalian City from 1978 to 1982 and 
entered the Municipal Bureau of Instrument, Meter and Electronic Industry.  In 1983, 
he acted as chairman of Dalian Federation of Trade Unions and deputy director of 
Economic Reform Commission concurrently. In 1985, he was appointed vice mayor 
in Dalian City. In 1988, he was transferred to Ministry of Labor and remained there 
for five years. In 1993, he became a senior party leader in Yunnan Province. In 2001, 
he served on National Audit Office for twelve years, before working in the Overseas 
Chinese Affairs Committee of NPC. As for Linghu’s career history, set October 2013 
as the ending point of survey time. The standard correlation or regression analysis 
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succeeds in exploring how the cumulative value of social capital is related to his 
highest rankings. It is merely a snapshot of the entire 43-year career life. It fails to 
sketch the complete career paths and changes in social capital across multiple 
episodes. As Tuma and Hannan (1984: 3) indicate, “sociological theories have 
become increasingly concerned with social change, and temporal data are becoming 
widely available. Yet empirical social research addresses primarily questions about 
static relationships (associations among phenomena at a single time point) and 
focuses mainly on cross-sectional analysis”. Event history analysis, however, can 
model the variations in social capital and occupational status on temporal 
dimensions. In this way, it is more likely to approximate social processes per se.  
 
In summary, event history analysis is superior to the standard statistical methods in 
interpreting social changes. The Chinese promotion mechanisms are essentially 
dynamic and sophisticated. The application of event history analysis in this thesis is 
exciting and rewarding not only for the richness of leadership and promotion 
information, but also for its statistical robustness and analytical abilities in 
interrelationships of longitudinal data.  
 
3.2 Data Collection 
 
Section 3.2 and 3.3 will provide a general picture of how the longitudinal data of 
Chinese leadership is generated. Section 3.2.1 outlines the diversity of data sources, 
explaining why to collect the leadership data between 1990 and 2013 and focus on 
provincial elites. On this basis, Section 3.2.2 will describe the total sample in the 
geographical settings. 
 
3.2.1 Data Sources 
 
This thesis endeavors to address occupational mobility of Chinese provincial leaders 
since 1990. Before introducing specific data sources, three important questions are 
posed. First, it is necessary to explain why this thesis gathered the biographic data 
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for the promotion analyses. The answers to this question are twofold. On one hand, 
the collection of biographic data maintains the balance between data availability and 
the political elites as research subjects. This thesis is interested in the promotion 
dynamics for Chinese provincial leaders. Elite studies, in practice, are confronted the 
difficulties of getting access to the “hard-to-reach” political elite and gaining 
permission for interviews. In addition, the promotion analyses give weight to the 
individual career histories and the historical changes in the promotion models from a 
longitudinal perspective. A large number of provincial leaders under study lost 
contact or passed away, which makes the data collection more complicated and 
difficult. Burch and Moran (1992) discuss the methods of data collection in elite 
studies and write: 
 
The standard techniques used to gather information about the population at 
large—such as social surveys and census returns—are rarely appropriate 
when studying contemporary elites, and are even less rarely appropriate in 
longitudinal studies, when many of the subjects are dead. The evidence from 
directories is second best, but it is a good deal more revealing than no 
evidence at all. (pp. 124-125) 
 
On the other hand, the aggregate biographic data on demographic attributes, 
educational attainment, social network characteristics and career trajectories 
provides insights into elite transformation and the historical trends of leadership 
selection (Eldersveld, 1982: 68; Waller, 1973: 155; Welsh, 1973b: 2). Moreover, 
“these data can also provide a more systematic basis for interrelating elite change 
and changes in social, economic, and political characteristics of a system” (Waller, 
1973: 155).  
 
The second question is why the data ranges from the year 1990 to 2013 over a 23-
year span. Roughly speaking, the leadership biographies between 1949 and 1990 are 
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mostly incomplete and unavailable18. A wide range of data for this thesis is drawn 
from online published leadership biographies. However, Chinese local governments 
established their official websites and Internet connections with the public in late 
1990s. Another significant reason is that Jiang Zemin took over power and occupied 
the uppermost leadership post in 1989. This is the emergence of the third 
generation of Chinese top leaders. Since then, the political succession incrementally 
became institutionalized in a peaceful manner. It triggered an immense research 
interest in elite mobility from the perspectives of party loyalty, meritocratic criteria 
and performance orientation (Li & White, 1988, 1998, 2003; Li & Bachman, 1989; 
Zang, 1991b, 1993, 2001; Chen, 1998; Li, 2001; Zhou, 2001; Bo, 2002). Therefore, the 
detailed statistical data on leadership is collected from the year 1990 onwards. 
Furthermore, given the research schedule of this thesis, the ending time point of 
survey is October 201319. The year 2013 is the year of profound leadership 
transitions for China. A new generation of provincial-level party leaders was elected 
by 3 July 2012. In January 2013, all the 31 provincial governments completed the 
leadership replacement. More leadership profiles became readily available. Selecting 
1990 and 2013 for data collection permits the comparative study of elite promotion 
                                                        
18 In 2008, the government information sharing started to receive the robust 
statutory support (The Central People’s Government of the People’s Republic of 
China. 2007. The Government Information Sharing Guidance of the People’s 
Republic of China (中华人民共和国政府信息公开条例) [Online]. (Updated 5 April 
2007) Available at: http://www.gov.cn/xxgk/pub/govpublic/tiaoli.html [accessed 1 
June 2014]. The central leadership biographies are available and updated particularly 
during the annual meetings of National Party Congress, National People’s Congress 
and Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference. The information on 
personnel shuffle and related leadership profiles appears less accessible at the 
provincial, municipal or even county levels. The development of open and 
transparent governments differs across regions in China.  
19 It is necessary to highlight two issues. One is leadership replacement in party 
organizations precedes that in government systems. The other is the personnel 
shuffles at the provincial level generally precede the central power transfer in China. 
To be specific, Liaoning was the first province to make a party leadership transition 
on 13 October 2011, while Beijing was the last one on 3 July 2012. The central 
committee of Chinese Communist Party (CCP) was elected at the 18th National Party 
Congress in November 2012. For the government officials at the provincial level, 
nearly all the officials were appointed in January 2013. The NPC and National CPPCC 
held in March 2013 elected the new-generation state leaders.  
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from the pre-Jiang period, Jiang’s third generation and Hu Jintao’s fourth generation, 
which will be discussed later in Chapter 8.  
 
The third question is why does the data focus on provincial leaders? Firstly, as noted 
earlier in Section 3.1.1, provincial leaders are competitive political players in the 
powerful decision-making center in Chinese politics. Selecting provincial leaders 
allows for tracking the bottom-up career trajectories and comparing differentiated 
occupational success. As illustrated in Table 2, there is a steady increase in the 
Politburo members working as top provincial chiefs. In particular, proportion of 
Politburo members with provincial leadership experience reaches a peak for the 16th 
Politburo. That is, they disproportionately constituted 83.33% of the 16th Politburo. 
Both 17th and 18th Politburo counted 20 members from provincial leaders (80%). The 
data reported in Table 2 adequately shows the significance of provincial career 
experience. A relatively large proportion of Politburo members are incorporated into 
the sample of 1,260 provincial leaders in this thesis.  
 
Table 2 Distribution by Provincial Working Experience for 13th to 18th 
Politburo, 2013 
Politburo 
Number of Proportion of 
Politburo 
members with 
provincial 
leadership 
experience 
Politburo 
members 
Provincial 
leadership 
experience 
13th 17 9 52.94% 
14th 20 10 50.00% 
15th 22 13 59.09% 
16th 24 20 83.33% 
17th 25 20 80.00% 
18th 25 20 80.00% 
Source: Author’s database. 
Note: Politburo members with provincial leadership experience refer to they ever 
worked as party secretaries, deputy party secretaries, governors or vice governors at 
the provincial level.  
 
 Secondly, this thesis attempts to elaborate how human and social capital leads to 
different promotion outcomes over career stages.  It implicitly assumes the 
possibility to track full career trajectories from the lower to upper administrative 
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ranks. In this regard, provincial leaders are suited to the research questions and 
conceptual designs. The diversity in career paths and promotion outcomes is well-
observed for this leadership group. In comparison, central leaders occupy the vice-
state-leader level ranking or above and thus exhibit little variance in where and 
when they reach a level cap within the hierarchy. For the municipal and county-level 
leaders, they have short seniority or receive limited promotion chances in party and 
government organizations. The investigation of such group fails to provide sufficient 
career data from the vice-provincial/ministerial level or above.  
 
Before discussing how to collect biographical data, it is necessary to indicate that 
provincial leaders in this thesis exclusively include party secretaries, deputy party 
secretaries, governors and vice governors at the provincial level. To develop the 
Chinese leadership dataset between 1990 and 2013, detailed statistical data was 
gathered from a diversity of sources. The first step is to compile a complete list of 
provincial leaders since 1990. It crucially confronts three issues. Firstly, as for the 
current leaders, the authoritative data source comes from the official government 
websites. However, this type of data mostly covers the list of provincial governors 
and vice governors. Only a small number of provinces published the list of party 
leaders as well. For example, out of 31 provinces, only Beijing, Jiangsu, Hainan, 
Gansu and Ningxia published the list of both party and government leaders. Secondly, 
for the former provincial leaders, a full set of the list and leadership biographies is 
available online, for instance, the leadership databases of Xinhua Net (新华网), 
People.com.cn (人民网 ), Chinese Economics Net (中国经济网 ), or regional 
leadership database of Guangdong Province, and so forth20. Nevertheless, Xinhua 
Net and People.com.cn merely offer the lists of provincial party secretaries and 
governors. Finally, in response to the missing-data problem, we turn to the election 
results of Provincial Party Committee of CCP, PPC and Provincial Chinese People’s 
                                                        
20  To access the list of provincial leaders, refer to Xinhua Net (新华网 ): 
http://www.xinhuanet.com/rwk/, People.com.cn ( 人 民 网 ): 
http://politics.people.com.cn/GB/8198/351134/index.html, Database of Local Party 
and Government Leaders, Chinese Economics Net (中国经济网，地方党政领导人
物库): http://district.ce.cn/zt/rwk/, Guangdong Political Leadership Database (广东
领导资料库): http://wen.oeeee.com/channel/5068.html.  
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Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC), coupled with useful information on 
personnel shuffles from organization departments21.  
 
Following the above procedures, this thesis compiled a full list of provincial leaders 
from 1990 to 2013. Table 3 shows the number of provincial leaders as four types in 
each province between 1990 and 2013, namely, provincial party secretaries, 
provincial governors, deputy party secretaries and vice governors. The numbers of 
party secretaries and provincial governors in each province range from three to nine, 
and four to nine, respectively. Both provinces of Hainan and Henan had nine party 
secretaries and on the other hand, Hebei and Shanxi had nine provincial governors 
during the period of 1990 and 2013. It is important to note that deputy party 
secretaries and vice governors considerably outnumber the former two groups. They 
are to a large extent disproportionately distributed in 31 provinces. For these two 
leadership groups, Tibet Autonomous Region stood far ahead of the other 30 
provinces with the largest numbers of 30 deputy party secretaries and 54 vice 
provincial governors.  
 
Table 3 Numbers of Top Provincial Leaders in 31 Chinese Provinces, 1990-2013  
Provinces 
Party 
Secretaries 
Governors 
Deputy Party 
Secretaries 
Vice Governors 
Anhui 6 8 20 33 
Beijing 6 8 22 45 
Fujian 7 8 20 34 
Gansu 8 8 18 35 
Guangdong 6 5 17 35 
Guangxi 6 5 18 39 
Guizhou 6 8 20 40 
Hainan 9 6 14 36 
Hebei 8 9 22 35 
Henan 9 7 22 36 
Heilongjiang 7 7 20 38 
Hubei 6 8 21 40 
Hunan 6 8 22 34 
                                                        
21 The election results are generally provided on the official newspapers of the CCP, 
Xinhua Net, People.com.cn and the official websites of the organization 
departments. 
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Jilin 6 8 24 35 
Jiangsu 6 6 21 40 
Jiangxi 6 5 19 38 
Liaoning 6 7 23 38 
Inner Mongolia 5 6 16 44 
Ningxia 5 4 15 33 
Qinghai 7 8 17 37 
Shandong 6 6 21 42 
Shanxi 6 9 24 39 
Shaanxi 5 8 22 33 
Shanghai 8 6 17 40 
Sichuan 7 6 25 42 
Tianjin 6 5 15 37 
Tibet 6 6 30 54 
Xinjiang 3 4 25 47 
Yunnan 5 5 17 34 
Zhejiang 5 8 18 37 
Chongqing 7 4 14 26 
Total 195 206 619 1175 
Source: Author’s database. 
 
After constructing a comprehensive list of provincial leaders, the second step is to 
collect leadership biographies. By and large, the government websites and online 
leadership databases mentioned above published biographies for provincial leaders 
if the list was available. Besides, more biographies were accessed from the elite 
databases of ifeng.com and Communist Party of China Net, baike.Baidu.com and 
Wikipedia22. Aside from the online sources, the biographical data came from the 
published books of Statistical Yearbooks of provinces, Provincial Chronicles (省志), 
Who’s Who in China: Current Leaders and the like. Not surprisingly, exceptions exist.  
The timing of career changes is partially lacking. The typical example is Liu Mingqi (刘
名启), former vice provincial governor of Hainan. His leadership profile only presents 
the timing of occupational status after 1992 and that before 1992 was unknown. 
Fortunately, the latter was eventually drawn from a speech Liu delivered in Hainan 
                                                        
22 To search more leadership biographies, please visit ifeng Political Elite Database 
(中国政要资料库 ) at http://renwuku.news.ifeng.com/, and The Database for 
Chinese Party, Government Leaders from Communist Party of China Net (中国党政
领导干部资料库) at http://cpc.people.com.cn/gbzl/index.html, baike.baidu.com (百
度 百 科 ) at http://baike.baidu.com/, and Wikipedia ( 维 基 百 科 ) at 
http://zh.wikipedia.org/wiki/首页.  
 
 
77 
Foreign Language College of Professional Education in 2010 23 . He explicitly 
introduced career experience in early days at the beginning of his speech, including 
the duration times spent from a grass-root cadre to mayor of Sanya City. This 
important message is virtually a complement to the existing profile. Likewise, 
educational information is scarce for a number of provincial leaders. This category of 
data was updated from the alumni resources. For instance, the biography of Mao 
Guanglie (毛光烈), current provincial vice governor of Zhejiang, shows that he has 
obtained a master’s degree of law and a doctoral degree of sociology. His 
undergraduate study experience in 1978 was eventually updated from the alumni 
information of Anhui University of Science and Technology24.  
 
After data collection, for reliability, it is necessary to cross-examine the data. In this 
thesis, except for a wide range of data sources noted above, the biographical 
information was further double checked through Chinese Political Elite Database of 
National Chengchi University of Taiwan25. In the following, the sample of provincial 
leaders will be presented. 
                                                        
23 Hainan Foreign Language College of Professional Education. 2010. Liu Mingqi: 
Thoughts on Chinese Reforms (刘名启：中国改革的思考). [Online]. (Updated 30 
Nov 2010) Available at: 
http://www.hnflvc.com/newsview.asp?ID=1800&class=49&type=jfle&downtype=. 
[Accessed 2 June 2014].  
24  The Alumni Foundation of Anhui University of Science and Technology 
congratulated on Mao Guanglie’s promotion to vice provincial governor in Zhejiang 
Province in January 2011 (Anhui University of Science and Technology. 2011. 
Congratulations on Mao Guanglie’s Promotion to Vice Provincial Governors in 
Zhejiang (热烈祝贺校友毛光烈出任浙江省副省长). [Online]. (Updated 19 Jan 2011] 
Available at: 
http://xyw.aust.edu.cn/newsview.asp?id=39&title=%C8%C8%C1%D2%D7%A3%BA%
D8%D0%A3%D3%D1%C3%AB%B9%E2%C1%D2%B3%F6%C8%CE%D5%E3%BD%AD%
CA%A1%B8%B1%CA%A1%B3%A4. ]Accessed 2 June 2014].  
25 Chinese Political Elite Database was established by National Chengchi University of 
Taiwan. It covers approximately 4,000 political elites at the vice-
provincial/ministerial level since 1966. The political elites here refer to elites from 
party, government and military systems. The leadership information is collected on 
the dimensions of name, birth year, age, birth place, nationality, educational 
experience, work experience and the relevant timing, party membership or not, and 
party seniority. For more details, please refer to the online database at: 
http://cped.nccu.edu.tw/.  
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3.2.2 Sample 
 
Based on the list and biographical data constructed, the sample in this thesis is 
selected in terms of different research purposes. On one hand, this thesis is 
interested in drawing a general picture of leadership transformation regarding 
demographic characteristics (Chapter 4) and human capital (Chapter 5). To achieve 
this, the sample under study in Chapter 4 and 5 is based on the full list of the 1990-
2013 Chinese provincial leaders. This sample selection focuses on who occupied 
what provincial leadership position in each province on the yearly basis. In this sense, 
considering the adequacy of biographical data, the sample is 1,891, accounting for 
85.10% of the total number of provincial leaders. 
 
On the other hand, more importantly, the second research purpose rests on the 
empirical assessment of social capital (Chapter 6), elite mobility (Chapter 7) and 
promotion dynamics (Chapter 8) in the course of political careers. The sample 
selection deserves careful investigation. For example, it is noteworthy that provincial 
leaders tend to change their jobs. They were transferred to different provinces, or 
promoted from vice provincial governors or deputy party secretaries, to provincial 
governors or party secretaries. Additionally, it is possible that provincial leaders take 
multiple responsibilities and concurrently worked as (1) vice provincial governors 
and deputy party secretaries; (2) provincial governors and deputy party secretaries; 
or (3) party secretaries and provincial governors. Thus, this leadership group was 
counted more than once in the list. Table 4 presents the job shifts of provincial 
leaders considering how many provinces they worked as four types of senior leaders. 
To be specific, 37 political elites worked in two or more provinces as party 
secretaries and twelve as provincial governors. 75 provincial leaders served two or 
more provinces as deputy party secretaries and 28 as vice provincial governors. To 
operationalize in event history analysis, the event occurrence and timing are 
recorded in the course of changing jobs for each provincial leaders.  
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Table 4 Distribution by the Number of Provinces Served as Four Types of Provincial 
Leaders, 1990-2013 
Source: Author’s database. 
Note: 1. Four types of provincial leaders refer to party secretaries, governors, deputy 
party secretaries, and vice governors at the provincial level.  
2. This statistical data is based on the sample of this thesis, namely 1,260 provincial 
leaders.  
 
The double-counting problem should be taken into consideration. For event history 
analysis, this thesis grounded the data analysis in the assumption that each 
provincial leader functions as a single observation case in the sample frame. That is, 
a provincial leader was counted exactly once even though he or she held concurrent 
positions or changed jobs within four types of senior provincial leaders. Under this 
condition, the population of interest here is 1,530 Chinese provincial leaders from 
Number of Provinces Frequency Percent 
1. Working as Provincial Party Secretaries 
0 1103 87.54% 
1 120 9.52% 
2 34 2.70% 
3 2 0.16% 
4 1 0.08% 
Total 1260 100.00% 
2. Working as Provincial Governors 
0 1060 84.13% 
1 188 14.92% 
2 12 0.95% 
Total 1260 100.00% 
3. Working as Deputy Provincial Party Secretaries 
0 758 60.16% 
1 427 33.89% 
2 70 5.56% 
3 4 0.32% 
4 1 0.08% 
Total 1260 100.00 
4. Working as Vice Provincial Governors 
0 309 24.52% 
1 923 73.25% 
2 27 2.14% 
3 1 0.08% 
Total 1260 100.00 
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1990 to 2013. Given data availability, 1,260 leaders comprise the sample, accounting 
for 82.35%26. To the best of knowledge, this sample appears to be one of the most 
up-to-date and complete Chinese provincial leadership datasets so far.  
 
3.3 Data Input 
 
Section 3.3 considers how to input the statistical data based on event history 
analysis. Technically, this section elaborates how to define the observation plans, 
dependent, explanatory and control variables, and eventually generate a person-
year data file.  
 
3.3.1 Observation Plans27 
 
As mentioned in Section 3.1, cross-sectional data is more interested in recording the 
observations at a single time point (Blossfeld, Glosch & Rohwer, 2007: 5; Tuma & 
Hannan, 1984: 3; Tuma, 1994: 140). Although commonly used in the standard 
statistical modeling, cross-sectional data fails to distinguish the time-dependence 
and a causal understanding of social processes (Davies, 1994: 38-39; Ruspini, 1999: 
221; Tarling, 2009: 156). In this thesis, the data is structured longitudinally in terms 
of specific research questions related to changes28 (Blossfeld, Glosch & Rohwer, 
                                                        
26 The percentage of provincial leaders with missing biographical information is 
17.65%. A vast majority of these leaders are working as vice provincial governors.  
27 Tuma and Hanna (1984: 18) identify observation plans as “the various schemes 
that can be used to collect systematic information pertinent to some phenomenon 
of interest”. In this thesis, Section 3.3.1 discusses how to define the risk period and 
unit of time in analyzing the promotion processes and structuring the longitudinal 
data in the person-year format.  
28 Blossfeld, Golsch and Rohwer (2007: 12-13) state that “Longitudinal data are 
obviously more effective in causal analysis and have less inferential limitations. They 
are indispensable for the study of processes over the life course (of all types of units) 
and their relation to historical change. Therefore research designs aimed at a causal 
understanding of social processes should be based on longitudinal data at the level 
of the units of analysis”. This thesis is interested in analyzing in what way human and 
social capital affect promotion outcomes and tracking the outcomes across career 
stages accordingly. This research question is indispensably correlated to time effects 
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2007: 12-13; Elliott, 2002: 109). After comparing four observation plans of panel 
data, event-count data, event-sequence data and event-history data29, Tuma and 
Hannan (1984: 22) point out the significance of event-history data by underlining 
that “whenever possible one should collect data on both the sequences and the 
timing of changes” (Mayer & Tuma, 1990: 4). As stated earlier in Section 3.1, not 
only does the event-history data synthesizes the information on the event 
occurrence, but also the timing of events and time-varying covariates. It directs the 
interest of statistical modeling from subject-specific to event-oriented observations. 
It enables an in-depth examination of what triggers changes by drawing time lines 
and underlining turning points for provincial leaders. Meanwhile, the time-
dependent nature makes it possible to take insights into the differences in 
promotion’s contingence upon human and social capital over time. As Berthoud & 
Gershuny (2000: 15) summarize, “longitudinal data offers a movie, rather than a 
snapshot”.  
 
Regarding the leadership transformation over time and the timing of promotion 
events, first and foremost is to identify the observation periods from entering to 
moving out of the risk set for each provincial leader (Allison, 2010: 415; Yamaguchi, 
1991: 161). As Box-Steffensmeier and Jones (2004:8) emphasize, “knowing the time-
of-entry into the process is important because it provides a natural baseline from 
which to compare units and observe subsequent history”. To look at the samples of 
provincial leaders in this thesis, the observation periods differ between Chapter 4-5 
and Chapter 6-8. Chapter 4 and 5 pertain to the descriptive analysis of historical 
changes in leadership formation and human capital for provincial leaders from 1990 
to 2013. Therefore, the particular observation period is more straightforward. It is 
                                                                                                                                                              
of age, duration and historical periods. In this sense, longitudinal data with event 
history analysis is evidently superior to cross-sectional data. 
29 Panel data is gathered at particular points in time. However the timing of 
measurement is to some extent arbitrary. Event-count data is interested in the 
numbers of event occurrence within a particular time interval. Event-sequence data 
“record the sequences of states occupied by each sample member” (Tuma & 
Hannan, 1984: 20). 
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restricted to the career episodes between the starting and ending points of 
obtaining provincial leadership.  
 
In Chapter 6-8, with regard to social capital and elite promotion dynamics across 
administrative ranks, all of provincial leaders are at risk of getting promotion after 
entering political career paths. To look at the temporal dynamics of promotion from 
the deputy-division-head level to the state-leader level, three ways of identifying the 
start of observation periods should be taken into account. In general, the starting 
point in time is the timing of entering the prior level before climbing to the 
administrative rank under study. Put another way, provincial leaders are expected to 
enter into the risk set of upward mobility under three occasions: (1) Promoted at the 
lower adjacent level within the step-by-step promotion; (2) promoted at the lower 
but not adjacent level with leap-frog promotion; or (3) assigned to the particular 
level under study once entering into public service30.  
 
Consider the promotion of interest at the vice-provincial/ministerial level as an 
example. The starting points in time could be the year when: (1) provincial leaders 
are promoted at the bureau/director level under the step-by-step promotion 
mechanism; (2) provincial leaders are promoted at a lower level before a leap-frog 
promotion to the vice-provincial/ministerial level; or (3) provincial leaders occupy 
the position at the vice-provincial/ministerial level as their first job in public service. 
For the former two cases, the observation period is for the most part equivalent to 
the duration between two promotions. In the last case, there exists a single 
observational record. The typical example is Jia Qinglin (贾庆林), the former 
                                                        
30 Section 3.3.2 will indicate that the analyses of promotion dynamics in this thesis 
are exclusively focused on promotions from the deputy-division-head level to the 
state-leader level. It is due to a considerable amount of missing data on career 
histories at the lowers ranks of the deputy-section-head level and the section-head 
level. As the only exception, considering the three possible ways of defining the 
starting point of observation periods, a number of event-history observations may 
be removed from the leadership subset regarding promotions at the deputy-division-
head level. It is primarily because promotions lower than the deputy-division-head 
level are unclear or inadequate.  
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chairman of CPPCC, rose to the post of deputy party secretary of Fujian from Taiyuan 
Heavy Machinery Plant in 1985.  
 
For provincial leaders, the observation periods are in general varied. There are also 
three possibilities pertaining to the ending point. First is the timing of resigning 
leading posts in public service with reference to the age or term limits. Second is the 
timing of exit from careers if the provincial leaders experience involuntary career 
termination because of death or corruption. The last possibility is to define the year 
2013 as the ending point if the provincial leaders keep staying in the current 
positions. For instance, Hu Chunhua (胡春华) is currently serving as Politburo 
member and party secretary of Guangdong. He started to work in the organization 
department in CCYL of Tibet Autonomous Region in 1983. The time of origin for Hu is 
1983 and the ending point is 2013. Hu’s observation period spans 20 years totally.  
 
In determining the observation periods, the multidimensional time effects deserve 
careful examinations. How is time measured in event history analysis of promotion 
dynamics? According to five possible ways to evaluate time dimensions from Tuma 
and Hannan (1984: 190-196), leadership selection outcomes in this thesis may vary 
with age, historical periods, cohort, duration and experience, respectively. However, 
time in leadership promotion modeling ultimately takes the form of historical 
periods (or calendar year). It is substantively due to the following two considerations.  
Firstly, in reality, duration dependency is partly related to age limits, term limits and 
term integrity within Chinese institutionalized leadership replacement31 (Kou & Zang, 
2014: 6-7). Given that leadership promotion is repeatable, duration dependence of 
promotion differs from period and age dependence (Tuma & Hannan, 1984: 192). In 
the successive Chapter 7, duration effect functions as a rigorous indicator to analyze 
promotion paths, namely the waiting time before advancing to each upper level. 
                                                        
31  For example, as stipulated in the provisional regulations on leadership 
replacement, party leaders and government officials are responsible for a five-year 
term of office and hold the same posts for no more than two consecutive terms 
(People.com.cn. 2006. Provisional Regulations on Leadership Replacement. 党政领
导干部职务任期暂行规定). [Online].  (Updated 7 August 2006). Available at:  
http://politics.people.com.cn/GB/1026/4671266.html. [Accessed 4 June 2014]. 
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However, this thesis rules out the duration effect in the causal understanding of 
promotion processes. Secondly, it is easy to assess age, period, cohort and 
experience effects. To be specific, age variations are calculated by current year 
minus birth year. Similarly, the cohort effect of provincial leaders is identified by 
birth year. Considering entry into career as the beginning of the observation period, 
the time dimension of experience represents seniority or the career duration time. 
Age, period, cohort and experience effects here yield a linear dependency (Tuma & 
Hannan, 1984: 192). However, historical periods are ultimately selected as a time 
dimension. It permits the further exploration of possible changes in promotion 
dynamics before the Jiang period, during the Jiang period and during the Hu period. 
This study is deeply embedded in Chinese politics in different historical settings. For 
age effects, age is instead conceived as one of the control variables in the promotion 
modeling (Allison, 1984: 41). The experience effect is also analyzed in the promotion 
models by regarding public service seniority as one of the human capital measures. 
The cohort effect is unexamined in the promotion models while merits investigation 
in the future studies.   
 
Based on the observation periods and calendar year as a time measure, the 
remainder of Section 3.3.1 will proceed to examine unit of time in event history 
analysis. A long time interval can be divided into smaller units of time for each 
provincial leader, by year, month, day and so forth. In terms of the standard 
leadership profiles, a large number of biographical data present the timing of career 
mobility by year or the exact month. For retired leaders, the cumulative duration of 
work experience generally amounts to over 40 years. Presumably, it would create a 
huge body of records to arrange the biographical data into the time interval of 
month. Therefore, it is appropriate to divide the observation periods on the annual 
basis because records by year correspond to the standard format of Chinese 
leadership biographies and effectively save abundance of time in data generation.  
 
The following sections will take a step further to introduce how to define and denote 
variables included in the statistical modeling.  
 
 
 
85 
3.3.2 Dependent Variables  
 
The event of interest in this thesis is leadership promotion in the power hierarchy. 
The aim is to analyze in what way human and social capital shape promotion 
outcomes across career stages. As indicated by Barnett (1966: 13), “as in most 
hierarchical bureaucratic systems, rankings were important not only because they 
were the basis for salary payments; they were also significant measures of status 
and prestige, as well as determinants of job opportunities”. In this thesis, the event 
of promotion occurs whenever provincial leaders move from the previous 
administrative rank to an upper rank. Therefore, to operationalize the statistical 
analysis, the dependent variable is a binary (0,1) variable, indicating whether or not 
the provincial leader gets promoted at a particular administrative rank. If the upward 
mobility exists, it is coded as 1. Otherwise, it is coded as 0.  
 
Although seemingly straightforward, the coding of promotion outcomes is far more 
complicated regarding administrative rankings in China’s civil service systems. 
According to Civil Service Law approved in 2005, the well-organized civil service 
system comprises ten administrative ranks for leadership posts. In this thesis, the 
level of below deputy-section head is added. As for Table 5, there are eleven 
administrative ranks for the career-history analysis in this thesis. For the non-
leadership posts, there are eight rankings, namely, counsel (巡视员), assistant 
counsel (助理巡视员), consultant (调研员), assistant consultant (助理调研员), 
principle section member (主任科员), senior section member (副主任科员), section 
member (科员) and clerk (办事员). Tables 5 provides an illustrative summary of 
administrative ranks for cadre management in China. 
 
The promotion outcomes at the section-head level and the deputy-section-head 
level are largely lacking. For the sample of 1,260 provincial leaders, it is difficult to 
identify whether and when promotion occurred for 965 provincial leaders (76.59%) 
at the section-head level and 1048 (83.17%) at the deputy-section-head level. As a 
result, this thesis prefers to look at the career mobility at the deputy-division-head 
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level or above. The dependent variable is the dichotomous variable of promotion 
outcomes at the eight administrative ranks, from the deputy-division-head level to 
the state-leader level, respectively.   
 
In terms of leadership biographies, provincial leadership experience broad-ranging 
occupational lines of party apparatus, government bureaucracies, military system, 
state-owned enterprises (SOEs), schools or universities, and non-governmental 
organizations. This thesis exclusively focuses on the upward mobility along 
administrative ranks in the CCP and government systems, together with major social 
organizations (社会团体) such as CCYL, All-China Women’s Federation, All-China 
Federation of Industry and Commerce, All-China Federation of Trade Unions, All-
China Federation of Returned Oversea Chinese, China Federation of Literary and Art 
Circles, Red Cross Society of China, and the like32.  
 
Table 5 A Summary of Administrative Ranks in China’s Civil Service System, 2013 
Rank Name Examples 
                                                        
32 Major influential social organizations in China include CCYL (中国共产主义青年
团), All-China Federation of Trade Unions (中华全国总工会), All-China Women’s 
Federation (中华全国妇女联合会), All-China Federation of Industry and Commerce 
(中华全国工商业联合会), All-China Federation of Returned Oversea Chinese (中华
全国归国华侨联合会), China Association for Science and Technology (中国科学技
术协会), All-China Federation of Taiwan Compatriots (中华全国台湾同胞联谊会), 
All-China Youth Federation (中华全国青年联合会), China Writers Association (中国
作家协会), China Federation of Literary and Art Circles (中国文学艺术界联合会), 
Red Cross Society of China (中国红十字会), All-China Journalists Association (中华全
国新闻工作者协会), Chinese People’s Association for Friendship with Foreign 
Countries (中国人民对外友好协会), Chinese People’s Institute of Foreign Affairs (中
国人民外交学会), China Council for the Promotion of International Trade (中国国际
贸易促进委员会), China Disabled Persons’ Federation (中国残疾人联合会), China 
Soong Ching Ling Foundation (中国宋庆龄基金会), China Law Society (中国法学会), 
Chinese Society of Ideological and Political Work (中国职工思想政治工作研究会), 
Western Returned Scholars Association (欧美同学会), Huangpu Military Academy 
Alumni Association (黄埔军校同学会), and The National Association of Vocational 
Education of China (中华职业教育社). Full text about social organization in China, 
please refer to: Chinese Government Net, n.d., Major Social Organizations (主要社会
团体). [Online]. (Updated n.d.) Available at: http://www.gov.cn/guoqing/2005-
05/24/content_2582481.htm. [Accessed 7 June 2014].  
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1 
Below Deputy-
Section-Head Level 
(乡科级以下) 
Staff members, clerk 
2 
Deputy-Section-
Head Level (乡科级
副职) 
Deputy Party Secretary of township-level CCP Committee, 
Deputy Head of township-level government, deputy 
secretary of Secretariat of township-level CCYL 
3 
Section-Head Level (
乡科级正职) 
Party Secretary of Township-level CCP Committee, Director 
of Standing Committee of Township-level People's 
Congress, Head of township-level government, Secretary of 
Secretariat township-level CCYL 
4 
Deputy-Division-
Head Level (县处级
副职) 
Deputy Party Secretary of county-level CCP Committee, 
Standing Committee Member of county-level CCP, Deputy 
Director of Standing Committee of county-level People's 
Congress, Deputy Head of county-level Government, Vice 
Chairman of county-level CPPCC, Secretary of Secretariat of 
Municipal CCYL 
5 
Division-Head Level (
县处级正职) 
County-level Party Secretary, Director of Standing 
Committee of County People's Congress, Head of County 
Government, Chairman of County CPPCC, Director-General 
of Municipal Bureau of Statistics, Director of Education and 
Training Division of Provincial Bureau of Human Resources 
and Social Security, Deputy Director-General of Bureau of 
Public Health of the Sub-provincial-level city, Director of 
Bureau of Public Security of prefectural-level city 
6 
Deputy-
Bureau/Director 
Level (厅局级副职) 
Deputy Municipal Party Secretary, Standing Committee 
Member of Municipal CCP, Vice Mayor, Deputy Director of 
Standing Committee of Municipal People’s Congress (MPC), 
Vice Chairman of Municipal CPPCC, Deputy Director-
General of Provincial Education Bureau, Director-General of 
Construction Bureau of the Sub-provincial-level city, Deputy 
Secretary of Provincial CCYL 
7 
Bureau/Director 
Level (厅局级正职) 
Municipal Party Secretary, Director of Standing Committee 
of MPC, Mayor, Chairman of Municipal CPPCC, Director-
General of Accounting Regulatory Department of Ministry 
of Finance, Director-General Provincial Bureau of 
Communications, Deputy Party Secretary of the Sub-
provincial-level city, Vice Mayor of the Sub-provincial-level 
city, Secretary of Provincial CCYL 
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8 
Vice-
Provincial/Ministeria
l Level (省部级副职) 
Deputy Provincial Party Secretary, Standing Committee 
Member of Provincial CCP, Secretary of Provincial 
Commission for Discipline Inspection, Secretary of 
Provincial Politics and Law Commission, Deputy Director of 
Standing Committee of PPC, Vice Provincial Governor, Vice 
Chairman of Provincial CPPCC, President of Provincial the 
Supreme People’s Court (SPC), Procurator-General of the 
Provincial Supreme People’s Procuratorate (SPP), Party 
Secretary of the Sub-provincial-level city, Mayor of the Sub-
provincial-level city, Secretary of Secretariat of CCYL 
9 
Provincial/Ministeria
l Level (省部级正职) 
Provincial Party Secretary, Director of Standing Committee 
of PPC, Provincial Governor, Chairman of Provincial CPPCC, 
Head of the CCP Central Organization Department, Deputy 
Secretary of the Central Commission for Discipline 
Inspection (CCDI), Deputy Secretary of CCP Central Politics 
and Law Commission (CPLC), Minister of Public Security, the 
First Secretary of Secretariat of CCYL 
10 
Vice-State-Leader 
Level (国家级副职) 
Politburo member, Secretariat of CCP Central Committee, 
Secretary of CCDI, Secretary of CPLC, Vice President of the 
People’s Republic of China (P.R.C.), Vice Chairman of NPC 
Standing Committee, Vice Premier of P.R.C., State 
Councilor, Vice Chairman of CPPCC, Vice Chairman of 
Central Military Commission (CMC), President of SPC, 
Procurator-General of SPP 
11 
State-Leader Level (
国家级正职) 
General secretary of CCP Central Committee, Member of 
Politburo Standing Committee, President of P.R.C., 
Chairman of NPC Standing Committee, Premier of P.R.C., 
Chairman of CPPCC, Chairman of CMC 
Source: The Central People’s Government of the P.R.C., 2005. Civil Service Law. 
[Online]. (Updated 27 April 2005). Available at: http://www.gov.cn/flfg/2005-
06/21/content_8249.htm [accessed 10 Nov. 2014]. 
 
3.3.3 Explanatory Variables 
 
This thesis points to the impacts of both human and social capital on promotion 
outcomes over eight administrative ranks. The explanatory variables here include 
time-varying covariates of human and social capital. The measures of both human 
capital and social capital are selected for the purpose of “the balance between 
feasibility and theoretical significance” (Kerckhoff, 1974b: 9). On one hand, as 
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indicated in Chapter 2, human capital pertains to the investment in health, 
education, training and work experience (Bodenhofer, 1967: 434; Lin, 2012: 90). To 
simplify the statistical modeling, this thesis will evaluate human capital by education 
(i.e. educational levels and academic majors) and public service seniority. On the 
other hand, social capital is closely associated with “resources embedded social 
networks” and occupational returns to network investments (Borgatti, Jones and 
Everett, 1998: 27-28; Bourdieu, 1986: 51; Burt, 1998: 7, 2000: 347-348, 2001: 32; 
Coleman, 1988: 98; Lin, 1999a: 29, 1999b: 467-468, 2000: 786; Lin, Fu and Hsung, 
2001: 58; Lin et al., 2009: 226; Portes, 1998: 6, 2000: 2; Putnam, 2001: 41; Schuller, 
Baron and Field, 2000: 1; Sobel, 2002: 139). The existing literature illuminates social 
capital by strength of social ties (Bian, 1997; Bian & Ang, 1997; Granovetter, 1973, 
1983; Lin, Ensel & Vaughn, 1981; Lin & Dumin, 1986; Marsden & Hurlbert, 1988; 
Montgomery, 1992; Murray, Rankin & Magill, 1981; Seibert, Kraimer & Liden, 2001; 
Wegener, 1991; Yakubovich, 2005; Yancy, DiTomaso & Post, 2009), structural holes 
(Burt, 1997a,b, 1998, 2001; Gargiulo & Benassi, 2000; Podolny & Baron, 1997; 
Rosenbaum & et al., 1999; Xiao & Tsui, 2007) and social resources (Bian & Huang, 
2009; Bozionelos, 2008; Bozionelos & Wang, 2006; Fernandez, Castilla & Moore, 
2000; Graaf & Flap, 1988; Lin, 1999b; Lin & Ao, 2008; Lin, Ensel & Vaughn, 1981; Lin, 
Fu & Hsung, 2001; Lin, Vaughn & Ensel, 1981; Lin & et al., 2009; Seibert, Kraimer & 
Liden, 2001). In the following, this thesis will discuss the definitions and 
measurement of both human and social capital. 
 
The explanatory variable of education in the current literature is frequently 
evaluated by years of schooling completed (Alwin, 1974; Blaug, 1976; Bian, 2009; 
Cannings & Montmarquette, 1991; Duncan & Hodge, 1963; Faia, 1981; Kerchkhoff, 
Campbell & Trott, 1982; Lin & Yauger, 1975; Schiefelbein & Farrell, 1984; Spilerman 
& Lunde, 1991; Sullivan, 1984; Winfield & et al., 1989). Or, it is measured as a 
dummy variable, indicating whether or not the research subject receives a specific 
educational credential (Schiefelbein & Farrell, 1984; Walder, 1995; Zang, 2001). In 
the previous research on Chinese elite mobility, education is measured as college 
education or the attainment of advanced degrees in most of the empirical studies 
(Bo, 2002; Huang, 2009; Liu, 2012; Shih, Adolph & Liu, 2012; Zhang, 2014), and takes 
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the form of years of education and academic majors in the promotion analyses for 
the prefecture-level mayors from Lin (2012). In Zang’s (2001) seminal work on 
Chinese elite stratification in 1994, the predictor variable of educational credentials 
is assessed by studying the attainment of college education, university ranking  and 
academic disciplines (Zang, 2001: 196). The theoretical concern in this thesis is the 
educational effect on promotions across career histories. It is necessary to 
distinguish, for example, the undergraduate study from the postgraduate study, or 
major in engineering from politics, in career success. Besides, it leaves open the 
subsequent questions. Does the educational effect differ in the early elite selection 
from the later process? Obviously, neither the indicator of years of schooling nor a 
dummy variable is capable of answering such questions. In response to the above 
challenges, this thesis is concerned with the alternative variables of educational 
levels, academic majors, and, more importantly, the timing of obtaining educational 
credentials33.  
 
The levels of educational attainment are classified into eight dimensions coded as 
one to eight: (1) primary school; (2) junior high school; (3) senior high school; (4) 
vocational school (including zhongzhuan (中专) and zhiye jiaoyu (职业教育)); (5) 
some college (sometimes called dazhuan (大专)); (6) a bachelor’s degree; (7) a 
master’s degree; and (8) a doctorate. The information on both the timing and the 
educational levels is gathered from leadership biographies. A detailed temporal 
record of education is substantially superior to the indicator of final educational 
degrees in the past research on Chinese political elites (Chen, 1998; Li & Bachman, 
1989; Li & White, 1998, 2003; Zang, 1993, 2001). The longitudinal strategy directs 
research attention away from the fixed and time-constant analysis of education. 
Instead, it focuses on a time-varying approach as stated in Section 3.1.2. Accordingly, 
It facilitates in-depth investigation regarding whether education functions as a 
                                                        
33 This thesis focuses on educational levels rather than years of schooling. This is 
because almost all the provincial leaders successfully obtain the educational degrees 
after years of study. The education in the Chinese context is differentiated by the 
educational degree obtained. The length of time for the same educational level is 
required similarly during the same historical periods. For example, a bachelor’s 
degree is awarded for four-year study and a master’s degree for two-year study.  
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screening vehicle at the early career stages, or yields occupational rewards in the 
long run.  
 
Alongside educational levels, another indicator of human capital is academic majors. 
According to the classification of academic majors for Chinese higher education, 
there are a total of twelve categories: (1) philosophy; (2) finance and economics; (3) 
law, politics and sociology; (4) education; (5) literature, linguistics and journalism; (6) 
history; (7) mathematics, physics, chemistry, biology and astronomy; (8) engineering 
and information science; (9) agriculture; (10) medical science; (11) management; and 
(12) arts34. In this thesis, academic majors of Chinese provincial leaders are grouped 
into two major categories: (1) science and engineering, and (2) humanities and social 
science. In the cases with educational levels below college education, the variable of 
academic major is correspondingly coded as 0. As illustrated in Table 6, the academic 
major of science encompasses Category 7, 8, 9 and 10. The remaining eight 
categories constitute the academic majors of humanities and social sciences.  
 
Table 6 Classification of Academic Majors for 1,260 Chinese Provincial Leaders, 1990-
2013 
Category Academic Majors 
Science 
Mathematics, physics, chemistry, biology and astronomy 
Engineering and information science 
Agriculture 
Medical Science 
Humanities 
and Social 
Science 
Philosophy 
Finance and economics 
Law, politics and sociology 
Education 
Literature, linguistics and journalism 
History 
                                                        
34 See, Ministry of Education, 2012. Jiaoyubu guanyu yinfa putong gaodeng xuexiao 
benke zhuanye mulu (2012), putong gaodeng xuexiao benke zhuanye shezhi guanli 
guiding deng wenjian de tongzhi (Classification of Academic Majors for Chinese 
Higher Education, 2012. 教育部关于印发普通高等学校本科专业目录). [Online] 
(Updated 14 Sep 2012). Available at: 
http://www.moe.gov.cn/publicfiles/business/htmlfiles/moe/s3705/201210/xxgk_14
3152.html. [Accessed 7 June 2014].  
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Management 
Arts 
Source: Ministry of Education, 2012. Jiaoyubu guanyu yinfa putong gaodeng xuexiao 
benke zhuanye mulu (2012), putong gaodeng xuexiao benke zhuanye shezhi guanli 
guiding deng wenjian de tongzhi (Classification of Academic Majors for Chinese 
Higher Education, 2012. 教育部关于印发普通高等学校本科专业目录). [Online]. 
(Updated 14 Sep 2012) Available at: 
http://www.moe.gov.cn/publicfiles/business/htmlfiles/moe/s3882/201210/143152.
html (accessed 10 Nov. 2014). 
 
In addition to education, this thesis examines the role of education in political 
upward mobility by analyzing the effect of work experience. As another important 
indicator of human capital, work experience takes the form of public service 
seniority here. This thesis is interested in looking at how long provincial leaders serve 
in the party or government systems and to what extent the duration time in public 
service contributes to upward mobility.  
 
In parallel to human capital, this thesis attempts to evaluate the accumulation of 
social capital and its career rewards. As noted previously, social capital is measured 
by the strength of social ties, structural holes or social resources in the existing 
literature. However, based on the leadership biographies of Chinese provincial 
leaders, it is difficult to quantify social capital by these indicators. For the purpose of 
operationalization, social capital in this thesis takes the form of social networks, 
exclusively those emerging from career experience and formal social interactions in 
the workplace (Campbell, Marsden & Hurlbert, 1986; Coleman, 1988; Granovetter, 
2005; Hezlett & Gibson, 2007; Seibert, Kraimer & Liden, 2001). The traditional 
analysis of network or guanxi in Chinese politics is largely organized around the 
inherited status advantages, party patronage or personal linkage within informal 
groups. This strand of literature is interested in uncovering scandals or rumors in a 
story-telling way. Although compelling and intriguing, it inevitably raises many more 
questions than it has answered. For example, is the analysis what really happened 
inside the black box of Chinese politics? Is that all the truth? Do formal relationships 
work in the political competition? This thesis successfully goes beyond the 
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traditional network analysis by examining work-related network characteristics in 
the institutional context. 
 
To be specific, social capital in this thesis centers on social networks cultivated and 
cumulated from formal work relationships and employment history. It leads to social 
resources and the occupational rewards within the opportunity structure. This thesis 
focuses on the accessible network resources rather than the mobilization of contact 
resources (Lin, 1999a: 36). Compared with strengths of social ties and structural 
holes, social networks are well observed in career trajectories.  In this thesis, social 
capital, exclusively based on the network-analytic concepts, is measured through 
three criteria: network size (Burt, 1992, 1997b; Podolny & Baron, 1997; Volker & Flap, 
1999) network diversity (Campbell, Marsden & Hurlbert, 1986; Cox & Harquail, 1991; 
Lin, 2000) and upper reachability (Lin, 1999a, 2001; Lin, Fu & Hsung, 2001).  As Lin 
(1999a: 37) emphasizes, “social capital is more than mere social relations and 
networks; it evokes the resources embedded and accessed. Nevertheless, such 
embedded resources cannot possibly be captured without identifying network 
characteristics and relations”.   
 
The first criterion of social capital is network size. It refers to the number of 
networks accessible for provincial leaders. In other words, network size is expanded 
under circumstances of:  (1) changing workplaces, organizations, bureaus, 
departments, divisions or sections; (2) changing occupations within or across 
organizations; and (3) obtaining the leadership post from the non-leadership post in 
the same division or department. Additionally, it is assumed that the network size 
remains constant for directors and deputy directors in the same section, division, 
department, bureau or organization. A coding example of network size is depicted in 
Table 7 in the case of Meng Qiliang （蒙启良), current vice governor of Guizhou 
Province.  
 
Table 7 A Coding Example of Network Size for Meng Qiliang, 2013 
Period Job 
Cumulative 
Network Size 
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1982.02-1984.11 Secretary, Section of Secretary, Qiannan Prefectural 
CCP Committee Office, Guizhou 
2 
Deputy Section Chief, Section of Secretary, Qiannan 
Prefectural CCP Committee Office, Guizhou 
1984.11-1986.03 Vice Mayor, Dunyun City, Guizhou 3 
1986.03-1986.09 Deputy Party Secretary, county-level district of 
Pinglang, Qiannan, Guizhou 
4 
1986.09-1989.08 Vice Mayor, Dunyun City, Guizhou 4 
1989.08-1992.09 Deputy Party Secretary, Guiding County, Guizhou 5 
Party Secretary, Guiding County, Guizhou 
1992.09-1994.05 Secretary-General, Qiannan Prefectural CCP 
Committee, Guizhou 
6 
1994.05-1994.05 Vice Governor, Qiannan Prefecture, Guizhou 7 
1994.05-1994.11 Consulant, Secretary Bureau, General Office of CCP 
Central Committee 
8 
1994.11-1997.06 Vice Governor, Qiannan Prefecture, Guizhou 8 
1997.06-1997.11 Vice Governor, Qiannan Prefecture, Guizhou 
Party Secretary, Dunyun City, Guizhou 9 
1997.11-1999.01 Party Secretary, Dunyun City, Guizhou 9 
1999.01-1999.06 Deputy Party Secretary, Qiannan Prefecture, Guizhou 10 
Governor, Qiannan Prefecture, Guizhou 
Party Secretary, Dunyun City, Guizhou 
1999.06-2005.01 Deputy Party Secretary, Qiannan Prefecture, Guizhou 10 
Governor, Qiannan Prefecture, Guizhou 
2005.01-present Vice Provincial Governor, Guizhou 11 
Source: Author’s database. 
 
In light of the above coding example, despite the network size of eleven, Meng 
primarily stays working along two occupational lines of party work and government 
administration. Accordingly, the range of social contacts and resource heterogeneity 
are to some extent limited for Meng. In sharp contrast, with the same network size 
of eleven, Ye Liansong (叶连松) possessed a brand range of job experience. He 
worked as a teacher in Shanghai Jiaotong University and a deputy factory leader in 
Shijiazhuang Diesel Engine Factory in early career years. In 1983, he served as 
director of Department of Economics and Center for Economic Research in Hebei 
Province. Ye worked as vice provincial governor in Hebei in 1985 and got promoted 
to provincial governor and deputy party secretary in 1993. After stepping down from 
provincial leadership posts, he was positioned in National CPPCC. The assumption 
arises from comparing Meng with Ye is that Ye tends to reach a wider variety of 
social resources than Meng through such diverse career patterns.  
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In this sense, the second criterion of social capital is network diversity. It reflects the 
number of career patterns provincial leaders have experienced throughout careers. 
At the core of the measurement is, therefore, to define career patterns in the 
networking context. After reviewing all the leadership profiles, this thesis, above all, 
endeavors to provide a comprehensive summary of career patterns in Table 8. In 
terms of the classification in Table 8, a value of seven is assigned to the network 
diversity of Ye. He experienced career patterns of education, industry, party work, 
government administration, finance/economic, research, and CPPCC. However, the 
previous example of Meng has network diversity of two.  
 
Table 8  A Summary of Career Patterns for 1,260 Chinese Provincial Leaders, 1990-
2013 
1 Party work 11 Audit/supervision 21 Population 
2 
Government 
administration 
12 Police/court 22 United front work/tongzhan 
3 Industry 13 Military 23 Foreign affairs 
4 Engineering 14 Agriculture 24 Ethnic affairs 
5 Economics/Finance 15 Civil affairs 25 Social welfare 
6 Education 16 Research 26 Transportation 
7 Culture  17 Policy research 27 Propaganda/media 
8 Technology/Science 18 Survey/investigation 28 Rural work 
9 Public health 19 Personnel/organization 29 CPPCC 
10 Social organization 20 Resources/environment 30 People’s Congress 
Source: Author’s database. 
 
The third criterion of social capital is upper reachability, indicating “the best possible 
resources in the networks or among ties” and the highest position accessible (Lin, 
1999a: 37, 2001: 62). The upper reachable social resources, the higher-status contact 
persons provincial leaders have gotten to know, and thus the more likely they are 
promoted. The variable of upper reachability is measured after answering the 
following important questions: (1) At what administrative ranks do provincial leaders 
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hold their positions? And (2) to what extent do provincial leaders access to the 
network center and power authority?  
 
Given the above questions, it turns out to be meaningful to distinguish provincial 
leaders with secretary experience from those without such backgrounds on one 
hand, and the CC members from the non-CC members on the other hand (Li & White, 
1988: 260). In terms of the former, as Li (2002: 1) states, “a mishu (秘书), therefore, 
can be an office clerk who only handles mail and files documents, but can also be a 
gatekeeper who decides what his or her boss needs to know, whom the boss sees, 
and even what is scheduled. Certainly a secretary-general (mishuzhang, 秘书长) or 
chief or staff, plays an important administrative role”. Out of 1,260 provincial leaders 
under study, 672 had work experience of secretary (mishu) or secretary-general 
(mishuzhang) (53.33%). In terms of the latter, the CC, together with the National 
Congress, is the highest leading body in Chinese politics. According to the Party 
Constitution of the CCP, the CC exercises influence and authority on the state 
policies and the election of top leaders, such as the Politburo members and the 
General Secretary35. Working as CC members increases the visibility and exposure to 
the top leaders. “Since all tasks are not equally observable nor all observers equally 
influential, visibility varies to the degree to which an individual is in a position to be 
observed by peers and superiors who can influence his movement in the 
organization” (Moore, 1978: 455). 315 out of 1,260 provincial leaders are the CC 
members (25%).  
 
On one hand, for provincial leaders without secretary experience or for the non-CC 
members, the upper reachability is regarded as the level of full positions above the 
administrative rank of provincial leaders themselves. For example, if a provincial 
leader serves as party secretary of the county-level CCP Committee, his own 
                                                        
35 See, Xinhua Net, 2013. Full Text of Constitution of Communist Party of China. 
[Online] (Updated 29 March 2013). Available at: 
http://english.cpc.people.com.cn/206972/206981/8188065.html. [Accessed 8 May 
2015]. It is stipulated in the Party Constitution “when the National Congress is not in 
session, the Central Committee carries out its resolutions, directs the entire work of 
the Party and represents the Communist Party of China in its external relations”.  
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administrative rank is the division-head level. His upper reachability is the bureau-
director level. This measurement is based on lines of authority and power 
relationships in Chinese bureaucracies. It is potentially consistent with the 
institutional norms of reporting responsibilities to higher-level organizations in China. 
On the other hand, for the CC members, the upper reachability is coded as the state-
leader level. For provincial leaders working as secretaries, the measurement of 
upper reachability becomes more complicated. The magnitude of upper reachability 
is equal to the administrative ranks for their superiors. For example, Liu Qibao (刘奇
葆) is currently working as Politburo member and Minister of Central Publicity 
Department. He worked a secretary for Wan Li (万里), then party secretary of Anhui 
Province from 1977 to 1980. Although merely at the section-head administrative 
rank, Liu’s upper reachability was the provincial/ministerial level where Wan Li took 
on his authority position. Liu was positioned advantageously at the center of social 
networks and maintained exposure to decision-makers in Anhui’s power structure. 
Again, consider, for example, current vice provincial governor of Shandong, Sun Wei 
(孙伟), was the personal secretary of Wu Bangguo (吴邦国), then Vice Premier. 
Although Sun was ranked at the bureau/director level, his upper reachability was the 
state-leader level.  
 
3.3.4 Control Variables 
 
Control variables in this thesis are age, gender, ethnicity, insiders vs. outsiders, and 
CCP membership. As mentioned in Section 3.3.1, time is a multifaceted variable. It is 
measured in the form of historical periods (or, calendar year) in the analysis of 
leadership promotion. The historical comparisons of the promotion dynamics in this 
thesis are based on the division of three historical periods, which will be explored 
later in Chapter 8. Age, however, may also exert strong influences on upward 
mobility. It is treated as a control variable in the promotion modeling.  
 
Gender is a categorical variable, with male coded as 0 and female as 1. Ethnicity is 
also a categorical variable, with the Han Chinese coded as 1 and the ethnic minority 
 
 
98 
as 0. Both of gender and ethnicity are time-constant variables. To compare the role 
of native and non-native leaders, provincial leaders are categorized into two groups, 
with native leaders coded as 1 and outsiders coded as 0. The variable of insiders vs. 
outsiders is time-dependent. Its value changes whenever provincial leaders 
experience job transfers across provinces. CCP membership enters the promotion 
modeling as a control variable as well. The variable of CCP membership is coded as 1 
for CCP members and otherwise as 0.  
 
This section closes the introduction of outcomes and predictor variables with a 
summary of operational definitions in Table 9.  
 
Table 9 A Summary of Variables and Operational Definitions, 2013 
Variable Operational Definition 
Dependent Variable 
Promotion, L4-L11 Was a provincial leader promoted: Yes=1, No=0 
Covariates 
Age Chronological age 
Gender Male=0, Female=1 
Ethnicity Han-Chinese=1, minorities=0 
Insiders vs. Outsiders Is a provincial leader a native leader?  
 
Native leaders=1, outsiders=0 
CCP membership Is a provincial leader a CCP member?  
 
Yes=1, No=0 
CCP seniority For how long has a provincial leader been a CCP member?  
Educational level What educational level has a provincial leader obtained?  
 
1=Primary school 
 
2=Junior high school 
 
3=Senior high school 
 
4=Vocational school 
 
5=Some college 
 
6=Undergraduate study 
 
7=Postgraduate study 
 
8=Doctoral study 
Academic major What was a provincial leader majored?  
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1=Science 
 
2=Humanities and social science 
Network size What is the size of networks accessible for provincial leaders? 
Network diversity How many career patterns has a provincial leader experienced? 
Upper reachability 
What is the highest administrative rank accessible for provincial 
leaders? 
Source: Author’s database. 
 
3.3.5 Person-Year Observations 
 
After examining the observation period and variables in the statistical modeling, this 
section proceeds to formulate the coding structure and data input. As discussed in 
Section 3.1 and 3.3.1, the leadership data in this thesis is arranged into the person-
year data structure from a longitudinal perspective.  Before moving to the practical 
coding procedures, it is worthwhile to note the strengths and limitations of the 
person-year format.  
 
The person-year data structure easily and successfully accommodates the time-
varying covariates of human and social capital on the calendar-year time dimension 
(Tarling, 2009: 187). For the dependent variable, there exists likelihood that more 
than one provincial leader experiences upward mobility in the same year. It is 
considered as the problem with ties. However, the tied promotions outcomes fit 
readily into the person-year data structure at discrete time points (Yamaguchi, 1991: 
16-17; Tarling, 2009: 187).  With the temporal records of both promotion outcomes 
and relevant covariates, the coding structure is clear and well understood. For data 
analysis, it is appropriate to run the person-year data in the standard logistic 
regression, which will be articulated in the next section. Compared with the 
advantages, one of the most significant disadvantages is that it is time-consuming to 
create a person-year dataset (Yamaguchi, 1991: 23-24). The record file is 
extraordinarily huge if the longitudinal data for each provincial leader covers the full 
course of career histories. In this thesis, there are 1,260 Chinese provincial leaders in 
the sample. They have an average of 26.63 years by the end of observation periods. 
The leadership dataset incorporates 33,557 observational records totally.  
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 In the person-year data organization, one research subject generally contributes 
multiple observational records to the leadership dataset. This remarkably differs 
from the standard data structure in which one research subject contributes one 
observational record. The person-year record file explicitly contains the useful 
information on when and whether promotions occur, together with the values of 
human and social capital. The number of observational records depends upon the 
length of time across observation periods. In this thesis, the origin of time depends 
on when provincial leaders experience promotion at the prior administrative rank, 
which has been already discussed in Section 3.3.1. Provincial leaders were expected 
to enter into the risk set of promotion then. In the person-year data structure, a 
separate record is created every year for each provincial leader. Because the 
leadership promotions are repeatable, the promotion at every administrative rank is 
regarded as a distinct observation (Tarling, 2009: 191).   
 
Table 10 presents an illustrative and informative example of Yuan Chunqing’s  (袁纯
清) person-year record file in leadership promotion analysis. In Table 10, the variable 
of ID is a sequential number for 1,260 provincial leaders. Yuan is currently working as 
party secretary of Shanxi Province and director of Standing Committee of Shanxi’s 
PPC. He was born in 1952 and started working as a police officer in Hanshou County, 
Hunan Province in 1971. As noted in Section 3.3.2, the event occurrence of interest 
focuses on the promotions at administrative ranks from the deputy-section-head 
level to the state-leader level. Meanwhile, the biographic details before Yuan’s 
promotion to the deputy-section-head level is obscured. Accordingly, the starting 
time point is the year of 1982, when Yuan worked as a deputy section chief at 
Department of Schools within CCYL. Since he is staying in the leadership post after 
October 2013, the ending point is the year of 2013. The variable of AGE is 
chronological, being calculated by the value of YEAR minus birth year. Thus, Yuan”s 
observation period spans from 1982 to 2013, with a total of 32 observational records. 
The variable of AGE is from 30 to 61. As for Yuan’s demographic characteristics, the 
variables of GD (namely, gender) and ETH (namely, ethnicity) are denoted as 0 and 1 
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respectively, indicating that he is male and Han Chinese. Since he joined the CCP in 
1971, a value of 1 is assigned to the variable of CCP (namely, a CCP member).  
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Table 10 A Person-Year Record File in the Case of Yuan Chunqing, 2013 
ID NAME YEAR AGE GD ETH NAT CCP EDU MAJ SIZE DIV UR LEVEL PROMO 
1084 Yuan 1982 30 0 1 0 1 6 2 4 2 7 4 1 
1084 Yuan 1983 31 0 1 0 1 6 2 4 2 7 4 0 
1084 Yuan 1984 32 0 1 0 1 6 2 5 2 7 5 1 
1084 Yuan 1985 33 0 1 0 1 6 2 6 2 9 6 1 
1084 Yuan 1986 34 0 1 0 1 6 2 6 2 9 6 0 
1084 Yuan 1987 35 0 1 0 1 6 2 6 2 9 7 1 
1084 Yuan 1988 36 0 1 0 1 6 2 7 2 9 7 0 
1084 Yuan 1989 37 0 1 0 1 6 2 7 2 9 7 0 
1084 Yuan 1990 38 0 1 0 1 7 2 7 2 9 7 0 
1084 Yuan 1991 39 0 1 0 1 7 2 7 2 9 7 0 
1084 Yuan 1992 40 0 1 0 1 7 2 8 2 11 8 1 
1084 Yuan 1993 41 0 1 0 1 7 2 10 3 11 8 0 
1084 Yuan 1994 42 0 1 0 1 7 2 11 3 11 8 0 
1084 Yuan 1995 43 0 1 0 1 7 2 12 4 11 8 0 
1084 Yuan 1996 44 0 1 0 1 7 2 12 4 11 8 0 
1084 Yuan 1997 45 0 1 0 1 8 2 14 5 11 8 0 
1084 Yuan 1998 46 0 1 0 1 8 2 14 5 11 8 0 
1084 Yuan 1999 47 0 1 0 1 8 2 14 5 11 8 0 
1084 Yuan 2000 48 0 1 0 1 8 2 14 5 11 8 0 
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Source: Author’s database.  
 
1084 Yuan 2001 49 0 1 0 1 8 2 15 5 11 8 0 
1084 Yuan 2002 50 0 1 0 1 8 2 16 5 11 8 0 
1084 Yuan 2003 51 0 1 0 1 8 2 17 6 11 8 0 
1084 Yuan 2004 52 0 1 0 1 8 2 19 7 11 8 0 
1084 Yuan 2005 53 0 1 0 1 8 2 19 7 11 8 0 
1084 Yuan 2006 54 0 1 0 1 8 2 20 8 11 9 1 
1084 Yuan 2007 55 0 1 0 1 8 2 21 8 11 9 0 
1084 Yuan 2008 56 0 1 0 1 8 2 21 8 11 9 0 
1084 Yuan 2009 57 0 1 0 1 8 2 21 8 11 9 0 
1084 Yuan 2010 58 0 1 0 1 8 2 23 8 11 9 0 
1084 Yuan 2011 59 0 1 0 1 8 2 23 8 11 9 0 
1084 Yuan 2012 60 0 1 0 1 8 2 23 8 11 9 0 
1084 Yuan 2013 61 0 1 0 1 8 2 23 8 11 9 0 
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As to educational attainment in Table 10, Yuan studied in Peking University in the 
major of law between 1977 and 1980. It is assumed that Yuan received the 
educational level of senior high school before the undergraduate study. Thus, the 
value of EDU retains 3 until 1980, with the variable of MAJ (namely, major) coded as 
0. Yuan took his master degree of law from China University of Political Studies and 
Law in 1990. Accordingly, between the year 1980 and 1989, the variable of EDU took 
6 for the undergraduate study and MAJ took 2 for humanities and social science. The 
variable of EDU is coded as 7 and MAJ as 2 from 1990 to 1996. In 1997, Yuan was 
awarded the doctoral degree of management from Hunan University, with EDU 
coded as 8 and MAJ as 2. In this way, it is straightforward to trace the changes in 
Yuan’s education. 
 
Based on Yuan’s career history, Table 11 illustrates how to code the variables of SIZE 
(or network size), DIV (or network diversity and UR (or upper reachability). It is 
interesting to note that Yuan has a network size of 23, network diversity of 8 and 
upper reachability of the state-leader level. In his career trajectory, he spent 17 
years working in the CCYL from 1980 to 1997. Yuan has experienced a sequence of 
career patterns, such as police/court, social organization, CPPCC, party work, 
audit/supervision, education, government administration and People’s Congress.  
 
Table 11 A Coding Example of Social Capital for Yuan Chunqing, 2013 
Period Job Size Diversity UR 
1971-1975 Police Officer, Public Security Bureau, Hanshou 
County, Hunan Province 
1 1 3 
1975-1977 Police Officer, Public Security Bureau, Changde 
Prefecture, Hunan Province 
2 1 3 
1977-1980 Student, Peking University 2 1 3 
1980-1982 Clerk, Department of Schools, CCYL 3 2 3 
1982-1984 Deputy Section Chief, Department of Schools, 
CCYL 
4 2 7 
1984-1985 Director, School Union Office, Department of 
Schools, CCYL 
5 2 7 
1985-1987 Deputy Director, Department of School, CCYL 6 2 9 
1987-1992 Director, Department of Schools, CCYL 6 2 9 
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1988-1993 Secretary-General, All-China Students 
Federation 
7 2 9 
1992-1997 Secretary, Secretariat of CCYL 8 2 11 
1993-1998 Deputy Director, Subcommittee of Social and 
Legal Affairs, CPPCC 
9 3 11 
1993-1995 Director, National Working Commission of 
Young Pioneers of China 
10 3 11 
1994-1997 Vice Chairman, All-China Youth Federation 11 3 11 
1995-1997 Party Secretary, Central Office of CCYL 12 4 11 
1997-2002 Secretary-General, CCDI 13 5 11 
1997-2000 Party Secretary, Department of Supervision, 
CCDI 
14 5 11 
2001-2010 Deputy Party Secretary, Shaanxi Province 15 5 11 
2002-2007 Alternate Member, the 16th CC 16 5 11 
2003-2004 Vice President, China Yan’an Executive 
Leadership Academy 
17 6 11 
2004-2006 Party Secretary, Xi’an City, Shaanxi Province 18 6 11 
Director, Standing Committee of Xi’an MPC, 
Shaanxi Province 
19 7 11 
2006-2010 Provincial Governor, Shaanxi Province 20 8 11 
2007-2010 Secretary, Shaanxi Provincial Government 21 8 11 
2007-
present 
Member, the 17th and 18th CC 21 8 11 
2010-
present 
Party Secretary, Shanxi Province 22 8 11 
Director, Standing Committee of Shanxi PPC 23 8 11 
Source: Author’s database. 
 
To look at the promotion dynamics, the coding starts from the deputy-division-head 
level to the state-leader level, as stated in Section 3.3.2. The variable of LEVEL is in 
turn assigned the values of 4 to 9, representing the specific administrative ranks 
Yuan has assumed from the deputy-division-head level to the provincial/ministerial 
level. Returning to Table 10, the column of PROMO represent distinct observational 
records for upward mobility across hierarchical rankings. The value of promotion at 
every administrative rank retains 0 until the promotion event occurs. It is coded as 1 
in a specific year when provincial leaders gets promoted. After the promotion 
occurrence, it takes 0 again. According to Table 10, Yuan started to obtain the 
deputy-division-head status in 1982 and advanced up to division-head level after two 
 
 
106 
years in 198436. Thus, PROMO is coded as 0 for the promotion nonoccurrence before 
1982 and 1 in 1982. Since 1983, PROMO retains 0. In this way, PROMO takes the 
value of 1 for upward mobility in Year 1982, 1984, 1985, 1987, 1992, and 2006, 
respectively. That is to say, Yuan successfully got promoted from the deputy-section-
head level to the provincial/ministerial level step by step within 24 years. Since it is 
too early to identify if Yuan will climb one step forward, PROMO is coded as 0 from 
2007 to 2013. 
 
To conclude, the construction of the person-year record file is overwhelmingly 
complicated, particularly for indicators of network size, network diversity and upper 
reachability. Based on career trajectories, the coding of social capital is closely 
associated with the organizational reforms in China. It warrants cautious analysis and 
interpretation. For instance, Fu Ziying (傅自应), current vice provincial governor of 
Jiangsu, has worked in a realm of economics and commerce for 30 years, 1981-2011. 
In terms of leadership profile, Fu actually stayed working in the same organization, 
despite the frequent changes in organization’s names. Specifically, Ministry of 
Foreign Economic Relations and Trade was renamed to Ministry of Foreign trade and 
Economic Co-operation in March 1993. In 2003, it was further restructured to 
Ministry of Commerce37. Regardless of the reorganization of Ministry of Commerce, 
it is tempting to overestimate Fu’s network size.   
 
                                                        
36 In the present example, it is specified that Yuan served as clerk and deputy 
section chief in Department of Schools, CCYL between January 1980 and June 1984. 
The exact time of being promoted to deputy section chief is missing. In this case, the 
possible solution is to divide the length of time working as clerk and deputy section 
chief and get an average of 26.5 months. The promotion time is assumed to be the 
year of 1982. Although far from ideal, this strategy attempts to solve the data-
missing problems for promotions outcomes in some occasions.  
 
37 See, Ministry of Commerce of the People’s Republic of China, n.d., Historical 
Overview of Ministry of Commerce （商务部机构沿革). [Online]. (Updated n.d.) 
Available at: http://www.mofcom.gov.cn/mofcom/yange.shtml. [Accessed 10 June 
2014]. 
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3.4 Data Analysis 
 
Data analysis in this thesis is primarily organized around two parts. One is the 
descriptive study of leadership characteristics and human capital in Chapter 4 and 5. 
As mentioned previously, the sample under examination is 1,891 Chinese provincial 
leaders from 1990 to 2013, regardless of double-counting issues. In the form of 
event-history statistical data, the dataset incorporate 9,814 observational records. 
With this dataset, Chapter 4 and 5 shed important light on provincial leadership 
transformation and historical changes in human capital, asking who are Chinese 
provincial leaders over the period of 1990-2013. In terms of the dynamic analysis of 
educational changes in Chapter 5, the observation period is extended from the 
career stages as provincial chiefs to the entire occupational careers. This analysis is 
focused on the occurrence of educational advancement, asking at what age and at 
what administrative rank provincial leaders improved their educational credentials.   
 
The investigation of social capital and elite mobility is based on the processes of 
accumulating and advancing hierarchical positions across eight administrative ranks. 
The primary interest here is to look at the entire course of career progress, not 
limited to the career intervals of attaining provincial authority positions.  It is 
guaranteed that each provincial leader in question has a single observational record 
on the yearly basis. An individual observation should subsume the comprehensive 
statistical details of demographic attributes, educational histories, the accumulation 
process of social capital and career trajectories. For this reason, the analysis in this 
part depends on the event-history data of 1,260 provincial leaders, rather than 1,891. 
The double-counting issues are taken into account. As stated earlier, the second 
leadership dataset contains 33,557 event-history observations. 
 
In creating the person-year record file, the observation periods are measured by 
year. The discrete-time model is strongly recommended here, considering the large 
time interval, the inclusion of time-varying covariates and the presence of tied 
promotions as emphasized earlier (Allison, 1982: 63, 1984: 15; Box-Steffensmeier & 
Jones, 1997: 1426; Mills, 2010, 4; Singer & Willett, 1993: 189; Tarling, 2009: 184; 
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Yamaguchi, 1991: 16-17). The next important issue to be considered is whether to 
treat all the promotions alike or distinguish promotions at different administrative 
ranks. In this thesis, the promotion models for the 1990-2013 Chinese provincial 
leaders are developed in two steps. That is, the overall promotion model irrespective 
of the variations across hierarchical levels, along with seven independent promotion 
sub-models for each administrative rank. In both the overall promotion model and 
the rank-specific promotion models, the historical continuities and changes in the 
promotion dynamics are studied. The procedures of modeling are briefly described 
below and will be introduced in details at the beginning of Chapter 8.  
 
The first step is to pool all the observations together and examine the promotion 
patterns as a whole. In this case, the promotional events for provincial leaders are 
repeatable because a broad majority of them experienced multiple promotions 
throughout their careers. In the course of statistical analysis, the problem of 
statistical dependence stems from repeated events. As indicated by Allison (1995: 
240), “it is well-known that whenever two or more observations come from the 
same unit (person, litter, organization), they tend to be more alike than two 
randomly chosen observations.” “Dependence among observations can be thought 
of as arising from unobserved heterogeneity.” (Allison, 1995: 240). This 
phenomenon is likely to apply to the elite mobility in China. Not surprisingly, 
provincial leaders with an early career success are more likely to win out in the 
political mobility at the successive administrative ranks. It is perhaps easily 
overlooked and constant individual determinants that lead to the similar outcomes 
in each round of political competitions. Their effects, however, are not included in 
the modeling. In addition, upward mobility between adjacent administrative ranks is 
correlated because of the step-by-step promotion institutions in China. Therefore, 
the neglect of dependence and unobserved heterogeneity will result in the 
misleading standard and biased error estimates (Allison, 1995: 233-240).  
 
In response to these difficulties, the method of generalized estimating equations 
(GEE) is employed to analyze the general promotion model in this thesis. GEE allows 
for within-person dependence in logistic regression analyses. It is appropriate to 
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accommodate correlated observations in a single model (Zhou, 2001: 1049-1050). 
Using GEE through the software of Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS), 
it is feasible to identify multiple promotions that occur to the same provincial leader.  
 
The second step is to take insight into the variations in promotion dynamics across 
administrative ranks. The above leadership dataset with 33,557 event-history 
observations is divided into seven subsets independently. The primary concern here 
is to identify the observation period for each separate model. The observation is 
terminated upon the promotion occurrence at the administrative rank under 
investigation. As suggested by Allison (2010: 418), “if repeated events are observed 
for an individual, the standard strategy is to reset the clock to 0 each time an event 
occurs and treat the intervals between events as distinct observations.” 
Operationally, for example, Gan Lin (甘霖), current vice governor of Sichuan, has 
experienced five promotions from the section-head level to the vice 
provincial/ministerial level. Distinct sequences of observations are created in terms 
of each career interval between two adjacent levels. The first sequence is from Gan’s 
working as section chief to deputy director of Police Research Office of Huizhou’s 
CCP, Guangdong during the period of 1993-1995. It is accordingly added to the 
subset pertaining to the upward mobility at the deputy-division-head level. After 
collecting the relevant observations, reset the clock to 0. The second sequence 
ranges from Gan’s career advancement from deputy director of Policy Research 
Office in 1995 to director of Investigation and Research Office of Guangdong’s 
Organization Department in 1999. It is added to the subset of promotion at the 
division-head level. By the same token, the remaining 3 sequences related to 
promotion occurrences are collected. Gan’s current administrative rank is the vice 
provincial/ministerial level and no further promotion is observed until 2013.  The 
observations after the last promotion are right censored, as discussed in the 
foregoing sections.  
 
Table 12 Chinese Leadership Subsets for Promotion Analyses, 1990-2013 
Administrative Rank Obs. Promotion Occurrence 
Deputy-Division-Head Level 1564 611 
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Division-Head Level 3026 662 
Deputy-Bureau/Director Level 3943 948 
Bureau/Director Level 5854 1027 
Vice-Provincial/Ministerial Level 7751 1217 
Provincial/Ministerial Level 12226 454 
Vice-State-Leader Level 4386 81 
Source: Author’s database. 
 
Table 12 summarizes the sample size of seven leadership subsets for analyzing 
promotion dynamics across seven administrative ranks. The discrete-time event-
history data in each separate subset is further analyzed in logistic regression models 
(Singer & Willett, 1993: 189; Yamaguchi, 1991: 19). 
 
Suppose that, P (t) is the probability of promotion at time t, given that a provincial 
leader is at risk of getting promoted at time t. To analyze how the explanatory 
covariates affect promotion outcomes, a linear function is generated:  
 
P (t)=a+b1x1+b2x2 (t)                                                          [1] 
 
For t=1, 2, 3, … a is the intercept. x1 is the time-constant covariate while x2 is the 
time-varying covariate. Since the probability of P (t) is greater than 0 and less than 1, 
the above linear function is presented in the logit transformation: 
 
Log (P (t)/(1-P (t)=a+b1x1+b2x2 (t)                                             [2] 
 
This thesis undertook the statistical analysis of the event-history dataset for Chinese 
provincial leaders in logistic regression of SPSS.  
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Chapter 4 Chinese Provincial Leaders: A Demographic Analysis 
 
This chapter is interested in answering a basic question of who are the Chinese 
provincial leaders over the period of 1990-2013. The demographic analysis is 
generally organized around the leadership backgrounds of age, gender, ethnicity, 
provincial origins and CCP membership, respectively38. Historical trends of each 
criterion will be formulated by analyzing the person-year leadership biographic data 
from 1990 to 2013. Given the same selection of four leadership categories and 
individual-year coding, the longitudinal analysis will be extended by comparing the 
1990-2013 provincial leaders and Bo’s (2002) 1949-1998 data. On the basis of the 
empirical findings, in-depth interpretations are directed toward the CCP’s history 
and the institutionalization of leadership selection and cadre management. The 
chapter will conclude with a discussion of the rise of the CR generation in provincial 
politics.  
 
4.1 Age 
 
On the whole, the average age for Chinese provincial leaders is 55.21 years, as 
compared with 55.50 years during the period of 1949-1998. In terms of different 
titles, the average age is 59.36 years for party secretaries, 57.56 for provincial 
governors, 55.86 for deputy secretaries and 53.72 for vice governors. By comparison, 
the 1949-1998 leadership profile shows that the average age is 57 for party 
secretaries, 56.80 for provincial governors, 54.50 for deputy secretaries and 55.70 
for vice governors (Bo, 2002: 37-38). Thus, with the exception of vice governors, the 
average age is mostly higher for party secretaries, governors and deputy secretaries 
                                                        
38  Empirical analysis in this chapter is primarily based on 9,814 person-year 
observations for the 1990-2013 provincial leaders, including the descriptions of 
general patterns and historical trends. Given the limited number of provincial 
leaders, Section 3.2 focuses on 131 female leaders to more closely examine the 
recruitment criteria and leadership transformation. When formulating the 
educational and career backgrounds of non-communist leaders, Section 3.5 turns to 
the cross-sectional data of 92 non-communist vice governors.  
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from 1990 to 2013 than from 1949 to 1998. On the other hand, consistent with the 
1949-1998 findings, the ascending order of the average age to a greater extent 
represents the elite status and power because party secretaries and governors at the 
full-ministerial level are older than deputy secretaries and vice governors at the vice-
ministerial level (Bo, 2002: 37).  
 
It is more meaningful to understand the standard deviation, minimum and maximum 
age by comparing the 1949-1998 and 1990-2013 provincial leaders. In Bo’s study 
(2002), the standard deviation for Chinese provincial leaders approximates to eight 
years for both the total sample and leadership groups of different titles. The ages 
range from 18 to 90 years for all the 1949-1998 leaders. However, as illustrated in 
Table 13, the standard deviation of ages is 4.82 for the 1990-2013 provincial leaders 
and the age ranges from 36 to 70. In this sense, the ages of the 1990-2013 Chinese 
provincial leaders are remarkably less dispersed and there is less volatility. This is 
primarily due to the institutionalized leadership selection in the reforming era, which 
receives further analysis below.  
 
Table 13 Ages of Chinese Provincial Leaders, 1990-2013 
Title Obs Mean Stad. Dev. Min Max 
Secretary 891 59.36 4.31 46 70 
Governor 908 57.56 4.38 42 67 
Deputy Secretary 2869 55.86 4.55 40 69 
Vice Governor 5146 53.72 4.45 36 70 
Total 9814 55.21 4.82 36 70 
Source: Author’s database 
 
From a longitudinal perspective, Figure 3 outlines the relatively steady presence of 
age for the 1990-2013 provincial leaders. The average age for provincial leaders is in 
the mid-50s every year. The stability in the average age is divergent from the steadily 
growing tendency in 1949-1980 and the dramatic decline in the 1980s (Bo, 2002: 37-
38). Bo (2002: 39) places the discussion on changes in the average age from 1949 to 
1998 in the Chinese context of political turmoil, such as Great Leap Forward 
Campaign and the CR (Bo, 2002: 37-39). In addition, the youthful rejuvenation in the 
1980s virtually originated from the introduction of the retirement systems for aging 
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senior leaders during Deng’s era (Lee, 1991: 234-245). Since the late 1990s, the 
institutional transformations of leadership replacement have been vigorously 
consolidated (Zang, 2005: 208-209). It effectively helps to explain why the average 
age has stabilized since the 1990s, as noted in the following.  
 
 
Figure 3 Age of Chinese Provincial Leaders, 1990-2013 
 
In what way has the process of institutionalization affected the average age and age 
structures of Chinese provincial leaders? On one hand, the institutional 
arrangements of age limit and term limit allow for bringing the younger generation 
into the leadership and the veterans’ exit from the official posts (Kou, 2002; Kou, 
Huang & Fan, 2006: 5-13; Zeng, 2013: 224). As formulated in Table 14, as early as 
1982, the provisions relating to the retirement system stipulated that the full-
ministerial leaders must be younger than 65 years and the vice-ministerial 60 years 
(Landry, 2003: 38-39)39. The provisions in 1992, 1995 and 2000 were promulgated to 
recruit younger cohorts into the positions of power and authority. In 1998 and 2000, 
                                                        
39 People’s Daily Online, 1982. “Zhonggong zhongyang guanyu jianli laoganbu tuixiu 
zhidu de jueding” (CCP Decision on the Retirement System of Senior Cadres, 中共中
央关于建立老干部退休制度的决定) [Online]. (Updated 20 Feb 1982) Available at: 
http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/64162/71380/71387/71591/4854975.html [accessed 
07 Oct 2014] 
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more regulations were issued to develop the ruling coalition of different birth 
cohorts. The above provisional efforts ultimately led to the elite formation of 
middle-aged provincial leaders and the emergence of leaders younger than 50 years 
old. More importantly, the upper age limitation on promotion eligibility further 
hinders the career advancement of aging cadres at each administrative level40. For 
instance, although adopted differently across regions in China, the upper age 
limitation averages appear to be 58 years for the vice-ministerial rank and 63 years 
for the full-ministerial rank (Kou & Tsai, 2014: 157). In other words, a vice-ministerial 
leader aged 58 will be eliminated from the promotional competition to the full-
ministerial position. Parallel to age limit, term limit rules out the possibility of the 
monopoly of power for over two consecutive terms of office.  The 1982 Constitution 
stresses that each term of office is subject to five years. In summary, the 
mechanisms of age and term restrictions have markedly engendered the leadership 
vitality and rejuvenation. 
                                                        
40 For a systematic presentation of age limits in Chinese leadership selection, see 
Chien-Wen Kou and Wen-Hsuan Tsai, “’Sprinting with Small Steps’ Towards 
Promotion: Solutions for the Age Dilemma in the CCP Cadre Appointment System” 
The China Journal, no. 71 (January 2014): 153-171. 
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Table 14 Regulations on Age and Tenure for Chinese Provincial Leaders, 2013 
Year Content of Regulations Source 
1982/02 
The age of full-ministerial leaders is in principle no more than 65 years.  
The age of vice-ministerial leaders is no more than 60 years. 
Zhonggong zhongyang guanyu jianli laoganbu 
tuixiu zhidu de jueding (CCP Decision on the 
Retirement System of Senior Cadres) 
1982/09 
Party cadres should be more revolutionary, younger in average age, better 
educated and more professionally competence. 
Zhongguo gongchandang zhangcheng 
(Constitution of Communist Party of China) 
1982/10 
In the CCP provincial committee, at least one leader is younger than 55 
years old from the second- or third-in-command.  
At least one third of members of the CCP provincial standing committee 
are younger than 55 years old.  
Guanyu shengji lingdao banzi peizhi de jidian 
yuanze yijian de tongzhi (CCP Announcement on 
Staffing Structure of Provincial Leadership) 
1982/12 Each term for provincial government leaders is subject to five years. The 1982 Constitution 
1992/11 
At the provincial level, there are generally party leaders and two 
government leaders younger than 50 years old.  
There are at least one party leader and one government leader in the mid-
45s.  
Zhonggong zhongyang zuzhibu guanyu jiji dadan 
de zuohao xuanba nianqing ganbu gongzuo de 
tongzhi (Central Organization Department of the 
CCP’s Announcement on Recruiting Young 
Cadres) 
1998/06 
At the provincial level, both the party and government leadership systems 
should consist of leaders at the ages of 60, 55 and 45.  
There are three party leaders and two government leaders younger than 
50 years old.  
Among them, there is at least one in the mid-40s.  
A certain number of party and government leaders aged around 50 obtain 
the leading positions of full titles.  
1998-2003 quanguo dangzheng lingdao banzi 
jianshe guihua gangyao (Development Program 
Concerning the Establishment of a National 
Party and State Leadership for 1998-2003) 
1999/04, 
2006/08 
Leading party and government cadres above the county-level should 
receive a transfer after serving in the same position for ten years.  
This exchange policy also applies to the party and government leaders 
Dangzheng lingdao ganbu jiaoliu gongzuo 
zanxing guiding (Interim Provisions on Exchange 
Work for Party and Government Leading 
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with a seniority of ten years at the same locality and at the same level.  Cadres) 
Dangzheng lingdao ganbu jiaoliu gongzuo 
guiding (Provisions on Exchange Work for Party 
and Government Leading Cadres) 
2000/09 
At the provincial level, both the party and government system should 
strive to recruit cadres younger than 50 years old if the number of this 
group is lower than 5.  
The number of cadres aged 50 must be increased for the leadership 
positions of full titles.  
Zhonggong zhongyang zuzhibu guanyu jinyibu 
zuohao peiyang xuanba youxiu nianqing ganbu 
gongzuo de yijian (The Organization Department 
of the CCP’s Notice on Training and Selecting 
Young Cadres) 
2002/07 
Young cadres should be selected and recruited into the party and 
government systems.  
Leading party and government cadres above the county-level should 
receive a transfer after serving in the same position for ten years.  
Generally, the party and government leading cadres of full titles do not 
receive transfers at the same time. 
In principle, party and government leaders should complete each term of 
five years. 
The cadres above the county-level who get promoted should obtain over 
two positions at the prior administrative level.  
 To get promoted from the deputy position to the full title, the cadres 
above the county-level should serve in the deputy position for over two 
years.  
To get promoted from the full title to the deputy position of the upper 
level, the cadres above the county-level should serve in the prior position 
for over three years. 
The party and government cadres in generally get promoted step by step.  
Dangzheng lingdao ganbu xuanba renyong 
gongzuo tiaoli (Regulations on Selecting and 
Appointing Party and Government Leading 
Cadres) 
2006/08 
Each term of office is subject to five years and should be completed 
without interruption for party and government leaders. 
Dangzheng lingdao ganbu zhiwu renqi zanxing 
guiding (Interim Provisions on the Term of 
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 For the special job requirements, leading cadres should not change their 
posts more than once within one term of tenure.  
Office for Party and Government Leading 
Cadres) 
Source: Kou, C.W., 2010. Zhonggong jingying zhengzhi de yanbian: zhiduhua yu quanli zhuanyi 1978-2010(The evolution of Chinese Elite 
Politics: Institutionalization and Power Transfer, 1978-2010, 中共精英政治的演变：制度化与权力转移，1978－2010). Taipei: Wunan 
chubanshe. P. 271-27441.
                                                        
41 The summary of institutional mechanisms from Kou (2010) focuses on regulations relative to top leaders at the vice-ministerial level or 
above. In this chapter, it is restricted to the regulations relative to provincial leaders. On the basis of Kou’s (2010) formulation, three important 
official regulations are added to Table 14 in this chapter, namely Constitution of Communist Party of China in September 1982, regulations 
issued in November 1992, April 1994 and September 2000. Besides, as for Dangzheng lingdao ganbu xuanba renyong gongzuo tiaoli 
(Regulations on Selecting and Appointing Party and Government Leading Cadres, 党政领导干部选拔任用工作条例) on July 2002, more 
detailed articles are provided in Table 14.  
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In addition to age and term limits, on the other hand, the institutionalization of term 
integrity and step-by-step promotion maintains the leadership stability (Kou & Zang, 
2014: 7-8). In 2002, the fulfillment of the entire term of office became a formal 
condition for cadre selection and appointment to higher levels. In 2006, as specified 
in Article 4 of the “Interim Provisions for Party and Government Leading Cadre 
Tenure” (dangzheng lingdao ganbu zhiwu renqi zanxing guiding, 党政领导干部职务
任期暂行规定), it was again emphasized that the office holders should at least serve 
one term of five years without interruption 42 . Alongside term integrity, the 
mechanism of step-by-step promotion necessitates the accumulation of work 
experience at the prior administrative rank before getting ahead43. The waiting time 
along political and administrative ladders is predictable at every administrative rank. 
Within the rigid hierarchy, in theory, suppose that a cadre successfully gets 
promoted after serving each term and fails to get into the fast track.  This cadre’s 
possible duration time is 35 years for regular career progression from the deputy-
section-head level to the full-ministerial level (Kou & Tsai, 2014: 157-158). In this 
way, a vast majority of the provincial chiefs inevitably reach their mid-50s in line 
with the well-defined tenure regulations and promotion practices.  
 
                                                        
42  Xinhua Net, 2006. “Dangzheng lingdao ganbu zhiwu renqi zanxing guiding” 
(Interim Provisions on the Term of Office for Party and Government Leading Cadres, 
党政领导干部职务任期暂行规定) [Online]. (Updated 06 Aug 2006) Available at: 
http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2006-08/06/content_4926300.htm 
[accessed 07 Oct 2014] 
43 According to the 2002 regulation on cadre selection as specified in Table 14, 
cadres above the county-level who get promoted should obtain over two positions 
at the prior administrative level. To get promoted from the deputy position to the 
full title, the cadres above the county-level should serve in the deputy position for 
over two years. To get promoted from the full title to the deputy position of the 
upper level, the cadres above the county-level should serve in the prior position for 
over three years. For more details, please refer to: People.com.cn, 2002. “Dangzheng 
lingdao ganbu xuanba renyong gongzuo tiaoli” (Regulations on Selecting and 
Appointing Party and Government Leading Cadres, 党政领导干部选拔任用工作条
例 ) [Online]. (Updated 23 July 2002) Available at: 
http://www.people.com.cn/GB/shizheng/16/20020723/782504.html [accessed 08 
Oct 2014] 
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Underlying the stability in the average age is the combination of different birth 
cohorts. In Figure 4, the proportion of provincial leaders from every birth cohort 
declined as they reached the age of 60. To put this in another way, the ratio of the 
1930s cohort reached the peak in 1991, the 1940s cohort in 1999 and the 1950s 
cohort in 2011.  The core cohort in power was actively engaged in party and 
government affairs between the mid-50s and the mid-60s. Thereafter, it was 
gradually replaced by the younger cohort for leadership renewal. Consider the 
provincial leaders born in the 1940s for example. The proportion of the 1940s 
leadership group exceeded that of the 1930s cohort in 1994 and grew to 76.60% in 
1999. It substantially dropped to 50.80% in 2005 and finally reached 1.17% in 2013. 
The allocation of different birth cohorts plays a vital role in leadership 
transformation by reconciling the contrasting principle of leadership rejuvenation 
and stability.  
 
 
Figure 4 The Distribution of Chinese Provincial Leaders by Birth Cohort 
 
To look at the variations in the average age over time, Figure 5 demonstrates the 
positive correlation of seniority with the hierarchical ranks. Across the period of 
1990 and 2013, party secretaries are older than provincial governors, who are older 
than deputy party secretaries. Provincial vice governors are the youngest. For 
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provincial leaders of four titles, their average age remained stable within a narrow 
fluctuation of 2.50 years. This well-understood age structure conforms to the 
institutional foundation of step-by-step promotion, as mentioned previously. For 
party secretaries, the average age was reduced to the lowest point of 57.97 years old 
in 2003. There was a general tendency of declining average age from 60.31 to 57.97 
for party secretaries between 1990 and 2003 (Figure 5). This was partly due to the 
retirement and power transfer of revolutionary veterans44. Comparing provincial 
governors with deputy party secretaries, it is evident that the average ages almost 
fluctuated over time in a similar fashion. This pattern is primarily accounted for the 
fact that provincial governors concurrently assumed the positions of deputy party 
secretaries. As to vice governors, the peak value of the average age emerged one 
year before the large-scale personnel reshuffles. For every term of five years, the 
average age was turned into the lower point after the leadership replacement, 
namely in 1994, 1999, 2004 and 2009.  
 
 
Figure 5 Age of Chinese Provincial Leaders by Title, 1990-2013 
 
                                                        
44 For example, the senior leaders who stepped down from their leadership posts 
during this period are Xu Shijie (许士杰), Deng Hongxun (邓鸿勋), Li Ligong (李立
功), Li Ziqi (李子奇), Lin Ruo (林若) and Pu Chaozhu (普朝柱) and so on.  
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As compared to the above findings, the averages for 1949-1998 provincial leaders 
display a disparate picture. The CR drew two critical lines in 1967 and in 1978. From 
1949 to 1967, the average ages were greater for provincial government leaders than 
for party leaders (Bo, 2002: 39). It was surprisingly at odds with a widely held belief 
that seniority was positively related to power. From 1968 to 1977, the provincial 
leaders of full titles were older than those of deputy titles. Furthermore, Bo (2002: 
39) indicates that the average ages for party secretaries and provincial governors 
were the same for the most part. A possible explanation was embedded in the 
overlapping of responsibility and political roles for party secretaries to act as the 
chairman of the Revolutionary Committee (Bo, 2002: 39-40). After 1978, the order of 
average ages was similar to the 1990-2013 pattern. As Bo (2002: 40) discusses, “after 
almost thirty years, the age structure of Chinese provincial leaders seemed to start 
to correspond to the power structure of the provincial government: the older, the 
more powerful.” 
 
In summary, age is of particular importance for career prospects in Chinese political 
spheres. Consistent with the 1949-1998 elites, the 1990-2013 Chinese provincial 
leaders are middle-aged. However, a striking difference basically lies in the 
mainstream of stability in age structure from 1990 to 2013. For instance, the average 
age remains stable over time and the relative age gap among four leadership groups 
is largely held constant. The hallmark of stability in age during this period was 
shaped by the institutionalization of elite mobility. Rather, the changes in age 
structure for the 1949-1998 provincial elites are attributed to vivid historical events 
and the resulting social transformation over periods of the founding of P.R.C., Great 
Leap Forward Campaign, the CR, and the Open Door Policy and economic reforms.  
 
4.2 Gender 
 
As anticipated, Chinese provincial leaders are male-dominated from 1990 to 2013. 
Based on the person-year data, 738 out of 9,814 cases are female provincial leaders, 
approximately 7.52% as illustrated in Table 15. Specifically, 118 female leaders have 
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ever entered provincial leadership45. The female proportion is exceedingly small for 
provincial party secretaries and governors, only 0.67% and 1.54%, respectively. Over 
the period of 1990-2013, Sun Chunlan (孙春兰) is the only female party secretary 
since 2009 and was successfully elected as Politburo member in 2012. There are in 
total three female leaders with provincial governorship. Uyunqimg (乌云其木格) 
became to work as acting chairwoman of government in Inner Mongolia 
Autonomous Region in 2000. The highest ranking throughout her career is the vice-
state-leader level, namely, vice chairperson of the Standing Committee of NPC 
between 2003 and 2013. The second provincial governor is Song Xiuyan (宋秀岩) in 
Qinghai from 2005 to 2010. She is currently working as vice president of All-China 
Women’s Federation. Besides, Li Bin (李斌) took up the post of provincial governor 
of Anhui in 2012 and has presided over National Health and Family Planning 
                                                        
45 In this section, the proportions of female leaders by title and over time are drawn 
from 9,814 person-year observations. However, to look at the female leadership 
characteristics only, the longitudinal study of female leaders is more interested in 
female leadership transformation across four historical episodes. Each new female 
entrant is treated as an independent case. In fact, out of 118 female leaders, 11 
leaders assumed multiple leadership offices or worked in more than one province. In 
this case, they potentially provide more than one case. The number of female 
leaders under study is thereby 131 rather than 118. To be specific, Chen Jiwa (陈际
瓦) worked as vice governor of Chongqing Province from 2000 to 2003 and was 
elected deputy party secretary of Guangxi Province in 2008. Chen Yujie (陈玉杰) 
became deputy party secretary of Hebei Province in 1994 and was transferred to Jilin 
Province as deputy party secretary in 1996. Fan Xiaomei (范肖梅) was made vice 
governor of Shaanx Province in 1993 and was promoted to deputy party secretary in 
1998. Li Bin (李斌) took the post of vice governor in Jilin from 2001 to 2007 and 
advanced to the leading position of governor and deputy party secretary in Anhui 
Province in 2011. Qiao Chuanxiu (乔传秀) was the deputy party secretary in Anhui 
Province between 1999 and 2001 before moving to Zhejiang Province. Song Xiuyan (
宋秀岩) worked as provincial governor and deputy party secretary in Qinghai. Sun 
Chunlan (孙春兰) was elected as deputy party secretary in Liaoning from 1997 to 
2005, appointed as provincial governor in Fujian from 2009 to 2012 and in Tianjin in 
2012. Uyunqimg (乌云其木格) ever served as vice chairperson from 1998 to 2000, 
deputy party secretary from 1994 to 2003 and chairperson from 2000 to 2003 in 
Inner Mongolia. Wu Aiying (吴爱英) assumed the position of vice governor of 
Shandong Province from 1993 to 1998 and continued working as deputy party 
secretary from 1998 to 2003. Zhang Lianzhen (张连珍) entered provincial leadership 
in Jiangsu as vice governor from 1995 to 2003 and as deputy party secretary from 
2003 to 2008. 
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Commission since 2013. Bo’s (2002: 56) study of 1949-1998 female leaders identifies 
that only Wan Shaofen (万绍芬), promoted to party secretary of Jiangxi in 1985, and 
Gu Xiulian (顾秀莲), promoted to provincial governor of Jiangsu in 1983.  
 
Although overwhelmingly underrepresented in party secretaries and governors, 
female leaders constitute 6.62% of deputy party secretaries and 10.26% of vice 
governors (Table 15). Among 118 female leaders, 33 worked as deputy party 
secretaries and 92 were appointed as vice provincial governors. From the historical 
point of view, the female representation for deputy secretaries increased from 
2.79% during the period of 1949-1998 to 6.62% between 1990 and 2013. For vice 
governors, similarly, there was a rise from 4.84% in 1949-1998 to 10.26% between 
1990 and 2013. The seemingly growing female share in provincial politics reflects the 
impact of state policies on improving gender equality in recent years. For instance, it 
was stipulated that at least one female leader must be recruited into the political 
establishment at the provincial, municipal and county levels by 200346. The 2001-
2010 Development Program Concerning Females in China (2001-2010 zhongguo funv 
fazhan gangyao, 2001－2010 年中国妇女发展纲要) points out the possible 
channels for female political participation and the significant role of Women’s 
Federation47.  
 
Table 15 Female Provincial Leaders in China, 1990-2013 
Title Obs. Females Percent 
Party Secretary 891 6 0.67 
Governor 908 14 1.54 
Deputy Secretary 2869 190 6.62 
Vice Governor 5146 528 10.26 
                                                        
46  General Office of the CCP Central Committee, 1998. 1998-2003 quanguo 
dangzheng lingdao banzi jianshe guihua gangyao (Development Program Concerning 
the Establishment of a National Party and State Leadership for 1998-2003, 1998－
2003 年全国党政领导班子建设规划纲要 ) [Online]. (Updated 24 Jun 1998) 
Available at: http://hqjt.xmu.edu.cn/oldweb/djzc/gbgz/ldbz/1998[16].htm [accessed 
10 Oct 2014] 
47 For more details, please refer to the link: http://news.xinhuanet.com/ziliao/2003-
09/03/content_1061214.htm.  In 2011, the State Council promulgated the 2011-
2020 Development Program on Females in China and confirmed the continued 
efforts to promote the political positions and participations for females.  
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Total 9814 738 7.52 
Source: Author’s database. 
 
Consider the changes in the recruitment of female provincial chiefs over time. As 
elaborated by Bo (2002: 57-59), from 1949 to 1967, a small number of female 
leaders previously participating in revolutionary activities and local forces occupied 
the elite positions at the provincial level. During the CR, ordinary female peasants 
and workers unexpectedly rose to prominence, thereby leading to a significant 
increase in the female percentage (Bo, 2002: 57). They were considered as reliable 
supporters with party loyalty and ideological conformity (Zhou, Tuma & Moen, 1996: 
764). Their political careers were, however, largely disrupted because of the purges 
after the CR. From 1978 to 1998, a rapid retreat appeared in the selection of female 
leaders. For the 1990-2013 female leaders, Figure 6 shows a generally slackened 
growth in female representation from 4.49% in 1990 to 9.37% in 2003. After 2003, it 
modestly fluctuated between 7.69% and 10.19%.  
 
 
Figure 6 Female Provincial Leaders in China, 1990-2013 
 
To describe the unique historical changes in female leadership attributes, a wide 
spectrum of time ranging from 1990 to 2013 is divided into four historical episodes 
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of 1990-1997, 1998-2002, 2003-2012 and 2013 in Table 1648. There are a total of 131 
cases of female leaders under study. From 1990 to 1997, out of 37 cases, twelve 
female leaders were assigned to provincial leading posts before 1990. It is worth 
noting that in the 1970s Ba Sang (巴桑) and Zhang Yuqin (张玉芹) worked as vice 
chairpersons of Revolutionary Committee of Tibet and Guizhou, respectively. This 
group of female leaders witnessed the profound social transformation and “rushed 
growth” state policies in industrialization and redistributive economies (Zhou, 2004: 
36-39; Zhou, Tuma & Moen, 1996: 770). The nation-building objectives and 
development agenda accordingly fostered the marked educational expansion and 
resource allocation to heavy industry and engineering (Zhou, 2004: 75-80). Under 
such sociopolitical context, 83.78% of female leaders were college graduates. As a 
typical example, Liu Shuying (刘淑莹), former vice governor of Jilin Province, was 
awarded a doctoral degree of chemistry in 1985 in the United States of America 
(U.S.A.). In terms of academic majors, 25 out of 31 college-educated leaders 
majoring in science. After college graduation, they entered pertinent workforces in 
relation to major fields of study as a result of centralized allocation of employment 
opportunities. For instance, Wu Yi (吴仪), former vice premier, graduated from 
Beijing Petroleum Institute in the major of petroleum engineering in 1962. Wu 
worked as a petroleum technician in her early career. She spent 26 years in 
petroleum industry before becoming vice mayor of Beijing in 1988. Zhao Di (赵地), 
former deputy party secretary of Henan Province, was a college graduate majoring in 
liquid-rocket engine design from Northwestern Polytechnic University in 1962. She 
concentrated on specialization of engineering for 18 years at early and mid-careers.  
 
At the core of the 1990-1997 female provincial leadership was the prevalence of 
professionals, particularly in industry and engineering. Among 15 female leaders 
who acquired industry-related jobs (approximately 40.54%), 13 worked in industry 
                                                        
48 131 cases of female provincial leaders are categorized into four groups: (1) the 
officeholders of provincial leadership between 1990 and 1997; (2) new recruits who 
were promoted to provincial leadership between 1998 and 2002; (3) new recruits 
who were promoted to provincial leadership between 2003 and 2012; (4) new 
recruits who were promoted to provincial leadership in 2013.  
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for over ten years, including Li Huifen (李慧芬) (former vice mayor of Tianjin), Fan 
Xiaomei (范肖梅) (former deputy party secretary of Shaanxi), and Shen Shuji (沈淑
济) (former vice governor of Inner Mongolia) and so on. Out of 37 female leaders, 18 
worked in SOEs, approximately 48.65%. More importantly, the long tenure for over 
ten years was discernible within these organizations (12 out of 18 cases, 66.67%). 
One of the notable examples is former vice chairperson of Guangxi, Wang Rongzhen 
( 王蓉贞 ). She served in North China Pharmaceutical Factory and Guilin 
Pharmaceutical Factory for over 30 years.  
 
From 1998 to 2002, out of 20 new female recruits, SOES provided approximately 
66.67%. Nine female leaders worked in SOEs for over ten years. Although there were 
40% of new recruits engaged in industry, only four leaders possessed industry-
specific seniority for over ten years. Alongside the persistently high proportion of 
professionals, career trajectories for female leaders recruited between 1998 and 
2002 seemed to be more varied.  A sizeable majority experienced job shifts across 
functional divisions or authority positions at the provincial, municipal or county 
level. For instance, former vice governor of Sichuan, Li Jin (李进) started her career 
by working as a technician in Neijiang Machine Factory of Sichuan in 1961. After 
working in this machine factory for over 20 years, Li took a salient step toward 
Organization Department of Neijiang City in 1983. Thereafter, she was promoted 
step by step from director of Organization Department of Neijiang, deputy party 
secretary of Neijiang, deputy director of Sichuan Economic and Trade Committee, to 
assistant to governor of Sichuan Province. In 1998, Li eventually held the office of 
provincial vice governor in Sichuan.  
 
From 2003 to 2012, the leadership characteristic of new female recruits is 
characterized by diverse career experience. Career patterns during this period 
encompassed 27.45% working in industry, 35.29% in economic or finance, 37.25% in 
personnel and 25.49% in propaganda. Besides, the proportion of new recruits with 
prior experience as professionals was further reduced to 35.29%.  In addition to the 
diversity of career patterns, another three major features are extraordinarily well 
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observed. Firstly, 22 out of 51 new recruits came from the cohort of sent-down 
youth, approximately 43.14%. They were born between late 1940s and late 1950s. 
Most of them entered universities around the year of 1978. They shared the similar 
life experience of the CR. Their life chances were distinctively shaped by radical state 
policies concerning send-down mobilization and reopening of universities (Zhou, 
2004: 124-131). Secondly, 52.94% of new recruits were experienced female leaders 
from CCYL. Out of 27 cases, 13 female leaders served in CCYL for over ten years, such 
as Jiang Daguo  (蒋大国) (former vice governor of Hubei Province), Jin Yinhuan (金银
焕) (former deputy party secretary of Shanxi Province) and Zhao Guohong (赵国红) 
(former vice governor of Liaoning Province). Finally, among 18 professionals, nine 
female leaders came from universities. Interestingly, seven female leaders worked in 
universities or research institutes for over ten years. For example, Liu Hongxiu (刘鸿
庥) was a professor from Guizhou Normal University and was appointed as vice 
governor of Guizhou in 2003. Zhang Junfang (张俊芳) experienced a vital career 
transition from deputy dean of Geography Department in Tianjin Normal University 
to deputy chief executive of Hexi District in Tianjin in 1998.  
 
In 2013, female provincial leadership was preoccupied with professionals from 
universities. For instance, Wang Yanling (王艳玲) served in Henan Agricultural 
University for about 13 years before taking up political and administrative offices. As 
another example, Tian Wen (田文), current vice chairperson of Xinjiang, stayed 
working in Xinjiang Normal University after college graduation from 1983 to 2003. 
Besides, it is important to note that six new entrants had secretarial experience, such 
as Weng Tiehui (翁铁慧) (former deputy secretary general of Shanghai Government), 
He Min (贺旻) (former assistant to mayor in Dalian) and He Xiqing (何西庆) (former 
secretary of general office in Gansu Government).  
 
To conclude, with a modest increase in female representation, there is still a long 
way to achieve gender equality in provincial leadership. By systematically reviewing 
female leadership transformation, the 1990-1997 female leaders were labeled as 
professionals in industry or engineering.  From 1998 to 2002, the new recruits 
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predominately came from SOEs. From 2003 to 2012, female leadership selection was 
distinctively characterized by career diversity and the rise of sent-down youth. In 
2013, professionals from universities started to play an increasingly important role in 
provincial politics.  As a whole, 1990-2013 female leaders received higher 
educational credentials. They appeared to be more professional regarding both 
scope and diversity in career trajectories.  
 
Table 16 Female Chinese Provincial Leaders by Historical Periods, 1990-2013 
 1990-1997 1998-2002 2003-2012 2013 Total 
N % N % N % N % N 
Obs. 37 
(28.24%) 
30 
(22.90%) 
51 
(38.93%) 
13 
(9.92%) 
131 
 
Non-CCP  7 18.92 4 13.33 8 15.69 3 23.08 22 
College Education* 31 83.78 20 66.67 32 62.75 12 92.31 95 
Professionals 29 78.38 15 50.00 18 35.29 8 61.54 70 
Sent-down Youth 0 0 5 16.67 22 43.14 3 23.08 30 
CCYL 9 24.32 8 26.67 27 52.94 4 30.77 48 
SOE 18 48.65 20 66.67 22 43.14 5 38.46 65 
University 4 10.81 9 30.00 16 31.37 8 61.54 37 
Secretarial Work 9 24.32 9 30.00 14 27.45 6 46.15 38 
Industry 15 40.54 12 40.00 14 27.45 4 30.77 45 
Finance 6 16.22 4 13.33 18 35.29 2 15.38 30 
Personnel 10 27.03 3 10.00 19 37.25 5 38.46 37 
Propaganda 3 8.11 3 10.00 13 25.49 3 23.08 22 
Source: Author’s database. 
Note: * College education refers to formal education in the regular educational 
system, including a master’s degree and a doctorate.  
 
4.3 Ethnicity 
 
Like female leaders, the particular group of minority leaders deserves extensive 
investigations49. The recruitment of minority leaders is the CCP’s continuing efforts 
in reconciling conflicting ethnic interests and maintaining sociopolitical stability, 
                                                        
49 For the person-year data, there are a total of 1,492 observations for 249 cases of 
minority leaders. For these 249 cases, it is possible that minority leaders held 
concurrent posts or experienced job transfers in different provinces. Given the 
double-counting issue, there are definitely 182 minority leaders served in provincial 
leadership between 1990 and 2013. 95.05% of them are CCP members. Tables and 
figures in this section are primarily plotted on the basis of 1,492 event-history 
observations.  
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particular in five autonomous regions (Li, 2008: 1-2). In a multinational country like 
China, to what extent are ethnic minorities represented in the provincial leadership? 
First of all, it is tempting to argue that the minority population is well represented or 
even overrepresented based on the following findings. According to the last three 
national censuses in 1990, 2000 and 2010, minorities consist of around 8% of the 
total population50. As noted in Table 17, however, minority leaders provide 15.24% 
of the total provincial leaders. From a longitudinal perspective, the ratio of minority 
leaders steadily remained over 13.39% during the entire period and reached a peak 
of 17.62% in 1998 (Figure 7). Generally, every reduction in the minority share was 
followed by a rapid resilience within one or two years. As compared to the minority 
share of 9.73% from 1949 to 1998 (Bo, 2002: 60), the minority representation has 
exhibited a substantial growth in the past decades. Besides, the proportions of 
minority origins are in a descending order of Tibetan (3.89%), Hui (2.27%), 
Mongolian (1.85%), Uyghur (1.37%), Zhuang (1.19%) and Manchurian (1.12%).  
 
Table 17 Ethnic Distribution of Chinese Provincial Leaders, 1990-2013 
Nationality Frequency Percent Cumulative 
Han 8296 84.76 84.76 
Tibetan 381 3.89 88.65 
Hui 222 2.27 90.92 
Mongolian 181 1.85 92.77 
Uyghur 134 1.37 94.14 
Zhuang 116 1.19 95.33 
Manchurian 110 1.12 96.45 
Yi 64 0.65 97.10 
Miao 54 0.55 97.65 
Tu 46 0.47 98.12 
Kasak 43 0.44 98.56 
Buyi 34 0.35 98.91 
Li 32 0.33 99.24 
Naxi 24 0.25 99.49 
Bai 22 0.22 99.71 
Korean 16 0.16 99.87 
Dong 6 0.06 99.93 
Yao 4 0.04 99.97 
Mulam 3 0.03 100.00 
Total 9788 100.00  
                                                        
50 National Bureau of Statistics of China, 2013. China Statistical Yearbook. China 
Statistics Press. 
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Source: Author’s database. 
 
 
Figure 7 Minority Provincial Leaders in China, 1990-2013 
 
Does this mean that ethnic minorities are proportionately represented indeed? In 
the following, the analysis of minority leaders by province and by leadership title 
sheds new light on this question. Table 18 reports percentages of the minority 
population derived from national censuses in 1990, 2000 and 2010 relative to the 
proportion of minority leaders across 31 provinces51. Minority leaders are generally 
proportional to the share of the minority population in 31 provinces. The 
autonomous regions understandably retain higher rates of minority leaders, such as 
Tibet (56.79%), Xinjiang (48.10%), Inner Mongolia (43.58%), Ningxia (34.62%) and 
Guangxi (34.18%). It is, notwithstanding, significant to indicate that minorities are 
underrepresented in Tibet and Xinjiang Autonomous Regions. The minority ratio is 
more than 60% in Xinjiang whereas the percentage of minority leaders is 48.10%. 
The corresponding figures for Tibet are over 90% versus 56.79%.  Apart from the 
provinces of regional autonomy, Qinghai, Guizhou, and Yunnan, as multi-ethnic 
provinces, have 21.38%, 33.23% and 21.38% of minority leaders. In these provinces, 
                                                        
51 In terms of the share of minority population, the data on numbers of total and 
minority populations were mostly drawn from the tabulations on the population 
censuses and statistical yearbooks in 1990, 2000 and 2010 across 31 provinces. Only 
was the population information of Inner Mongolia collected from the statistical book 
of Inner Mongolia Under 30-year Reforms (2009).  
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ethnic minorities are also disproportionately represented. In brief, minority 
representation differs across provinces.  
 
Why are ethnic minority leaders recruited into authority status?  The answer to this 
question apparently pertains to the significant role played by minority leaders in 
legitimizing the regime and maintaining ethnic stability.  It is reasonable to assume 
that the CCP tends to rely on ethnic minority elites for better policy implementation 
in close-knit ethnic communities. The relative closure of social network results in 
both the within-group cohesiveness and between-group exclusiveness (Coleman, 
1988: 101-108). In this regard, minority leaders, effectively bridge between the CCP 
center and ethnic cliques. On one hand, a vast majority of them are CCP members 
and trained in party schools. They are political loyalists of the CCP and supporters of 
the central policies. On the other hand, out of 1,492 event-history observations of 
minority leaders, 76.94% served in home provinces. They accumulate cultural and 
social capital by sharing the same languages, customs and social norms embedded in 
interconnected social networks. Their ethnic backgrounds facilitate the 
trustworthiness, sanctions and coordination within these networks.  
 
Table 18 Proportions of Minority Population and Leaders in China, 1990-2013 
Province 
Percentage of Minority Population (%) Minority 
Leaders (%) 1990 2000 2010 
Anhui 0.58 0.67 0.67 9.31 
Beijing 3.92 4.31 4.09 1.45 
Chongqing -- 6.47 6.72 7.63 
Fujian 1.55 1.73 2.16 0.00 
Gansu 4.33 8.70 9.42 10.80 
Guangdong 0.58 1.49 1.98 8.57 
Guangxi 38.90 38.08 37.93 34.18 
Guizhou 34.71 37.84 36.11 33.23 
Hainan 15.20 17.38 16.44 10.37 
Hebei 8.04 4.35 4.17 16.09 
Henan 1.18 1.22 1.19 13.17 
Heilongjiang 5.65 4.89 3.59 0.60 
Hubei 3.96 4.36 4.31 6.98 
Hunan 6.91 10.13 9.97 6.51 
Jiangsu 0.23 0.36 0.49 0.88 
Jiangxi 0.28 0.31 0.34 1.59 
Jilin 10.21 9.03 7.96 10.04 
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Liaoning 15.62 16.06 15.19 9.45 
Inner Mongolia 19.12 22.76 20.46 43.58 
Ningxia 33.47 35.02 35.28 34.62 
Qinghai 42.11 45.47 46.98 21.38 
Shaanxi 0.48 0.49 0.51 0.35 
Shandong 0.60 0.70 0.76 1.97 
Shanghai 0.49 0.63 1.20 3.04 
Shanxi 0.29 0.32 0.26 4.53 
Sichuan 2.69 5.40 6.10 7.73 
Tianjin 2.31 2.67 2.55 0.30 
Xinjiang 62.42 60.79 61.85 48.10 
Tibet 96.30 93.94 91.83 56.79 
Yunnan 33.61 35.90 33.37 25.89 
Zhejiang 0.51 0.86 2.23 1.63 
Total 8.04 8.41 8.49 15.24 
Source: Author’s database; CNKI, Zhongguo jingji yu shehui fazhan tongji shujuku 
(Chinese Economic and Social Development Database, 中国经济与社会发展统计数
据库), accessed October 18, 2014. 
http://tongji.cnki.net/kns55/Navi/NaviDefault.aspx.  
 
In addition to the interprovincial comparison, it is critical to take insight into the 
ethnic distribution by leadership title. As shown in Table 19, minority political elites 
take only 2.47% of party secretaries. In fact, from 1990 to 2013, only four provincial 
party secretaries have ethnic minority backgrounds. They are Guan Guangfu (关广富) 
in Hubei, Shi Zongyuan (石宗源) in Guizhou, Wu Jinghua (伍精华)in Tibet, Yang 
Zhengwu (杨正午) in Hunan, and Hui Liangyu (回良玉) in Anhui and Jiangsu. 
Interestingly, Hui Liangyu (回良玉), as a Hui nationality leader, worked in the 
provinces of Jilin, Hubei, Anhui and Jiangsu before ascending to Politburo member 
and vice premier. Yet these places are recognized as Han-dominated provinces with 
very low minority ratio in Table 18. Contrary to party secretaries, ethnic minorities 
provide 19.82% of provincial governors, 15.65% of deputy party secretaries and 
16.43% of vice governors.  
 
From a historical point of view, for the 1949-1998 provincial leaders, the percentage 
of minority government leaders was mostly larger than that of minority party leaders 
(Bo, 2002: 61-63). An interesting exception emerged in the course of the CR. Bo 
(2002: 61) attributes the higher rate of minority party leaders between 1968 and 
1977 to the career ascending of the former government leaders. From 1990 to 2013, 
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the proportion of minority government leaders remained stable whereas that of 
minority party leaders decreased slowly (Figure 8). In extreme cases, as for five 
autonomous regions in China, minority leaders monopolized provincial governorship.  
Meanwhile, Han Chinese leaders exercised paramount control over the party 
apparatus. This finding is in accord with Article 17 of Law of the P.R.C. on Regional 
National Autonomy. Consequently, the minority overrepresentation was more likely 
to apply to the selection of government leaders than party leaders from 1990 to 
2013.  
 
Table 19 Ethnic Distribution of Chinese Provincial Leaders by Title, 1990-2013 
Title Obs. Minority Percent 
Party Secretary 891 22 2.47 
Governor 908 180 19.82 
Deputy Secretary 2857 447 15.65 
Vice Governor 5132 843 16.43 
Total 9788 1492 15.24 
Source: Author’s database. 
 
 
Figure 8 Minority Provincial Leaders in China by Type, 1990-2013 
 
After evaluating the overall pattern of ethnic representation, the main analytical 
focus next is on 1,492 observations of minority leaders only. Based on Table 18, 31 
Chinese provinces are classified into three types with regard to minority ratios in 
2010: (1) five ethnic autonomous regions including Guangxi, Ningxia, Inner Mongolia, 
Xinjiang and Tibet; (2) multi-ethnic provinces with over 5% of minority populations; 
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(3) other provinces52. Table 20 articulates the distribution of minority leaders by 
three types of provinces from 1990 to 2013. It is well recognized that minority 
leaders for the most part served in the autonomous regions and multi-ethnic 
province, approximately 86.22%. For party secretaries, 63.64% of minority leaders 
were allocated to multi-ethnic provinces. 77.78% of minority provincial governors 
and 63.31% of minority deputy secretaries tended to work in autonomous regions. 
For minority vice governors, the proportions for working in autonomous regions and 
multi-ethnic provinces are 48.62% and 36.70%, respectively. In this light, the political 
influence of minority leaders is dramatically restricted to the autonomous regions 
and multi-ethnic provinces.  
 
Table 20 Distribution of Minority Leaders by Province, 1990-2013 
 Autonomous 
Region 
Multi-ethnic 
Province 
Others Total 
Party 
Secretary 
0 14 8 22 
(0.00%) (63.64%) (36.36%) (100.00%) 
Governor 
140 24 16 180 
(77.78%) (13.33%) (8.89%) (100.00%) 
Deputy 
Secretary 
283 106 58 447 
(63.31%) (23.71%) (12.98%) (100.00%) 
Vice 
Governor 
404 305 134 843 
(48.62%) (36.70%) (15.90%) (100.00%) 
Total 
827 449 216 1492 
(55.88%) (30.34%) (14.48%) (100.00%) 
Source: Author’s database. 
 
In summary, ethnic minorities are seemingly considered to be overrepresented 
because the minority share of provincial leaders exceeds that of the total 
population. However, the preceding analysis advances our knowledge of minority 
                                                        
52 Excluding five autonomous regions, the multi-ethnic provinces comprise Gansu, 
Guizhou, Hainan, Hunan, Jilin, Liaoning, Qinghai, Yunnan, Sichuan and Chongqing. 
The classification here seems to be somewhat arbitrary. For example, the 
percentages of minority populations in Hebei and Heilongjiang reached 8.04% and 
5.65%, respectively in 1990. However, According to the national census in 2000, the 
minority share turned into 4.35% for Hebei and 4.89% for Heilongjiang. In 2010, the 
corresponding figures are 4.17% for Hebei and 3.59% for Heilongjiang. Nonetheless, 
if Hebei and Heilongjiang were added to the multi-ethnic category, it would enhance 
the existing finding that minority leaders would be allocated to the ethnic 
autonomous regions and the multi-ethnic provinces.  
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representation in local leadership. For instance, with high ratios of minority 
populations, ethnic minorities are underrepresented in such provinces as Xinjiang, 
Tibet, Qinghai and Yunnan (Table 18). In terms of different leadership titles, the 
overrepresentation of ethnic groups simply arises from government leaders rather 
than party leaders (Figure 8). Above all, the regional distribution of minority leaders 
draws a boundary for their active political involvement within autonomous regions 
and multi-ethnic provinces. Although well represented, ethnic minorities still exert a 
rather limited impact on provincial politics.  
 
4.4 Provincial Origin 
 
Since the foundation of the P.R.C., the proportion of native leaders has changed 
considerably. Presumably, it to some extent signals the central-local power balance 
in China. From 1990 to 2013, provincial leaders serving in their home provinces take 
41.11% (Table 21). To be specific, the ratios of insiders are in a descending order of 
16.05% of party secretary, 36.78% of provincial governors, 37.92% of deputy 
secretaries and 47.99% of vice governors. As compared to the 1949-1998 provincial 
elites (Bo, 2002: 45), the total proportion of native leaders from 1990 to 2013 rises 
by 6.01%. The increasing tendency also occurs for the 1990-2013 provincial leaders 
of deputy titles, namely, deputy party secretaries and vice governors. Nevertheless, 
the reverse is true for the 1990-2013 party secretaries and provincial governors.  
 
Table 21 Native Provincial Leaders in China, 1990-2013 
Title Obs. Native Percent 
Party Secretary 891 143 16.05 
Governor 908 334 36.78 
Deputy Secretary 2869 1088 37.92 
Vice Governor 5145 2469 47.99 
Total 9813 4034 41.11 
Source: Author’s database. 
 
From a longitudinal perspective, Figure 9 sketches the ups and downs of the 
proportion of native leaders over time. From 1990 to 2001, there was a slight 
fluctuation between 40.91% and 44.11%. The insider ratio dipped sharply to the 
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lower point of 36.96% in 2002 and significantly rose to 41.80% in 2003. After 2003, 
the proportion of native leaders exhibited a fluctuating trend between 40.09% and 
42.42%. It then dropped again to 39.83% in 2009, reached to the bottom of 36.15% 
in 2010, and slowly recovered to 39.91% in 2013. On the contrary, the historical 
change in the ratio of native leaders was more evident for the 1949-1998 provincial 
leaders. The turning point was in 1968 (Bo, 2002: 45-47). It declined slowly by 
approximately 20% before 1968 and hit the lowest point around 10% in 1968. After 
1968, it increased modestly to around 45%.   
 
 
Figure 9 Native Provincial Leaders in China, 1990-2013 
 
What ultimately leads to the historical changes in native provincial leaders? The 
possible answer is basically rooted in the CCP’s history and institutional 
transformation of cadre management. In principle, CCP adheres to party control over 
leadership selection and appointment (dang guan ganbu, 党管干部) (Heilmann & 
Kirchberger, 2000: 1).  In early years of the P.R.C., regional variations in cultures and 
socioeconomic status as well as local factions raised heavy challenges for CCP to 
implement central policies. Accordingly, native provincial leaders were largely 
revolutionary veterans serving in home provinces for years or coming from local 
guerrilla forces prior to 1949 (Bo, 2002: 45). They were politically reliable and 
extensively familiar with local conditions. They accumulated durable and resource-
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rich social networks in their localities. As a result, the proportion of local leaders 
remained high during that period. With the passage of time, native leaders were 
undoubtedly regarded as major threats of central authorities. In the course of the CR, 
the sharp decline in the number of insiders could be explained by purges of 
incumbents in decade-long campaigns.  
 
In the late 1970s, a large number of rehabilitated cadres returned to power. It 
brought about the resurge of native leaders on one hand, and directly led to the 
overburden of Organization Department of the CCP Central Committee (below in 
short: Central Organization Department) 53 . As a prominent agency for cadre 
management, the CCP and Central Organization Department used to be responsible 
for provincial/ministerial- and bureau/director-level cadres under the two-level-
down personnel system (xiaguan liangji, 下管两级) (Wang, 2012: 95). There was an 
excessively large number of centrally controlled cadres. From the outset of economic 
reforms, the CCP strove to promote local initiatives and embarked on 
decentralization of personnel reforms by introducing the one-level-down system 
(xiaguan yiji, 下管一级) (Burns, 1994; Manion, 1985: 218, 233). That is, the CCP and 
Central Organization Department took charge of the ministerial-level cadres and a 
number of key leadership positions only. In this way, local parties were granted 
greater discretions in nominating, screening, appointing, training and evaluating 
cadres. Consequently, the decentralized cadre management system induced a 
massive growth of native leaders. It could be argued that the rise in natives possibly 
triggers localist deviations and erosions of the CCP center’s power and authority (Bo, 
2002: 7-9). 
                                                        
53 According to Provisions on Reforming Cadre Management System (guanyu gaige 
ganbu guanli tizhi wenti de guiding, 关于改革干部管理体制问题的规定), centrally 
controlled cadres include ministers and vice ministers in central governments and 
related departments, standing committee members of the provincial CCP, Provincial 
Commission for Discipline Inspection, provincial governors and vice governors, 
director and deputy director of PPC and Provincial PPCC, chief judge of Provincial 
SPC, chief procurator of Provincial SPP, mayors and vice mayors of major cities. 
Besides, it also subsumes a small number of leaders from key enterprises, public 
institutions and influential universities.  It was reported that the number of centrally 
controlled cadres declined from over 13,000 to about 7,000 (Chung, 2001: 59-60).  
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In 1990, in order to reinforce central control, the CCP initiated the recentralization of 
cadre appointment and management (Chung, 2001: 60). The centrally controlled 
cadres were extended to party secretaries and mayors from “central economic 
cities” (jihua danlie shi, 计划单列市)54. Since the 1990s, the CCP has vigorously 
institutionalized cadres’ exchange and avoidance systems.55 The basic purpose of 
this practice is twofold. On one hand, political elites take the form of job shifts to 
enhance professional administrative expertise and acquire diverse work experience. 
This is an effective way for the CCP to select and train future political leaders as both 
generalists and specialists. On the other hand, more conspicuously, there exists a 
high degree of corruption for local leaders from a dense spider web of social 
connections in home provinces. As a typical example, after the 18th NPC, 52 cadres at 
the vice-provincial/ministerial-level or above were investigated in the anti-graft 
campaign until October 201456. Among them, 23 were retained in home provinces 
                                                        
54 According to the Provisions on Central Organization Department’s Revising the 
Hierarchical List of Centrally Controlled Cadres (zhonggong zuzhibu guanyu xiuding 
‘zhonggong zhongyang guanli de ganbu zhiwu mingchengbiao’ de tongzhi, 中共组织
部关于修订《中共中央管理的干部职务名称表》的通知), central economic cities 
refer to Shenyang, Dalian, Changchun, Harbin, Xi’an, Chengdu, Chongqing, Qingdao, 
Nanjing, Ningbo, Xiamen, Wuhan, Guangzhou and Shenzhen.  
55 CCP promulgated the following regulations to promote cadres’ exchanges and 
avoidance systems: CCP’s Decisions on Exchange Systems for Party and State Leading 
Cadres (zhonggong zhongyang guanyu shixing dang he guojia jiguan lingdao ganbu 
jiaoliu zhidu de jueding, 中共中央关于实行党和国家机关领导干部交流制度的决
定) (1990), Interim Provisions on Exchange Work for Party and State Leading Cadres) 
(dangzheng lingdao ganbu jiaoliu gongzuo zanxing guiding, 党政领导干部交流工作
暂行规定) (1999), Interim Provisions on Avoidance System for Party and State 
Leading Cadres (dangzheng lingdao ganbu renzhi huibi zanxing guiding, 党政领导干
部任职回避暂行规定) (2006), Provisions on Exchange Systems for Party and State 
Leading Cadres (dangzheng lingdao ganbu jiaoliu gongzuo guiding, 党政领导干部交
流工作规定 ) (2006), Development Program on Promoting Cadres’ Personnel 
Reforms, 2010-2020 (2010-2020 shenhua ganbu renzhi zhidu gaige guihua gangyao, 
2010-2020 深化干部任职制度改革规划纲要) (2009).  
56 The data for 52 corrupt senior cadres were drawn from the official website of CCDI 
(http://www.ccdi.gov.cn/ajcc). These cadres were largely investigated and exposed 
for bribery and corruption after the 18th NPC, that is, from December 2012 to 
October 2014. 23 leaders serving in home provinces throughout their careers include 
Wu Yongwen (吴永文) (Hubei), Liu Tienan (刘铁男) (Beijing), Wang Suyi (王素毅)  
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across their career course (44.23%). 14 had worked in their birthplaces for a period 
of time (26.92%). Altogether, 71.15% of corrupt senior cadres acquired work 
experience in native provinces. For instance, Bai Enpei (白恩培), former party 
secretary of Qinghai and Yunnan, steered his career to become a high-profile 
political leader after working in his birthplace of Shaanxi for 20 years. Another 
notable example was Jiang Jiemin (蒋洁敏), former deputy party secretary and vice 
governor in Qinghai. Jiang was born in Shandong and started working in the 
petroleum industry there from 1972 to 1994. For the purpose of anti-corruption, it 
implicitly assumes that regular transfers for provincial leaders and the relatively 
higher share of outsiders viably suppress patronage, nepotism and factionalism 
through kinships and social ties. As a consequence, during the period of 1990-2013, 
62.62% of provincial leaders experienced occupational transitions across provinces57. 
The rapid upward trend of the native ratio in the aftermath of the CR was eventually 
handicapped with a drop to 40.91% in 1992(Figure 9). As noted earlier, after 1990, 
the ratio of insiders over outsiders largely stabilized with a minor fluctuation for 
provincial leaders.  
 
                                                                                                                                                              
(Inner Mongolia), Li Daqiu (李达球) (Guangxi), Ji Jianye (季建业) (Jiangsu), Chen 
Bohuai (陈柏槐) (Hubei), Guo Youming (郭有明) (Hubei), Tong Mingqian (童名谦) 
(Hunan), Li Chongxi (李崇禧) (Sichuan), Shen Peiping (沈培平) (Yunnan), Yao Mugen 
(姚木根) (Jiangxi), Yang Baohua (阳宝华) (Hunan), Du Shanxue (杜善学) (Jiangxi), 
Ling Zhengce (令政策) (Shanxi), Wan Qingliang (万庆良) (Guangdong), Zhang Tianxin 
(张田欣) (Yunnan), Han Xiancong (韩先聪) (Anhui), Wu Changshun (武长顺) (Tianjin), 
Chen Tiexin (陈铁新) (Liaoning), Chen Chuanping (陈川平) (Shanxi), Nie Chunyu (聂
春玉) (Shanxi), Bai Yun (白云) (Shanxi) and Ren Runhou (任润厚) (Shanxi). 13 leaders 
with work experience in birthplaces are Yi Junqing (衣俊卿), Guo Yongxiang (郭永祥), 
Wang Yongchun (王永春), Jiang Jiemin (蒋洁敏), Chen Anzhong (陈安众), Zhu Zuoli 
(祝作利), Jin Daoming (金道铭), Shen Weichen (申维辰), Tan Qiwei (谭栖伟), Su 
Rong (苏荣), Bai Enpei (白恩培), Sun Zhaoxue (孙兆学), Pan Yiyang (潘逸阳) and Qin 
Yuhai (秦玉海).  
57 This calculation is based on 1,260 provincial leaders from 1990 to 2013. Out of 
1,260 provincial leaders, 471 worked in one province (37.38%). 426 worked in two 
provinces (33.81%) and 254 in three provinces (20.16%). 83 served in four provinces 
(6.59%), 22 in five provinces (1.75%) and four in six provinces (0.32%). Chapter 3 has 
already formulated the distribution of provincial leaders with occupational 
transitions by leadership title.  
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Underlying the slightly fluctuating pattern of native leaders, a disparate picture 
emerges by comparing party and government leaders (Figure 10). There was a 
widening gap in the proportion of native leaders between these two leadership 
groups. Native government leaders outnumbered native party leaders in proportion 
from 1990 to 2013. The former group stayed between the levels of 40.74% and 
49.61%, whereas the latter exhibited a downward trend from 43.51% in 1990 to 
16.67% in 2013. To look more closely at native leaders by title, Figure 11 shows a 
decline in the ratios of insiders for party secretaries, provincial governors and deputy 
party secretaries. Strikingly, the proportion of native party secretaries decreased 
markedly from 34.38% in 1990 to 2.70% in 2011. The notable exception was the 
share of native vice governors. It remained as high as over 45% for 17 years from 
1997 to 2013. The above findings provide strong evidence for the tightening central 
control over the native ratios for provincial leaders of full titles or party leaders. 
 
 
Figure 10 Native Provincial Leaders in China by Type, 1990-2013 
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Figure 11 Native Provincial Leaders in China by Title, 1990-2013 
 
After comparing native leaders by leadership types and titles, a fascinating question 
arises: is there any variation in the share of native leaders across 31 provinces? Table 
22 demonstrates the interprovincial variations in ratios of insiders. Shandong has the 
highest proportion of native leaders, approximately 81.22%. To a lesser extent, the 
insider ratios are 67.14% for Guangdong, 66.37% for Jiangsu and 59.35% for Zhejiang. 
Interestingly, the above-mentioned provinces were all highly ranked with regard to 
the total Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in 2013. Besides, the native ratios in five 
ethnic autonomous regions amount to 51.32% for Tibet, 48.10% for Xinjiang, 35.82% 
for Inner Mongolia, 33.33% for Ningxia and 30.93% for Guangxi. It could be 
preliminarily inferred from the above findings that CCP recruits more local political 
elites for either economic stability or political stability. In sharp contrast, Tianjin, 
Shanghai, Gansu and Beijing hold as small native ratios as 18.10%, 13.68%, 11.42% 
and 11.23%, respectively. Although the centralization or decentralization of cadre 
management uniformly applies to 31 provinces, distinctive regional variations in 
local leadership selection are still definite and discernible all over China.  
 
Table 22 Native Provincial Leaders in China by Province, 1990-2013 
Province Obs. Native Percent 
Anhui 297 102 34.34 
Beijing 276 31 11.23 
Chongqing 262 94 35.88 
Fujian 258 151 58.53 
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Gansu 324 37 11.42 
Guangdong 350 235 67.14 
Guangxi 353 138 39.09 
Guizhou 331 134 40.48 
Hainan 299 75 25.08 
Hebei 317 127 40.06 
Henan 281 107 38.08 
Heilongjiang 332 75 22.59 
Hubei 301 134 44.52 
Hunan 338 165 48.82 
Jiangsu 342 227 66.37 
Jiangxi 252 97 38.49 
Jilin 239 76 31.80 
Liaoning 334 97 38.49 
Inner Mongolia 358 123 34.36 
Ningxia 214 71 33.18 
Qinghai 318 70 22.01 
Shaanxi 285 99 34.74 
Shandong 362 294 81.22 
Shanghai 329 45 13.68 
Shanxi 309 157 50.81 
Sichuan 362 180 49.72 
Tianjin 337 61 18.10 
Xinjiang 368 177 48.10 
Tibet 530 272 51.32 
Yunnan 309 159 51.46 
Zhejiang 246 146 59.35 
Total 9813 4034 41.11 
Source: Author’s database. 
 
In summary, as a whole, the average proportion of the 1990-2013 native provincial 
leaders is 41.11%. It is a little higher than the native share of 35.10% from 1949 to 
1998. Since the 1990s, the institutionalization of cadres’ exchanges and avoidance 
principles has contributed to a sustained decline in the native ratios of party 
secretaries, provincial governors and deputy party secretaries. Party secretaries are, 
in particular, overwhelmingly dominated by outsiders. By comparison, the 
proportion of native vice governors remained somewhat steady. Additionally, the 
rates of native leaders differ remarkably by province. There is no convincing or 
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strong evidence of localism by simply analyzing the insider-outsider ratio58 (Bo, 2002: 
47). It is instead reasonable to conclude here with the CCP’s emphasis on job 
transfers and political mobility for provincial leaders.  
 
4.5 Party Membership 
 
The absolute dominance of CCP members in provincial leadership corresponds to the 
CCP’s long-lasting emphasis on political loyalties and ideological commitment. To 
look at the 1949-1998 provincial leaders, the proportion of non-CCP members is 
6.15% (Bo, 2002: 42). From 1949 to 1998, the political opportunities for non-
communists existed in either provincial governors or vice governors. As for 1990-
2013 provincial leaders, the only exception is provincial vice governors who have 
non-communists. Out of 9,721 individual-year observations with known party 
membership, non-communist vice governors take 5.77% of provincial leaders. In 
terms of ages, non-CCP members are older and more variable than CCP members for 
both the 1949-1998 and the 1990-2013 vice governors (Table 23). For the 1990-2013 
vice governors, the ages for communists and non-communists are differentiated 
from each other to a lesser degree.  Specifically, the difference in the average age 
between 1990 and 2013 is less than one year, while it is 9.5 years for the 1949-1998 
vice governors (Bo, 2002: 42). The standard deviation for age is 4.38 years for 
communist vice governors and 4.98 for non-communists during the period of 1990-
2013. However, the difference in standard deviations for age is 3.84 years for the 
1949-1998 vice governors (11.14 versus 7.30) (Bo, 2002: 41). To sum up, non-
communists are less likely to hold office of provincial chiefs from 1990 to 2013. The 
contrast in age is reduced between communist and non-communist vice governors.  
 
Table 23 Ages of Communist and Non-Communist Provincial Vice Governors in China, 
1990-2013 
 Obs. Mean Stad. Dev. Min Max 
CCP  4492 53.61 4.38 36 64 
                                                        
58 For a systematic analysis of this view, see Zhiyue Bo, Chinese Provincial Leaders: 
Economic Performance and Political Mobility Since 1949 (New York & London: M.E. 
Sharpe, 2002). 
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Non-CCP  561 54.31 4.98 40 70 
Source: Author’s database. 
 
By considering the historical trends, Figure 12 illustrates the proportion of non-
communist leaders across the period of 1990 to 2013. The rise and fall of non-
communist provincial elites were greatest after 1997.  With narrow fluctuations, the 
non-communist ratio generally increased by simply comparing the values at the year 
of government leadership reshuffles. That is to say, non-communists provided 3.79 
in 1993, 4.73% in 1998, 7.65% in 2003, and 8.57% in both 2008 and 2013. In this 
regard, non-communist provincial leaders from 1990 to 2013 roughly showed a slow 
upward-mobility pattern.  
 
 
Figure 12 Non-Communist Provincial Leaders in China, 1990-2013 
 
Given a limited pool of non-communist provincial leaders, the following analysis 
turns to the cross-sectional data of 1,891 Chinese provincial leaders and primarily 
focuses on a total of 92 provincial vice governors without CCP memberships. Table 
24 describes the distribution of 1990-2013 provincial leaders by party. The largest 
number of non-communist leaders is 17, from either Jiusan Society or China 
Democratic National Construction Association. All of the non-communists assumed 
the leadership position of vice governor in a single province. 51 out of 92 non-
communists stayed working in the provincial governorship for a term of office or 
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even less than five years (55. 43%). Gyibug Puncog Cedain (吉普•平措次登), former 
vice chairman of Tibet, had the longest tenure of 17 years from 1983 to 2000. He 
was an independent without joining any political party. Another two non-communist 
vice governors with seniority of over ten years are Li Lanfang (李兰芳) in Guangdong 
and Xie Lijuan (谢丽娟) in Shanghai. From 1990 to 2013, the highest hierarchical 
rank for non-communists is the vice-state level. Among 92 non-communist vice 
governors, twelve leaders successfully sat at the apex of the national leadership 
(13.04%). Ten of them took up the office of vice chairman of CPPCC and only two 
served as vice chairman of the NPC Standing Committee.  
 
Table 24 Distribution of Chinese Provincial Leaders by Party, 1990-2013 
Parties Obs. Percent 
1. No Party 12 0.63 
2. CCP 1799 95.13 
3. Jiusan Society 17 0.90 
4. China Democratic League 14 0.74 
5. China Democratic National Construction Association 17 0.90 
6. Chinese Peasants’ and Workers’ Democratic Party 9 0.48 
7. China Association for Promoting Democracy 8 0.42 
8. Zhigongdang of China 7 0.37 
9. Revolutionary Committee of the Kuomingtang 5 0.26 
10. Taiwan Democratic Self-Government League 3 0.16 
Total 1891 99.99 
Source: Author’s database. 
 
In terms of formal educational attainment, three aspects should be highlighted. First, 
non-communist vice governors were predominately college graduates, 
approximately 92.39% (85 out of 92). 16 were awarded doctoral degrees. 11 
received their diplomas of M.A. or Ph.D. from oversea education59. For example, 
current vice governor of Hubei, Guo Shenglian (郭生练) graduated from Department 
                                                        
59 For those with oversea education, Guo Shenglian （郭生练) received a master’s 
degree and a doctorate in Iremand. Cao Xiaohong (曹小红) and Ma Peihua (马培华) 
studied in Japan. Jiang Xinzhen (姜信真) received undergraduate study in Soviet 
Union. Huang Ribo (黄日波) obtained his Ph.D. degree in United Kingdom and Zhang 
Taolin (张桃林) in West Germany. Five leaders preferred United States for further 
study including Cao Weixing (曹卫星), Chen Zhangliang (陈章良), Gu Shengzu (辜胜
阻), Liu Shuying (刘淑莹) and Lu Debin (吕德彬).  
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of Engineering Hydrology, National University of Ireland for both M.A. and Ph.D. 
degrees. Chen Zhanglians (陈章良), former vice chairman of Guangxi, obtained a 
doctoral degree of plant genetic engineering and molecular biology from University 
of Washington in 1987. Second, 64 provincial leaders in question preferred to 
upgrade educational degrees after their entry into the labor force (69.57%). 31 non-
communists temporarily discontinued their careers and returned to school. It is 
potentially due to their academic careers in universities where educational 
achievement was rewarded in occupational progress. Third, regarding academic 
majors of higher education, natural science and engineering is far more popular than 
humanities and social science. 70 out of 85 college-educated non-communists 
studied physics, chemistry, biology, agriculture, medicine and the like (82.35%)60.  
 
With respect to career patterns of non-communist vice governors under study, it is 
interesting to note that, one of the most spectacular careers for non-communist vice 
governors is academics.  Particularly, 20 non-communists followed career paths from 
presidents of universities to politics and government administration61. For instance, 
                                                        
60 Distributions of 1990-2013 non-communist vice governors by academic majors 
are: Seven vice governors majored in economic/finance, two in law, one in 
education, five in literature, 22 in natural sciences (including physics, mathematics, 
chemistry and biology), 29 in engineering, twelve in agriculture and seven in 
medicine.  
61 Specific examples include Cai Qiufang (蔡秋芳) from Laiyang Agiructural College of 
Shandong, Cao Weixing (曹卫星) from Nanjing Agricultural University, Cao Xiaohong 
(曹小红) from Tianjin University of Science and Technology, Chen Guizun (陈癸尊) 
from Jiangxi Institute of Metallurgy, Chen Zhangliang (陈章良 ) from Peking 
University and China Agricultural University, Chen Zongxing (陈宗兴 ) from 
Northwestern University and Northwest A & F University, Du Yijin (杜宜瑾) from 
Anhui Normal University and Anhui University, Gao Feng (高峰), Kunming University 
of Science and Technology and Dali University, Hao Yuan (郝远) from Gansu 
Polytechnic University, Hu Zhenpeng (胡振鹏) from Jiangxi Polytechnic University 
and Nanchang University, Jin Zhongqing (金忠青), from Hehai University, Liu 
Hongxiu (刘鸿庥) from Guizhou Normal University, Lu Debin (吕德彬) from Henan 
Agricultural University, Teng Weiping (滕卫平) from China Medical University, Wang 
Zuoshu (王佐书) from Harbin Normal University, Xie Guangxiang (谢广祥) from 
Huainan Polytechnic University, Xie Qingsheng (谢庆生) from Guizhou Polytechnic 
University, Zhang Daohong (张道宏 ) from National Southwestern Associated 
Univeristy and Xi’an University of Arts and Science, Zhang Shaoqin (张少琴) from 
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Chen Zhangliang (陈章良) was vice-president of Peking University and president of 
China Agricultural University before working as vice chairman of Guangxi. Zhuang 
Gonghui (庄公惠), former vice mayor of Tianjin, was vice-president of Tianjin 
University. Teng Weiping is currently working as vice chairman of provincial CPPCC of 
Liaoning. He was former president of China Medical University and is also renowned 
for his expertise in medicine. The second characteristic for career patterns is CPPCC 
as one of the major avenues for career transitions and advancement. Empirically, 
twelve non-communists experienced a straightforward job shift from vice chairman 
of provincial CPPCC to vice governor (13.04%). The typical examples include Cao 
Weixing (曹卫星) (Jiangsu), Cao Xiaohong (曹小红) (Tianjin), Feng Jionghua (冯迥华) 
(Ningxia), Guo Shenglian (郭生练) (Hubei), He Baoxiang (何报翔) (Hunan), He Min 
(贺旻) (Liaoning), Huang Ribo (黄日波) (Guangxi), Gyibug Puncog Cedain (吉普•平措
次登) (Tibet), Sun Anmin (孙安民) (Beijing), Sun Dongsheng (孙东生) (Heilongjiang), 
Wang Lu (王路) (Hainan) and Wang Wenyuan (王文元) (Liaoning). On the other 
hand, national or provincial CPPCC was an occupational destination for 30 non-
communists after their serving as vice governors (32.61%). Notable is He Luli (何鲁
丽), former vice chairman of CPPCC from 1996 to 1998 and vice chairman of NPC 
from 1998 to 2008.  
 
In summary, non-communists were merely allocated to the elite status of provincial 
vice governor during the period of 1990 to 2013. The proportion of non-communists 
remained at a rather low level of the total provincial leaders. They were largely well 
educated. Their occupational trajectories generally commenced in the professional 
career line. The typical career pathways were from CPPCC to provincial governorship 
or vice versa.  
 
4.6 Conclusion and Discussion 
 
                                                                                                                                                              
Taiyuan University of Science and Technology, and Zhuang Gonghui (庄公惠) from 
Tianjin University.   
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This chapter has explicated the continuity and changes in demographic backgrounds 
for provincial leaders from 1990 to 2013. The extraordinary strength of this chapter 
is to longitudinally trace historical trends and to compare the 1990-2013 leadership 
profile with that of 1949-1998. In terms of continuity in elite selection, for example, 
it is plausible to regard Chinese provincial leadership by and large as Han-dominated, 
male-dominated, Communist-dominated and outsider-dominated since 1990. 
Moreover, provincial leadership from 1990 to 2013 was characterized by the stability 
in average age structures and coalitions of different birth cohorts. There was little 
difference in the proportion of both minority and native government leaders. In 
contrast, major historical changes include a slow growth in the ratios of both female 
and non-communist provincial leaders as well as a dramatic decline in both native 
and minority party leaders. By comparing with Bo’s empirical study of the 1949-1998 
provincial elites, as a whole, there were greater proportions of female leaders, 
ethnicity minority leaders, native leaders and non-communist leaders from 1990 to 
2013.  
 
The overall quantitative assessment of provincial leadership transformation in 
reforming China has profound implications. Chinese provincial politics is moving 
towards the institutionalization of power succession, which will be stressed below. 
Political selection of provincial chiefs is far from gender and ethnic equality. Given 
the predominance of CCP-members in provincial politics, political credentials and 
party loyalty, for the most part, substantially matter in the race for promotion. In 
terms of the historical changes in the proportion of native leaders, it is still an open 
question whether or not there is a localist tendency in Chinese provincial politics.  
 
After analyzing the relative provincial leadership stability and transformation, the 
next issue to consider is why. That is to ask, how is provincial leadership selection 
structured behind the above empirical observations? In Bo’s study (2002), the 
striking changes in leadership attributes are inevitably and closely related to three 
decisive turning points in the Chinese history, namely the founding of the P.R.C., the 
outbreak of the CR and the introduction of economic reforms. Disparate from the 
massively turbulent episode, the post-1990s China is essentially marked by party-led 
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institutionalization. Consequently, this chapter has tentatively answered the above 
question within the larger framework of institutionalization of leadership selection in 
China. For instance, in Section 4.1, the analysis of age structures is grounded in the 
institutional foundations of age limit, term limit, term integrity and step-by-step 
promotion.  In Section 4.4, the systems of cadres’ exchange and avoidance 
essentially functions as a hindrance to the rapid expansion of native leaders.  
 
Based on the compelling empirical findings, this chapter will close by discussing an 
intriguing theme in Chinese provincial politics--the rise of the CR generation62. This 
leadership group has risen to power and played a crucial role in decision making in 
the upper echelons in current China. The study of the CR generation provides a vivid 
example for understanding how socioeconomic and macropolitical transformation 
shapes life chances of political elites and the changing nature of leadership cohorts 
(Li, 2000: 8-9). It is generally believed that political activists or those becoming CCP 
members during the CR should be largely eliminated from fierce mobility 
competitions for the reason of political suspicion. The fact is, however, those joining 
the CCP during the CR—for example, Xi Jinping (习近平), Li Keqiang (李克强), Zhang 
Gaoli (张高丽), Zhang Dejiang (张德江) and Liu Yunshan (刘云山)--has became the 
backbone of Chinese provincial leadership from 2002 onward. They account for 54% 
of the total of provincial leaders (Figure 13). Despite a decline from 60.22% in 2006 
to 32.86% in 2013 as a whole, the CR generation has still retained over 55% of 
provincial party leadership positions since 2002 (Figure 14).  
 
                                                        
62 Xiaowei Zang and Rongrong Lin discuss the rise of the CR generation in their 
unpublished paper by comparing the leadership continuity and changes in 1988 and 
2011. They observe the resilience of this cohort.  It is at odds with the general 
conviction that political elites joining the CCP during the CR are politically unreliable. 
However, as defined by Cheng Li (2001: 10), the CR generation is ‘the one born 
between 1941 and 1956, making them ten to twenty-five years of age when the CR 
began in 1966 and forty-four to fifty-nin in 2000.’ Despite the conceptual distinction, 
provincial leaders born between 1941 and 1956 constitute 91.59% of the CR 
generation under examination in this chapter.  
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Figure 13 Cultural Revolution Generation in China, 1990-2013 
 
 
 
Figure 14 CR Generation in China by Type, 1990-2013 
 
The CR generation is highly homogeneous in demographic backgrounds and life 
journeys. They were overwhelmingly born in the 1940s and 1950s, approximately 
96.4% (Table 25). 36.02% of them came from the coastal provinces of Shandong, 
Jiangsu, Hebei and Zhejiang. They became CCP members from 1966 to 1976, 
particularly in the second half of the CR. A large number of them started working in 
party systems or government bureaucracies during the CR (43.24%). What stands 
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out in their career trajectories is party work and government administration. To a 
lesser extent, secretarial work is also one of their major career patterns (54.57%).  
 
Compared with the other provincial leaders, the CR generation produced a lower 
proportion of college graduates (75.36% versus 60.18%). For college graduates, 
52.16% entered universities prior to the CR from 1960 to 1965 and 12.52% in 1978, 
one year after the reopening of universities. To improve educational levels, the CR 
generation tended to prefer part-time continuing education (61.17%), particularly 
from party schools. In terms of occupational positions, they were more likely to work 
in CCYL or take up grass-root leadership positions at the township level.  
 
Given the homogeneity, how can the rise of the CR generation be explained? Firstly, 
as early as 1981, Chen Yun, one of the paramount revolutionary elders and policy 
makers, stressed the significance of recruiting younger cadres, in particular those in 
their 40s or even younger63. Although controversial, Chen further explained that this 
cohort witnessed how the CR was launched and promoted in China. They possibly 
participated in the widespread campaigns and thus understood how the younger 
generation responded to the CR.  The emergence of the CR generation is at least 
partially the result of leadership rejuvenation in the 1980s. They constructed a 
specific pool of eligible candidates for younger elite recruitment at that time. 
Secondly, it comes as no surprise to present that party work and government 
administration have been long emphasized in leadership selection. The grass-root 
work experience is growing in importance. More importantly, work experience in 
CCYL confers the persistence of age advantages in elite mobility. In this regard, such 
career experience yields positive returns of occupational achievement for the CR 
generation. Finally, the CR generation has virtually benefited from the secretarial 
work experience in developing interpersonal skills and network contacts with higher-
ranked leaders. The accumulation of social capital contributes favorably to the 
upward mobility of the CR generation, which will be empirically tested in Chapter 8.   
 
                                                        
63 See Chen Yun wenxuan, disanjuan [Selected Works of Chen Yun, vol. 3, 陈云文选
第三卷] (Beijing: Remin chubanshe, 1995) 
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Table 25 Comparative Data for the CR Generation and non-CR Leadership Group in 
China, 1990-2013 
 CR Generation Others 
% Of 1990-2013 provincial leaders 44.21 55.79 
Birth year 
% Born in the 1940s  52.45 37.00 
% Born in the 1950s 43.95 24.11 
Birth place 
% Born in Shandong, Jiangsu, Hebei and Zhejiang 36.02 33.17 
Education 
% College Education or above (formal education) 60.18 75.36 
Year of university entrance 
% From 1960 to 1965 52.16 31.48 
% In 1978 12.52 15.85 
% Part-time continuing education 61.17 36.38 
% Receiving educational degrees from party school 39.36 16.95 
Work experience 
% Party work 99.63 97.53 
% Government administration 91.52 93.79 
% Secretarial Work 54.57 49.44 
% CCYL 42.89 21.21 
% Grass-root leadership 16.46 6.98 
Year of entering public service  
% During the CR 43.24 15.18 
Source: Author’s database. 
 
This chapter has taken a close look at the demographic characteristics of Chinese 
provincial leaders from 1990 to 2013. After articulating who they are, Chapter 5 and 
Chapter 6 will proceed to investigate human capital and social capital for provincial 
leaders, respectively.  
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Chapter 5 Human Capital of Chinese Provincial Leaders 
 
After answering who are Chinese provincial leaders, this chapter will provide a telling 
account of their human capital by adequately formulating educational levels, 
academic majors and work experience. To this end, this chapter firstly distinguishes 
formal education from final education. The former refers to the full-time education 
in the regular educational system and the latter focuses on the final degrees, taking 
account of the on-the-job education. The fundamental reason for this distinction is 
the part-time education as mainstream in Chinese politics and more importantly, the 
suspicion of its quality, which will be explained in Section 5.1.1. The hallmark of the 
educational analysis in this chapter is to look beyond the formal or the final 
educational degrees only. Instead, it devotes considerable attention to the detailed 
educational histories of Chinese provincial leaders from 1990 to 2013. Section 5.1.2 
and 5.1.3 provide a quantitative two-time point assessment of education for Chinese 
provincial leaders in terms of both educational levels and academic majors. It asks 
interesting questions: What are formal and final educational backgrounds of Chinese 
provincial leaders? To what extent does formal educational attainment differ from 
final education for Chinese provincial elites? How has the proportion of college-
educated leaders changed over time? In what way has the percentage of political 
leaders trained in science and engineering evolved in Chinese provincial politics? 
After answering these questions, Section 5.1.2 and 5.1.3 extend the descriptive 
analysis and relates the educational landscapes of Chinese political elites to the 
Chinese educational reforms, such as two waves of educational expansions in the 
1950s and the late 1970s along with the 1952 educational restructuring. In this way, 
Section 5.1 makes causal inferences underpinning the empirical evolution of 
provincial leaders’ educational achievement.  
 
Section 5.2 performs a dynamic analysis of educational trajectories for Chinese 
provincial leaders. The focus of the dynamic analysis is on the event of educational 
advancement, including both the changes in educational levels and academic majors. 
The main interest here is the education-changing events after working in the labor 
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force and the regular educational advancement to a master’s degree or a doctorate. 
In such longitudinal study, education is considered as a time-varying variable. 
Fascinating questions arise. For example, at what age, at what career stages and at 
what administrative rank did Chinese provincial leaders improve their educational 
levels? At what age was specialty of humanities and social sciences more favored by 
Chinese provincial leaders in attaining higher education? Did this group of political 
elites change academic majors in educational progression?  
 
Human capital comprises both education and work experience in this thesis. 
Alongside the educational analysis in Section 5.1 and 5.2, Section 5.3 briefly 
introduces the average public service tenure of Chinese provincial leaders from 1990 
to 2013. The declining trend of public service seniority before 2000 is noticeable. It is 
basically attributed to recruiting elites with lengthy work experience in the SOEs. 
That is to say, given a similar total amount of work experience, the longer tenure in 
the SOEs, the shorter seniority in public service.  
 
After formulating human capital of Chinese provincial leaders, Section 5.4 
undertakes a brief theoretical review of technocracy and political technocracy. Based 
on literature review, it turns to discuss if the technocratic leadership emerges in 
provincial politics. By analyzing the specialty and career patterns of the 1990-2013 
provincial leaders, this section quantitatively evaluates the proportion of technocrats 
and career bureaucrats. It is argued that bureaucrats, rather than technocrats, 
conspicuously sit at the apex of the provincial power hierarchy.   
 
5.1 Education: Two Time-Point Assessment 
 
This section begins by asking a basic question: why is it necessary to differentiate 
formal education and final education? The answers to this question point to the 
growing interest in educational advancement through part-time education on one 
hand and the suspicion of the quality of part-time educational attainment on the 
other. In terms of educational advancement, Section 5.1.1 firstly explains the 
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underlying stimuli for improving educational credentials in Chinese politics. Three 
aspects are stressed: (1) Education as a norm of meritocracy for political upward 
mobility; (2) education as an effective way of developing resource-rich social 
connections; and (3) education as a major gateway to establish politics-education 
alliance. With the increasing educational levels via part-time study, Section 5.1.1 
secondly goes even further in discussing the quality of part-time educational 
upgrading. The suspicion of part-time education is encouraged by fake diplomas and 
the discrepancy between educational levels and relatively deficient academic 
training for Chinese political elites.  
 
On this basis, Section 5.1.2 and 5.1.3 will articulate the highest educational levels 
and the corresponding academic majors at two time points of obtaining formal and 
final education. The comparative and longitudinal study of formal and final 
education is conducted. Regarding formal educational attainment, Section 5.1.2 
highlights the upward trends of college-educated leaders during the period of 1990-
1999 and 2011-2013. The plausible explanation for this finding lies in two waves of 
educational expansions in the mid-1950s and the late 1970s in Chinese educational 
histories. As for the highest degree in final education, the persistent increase of 
college-educated provincial leaders is observable. The interpretation of this 
empirical finding is oriented toward the answer to why educational advancement 
prevails in Section 5.1.1. With regard to the fields of specialization, provincial leaders 
trained in science and engineering were well represented from 1990 to 2005 in 
formal education and from 1990 to 1999 in final education. The former results from 
the nationwide educational restructuring in 1952. The latter is contingent upon the 
growth of part-time education (particularly through party-school training systems) 
and the advantages of humanities and social sciences for cadre elites in Chinese 
politics.  
 
5.1.1 Why Differentiate Formal and Final Education? 
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First of all, Chinese political leaders during the period of 1990-2013 are strongly 
motivated in raising educational credentials. For 1,260 provincial leaders in question, 
828 obtained higher educational degrees after entering the labor force (65.71%). 
Among them, 627 received part-time education after starting their careers. By 
linking the timing of educational attainment to political or administrative careers, 
578 provincial leaders returned to school after working in public service (45.87%). It 
is important to highlight that only 44 provincial leaders temporarily discontinued 
their political careers and attained full-time study in the regular educational system. 
Thus, educational trajectories for Chinese provincial leaders from 1990 to 2013 are 
marked by the prevailing educational advancement and part-time education.  
 
How can the prevalence of educational advancement be accounted for? First, 
education gradually appears to be one of the pivotal baselines for political mobility 
where meritocracy and professional competence are increasingly emphasized. 
Despite a wave of educational advancement in the aftermath of the CR, in fact, the 
year of 1995 potentially marked a watershed in the role of higher education in 
career mobility for Chinese leaders.  
 
The pre-1995 era was characterized by the emphasis on cadres’ ideological 
education and the importance of party-school training systems64. Education rarely 
                                                        
64 The typical regulations include “zhonggong guanyu jiaqiang lilun jiaoyu de jueding 
de tongzhi” (CCP’s Announcement on Enhancing Ideological Education, 中共关于加
强理论教育的决定的通知) in 1951, “zhongguo zhongyang weiyuanhui guanyu 
1953-1954nian ganbu lilun jiaoyu de zhishi” (CCP’s Instructions on 1953-1954 
Cadres’ Ideological Education, 中国中央委员会关于 1953－1954 年干部理论教育
的指示) in 1953, “zhonggong zhongyang guanyu lunxun quandang gaozhongji ganbu 
he tiaozheng dangxiao de jihua” (CCP’s Plans on Training Senior and Middle-level 
Party Cadres and Adjusting Party Schools, 中共中央关于轮训全党高中级干部和调
整党校的计划) in 1954, “zhonggong zhongyang guanyu jiaqiang chuji dangxiao 
gongzuo de zhishi” (CCP’s Instructions on Enhancing Junior Party Schools, 中共中央
关于加强初级党校工作的指示) in 1956, “zhonggong zhongyang guanyu shixian 
dangxiao jiaoyu zhengguihua de jueding” (CCP’s Decisions on Institutionalizing Party-
school Education, 中共中央关于实现党校教育正规化的决定) in 1983, “zhonggong 
zhongyang guanyu jiaqiang dangxiao gongzuo de tongzhi” (CCP’s Announcement on 
Enhancing Party-school Work, 中共中央关于加强党校工作的通知 ) in 1990, 
“zhonggong zhongyang guanyu jiaqiang dang de jianshe jige zhongda wenti de 
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functioned as a leadership selection or promotion criterion during this period. 
Instead, it was merely intended for the incumbents of authority positions to better 
fulfill leadership responsibilities. Only a few exceptions existed. For example, the CCP 
strove to improve the educational level of cadres to junior middle school in 1953. It 
is because the state-building agenda came into conflict with the poorly educated 
revolutionary generation, particularly those from socioeconomic statuses of 
peasants and workers65. Since the 1980s, educational requirements have been 
designed for specific leadership groups. For instance, in 1982, the minimum 
educational level of senior high school or vocational school (zhongzhuan, 中专) was 
underlined in recruiting cadres into central party and state organs66.  In 1983, it was 
stipulated that the reserve cadres (houbei ganbu, 后备干部) should receive the 
educational level of some college67.  
 
                                                                                                                                                              
jueding” (CCP’s Decisions on Important Issues on Enhancing Party System, 中共中央
关于加强党的建设几个重大问题的决定) in 1994.  
65 People.com.cn, 1953. “zhonggong zhongyang guanyu jiaqiang ganbu wenhua 
jiaoyu gongzuo de zhishi” (CCP Instructions on Improving Cultural Education for 
Cadres, 中共中央关于加强干部文化教育工作的指示) [Online]. (Updated 24 Dec 
1953) Available at: http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/64184/64186/66658/4492854.html 
[accessed 29 Oct 2014]  
66  People’s cn, 1982. “zhonggong zhongyang guowuyuan guanyu zhongyang 
dangzheng jiguan ganbu jiaoyu gongzuo de jueding” (CCP and the State Council’s 
Decisions on Education for Cadres from Central CCP and State Organs, 中共中央国
务院关于中央党政机关干部教育工作的决定) [Online]. (Updated 3 Oct 1982) 
Available at: 
http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/64162/71380/71387/71591/4854985.html [accessed 
29 Oct 2014]. 
67 Education systems in China incorporate educational levels of primary schools, 
junior middle schools, senior middle schools or vocational schools, some college, a 
bachelor’s degree, a master’s degree and a doctorate. According to Higher Education 
Law of China, higher education includes 2- or 3-year some college, 4- or 5-year 
undergraduate study (i.e., a bachelor’s degree), 2- or 3-year postgraduate study (i.e., 
a master’s degree) and 3- or 4-year Ph.D. (i.e., a doctorate). For more details, please 
refer to: Ministry of Education, 1998. “zhonghua renmin gongheguo gaodeng jiaoyu 
fa”  (Higher Education Law of China, 中华人民共和国高等教育法). [Online] 
(Updated 29 Aug 1998). Available at: 
http://www.moe.edu.cn/publicfiles/business/htmlfiles/moe/moe_619/200407/1311
.html (accessed on 18 Dec 2014). 
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As late as 1995, however, the education-occupation linkage was reinforced, 
particularly for degree-oriented education. Education qualifications were for the first 
time well defined in Chinese leadership selection. According to Article 7 of “Interim 
Regulations on Cadre Recruitment” (dangzheng lingdao ganbu xuanba renyong 
gongzuo zanxing tiaoli, 党政领导干部选拔任用工作暂行条例), the selection of 
party and state cadres takes into account educational degrees of some college or 
higher68. For the vice-provincial/ministerial level cadres, receiving college education 
is a basic standard. Thereafter, higher education has inevitably become increasingly 
salient69. In 2002, the educational criterion of college education or higher more 
extensively applied to leaders at the deputy-bureau/directorate level or above70.  In 
2006, tougher education criterion was imposed on career advancement for full-title 
leaders at the county level, that is, college education or higher71. After considering 
the close interrelation of education with political career prospects, Chinese political 
elites, particularly after 1995, are inclined to invest in education for upward mobility. 
It will receive empirical confirmation in Section 5.2.1. 
 
The second reason for the interest in educational advancement is wide-ranging 
social networks fostered through alumni and school ties. Like the Ivy League schools 
                                                        
68 People.com.cn, 1995. “dangzheng lingdao ganbu xuanba renyong gongzuo zanxing 
tiaoli” (Interim Regulations on Cadre Recruitment, 党政领导干部选拔任用工作暂
行 条 例 ). [Online] (Updated 9 Feb 1995). Available at: 
http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/64162/71380/71387/71591/4855103.html (accessed 
on 29 Oct 2014). 
69 For example, education of some college was re-emphasized in “Development 
Program Concerning the Establishment of a National Party and State Leadership, 
1998-2003” (1998-2003 quanguo dangzheng lingdao banzi jianshe guihua gangyao, 
1998－2003 年全国党政领导班子建设规划纲要).  
70 People’s cn, 2002. “dangzheng lingdao ganbu xuanba renyong gongzuo tiaoli” 
(Regulations on Cadre Recruitment, 党政领导干部选拔任用工作条例). [Online] 
(Updated 23 Jul 2002). Available at: 
http://www.people.com.cn/GB/shizheng/16/20020723/782504.html (accessed on 
29 Oct 2014). 
71 People.com.cn, 2006. “zhongzubu: jianshe shanyu zhixian lizheng de gaosuzhi 
dangzheng zhengzhi duiwu” (Central Organization Department: Developing High-
Quality Party and State Full-title Leadership at the County Level, 中组部：建设善于
治县理政的高素质党政正职队伍). [Online] (Updated 26 Jan 2006). Available at: 
http://politics.people.com.cn/GB/1027/4066050.html (accessed on 29 Oct 2014). 
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in the U.S.A., prestigious schools in China have produced a considerable proportion 
of political leadership. Graduates from the same school are more likely to be 
recruited into the same informal social networks, or even political alliance (Ishida, 
Spilerman & Su, 1997: 868). As a prominent example, Tsinghua University stands out 
among the high-ranking universities, no only in the technological realm but also in 
the political arena. Tsinghua alumni constitute 14.56% of the Politburo members 
from the 12th to the 18th CCs (Table 26). The proportion of Tsinghua University 
graduates reaches its pinnacle at the 15th Politburo, accounting for 22.73%. To 
mention only a few72 , Xi Jinping (习近平), current president, completed his 
undergraduate, postgraduate and doctoral studies in Tsinghua. Former president, Hu 
Jintao (胡锦涛) was also a Tsinghua undergraduate majoring in water conservancy 
engineering. Hu remained working in Tsinghua as a political counselor after 
graduation until 1968. Zhu Rongji (朱镕基), former premier, graduated from School 
of Electrical Engineering, Tsinghua University in 1951. The alumni network 
developed from educational backgrounds could be regarded as one of the social 
capital indicators, which warrants further exploration. However, the empirical 
promotion analyses in this thesis exclusively focus on the social capital accumulated 
from formal work contacts rather than alumni networks. 
 
Table 26 Proportion of Tsinghua Graduates from the 12th to 18th Politburos  
 Obs. Tsinghua Alumni Percent 
12th Politburo (1982.09-1987.11) 25 1 4.00 
13th Politburo (1987.11-1992.10) 17 3 17.65 
14th Politburo (1992.10-1997.09) 20 3 15.00 
15th Politburo (1997.09-2002.11) 22 5 22.73 
                                                        
72 Hu Qiaomu (胡乔木) was the only Tsinghua graduate as the 12th Politburo 
member.  For the 13th Politburo, Tsinghua alumni include Li Ximing (李锡铭), 
Songping (宋平) and Yao Yilin (姚依林). At the 14th Politburo, there were Zhu Rongji (
朱镕基), Wu Bangguo (吴邦国) and Hu Jintao (胡锦涛) from Tsinghua University. At 
the 15th Politburo, Tsinghua graduates include Zhu Rongji (朱镕基), Wubangguo (吴
邦国), Wu Guanzheng (吴官正), Hu Jintao (胡锦涛) and Huang Ju (黄菊). For the 
16th, Wu Bangguo (吴邦国), Wu Guanzheng (吴官正), Hu Jintao (胡锦涛), Huang Ju (
黄菊) and Zeng Peiyan (曾培炎) ever studied in Tsinghua University. For the 17th, Xi 
Jinping (习近平), Liu Yandong (刘延东), Wu Bangguo (吴邦国) and Hu Jintao (胡锦
涛) came from Tsinghua. As recent as the 18th Politburo, only Xi Jinping (习近平) and 
Liu Yandong (刘延东) were Tsinghua graduates.  
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16th Politburo (2002.11-2007.10) 24 5 20.83 
17th Politburo (2007.10-2012.10) 25 4 16.00 
18th Politburo (2012.11-2017.11) 25 2 8.00 
Total 158 23 14.56 
Source: Author’s database. 
 
Finally, educational advancement is closely related to the coalition building and 
cooperation between political leaders and universities. It is difficult to clarify if 
educational progression increases the odds of politics-education alliance or vice 
versa. Although this cause-and-effect relationship is probably intertwined, there is 
little doubt that Chinese political leaders tend to have both political and academic 
prominence. A typical example is former vice governor of Yunnan, Shen Peiping (沈
培平)73. Shen’s formal education is some-college from Department of Chinese 
Language and Literature, Baoshan Teachers’ Training College. However, Shen 
advanced his educational credentials by studying Chinese literature in Yunnan 
Education Institute and business management in Central Party School. He was 
awarded a doctoral degree of natural geography from Beijing Normal University 
while simultaneously working as mayor and deputy party secretary of Puer city, 
Yunnan in 2007. Five months later, he was appointed as adjunct professor of School 
of Resources in the same university. Shen was well known as Mayor of Tea for 
strongly promoting the fermented tea industry in Puer. His thesis was entitled as 
Research on the Development of Fermented Tea Industry in Yunnan Province. He 
published a series of research papers on fermented tea with his thesis supervisor, Liu 
Xuemin (刘学敏). Besides, Shen was former Dean of Beijing Institute of Tea. The 
institute was jointly established by Puer Municipal Government and School of 
Resources of Beijing Normal University in 2010. Apparently, both a doctoral degree 
and academic titles injected added value into Shen’s Curriculum Vitae. Shen’s higher 
educational advancement to a doctorate and academic collaboration potentially 
benefited from his local leadership experience in Puer. 
                                                        
73 People’s cn, 2014. “Yunnan yuan fushengzhang Shen Peiping de xueli zhi mi” (The 
Myth of Educational Qualifications for Former Vice Governor of Yunnan Shen 
Peiping, 云南原副省长沈培平的学历之谜). [Online] (Updated 12 March 2014). 
Available at: http://politics.people.com.cn/n/2014/0312/c1001-24617840.html 
(accessed on 31 Oct 2014). 
 
 
161 
 
Overall, there is no doubt about the growing interest in educational advancement 
for Chinese provincial leaders. However, part-time education is a top priority. It is 
principally because of the workload of leadership responsibilities and, more 
importantly, the age dilemma under the step-by-step promotion mechanism. As 
analyzed in Chapter 4, career interruptions confer a striking age disadvantage on 
upward mobility for provincial leaders. It potentially undermines the preference of 
full-time continuing education.  
 
Alongside the rise of part-time educational advancement, the questioning of its 
quality is the second reason for distinguishing formal and final education in this 
chapter. Typically, the CCP launched a nationwide verification of cadres’ diplomas 
between 2002 and 200474. For 670,000 cadres under investigation at the county 
level and above, one out of 40 cadres had fake diplomas. Pei (2012) conceives the 
“inflated advanced degree” as “a sign of systemic cheating”. Cadres’ education 
scandals deteriorate by way of dubious educational credentials coupled with the 
major discrepancy between educational qualifications and the corresponding 
academic training received75. In terms of the former, educational degrees are 
acquired from black-market transactions or maneuver of disqualified degree-
granting schools, such as the diploma-selling scandal for Provincial Party School of 
                                                        
74 CCP News, 2002. “zhongyang zuzhibu renshibu jiaoyubu guowuyuan xuewei 
weiyuanhui guanyu jiaqiang he guifan ganbu xueli xuewei guanli gongzuo de yijian” 
(Central Organization Department, Ministry of Personnel, Ministry of Education, and 
Academic Degree Commission of State Council’s Notice on Regulating Cadres’ 
Educational Qualifications, 中央组织部、人事部、教育部、国务院学位委员会关
于加强和规范干部学历学位管理工作的意见). [Online] (Updated on 21 April 
2002). Available at: 
http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/64162/71380/102565/182144/10995076.html 
(accessed on 31 Oct 2014).  
75 Changjiang Networks, 2015. “guanyuan xueli zaojia yeshi yizhong ‘linglei fubai’” 
(Receiving Fake Diplomas is a Another Type of Corruption, 官员学历造假也是一种
“ 另 类 腐 败 ” ). [Online] (Updated on 8 May 2015). Available at: 
http://news.cjn.cn/cjsp/dp/201505/t2644851.htm (accessed on 11 May 2015). 
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Hainan in 200476.  The notable examples include former vice governor of Jiangxi, Hu 
Changqing (胡长清), and former mayor of Shenzhen, Xu Zongheng (许宗衡)77. Hu 
held a forged bachelor’s degree from Peking University. As for Xu, his oversea 
education in International East-West College of U.S.A. was highly questionable.  
 
Regarding the deficiency in educational training, it reveals the cadres’ low 
involvement in lectures, assignments and thesis even though their obtained 
diplomas are authentic. In this regard, continuing education does not invariably lead 
to knowledge and capability transfers. Rather, at the core of such education may be 
the politics-education alliance, as mentioned previously. Its quality and impact is 
highly questioned. One of the extreme cases is Wang Lijun (王立军), former vice 
mayor and police chief of Chongqing78. His formal degree is merely junior middle 
school.   Nevertheless, Wang successfully raised educational credentials to a 
doctorate by part-time continuing education. It is worthwhile to underline the 
starting time of Wang’s EMBA and doctoral study. Wang participated in the EMBA 
program in Northeast University of Finance and Economics (NUFE) in September 
2004. After three months, a Social Psychology Laboratory was jointly founded by 
NUFE and Municipal Bureau of Public Security of Jinzhou, where Wang worked as 
                                                        
76 People.com.cn, 2004. “Hainan chachu wenping da’an, sheng dangxiao weigui 
fachu shuqian zhang wenping” (Hainan Investigated the Case of Fake Diploma 
awarded from Hainan Provincial Party School, 海南查处文凭大案，省党校违规发
出 数 千 张 文 凭 ). [Online] (Updated on 16 June 2004). Available at: 
http://www.people.com.cn/GB/shehui/1061/2574584.html (accessed on 11 May 
2015). 
77 For Hu’s case, please refer to: People.com.cn, 2000. “Beida jielu huchangqing 
‘Beida biye’ zhenxiang” (Peking University Uncovered Hu Changqing’s fake diploma 
earned from Peking University, 北大揭露胡长清“北大毕业”真相). [Online] 
(Updated on 7 September 2000). Available at: 
http://www.people.com.cn/GB/channel1/13/20000907/223204.html (accessed on 
11 May 2015); For Xu’s case, please refer to: People.com.cn, 2009. “Xu Zongheng de 
‘wenping’ shi jiade?” (Is Xu Zongheng’s educational degree fake? 许宗衡的“文凭”
是 假 的 ？ ). [Online] (Updated on 17 June 2009). Available at: 
http://politics.people.com.cn/GB/113795/9491173.html (accessed on 11 May 2015). 
78 South Weekly Online, 2012. “xuezhe Wang Lijun” (Scholar Wang Li Jun, 学者王立
军 ). [Online] (Updated on 18 Dec 2012). Available at: 
http://www.nbweekly.com/news/special/201212/31976.aspx (accessed on 31 Oct 
2014). 
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director. In 2007, Wang started his doctoral program in Dalian Maritime University. 
In July that year, Municipal Bureau of Public Security of Jinzhou became the practical 
teaching base for juris masters from Dalian Maritime University. Meanwhile, Wang 
was appointed as adjunct professor and postgraduate supervisor. More cooperative 
programs came into being with the University particularly after Wang’s ascending to 
deputy director of Municipal Bureau of Public Security of Chongqing in 2008. It is 
reasonable to indicate that Wang’s pursuit of higher education was accompanied by 
his efforts in promoting exchanges and cooperation between public organizations 
and universities. In this sense, the corresponding degrees were inevitably suspicious.  
 
In summary, according the preceding analysis, in the first place, the predominance of 
educational advancement through part-time study has been observed. It virtually 
results from three aspects: (1) merit-based educational qualification for elite upward 
mobility, (2) expanding social networks, and (3) the mutually beneficial politics-
education alliance. In the second place, the attainment of part-time credentials is of 
dubious validity by analyzing both the fake diplomas and the inadequate 
participation in learning activities. Education of Chinese provincial leaders, thereby, 
calls for independent studies of formal and final education, respectively. Under two 
separate educational lines of full-time and part-time education, the following section 
will center on the highest degrees obtained and the corresponding fields of study79.  
 
5.1.2 Educational Level: Formal Education versus Final Education 
 
                                                        
79 Specifically, all of Chinese provincial leaders attained the highest formal degrees 
before entering provincial leadership. To look at the entire educational histories, 
2.89% of provincial leaders continued ascending educational achievement after 
assuming provincial authority posts. That is to say, out of 9,814 life-history 
observations, 284 preferred to ascend educational levels after leaving leading 
positions in question. To this end, final education in Section 5.1 exclusively refers to 
the specific educational credential political leaders hold in office of party secretaries, 
provincial governors, deputy secretaries or vice governors. Section 5.2 will extend to 
look at the entire educational trajectories and focus on events of educational 
changes.  
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In terms of formal education, based on 9,814 life-history observations, 68.65% of 
Chinese provincial leaders from 1990 to 2013 are college graduates (Table 27). 
Among them, only 6.47% are involved in master programs and 2.45% in doctoral 
programs. With regard to final education, college graduates account for 85.82% of 
Chinese provincial leaders (including B.A., M.A. and Ph.D.). The proportions of 
masters and PhDs tremendously increase to 34.09% and 10.35%, respectively. In this 
sense, Chinese provincial leaders are inclined to raise their educational levels.  
 
Table 27 Educational Level of Chinese Provincial Leaders, 1990-2013 
 Formal Education Final Education 
Obs. Percent Obs. Percent 
High School or 
Below 
2007 20.45 404 4.12 
Some College 1070 10.90 987 10.06 
B.A. 5862 59.73 4060 41.38 
M.A. 635 6.47 3345 34.09 
Ph.D. 240 2.45 1015 10.35 
Total 9814 100.00 9811 100.00 
Source: Author’s database. 
 
In the following, a longitudinal and comparative study of college-educated provincial 
leaders is firstly undertaken. Figure 15 compares the proportions of college 
graduates in provincial politics with respect to formal and final education, 
respectively. Secondly, after providing a general account of college-educated elites, 
this section attempts to explain the historical changes in the ratios of provincial 
leaders receiving full-time college education. This analysis is rooted in the 
educational expansions in the mid-1950s and the late 1970s as well as the 
educational depression during the CR. In addition, the growing trend of college-
educated leaders in final degrees has been interpreted in Section 5.1.1. Finally, the 
percentages of college-educated leaders in formal and final education are further 
compared between party and government leaders.  
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As Figure 15 shows, formal college education reveals two rapid-growth episodes, 
namely, 1990-1999 and 2011-2013 80 . The ratio of college graduates among 
provincial elites displayed a slowly increasing presence from 57.30% to 63.03% 
during the period of 1990-1994. A dramatic increase by 5.70% occurred in 1995. 
Thereafter, the proportion of college graduates reached its height of 75.18% in 1999 
and gradually diminished to a lower level of 64.93% in 2008. After a two-year 
vacillation, there has been a resurge of college-educated leaders since 2011, starting 
at the level of 69.23% in 2011 and climbing to 73.94% in 2013.  
 
In sharp contrast to formal higher education, the presence of provincial leaders with 
college degrees is more straightforward for final education.  As expected, Figure 15 
illustrates a path of steady growth for college-educated leaders over the past two 
decades, from 59.93% in 1990 to 99.77% in 2013. In particular, college graduates 
have overwhelmingly pervaded every corner of provincial leadership since 2011, 
providing 99.28% in 2011, 99.75% in 2012 and 99.77% in 2013.  
 
The comparison of formal and final higher education is revealing. The gap of formal 
vis-à-vis final education was widening for the college-educated ratio, particularly 
during the period of 2000-2010. It provides initial support to the trend of schooling 
progression for Chinese provincial leaders. In 1990, the ratio of provincial leaders 
with final college degrees was only 2.63% higher than that with formal college 
diplomas. However, the college-educated gap increased to 33.07% in 2010 and 
started to slowly shrink to 25.83% in 2013. What led to the narrowing gap after 2010? 
The possible explanations are the unprecedented predominance of college 
graduates for final education on one hand, and the increasing representation of 
provincial leaders obtaining formal higher education on the other.  
 
                                                        
80 The longitudinal study of college-educated provincial leaders focuses on those 
with a bachelor’s, master’s or a doctoral degree. To analyze the timing of college 
entry, educational history was limited to the timing of starting a bachelor program 
only. It is possible that a provincial leader obtained the highest formal degree after 
the CR, while receiving college education before the CR. Accordingly, the timing of 
entry into college should date back to the pre-CR period.  
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Figure 15 College-educated Chinese Provincial Leaders, 1990-2013 
 
Regarding the persistent growth of final educational levels, Section 5.1.1 has already 
analyzed why Chinese provincial leaders were interested in improving final 
educational outcomes. However, in terms of formal education, how could the 
impacts of historical periods on college-educated ratios be interpreted? In fact, the 
answer to this question is closely linked to the centralization of educational systems 
and vacillations of educational policies in Chinese history. First, the increases in 
college-educated leaders during the periods of 1990-1999 and 2011-2013 conform 
to two distinctive episodes. One is the first wave of educational expansion after the 
inception of the P.R.C., from the mid-1950s to the mid-1960s. The other is the 
reopening of universities, in the immediate aftermath of the CR, from 1977 to 1980.  
 
For the 1990-1999 college-educated provincial leaders, they largely came from the 
birth cohorts of 1930s (32.94%) and 1940s (60.07%). 93.54% entered universities 
prior to the CR (Table 28). In particular, 59.82% of the 1990-1999 provincial leaders 
were enrolled in colleges between 1960 and 1965. The typical examples include Wu 
Bangguo (吴邦国) (former chairman of NPC, vice premier and party secretary of 
Shanghai), Li Changchun  (李长春) (former member of Politburo standing committee 
and party secretary of Guangdong and Henan), He Guoqiang  (贺国强) (former 
member of Politburo standing committee and party secretary of Chongqing) and 
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Guo Jinlong (郭金龙) (current Politburo member and party secretary of Beijing). The 
educational composition of Chinese provincial leaders from 1990 to 1999 reflects the 
macropolitical contexts in early years of the P.R.C. The political emphasis and agenda 
priorities were directed toward massive national building, heavy-industry 
development and economic growth. Under such historical contexts, the conflict 
became acute regarding the increasing demand of highly trained labor force and the 
severe illiteracy rates. Thus, the CCP pragmatically sought to promote both basic and 
higher education (Hannum, 1999: 195; Zhou, 2004: 75-78). As shown in Figure 16, 
higher education enrollment increased from 117,000 in 1949 to 962,000 in 1960. 
There was a gradual moderate decline to 674,000 in 1965.  
 
Table 28 Year of College Entry for College-educated Provincial Leaders, 1990-1999 
Year of College Entry Obs. Percent 
Pre-Cultural Revolution 2317 93.54 
Cultural Revolution 90 3.63 
Post-Cultural Revolution 70 2.83 
Total 2477 100.00 
Source: Author’s database. 
 
 
Figure 16 Higher Education Enrollment in China, 1949-199881  
                                                        
81 The data of higher education enrollment from 1990 to 2012 was drawn from China 
Statistical Yearbook in 1990, 2005 and 2013. Since 1999, the universities or colleges 
have expanded their enrollment considerably. The higher education enrollment was 
 
 
168 
 Note: Higher education enrollment is measured in thousand.  
Source: China Statistical Yearbook 
 
For the 2011-2013 college-educated provincial leaders, 66.40% were born in the 
1950s. 80.02% started formal college education after the CR (Table 29). Most striking 
is that 45.60% entered universities in 1978. For example, Wang Zhengwei (王正伟), 
current vice chairman of NPPCC, studied Chinese literature in Ningxia University 
from 1978 to 1982. Zhou Qiang (周强), current president of SPC, was admitted into 
Southwest Politics and Law University after working as a sent-down youth for two 
years. In retrospect, after the chaotic years of the CR, the CCP strove to restore the 
sociopolitical order and the disrupted educational systems. The National College 
Entrance Examination was resumed in 1977. This strategy dramatically altered both 
the educational and future employment opportunities for birth cohorts of the 1950s 
and the early 1960s.  According to Figure 16, approximately 625,000 young students 
were admitted into colleges in 1977. In 1978, the number of college education 
enrollment got closer to its peak value before the CR, approximately 856,000. It 
maintained a drastically rapid growth to 23.91 million in 2012.  
 
Consider the 1990-1999 and 2011-2013 provincial leaders receiving college 
education in a historical perspective. Given the scarcity, higher education graduates, 
who had been politically screened before entry into colleges particularly after 1957, 
appeared to be both “red” and “expert”. A somewhat large pool of leadership 
candidates—younger, politically reliable and well educated--was created through 
educational expansions during these periods. In line with Deng Xiaoping’s (邓小平) 
cadre policy of Four Modernizations (ganbu sihua, 干部四化) in 1980, educational 
credentials partly facilitated prospective career advancement for these groups of 
college entrants.  
                                                                                                                                                              
117,000 in 1949, 4,134,000 in 1999 and 23,913,000 in 2012. It increased 
approximately 35-fold from 1949 to 1999, and 204-fold from 1949 to 2012. To better 
present educational expansion in early years, Figure 16 was only compiled by the 
statistical data from 1990 to 1998, before the initiation of higher education 
enrollment expansion policy. Higher education enrollment in Figure 16 is measured 
in thousand.  
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Table 29 Year of College Entry for College-educated Provincial Leaders, 2011-2013 
Year of College Entry Obs. Percent 
Pre-Cultural Revolution 33 3.75 
Cultural Revolution 143 16.23 
Post-Cultural Revolution 705 80.02 
Total 881 100.00 
Source: Author’s database. 
 
Between extraordinary periods of 1990-1999 and 2011-2013, there had been a 
decrease in the college-educated percentage of provincial leaders for a decade, from 
74.53% in 2000 to 65.90% in 2010. The downward trend emerged in response to the 
CR era. Numerous universities or colleges were shut down. The role of higher 
education was downplayed. As indicated in Figure 16, the number of higher 
education enrollment hit the lowest point of 48,000 in 1970. Exceptionally, in the 
second half of the CR, young workers, peasants and soldiers, as the pillars of the 
party state, were recruited into colleges82. The decisions on college admission for the 
worker-peasant-soldier students  (gong nong bing xueyuan, 工农兵学员) were 
based on recommendation instead of academic achievement. The notable examples 
are Xi Jinping (习近平) (current president of P.R.C.), Wang Qishan (王岐山) (current 
secretary of CCDI), and Liu Qibao (刘奇葆 ) (current head of Propaganda 
Department). In such politically turbulent settings, a large number of Chinese youths 
were reluctantly transferred or spontaneously preferred to enter work force, rather 
than regularly continue study in schools. As for the 2000-2010 provincial leaders, 
78.14% started their careers during this era (Table 30). 54.29% came from the CR 
generation, as discussed in Chapter 4, which was particularly affected by lower 
enrolments of higher education.  
                                                        
82 According to “Summary of the National Education Work Conference” (quanguo 
jiaoyu gongzuo huiyi jiyao, 全国教育工作会议纪要) in 1971, the recruitment criteria 
of the worker-peasant-solider students primarily focus on: (1) around twenty years 
old; (2) at least two- or three-year work experience; (3) educational levels equivalent 
to junior high school or higher. For those experienced workers, peasants and 
revolutionary cadres, the limitations of age and educational requirements could be 
loosened. The selection of the worker-peasant-solider students strictly adheres to 
the procedures of self-application, mass recommendation, leaders’ approval and 
colleges’ review.  
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Table 30 Year of Career Entry for Provincial Leaders, 2000-2010 
Year of Entry into Labor Force Obs. Percent 
1966 207 4.22 
1967 350 7.14 
1968 870 17.74 
1969 702 14.31 
1970 411 8.38 
1971 288 5.87 
1972 275 5.61 
1973 181 3.69 
1974 255 5.20 
1975 175 3.57 
1976 119 2.43 
Total 3833 78.14 
Source: Author’s database. 
 
After interpreting the changes in formal college-educated rates, the next step is to 
compare educational credentials of party and government leaders. With respect to 
formal degrees, prior to 1999, educational levels for government leaders were 
higher than party leaders (Figure 17). The college-educated gap for two leadership 
groups fluctuated around 10% from 1990 to 1998. During the period of 1999-2009, 
there was little difference in the college-educated ratios between party and 
government leaders. After 2009, the proportion of government leaders with formal 
higher education again outnumbered that of party leaders.  
 
 
Figure 17 College-educated Provincial Leaders for Formal Degrees by Type, 1990-
2013 
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With respect to final educational attainment, college graduates had produced a 
markedly larger percentage of government leaders than party leaders by 1998 
(Figure 18). The most pronounced difference arose in 1991 when college graduates 
took 54.17% of party leaders but only 70.34% of government leaders. From 1999 
onward, these two leadership groups exhibited a similar and stable increase. By 
comparing the differences in formal and final educational outcomes, it is worth 
mentioning that the rate of educational progression for party leaders remarkably 
accelerated after 2000. It significantly outpaced that for government leaders since 
2010. As a result, all party leaders at the provincial level were college graduates from 
2011 to 2013.  
 
 
Figure 18 College-educated Provincial Leaders for Final Degrees by Type, 1990-2013 
 
To conclude, educational advancement is well established for the 1990-2013 Chinese 
provincial leaders. Educational credentials during this period are characterized by 
the prevalence of higher education. There is no doubt about the persistently 
increasing presence of college graduates in provincial politics in terms of final 
educational degrees. However, as for formal education, the pattern of college-
educated provincial leaders changed over time. It was fundamentally shaped by the 
shifting state agendas and educational policies. The growth of college-educated 
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provincial leaders originated in educational expansions before and after the CR in 
the long run.  
 
5.1.3 Academic Major: Formal Education versus Final Education 
 
This section delineates the preferences of specialty for Chinese provincial leaders 
from a historical point of view. It illuminates that science and engineering majors 
prevailed during the period of 1990-2005 in formal education and during the period 
of 1990-1999 in final education. To interpret the former finding, this section looks 
into the sociopolitical transformation and the educational restructuring in the 1950s. 
For the observation related to final education, the analysis is situated in the 
prevalence of part-time education and party-school education, along with the 
compatibility of humanities and social sciences with the job description of party 
workers, government administrators and the like.  
 
Based on 9,814 life-history observations, the percentage of provincial leaders trained 
in humanities and social sciences for formal degrees varies with that for final degree 
(Table 31). Overall, 42.62% of provincial leaders prefer humanities and social 
sciences in formal education, as compared to 60.69% in final educational attainment. 
To be specific, provincial leaders are more likely to study science in full-time 
bachelor, master and doctoral programs. The corresponding figures are 59.69%, 
60.16% and 71.25%, respectively. On the contrary, 62.64% of provincial leaders with 
the educational level of some college tend to select humanities and social sciences 
as the major field of study.  
 
Regarding final educational degrees, the major field of humanities and social 
sciences is more favored by provincial leaders with some college, master and 
doctoral diplomas. The corresponding figures of percentages are 71.07%, 83.03% 
and 67.49%, respectively. It is merely in the bachelor’s degree that science still 
prevails. To summarize, as for either formal or final education, provincial leaders 
with the educational level of some college are inclined to study humanities and 
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social sciences. Those with bachelor’s degrees are more interested in science and 
engineering. Nonetheless, there exists a major shift in selecting academic disciplines 
for provincial leaders with master’s and doctoral degrees. Science substantially 
attracts more attention in formal education, whereas humanities and social sciences 
in final education.  
 
Table 31 Academic Major of Chinese Provincial Leaders, 1990-2013 
 Formal Education Final Education 
 
Obs. 
Humanities & 
Social Science 
Percent Obs. 
Humanities & 
Social Science 
Percent 
Some College 918 575 62.64 840 597 71.07 
B.A. 5778 2329 40.31 4030 1545 38.34 
M.A. 630 251 39.84 3335 2769 83.03 
Ph.D. 240 69 28.75 1015 685 67.49 
Total 7566 3224 42.61 9220 5596 60.69 
Source: Author’s database. 
 
Over time, for both formal and final education, the ratios of provincial leaders 
trained in humanities and social sciences generally exhibited a steady and moderate 
upward pattern (Figure 19). On the contrary, the ratios of provincial leaders majoring 
in science experienced a sharp decline after 1999. For the highest formal degree, the 
relative predominance of science and engineering was evident between 1990 and 
2005. It started at the level of 48.63% in 1990 and slowly rose to the peak of 60.73% 
in 1997. After 1997, it modestly dropped to 37.20% in 2013 with minor fluctuations. 
Considering those majoring in humanities and social sciences, the changes in 
proportions started with a small reduce from 24.31% in 1990 to 21.84% in 1993. 
From 1994 onward, it maintained a steadily slow growth, from 24.78% in 1994 to 
52.13% in 2013. Intriguingly, as for formal education, the 1990-2005 Chinese 
provincial leadership was dominated by higher education graduates majoring in 
science. Since 2006, more provincial leaders have selected humanities and social 
sciences as major fields of study relative to science.  
 
In terms of the highest final degree, Figure 19 reveals the accelerated growth of 
provincial leaders majoring in humanities and social sciences. Before 2000, there was 
a fluctuating increase in leaders from humanities and social sciences, vacillating 
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between 32.14% and 44.95%. It was followed by a rapid increase to 50.00% in 2000. 
Thereafter, provincial leaders with humanities and social sciences constituted a 
larger portion, from 52.44% in 2001 to 78.64% in 2013. The peak value was 79.64% 
in 2012. That is to say, the predominance of leaders from academic disciplines of 
science and engineering has disappeared since 2000. Parallel to the growth of 
provincial leaders from humanities and social sciences, the ratio of those majoring in 
science fluctuated between 48.82% and 55.32% across the period of 1990-1999. It 
displayed a downward pattern from 48.56% in 2000 to 21.36% in 2013.  In summary, 
to look at the composition of academic disciplines in final education, the 1990-1999 
provincial leaders tended to study science. Since 2000, the preference of humanities 
and social sciences has become mainstream.  
 
 
Figure 19 Academic Major of Chinese Provincial Leaders, 1990-2013 
 
The above-mentioned evolution of academic disciplines gives rise to fascinating 
questions for Chinese provincial leadership. For instance, what induces the 
dominance of provincial leaders trained in science for formal degrees between 1990 
and 2005? What resulted in the increasing representation of elites studying 
humanities and social sciences in final education?  
 
The answer to the first question virtually dates back to the particular historical 
period when the 1990-2005 provincial elites were enrolled in higher education. 75% 
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of this leadership group entered colleges or universities before the CR, particularly 
between 1960 and 1965. Under state socialism, the CCP, as an overarching authority, 
determined the focus of state policies in such ways that heavy industry was 
prioritized. There was, notwithstanding, an acute dearth of high-quality specialists in 
Mao’s era. To solve this bottleneck, the CCP allocated and mobilized resources to 
better support national development and industrialization 83 . As analyzed in 
preceding section, higher education was promoted to nurture a highly specialized 
manpower with scientific knowledge and technical expertise. To this end, the CCP 
restructured faculty layouts within and across colleges into the Soviet-type 
educational system in 1952.  
 
The higher education reform placed profound emphasis on training science-oriented 
professionals84. At the empirical level, across the period of 1949-2012, the size of 
universities related to science and engineering experienced two waves of expansions. 
One is in 1960 when the number of universities significantly displayed a 13-fold 
increase from 68 in 1949 to 880 in 1960. The other started in 2004 when the size of 
universities specialized in science markedly increased from 363 in 2003 to 823.  To 
                                                        
83 The primary purpose of education substantially centered around improving the 
average educational levels and providing specialists, as highlighted in “State 
Council’s Decision on Reforming Educational Institutions” (zhengwuyuan guanyu 
gaige xuezhi de jueding, 政务院关于改革学制的决定) in 1951, “Reforming the 
Faculties in Colleges and Effectively Training Cadres for National Building” (zuohao 
yuanxi tiaozheng gongzuo youxiao de peiyang guojia jianshe ganbu, 做好院系调整
工作，有效地培养国家建设干部) in 1952, “Report on Primary, Secondary and 
Higher Education and the Elimination of Illiteracy” (zhonggong zhongyang pizhuan 
zhongyang jiaoyubu dangzu guanyu da zhong xiaoxue jiaoyu he saomang yundong 
deng wenti de baogao, 中共中央批转中央教育部党组关于大中小学教育和扫盲运
动等问题的报告) in 1952, “State Council’s Instruction on Improving and Developing 
Higher Normal Education” (zhongyang renmin zhengfu zhengwuyuan guanyu gaijin 
he fazhan gaodeng shifan jiaoyu de zhishi, 中央人民政府政务院关于改进和发展高
等示范教育的指示) in 1953.  
84 CCP News, 2002. “zuohao yuanxi tiaozheng gongzuo youxiao de peiyang guojia 
jianshe ganbu” (Reforming the Faculties in Colleges and Effectively Training Cadres 
for National Building, 做好院系调整工作，有效地培养国家建设干部). [Online] 
(Updated on 24 Sep 1952). Available at: 
http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/64184/64186/66657/4492782.html (accessed on 8 
November 2014). 
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put it in another way, as shown in Figure 20, science-specific universities took over a 
half of the total universities nationwide during the periods of 1952-1957 and 1978-
1981. They accounted for over 60% between 1958 and 1977 (except the first half of 
the CR, 1966-1970). In this regard, it is reasonable to expect that the CCP strove to 
invest more in producing professionals in early years, such as engineers and 
technicians.  
 
In terms of college enrollments illustrated in Figure 21, the percentage of college 
students majoring in science rose by 10% from 1949 to 1953. With a small 
fluctuation between 1954 and 1957, it markedly climbed from 67.2% in 1958 to 
90.7% in 1969. Despite a sharp fall in 1970, college students trained in science 
provided over 60% over time for the most part. The compelling reasons for selecting 
science and engineering as major fields of study could be the practical concerns with 
individual interest and life chances, the interference and redistribution of the CCP, or 
both. In some cases, eligible college applicants were chosen very early before the 
college entrance examinations started. A vast majority of them shared similar 
convictions that the needs of the party state were their first priority because of 
party-state-centered ideological indoctrination.  
 
To sum up, the 1952 restructuring of educational systems in China conferred the 
relative advantage of natural science over humanities and social sciences in higher 
education in the long run. To a considerable extent, it helps explain why a large 
number of provincial leaders received full-time training of science and engineering 
since 1990.  
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Figure 20 Proportion of Science-specific Universities in China, 1949-198185 
 
 
                                                        
85  For 1949-1981 data, see “Zhongguo jiaoyu nianjian: 1949-1981” (Education 
Statistical Yearbook of China: 1949-1981, 中国教育年鉴：1949－1981 年) (Beijing: 
China Encyclopedia Publishing House, 1984), p. 965-967. The statistical data on the 
number of universities are classified into twelve categories, namely comprehensive 
universities and universities specialized in industry/engineering, agriculture, forestry, 
medicine, normal education, Chinese language and literature, economics/finance, 
legal studies, physical education, arts and others. The statistical data on the number 
of college students enrolled are based on eleven categories including 
industry/engineering, agriculture, forestry, medicine, normal education, literature, 
physics/chemistry, economics/finance, legal studies, physical education and arts. To 
better present historical changes in academic disciplines, this section integrates 11 
categories of college enrollment into two general dimensions, namely science, 
humanities and social sciences. For the classification of universities, this section 
focuses on three types, namely comprehensive universities, science-specific 
universities and those specialized in humanities and social sciences. The major fields 
of industry/engineering, agriculture, forestry, medicine and physics/chemistry are 
incorporated into science. It is the so-called physic-engineering-medicine-agriculture 
category in higher education candidates’ application forms (li gong yi nong lei, 理工
医农类). The remaining academic majors consist of the dimension of humanities and 
social sciences.  
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Figure 21 Proportion of College Enrollment Trained in Science, 1949-1981 
 
Concerning the second question, it is important to note that the growth of provincial 
leaders trained in humanities and social sciences in last degree is accompanied by an 
increase in the proportion of part-time education. As shown in Figure 22, from the 
outset, the ratio of provincial leaders with part-time education slowly grew from 
14.23% in 1990 to 27.66% in 1999. Thereafter, it exhibited a conspicuous increase 
from 29.95% in 2000 to 75.36% in 2008. Since 2009, part-time education has been 
steadily and enormously favored by political elites, amounting to 79.11% in 2013. In 
this sense, as for final education, the continuing predominance of the 1990-1999 
provincial leaders majoring in science is primarily attributed to the fact that part-
time education received scant attention before 2000. It is more likely that final 
educational attainment for provincial leaders between 1990 and 1999 equals to their 
formal educational degrees. However, the historical period of 2000-2013 tells a 
different story. Since 2000, a larger ratio of provincial leaders has acquired part-time 
education and more importantly, preferred humanities and social sciences as fields 
of concentration. This finding poses another intriguing question. Why was the 
academic major of humanities and social sciences more popular in the last 
educational degree after 1999?  
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Figure 22 Part-time Education for Chinese Provincial Leaders, 1990-2013 
 
The possible explanations are threefold. First, training in humanities and social 
sciences is essentially pertinent to the career paths of management and leadership. 
To return to the educational backgrounds of the 2000-2013 provincial elites, 
approximately 54.25% were enrolled in the last educational degrees after serving in 
party apparatus or government bureaucracies. In addition, a certain number of 
political leaders advanced their educational levels after working as managers in the 
SOEs for years. Party leaders, government administrators or corporate managers 
play a pivotal role in policy making and implementation at the crux of the power 
structure. In this case, such academic majors as finance, political sciences, legal 
studies or business management are regarded as a proxy for professional knowledge 
and skills on party affairs, government administration, financial management and 
the like.  
 
Second, party schools provide a principal avenue for political leaders to obtain 
educational credentials. They are conceived as the cradle of training leading cadres 
in contemporary China.  In other words, they could be considered as an important 
mechanism to provide party-sponsored educational opportunities.  Not only it is 
easier for cadre elites to ascend educational achievement, but also engage in 
networking activities through party schools. Figure 23 reports the historical changes 
in the proportion of provincial leaders graduating from party schools for educational 
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degrees. The upward trend is noticeable from 8.24% in 1990 to 37.09% in 2013, with 
the peak value of 42.82% in 2010. The curriculum from party schools is confined to 
academic disciplines of humanities and social sciences. Consider the disciplinary 
structure of Central Party School as an example. Central Party School provides a 
broad range of modules, such as Marxism, philosophy, economics and finance, legal 
studies, sociology, political science and so on. Receiving party-school education 
increases the likelihood of studying humanities and social sciences.  
 
 
Figure 23 Party-School Education for Chinese Provincial Leaders, 1990-2013 
 
Finally, the pronounced tendency of studying humanities and social sciences stems 
from the differences in training requirements. In another sense, the disciplinary 
guidelines and criteria for natural science and engineering studies are far more 
complex and rigid as compared to those for humanities and social sciences. Like 
physical or chemistry science, students are more likely to be attached to the 
laboratories. The college admission is based on the fulfillment and mastery of 
prerequisite courses (Astin, 1972: 11). To sharp contrast, time and course design are 
relatively flexible as to humanities and social sciences. Given the heavy workload on 
a tight schedule, academic majors of humanities and social sciences are apparently a 
better choice for provincial leaders.  
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To conclude with the above explanations, the major discipline of humanities and 
social sciences are more compatible with the leadership responsibilities and time 
schedules for provincial elites. It effectively responds to the CCP’s emphasis on 
educational advancement. The subsequent section will investigate the events of 
educational changes over educational histories for the 1990-2013 Chinese provincial 
leaders86. It is guided by the following questions.  For instance, at what age and what 
administrative ranking did provincial leaders ascended their educational levels? To 
what extent did political elites change their disciplinary backgrounds?  
 
5.2 Education Changes: A Dynamic Analysis 
 
To take insight into educational histories, the analysis of education changes is based 
on the event-history data derived from 1,260 instead of 1,891 Chinese provincial 
leaders. The distinction from the leadership dataset of 1,891 provincial elites is that 
each provincial leader is identified as a distinct case in the former sample regardless 
of how many provinces or provincial leadership positions they assumed 87 . 
                                                        
86 Leadership biographies start with either the year of entry into higher education 
(including vocational education and some college) or the year of entry into labor 
force as to provincial leaders without higher education. Therefore, education 
changes are coded along two critical dimensions: (1) after-working educational 
progression, or (2) before-working higher educational advancement to a master’s 
degree or a doctorate in regular educational systems. Out of 1,387 observational 
records related to educational changes, only 38 provincial leaders advanced to a 
master’s degree or a doctorate in regular educational systems prior to entering labor 
force (2.74%).  
87 In this thesis, the leadership transformation is mostly based on the event-history 
data of 1,891 Chinese provincial leaders. The empirical analyses cover demographic 
characteristics, formal and final education and work experience. In this sample, a 
number of provincial leaders may appear in the leadership dataset more than once if 
they experienced job transfers across provinces as provincial chiefs or changes in 
leadership roles (e.g., from vice governor to governor). On the other hand, in 
analyzing educational histories and career trajectories, the analyses are based on the 
event-history data of 1,260 Chinese provincial leaders. Each provincial leader is 
treated as a distinct case irrespective of inter-province job moves and career 
advancement across provincial chiefs. Furthermore, the analyses of social capital and 
elite mobility processes are also based on the leadership dataset of 1,260 provincial 
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Empirically, 817 out of 1,260 provincial officials experience after-working 
educational advancement or higher education progression prior to labor force entry, 
approximately 64.74%. The number of education-changing events under study is 
1,387, i.e., 1.10 education changes per provincial leader on average.  
 
Table 32 Number of Education Changes for Chinese Provincial Leaders, 1990-2013 
Number of Education Changes Obs. Percent 
1 374 45.78 
2 322 39.41 
3 116 14.20 
4 4 0.49 
5 1 0.12 
Total 817 100.00 
Source: Author’s database. 
 
To be specific, Table 32 demonstrates the number of education changes over the 
entire educational trajectories for Chinese provincial leaders.  Firstly, 374 out of 817 
provincial leaders experience one educational progression. For instance, Hu 
Chunhua (胡春华), current Politburo member and party secretary of Guangdong, 
completed postgraduate studies from Central Party School in 1999, 16 years after his 
graduation from Peking University in 1983. Secondly, 39.41% of provincial leaders 
improve their educational attainment twice throughout educational histories, such 
as Cao Weixing (曹卫星), current vice governor of Jiangsu. Cao received his 
bachelor’s degree from Yangzhou University in 1982. He accordingly ascended his 
educational levels to a master’s degree and a doctorate from Nanjing Agricultural 
University in 1985 and Oregon State University in the United States in 1989. Thirdly, 
14.20% experience three education changes. Take Chen Xiaoguang (陈晓光), current 
vice chairman of NPPCC for example. Chen graduated from Jilin University of 
Technology and advanced his educational levels from basic education to a bachelor’s 
degree in 1982. He continued higher education and was awarded a master’s degree 
in 1985. After one-year working as a teacher, Chen returned to Jilin University of 
Technology for a doctorate. Lastly, only 4 leaders and one provincial official have 
                                                                                                                                                              
leaders because the changes of social capital and elite mobility across administrative 
ranks are of interest in this thesis.  
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educational advancement for four and five times, respectively. Typical examples are 
Jiang Dingzhi (蒋定之), current provincial governor of Hainan and Han Changfu (韩长
赋 ), current minister of Ministry of Agriculture. Specifically, Jiang improved 
educational levels four times after two years of working, namely, from basic 
education to the vocational education of No. 2 Normal School of Zhenjiang in 1979, 
some-college education from Nanjing University in 1985, an undergraduate study in 
Central Party School in 1999 and a master’s degree in engineering from Nanjing 
University of Science and Technology in 2001. Strikingly, Han is a provincial leader 
with the most education changes after entering labor force. His five-time 
educational advancement respectively occurred in 1976 from basic education to 
vocational education in Hulan Normal School, in 1985 with two educational 
progressions to some college and an undergraduate study in Renmin University of 
China, in 1993 for a master’s degree from China University of Political Science and 
Law and in 2007 receiving a doctorate from Tsinghua University.  
 
Underlying the number of education changes is the fact that multiple education 
changes largely occurred to provincial leaders who were born during the period of 
1952-1960 and those starting working during the CR. Compared with 20.32% for a 
single education change, those born from 1952 to 1960 constitute 68.85% of 
provincial leaders with multiple changes in educational backgrounds. In terms of 
entry into labor force, 76.07% of provincial elites with multiple education changes 
started working during the CR, as compared to 43.85% with a single education 
change. Based on the above findings, it is evident to observe the impact of the 
outbreak of the CR on educational trajectories and the transition from school to 
work for this group. In the CR era, a large number of this provincial leadership group 
discontinued their education and simply received basic education before working. In 
the mid 1990s during the career stages of establishment and advancement, however, 
they witnessed a growing emphasis on educational standards in the political and 
administrative spheres. For occupational upgrading, although poorly educated at 
adolescence, they were significantly motivated to achieve better educational 
credentials in their 30s and 40s.   
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5.2.1 Changes in Educational Levels 
 
Overall, whatever educational-level advancement, 62% of provincial leaders with 
education changes come from the birth cohort of 1950s. Their life chances are 
markedly shaped by the initiation of the CR. 68.13% of them experienced a major 
shift away from school life to careers during the CR. To look at educational upgrading 
to each level independently, there are the most cases ascending educational levels 
to a master’s degree, approximately 40.30% as shown in Table 33. Among 559 cases 
of education changes, 94.10% occurred after labor force entry (526 cases). The 
proportions of cases improving educational levels to some college, a bachelor’s and 
a doctoral degree are 14.28%, 31.43% and 13.12%, respectively. For educational 
improvement to a doctorate, 177 out of 182 cases occurred after labor force entry 
(97.25%).  
 
In essence, the educational advancement to some college and a bachelor’s degree 
conforms to the post-CR trends in acquiring higher educational credentials between 
the late 1970s and the 1980s. Returning to the empirical findings, 82.83% of 
educational upgrading to some college and 55.50% to university education occurred 
in the 1980s. Noteworthy is that 134 provincial leaders completed college education 
in 1982 after education interruption in the CR era and working for several years. 
Additionally, an increase in educational qualifications to a master’s or a doctoral 
degree primarily responds to the rise of education as a meritocratic criterion in 
leadership selection since the mid 1990s.  It is evidenced by the education-related 
data that 68.87% of educational progression to a master’s degree and 80.77% to a 
doctorate emerged in the 1990s and the 2000s.  
 
With regard to the education-changing cases occurring to high school or below, 
nearly all obtained educational credentials in vocational schools after working. 
Vocational education, however, functions as a springboard for further educational 
achievement for Chinese provincial leaders. The only exception is Amudun Niyaz (阿
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木冬·尼牙孜), former vice chairman and deputy party secretary of Xinjiang. He 
received part-time vocational study from Party School of Xinjiang as his final 
educational degree.  
 
Table 33 Education Changes of Chinese Provincial Leaders, 1990-2013 
To Obs. Percent 
High School or Below 12 0.87 
Some College 198 14.28 
B.A. 436 31.43 
M.A. 559 40.30 
Ph.D. 182 13.12 
Total 1387 100.00 
Source: Author’s database. 
 
The following pages in Section 5.2.1 will look into the dynamics of educational--level 
changes by answering three fascinating questions: (1) At what age did Chinese 
provincial leaders improve their educational levels?  (2) When did they have 
educational progression in terms of tenure in the workplace? (3) At what 
administrative rank did they increase educational qualifications? In fact, the above 
three questions are somewhat interrelated regarding different dimensions of time. 
To a certain extent, age is closely associated with job tenure and the hierarchical 
positions as already analyzed in Chapter 4.  
 
In terms of four age groups as illustrated in Figure 24, there are more provincial 
leaders increasing educational attainment to some college or a bachelor’s degree 
before reaching the age of 40. The specific ratios are 75.75% for some college and 
89.91% for a bachelor’s degree. More importantly, 67.33% of provincial leaders 
under age 40 improved their educational levels to some college after serving in party 
or government systems, whereas 52.43% advanced to university education before 
entering public service. As to the latter, the change in educational status is closely 
related to the dramatic historical event of resuming college examinations in 1977. As 
to the former, the on-the-job training for the diploma of some college primarily 
results from the CCP’s efforts in improving young cadres’ educational credentials in 
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the early 1980s88. The CCP mobilized a wide range of resources in providing degree-
specific courses and training for poorly educated cadres, particularly through party-
school systems. It is sufficiently evidenced by the empirical assessment of some-
college degrees obtained in the 1980s for cadres under age 40. Out of 89 provincial 
leaders, 74.16% obtained some-college degrees from party schools or specialized 
cadre training classes (ganbu zhuanxiu ban, 干部专修班) from higher education 
institutions. In brief, the acquisition of some-college education in the 1980s for 
young cadres could be considered as the party-led educational advancement and 
party patronage. Furthermore, pursing a some-college degree also depended on 
cadres’ individual decisions to pursue better career prospects. It is because the 
diploma of some college appeared to be the minimum educational standards for 
reserve cadres (houbei ganbu, 后备干部). It substantially fostered young cadres’ 
motivation in educational advancement to some college at least89.  
 
In addition to the age group under age 40, Figure 24 points out another important 
finding. Provincial leaders aged in the 30s and 40s were inclined to acquire a 
master’s degree or a doctorate, accounting for 74.96% and 77.47% of that cohort, 
respectively. For the age group of 30-49, a master’s degree or a doctorate is more 
                                                        
88 For those aged less than 40 and with education of junior middle school, they 
should increase their educational levels to some college through three- or five-year 
training. For more details, see People.com.cn, 1982. “zhonggong zhongyang 
guowuyuan guanyu zhongyang dangzheng jiguan ganbu jiaoyu gongzuo de jueding” 
(CCP and the State Council’s Decisions on Education for Cadres from Central CCP and 
State Organs, 中共中央国务院关于中央党政机关干部教育工作的决定) [Online]. 
(Updated 3 Oct 1982) Available at: 
http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/64162/71380/71387/71591/4854985.html [accessed 
19 Nov, 2014].  
89 Reserve cadres are selected based on the following criteria: (1) the solid belief in 
communist ideology; (2) political loyalty and integrity during the CR; (3) excellent 
work performance and general analytical skills; (4) the educational level of some 
college; (5) age limits around 40 and 45 years old; and (6) be healthy. Fore more 
details, see People.com.cn, 1983. “zhonggong zhongyang zuzhibu guanyu jianli 
shengbuji houbei ganbu zhidu de yijian” (Organization Department’s Notice on 
Developing Reserve Cadres Systems of Provincial/Ministerial Levels, 中共中央组织
部关于建立省部级后备干部制度的意见) [Online]. (Updated 5 Oct 1983) Available 
at: http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/64162/71380/71387/71591/4855020.html 
[accessed 19 Nov 2014]. 
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likely to be awarded to those having started political or administrative careers. The 
proportions are 83.77% for educational advancement to a master’s degree after 
entry into public service and 66.67% to a doctorate. In the following, the answer to 
the third question concerning administrative ranks will shed more light on 
educational advancement to a master’s degree after working in public service.  
 
 
Figure 24 Education Changes of Chinese Provincial Leaders by Age Group, 1990-2013 
 
At what career stage did provincial leaders improve educational levels? Figure 25 
shows the occurrence of education changes with tenure in labor force. In terms of 
educational upgrading to some college and a doctorate, the event occurrences of 
education changes are evenly distributed by job tenure. On the other hand, over a 
half of provincial leaders tended to improve educational levels to a bachelor’s 
degree from 5- to 10-year seniority, particularly after 7-year working experience. 
They were largely younger than 30 years old and largely improved their educational 
credentials in the 1980s. It can be assumed that provincial leaders get involved in the 
undergraduate program at the early start of their careers. By comparison, provincial 
leaders are more likely to acquire a master’s degree either before working or after 
over 20 years of working. 29.87% of educational advancement to a master’s degree 
occurs when provincial leaders have job tenure from 23 to 28 years. With a seniority 
of 23-28 years, an overwhelming majority of provincial leaders were in the 40s. For 
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the most part, they completed educational progression in the 1990s. More 
discussions pertaining to improving educational levels to a master’s degree at 
midcareer will be shown in answering the third question.  
 
 
Figure 25 Education Changes of Chinese Provincial Leaders by Job Tenure, 1990-2013 
 
At what administrative rank did education changes occur? The answers are provided 
in Table 34. First, educational advancement to some college generally occurred 
before entry into public service or at the administrative ranks of deputy-
bureau/director level or below. Second, as mentioned previously, provincial leaders 
completed college education at the very early career stages, namely either before 
starting political careers or at administrative ranks lower than deputy-division-head 
level. A vast majority of them experienced major life transitions and won the 
educational opportunity after the reopening of universities in 1977. It seems to be 
the mixed result of both the post-CR educational reforms and the CCP’s emphasis on 
recruiting younger and better-educated cadres. Finally, educational advancements 
to a master’s degree and a doctorate share a similar pattern. More specifically, they 
mostly occur before working with public organizations or at the administrative ranks 
between deputy-bureau/director level and vice-provincial/ministerial level. This 
observation is to a greater extent consistent with the above two findings. One is that 
provincial leaders in the 30s and 40s are more interested in attaining a master’s or a 
doctoral degree. The other is that provincial leaders, as mid-career cadres, are likely 
to earn a master’s degree.  
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All these findings provide important empirical support to the vital role of higher 
education in top leadership selection since 1995. As specified earlier in Section 5.1.1, 
a master’s degree or a doctorate was required in recruiting leading cadres at the 
vice-provincial/ministerial level in 1995 and 1998 90 . In 2002, this educational 
requirement was underlined for the cadre appointment at the deputy-
bureau/director level or above 91. In response to such achievement-based promotion 
criteria, educational advancement to a master’s degree or a doctorate sprouted in 
the 1990s and the 2000s. Strikingly, around a half of provincial leaders endeavored 
to earn a master’s degree before climbing to the vice-provincial/ministerial level, 
namely at the deputy-bureau/director level and bureau/director level. Both the 
educational level and the timing of educational attainment therefore appear highly 
significant for political careers.  
 
Table 34 Education Changes of Chinese Provincial Leaders by Administrative Rank, 
1990-2013 
Administrative Rank Some College B.A. M.A. Ph.D. 
Not in Public Service  
49 208 140 52 
(24.75%) (47.71%) (25.04%) (28.57%) 
Lower than Deputy-Division-
Head Level 
35 123 15 2 
(17.68%) (28.21%) (2.68%) (1.10%) 
Deputy-Division-Head Level 
26 19 10 3 
(13.13%) (4.36%) (1.79%) (1.65%) 
Division-Head Level 
26 22 23 4 
(13.13%) (5.05%) (4.11%) (2.20%) 
Deputy-Bureau/Director Level 34 32 117 21 
                                                        
90 People.com.cn, 1995. “dangzheng lingdao ganbu xuanba renyong gongzuo zanxing 
tiaoli” (Interim Regulations on Cadre Recruitment). [Online] (Updated 9 Feb 1995, 党
政 领 导 干 部 选 拔 任 用 工 作 暂 行 条 例 ). Available at: 
http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/64162/71380/71387/71591/4855103.html (accessed 
on 29 Oct 2014); General Office of the CCP Central Committee, 1998. 1998-2003 
quanguo dangzheng lingdao banzi jianshe guihua gangyao (Development Program 
Concerning the Establishment of a National Party and State Leadership for 1998-
2003, 1998－2003 年全国党政领导班子建设规划纲要), No. 16. 
91 People.com.cn, 2002. “dangzheng lingdao ganbu xuanba renyong gongzuo tiaoli” 
(Regulations on Cadre Recruitment, 党政领导干部选拔任用工作条例). [Online] 
(Updated 23 Jul 2002). Available at: 
http://www.people.com.cn/GB/shizheng/16/20020723/782504.html (accessed on 
29 Oct 2014). 
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(17.17%) (7.34%) (20.93%) (11.54%) 
Bureau/Director Level 
15 22 163 49 
(7.58%) (5.05%) (29.16%) (26.92%) 
Vice-Provincial/Ministerial Level 
11 8 84 46 
(5.56%) (1.83%) (15.03%) (25.27%) 
Provincial/Ministerial Level 
2 1 7 5 
(1.01%) (0.23%) (1.25%) (2.75%) 
Total 
198 436 559 182 
(100.00%) (100.00%) (100.00%) (100.00%) 
Source: Author’s database. 
 
To conclude, the dynamic analysis of education changes, in fact, principally 
explicates the extent to which educational stratification of the 1950s birth cohort 
was shaped by the launch of the CR. Although the 1950s cohort takes only 34.37% of 
the total leadership sample under study in this thesis, it produces 62% of provincial 
leaders who achieved educational advancement from 1990 to 2013. The 1950s birth 
cohort of provincial leaders is a unique leadership group. They are, first and 
foremost, staying in power and actively engaged in contemporary Chinese politics. 
They became primary or middle school dropouts at youth from the inception of the 
CR. A large number of them underwent profound life-course transitions from school 
to work in the middle of the CR. They benefited from the far-ranging educational 
reforms and returned to school in their 20s during the Deng era. At midcareer, they 
appeared as political stars in the making. At the same time, they witnessed the 
growing importance of higher educational credentials in elite mobility in the 1990s. 
The decisive turning points in the life course of this leadership group emerged at the 
turning points in the CCP’s history. In another sense, it is reasonable to conclude that 
educational advancement for this group of political actors is inherently policy and 
politically driven.  
 
5.2.2 Changes in Academic Majors 
 
In parallel to the changes in educational levels as investigated previously, this section 
will examine the changes in academic majors from educational histories of Chinese 
provincial leaders between 1990 and 2013. As reported in Table 35, among 
 
 
191 
education-changing events, the proportion of humanities and social sciences majors 
remains above and beyond that of science and engineering. A large number of 
provincial leaders hold the same category of specialty in the course of higher 
educational advancement. For all the education-changing events, it is important to 
indicate that 12.84% of provincial leaders make major changes from science to 
humanities and social sciences. Section 5.1.3 has already explained why academic 
disciplines of humanities and social sciences prevail in educational attainment for 
Chinese political elites. This section prefers to look at the events of major changes.  
 
Consider major-changing events from humanities and social sciences to science only. 
The acquisition of science majors here exhibits three distinct patterns. First, the 
changes in academic majors to science are pertinent to job description and 
responsibilities. For example, Bai Aying (白阿莹), current vice governor of Shaanxi, 
preferred to study management engineering for his master degree in Xi’an Jiaotong 
University between 1991 and 1993. This apparently departs from his prior academic 
background of Chinese literature, for either some college or a bachelor’s degree. 
Bai’s occupational history shows that Bai has worked from a frontline worker to a 
leader in Qinchuan Machinery Factory of China North Industries Group Corporation 
for 24 years. Therefore, the major shift from Chinese literature to management 
engineering is more occupation-specific. As another example, Wang Maolin (王茂林), 
former party secretary of Shanxi and Hunan, received adult education catering to 
cadres in the coal mining industry. Wang changed his academic discipline from 
accounting to coal mining engineering while serving in the Datong Mining 
Administration for over ten years.  
 
Second, the major changes are partly due to the interdisciplinary nature of academic 
majors. For example, degree holders of management science and engineering could 
be regarded as graduates specialized either in management or in engineering. Out of 
26 provincial leaders, ten with a major of management science and engineering are 
categorized as the science majors, such as Ding Shaoxiang (丁绍祥) graduating from 
Kunming University of Science and Technology, Feng Jianshen (冯健身) from Harbin 
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Institute of Technology and Wang Yang (汪洋) from University of Science and 
Technology of China92. It seems the academic discipline of management science and 
engineering is more likely to be identified as a science major in the science-specific 
universities. Returning to one of the above examples, Wang was trained in public 
administration in an undergraduate program in Central Party School from 1989 to 
1992. He studied management science in School of Management Science for a 
master’s degree from 1993 to 1995. The former is classified as humanities and social 
sciences and the latter as science and engineering. Thus, Wang is considered to 
change academic majors. In comparison, Luo Huining (骆惠宁), current party 
secretary of Qinghai, earned a bachelor’s degree of economics from Anhui University 
between 1978 and 1982. He received a master’s degree of management by studying 
management science and engineering in School of Business in University of Science 
and Technology of China from 1999 to 2002. In this respect, Luo was trained in the 
same specialty of humanities and social sciences for both a bachelor’s degree and a 
master’s degree. Comparing Wang’s and Luo’s educational backgrounds, they exhibit 
the similar patterns, namely studying humanities and social sciences for university 
education and management science for a master’s degree. However, they are 
classified into different leadership groups regarding whether or not they have 
changed academic disciplines in the course of educational advancement. This is 
because the specialty of management science and engineering is regarded as a 
major of science in some universities but that of humanities and social sciences in 
the others.  
 
Finally, a small portion of educational advancement comes from the training 
program for one-year master study jointly organized by Chinese governments and 
universities. The typical examples are three current vice governors of Hebei, Jiang 
Deguo (姜德果), Shen Xiaoping (沈小平) and Xu Ning (许宁). All of them attended 
                                                        
92 More examples include Fu Zhifang (付志方) and Song Xuantao (宋璇涛) from 
Tianjin University, Li Liguo (李立国) from Northeast University of Science and 
Technology, Qin Guangrong (秦光荣) from Central South University of Technology, 
Song Enhua (宋恩华) and Yang Yongmao  (杨永茂) from Harbin Institute of 
Technology, and Zhang Xuebin (张学兵) from Tongji University.  
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the mayors’ class launched in 199893. They graduated as Master of Science in 
Managerial Economics from Nanyang Technological University of Singapore. They 
are conceived as master degree holders of science majors, rather than humanities 
and social sciences.  
 
In summary, education changes for Chinese provincial leaders are characterized by 
the predominance of academic majors of humanities and social sciences, coupled 
with the persistence of the same category of academic disciplines. By examining the 
changes in fields of specialization, the transition from science to humanities and 
social sciences is more likely to occur for political elites in China.  
 
Table 35 Changes in Academic Majors for Chinese Provincial Leaders, 1990-2013 
Changes in Academic Major Frequency Percentage Total 
No Major 
To science 
161 11.62 
360 
(25.97%) 
Science 173 12.48 
Humanities & 
Social Science 
26 1.88 
No Major 
Humanities & 
social sciences 
377 27.20 
1026 
(74.03%) 
Science 178 12.84 
Humanities & 
Social Science 
471 33.98 
Total 1386 100.00  
Source: Author’s database. 
 
To take a step further, Figure 26 illustrates the distribution of academic disciplines by 
age across different educational level advancement. The dominance of humanities 
and social sciences is well observed. Specifically, it applies to educational 
advancement to some college and a bachelor’s degree for provincial leaders of all 
ages, to a master’s degree for those aged 32 or over, and to a doctorate for those 
older than 35 years. This trend is ultimately accounted for by two critical 
observations found in the above-mentioned leadership groups. One is that majors of 
humanities and social sciences are highly job-related for provincial leaders who 
                                                        
93 For more details about the Chinese mayors’ class from Nanyang Technological 
University of Singapore, visit the website of 
http://cohass.ntu.edu.sg/Academics/Pages/NanyangCentreforPublicAdministration.
aspx.  
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experienced educational progression after entering public service.  The other is that 
the long time lags between two adjacent educational levels lead to a lack of 
preparatory courses for science majors.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 26 Major Changes of Chinese Provincial Leaders by Age, 1990-2013 
 
At the empirical level, on one hand, a vast majority of these leadership groups 
improved their educational credentials after starting their political careers. In 
particular, the proportions for educational progression after entry into public service 
are 73.23% for some college and 74.06% for a master’s degree (Table 36). As 
analyzed earlier in Section 5.2.1, the academic training of humanities and social 
sciences helps enhance the governance-related professional knowledge and 
decision-making expertise for political elites, such as political sciences, law studies, 
public administration, economics and finance. Besides, as indicated before, the 
relative flexibility in schedules and lecturing for humanities and social sciences fits 
better with political or bureaucratic careers. On the other hand, as shown in Table 
36, the average intervals between two educational levels are in a descending order 
of some college (15.80 years), a master’s degree (15.28 years), a doctorate (11.77 
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years) and a bachelor’s degree (9.96 years). Noteworthy is that the interval relative 
to the prior educational level amounts to ten years or longer for 77.78% of provincial 
leaders with educational advancement to some college and 77.95% to a master’s 
degree. The long intervals to a certain degree undermine the aspirations of studying 
science or engineering majors because of the tougher admission requirements, such 
as mathematics and calculus. As a result, they tended to choose humanities and 
social sciences as field of concentration.  
 
Table 36 Public Service Tenure and Educational Duration Time in Education-Change 
Events, 1990-2013 
 Obs. Public Service Percent Duration Time 
Some College 198 145 73.23 15.80 
B.A. 436 224 51.38 9.96 
M.A. 449 399 88.86 15.28 
Ph.D. 137 117 85.40 11.77 
Source: Author’s database. 
Note: 1. The analysis of educational advancement to some college and a bachelor’s 
degree focuses on provincial leaders of all ages. The analysis of educational 
advancement to a master’s degree focuses on provincial leaders aged 32 or over and 
to a doctorate focuses on those aged 36 or over.  
2. The third column of “public service” summarizes how many provincial leaders 
improve their educational levels to a specific level after the public service entry. 
3. The duration time is measured by year.  
 
On a final note, in Figure 26, the proportion of science majors lags far behind that of 
humanities and social sciences with respect to educational advancement to some 
college and a master’s degree. It is partly attributed to the party sponsored adult 
education through party school systems. Empirically, 58.08% of provincial leaders 
with educational progression to some college obtained diplomas from party schools 
or cadres’ training courses. In the case of educational upgrading to a master’s degree, 
48.11% of provincial leaders aged 32 or over received party-school education. As 
already discussed in Section 5.1.3, a high percentage of party-school education is 
ultimately accompanied by an increase in studying humanities and social sciences 
because of the modules available within party school systems.  
 
In summary, the selection of specialty for provincial leaders with education changes 
yields two major characteristics. One is the partial persistence of the same type of 
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academic disciplines coupled with a number of disciplinary changes at different 
educational levels. The other is the preponderance of humanities and social sciences 
in education changes. The preference of humanities and social sciences originates 
from its linkage with political careers, the difference between two distinct academic 
disciplines and the influence of party-school education.  
 
Section 5.1 and 5.2 has already grounded the education analysis in the educational 
trajectories of provincial leaders. The education analysis is based on the comparison 
of formal and final education along with the dynamic analysis of education changes. 
The in-depth interpretation of empirical results is placed in the overview of the CCP’s 
history of educational reforms, such as two waves of educational expansions in the 
1950s and the late 1970s and the faculty restructuring in the early 1950s. After 
delineating the educational attainment of provincial leaders, Section 5.3 will proceed 
to touch on another facet of human capital, namely tenure in public service.  
 
5.3 Seniority in Public Service 
 
In this section, the examination of public service tenure is based on 9,798 event-
history observations with the starting year of public service available.  Out of 9,798 
cases for provincial leaders from 1990 to 2013, 13.38% attain their first job in the 
party apparatus or government bureaucracy. The average seniority in public service 
is 23.46 years. For provincial leaders with different leadership titles, the 
corresponding figures of public service tenure are 28.18 years for party secretaries, 
25.33 years for provincial governors, 24.80 years for deputy secretaries and 21.58 
years for vice governors (Table 37). It could be concluded that, the tenure with 
public organizations is positively associated with the hierarchical levels in provincial 
leadership. That is, the higher position in the power structure, the longer seniority of 
working in public service.  
 
Table 37 Seniority in Public Service of Chinese Provincial Leaders, 1990-2013 
 Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Party Secretary 891 28.18 10.62 3 54 
 
 
197 
Governor 905 25.33 10.65 0 49 
Deputy Secretary 2860 24.80 9.72 0 49 
Vice Governor 5142 21.58 10.05 0 53 
Total 9798 23.46 10.29 0 54 
Source: Author’s database. 
 
Longitudinally, Figure 27 shows the historical changes in the average length of time 
that provincial leaders spent in working with public organizations. It is 
straightforward to identify a decrease with small fluctuations in the average public 
service seniority from 1990 to 1999. The lowest value is 21.41 years on average in 
1999. From 2000 onward, the average seniority rose steadily over time with a slight 
drop at every critical turning point of leadership transitions. This pattern is 
essentially due to the institutionalization of leadership selection as analyzed in 
Chapter 4. In other words, the stable increase results from the relatively stable term 
of office provincial leaders held and the comparable duration of time for upward 
mobility at each administrative rank. The small decreases in the average tenure are 
the results of recruiting new political elites into provincial leadership. Concerning the 
changes in the average public service tenure, how could the pre-2000 declining 
trend be explained? 
 
 
Figure 27 Seniority in Public Service of Chinese Provincial Leaders, 1990-2013 
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The answer to the above question is embedded in the career experience in the SOEs 
for Chinese political elites. 54.57% of the 1990-1999 leaders were assigned to the 
provincial authority positions after serving in the SOEs for a long time. Among them, 
66.13% had seniority in the SOEs for more than ten years. As such, given the stability 
in the average age and the average job tenure, the high proportion of provincial 
leaders with lengthy tenure in the SOEs accordingly suppressed the accumulation of 
work experience in public service. The average tenure for political or bureaucratic 
careers thereby diminished from 1990 to 1999. Section 5.4 in the following will 
revisit these leaders’ occupational history in the SOEs.  
 
In terms of the descriptive analysis of public service tenure, the last characteristic of 
interest is the year of public organizational entry in comparison with the year of the 
career start. Regarding the labor force entry, most provincial leaders took their first 
job during the CR, approximately 60.82%. Figure 28 highlights that the peak of career 
start is located in the year of 1968 with 13.51% of provincial leaders starting careers 
at that time. By comparison, in terms of the starting year of public service, a broad 
majority of provincial leaders embarked on political careers shortly after the CR, 
particularly in 1983. By overviewing the leadership characteristic transformation in 
Chapter 4 and the human capital of provincial leaders in this chapter, the long-
lasting impact of the CR is evident for the 1990-2013 provincial leadership.  
 
 
Figure 28 Year of Starting Working and Public Service for Chinese Provincial Leaders, 
1990-2013 
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To conclude, the longitudinal changes in the public service tenure diverge into two 
distinctive historical periods, namely 1990-1999 and 2000-2013. As to the former, 
the 1990-1999 provincial leadership selection is characterized by recruiting a large 
number of elites from the SOEs. The resulting long tenure with the SOEs entailed a 
declining trend of the average seniority in public service in the 1990s. During the 
period of 2000-2013, the average tenure in party systems or governments for the 
most part displays a steady increase.  
 
5.4 Technocracy or Political Technocracy? 
 
Revisiting the above findings on the rise and fall of science and engineering majors, 
the further examination of educational backgrounds and career experience for 
Chinese political elites speaks to an ongoing debate over leadership transitions in 
reforming China. This section will begin by reviewing this scholarly debate 
surrounding technocracy and political technocracy. On this basis, the bureaucratic-
technocracy leadership is identified in provincial politics after the empirical 
assessment of provincial elite transformation.    
 
Some scholars stress the rise of technocratic politics after the Twelfth Party Congress 
in 1982 (Li, 2001; Li & White, 1988, 1990, 1998). That is, the ruling elite in post-Mao 
China is a group of technically trained leaders with professional job experience, such 
as industrial managers, economic planners or engineers (Li, 2001: 25-28; Li & White: 
19, 1998: 235-236). They share similar technocratic identity and a pragmatic 
orientation (Li & White, 1988: 395-396). They maintain the leadership unity and 
stability along with mutual recognition (Li & White, 1998: 234). In parallel to this 
technocracy paradigm, other scholars, however, reject the dominance of 
technocrats. They, alternatively, point out the coexistence and cooperation of 
technocrats and career bureaucrats. They argue that neither of these two groups is 
granted absolute authority or monopolizes the unbounded power. In fact, they share 
political power (Lee, 1983; Zang, 1991a, 1993, 1999). As Zang (1993: 801) puts it, 
“the career bureaucrats need the technocrats for their advice and expertise, and 
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thus need to share power with them. The technocrats need to cooperate with the 
career bureaucrats in order to climb up the political hierarchy that has been 
controlled by the latter.” In this respect, the leadership formation is conceived as 
political technocracy instead of just technocracy (Zang, 1991a: 123).  
 
Both sides interpret the emergence of technocratic elites as a changing way of 
legitimizing ruling power and responding to the massive political and socioeconomic 
changes at large (Li & White, 1988: 395-396, 1990: 12-13, 1998: 234). It 
fundamentally responds to the demands of modernizations, economic achievement 
and technological development (Zang, 1993: 789-790). In other words, as argued by 
Li and Bachman (1989: 89), “under the impact of an accelerating worldwide scientific 
and technological revolution, technical expertise should be a basic credential for 
leadership and a fundamental reason for popular support. According to these 
leaders, modern society is so complex that only experts can estimate the 
implications of a decision.” 
 
The divergence of both sides primarily lies in the weaknesses of technocratic elites 
and the relative strengths of career bureaucrats observed by the political 
technocracy thesis. For example, reasonable doubt remains as to whether or not 
technocrats, as technical specialists, could effectively cope with the complex 
sociopolitical issues that are basically different from technical issues (Li & Bachman, 
1989: 90). As Li and White discuss (1990: 20-21), “social and economic problems 
sometimes caused by new policies often occur more rapidly than the means 
technocrats can devise to deal with them. Their technical ‘expertise’ is probably even 
more important as a legitimacy to justify their rule than as a functional requisite of 
their leadership.” Rather, career bureaucrats come to the fore from the grassroots 
level step by step. They possess broad career experience and accumulate political 
and human capital in diversified functional divisions as well as party and government 
organs at varying levels. They are relatively advantaged in bureaucratic operation, 
specialized knowledge and experience in governance. They are better at people skills 
than technocrats who undertake technical jobs and work with machines for decades. 
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Therefore, it could be argued that career bureaucrats on one hand co-opt technical 
professionals into the power center, and on the other, hinder the rise of technocrats.  
 
Although current literature has empirically thrown new light on the above 
controversy regarding technocracy or political technocracy, the focal point under 
study is largely central leaders, particularly the members of CCs (Lee, 1983; Li & 
White, 1988, 1998; Zang, 1991a, 1993, 1999). This section will enrich the 
understanding of elite transformation by analyzing the specialty and main career 
patterns of the 1990-2013 Chinese provincial leaders. An intriguing question arises: 
is the contemporary Chinese provincial leadership characterized as technocracy or 
political technocracy?  
 
To avoid definitional ambiguities, this section follows the definition of technocracy 
from Li and White (1990: 19, 1998: 235-236). Technocrats are identified according to 
three necessary and important elements: (1) specialty in such applied sciences as 
engineering and natural sciences in formal education of some college or above; (2) 
professional job experience in engineering, industry and economic planning; and (3) 
assuming authority positions. For the purpose of operationalization, the technocratic 
majors are considered as both natural and applied science, such as physics, 
chemistry, biology, geology, mathematics, engineering, agriculture and medical 
science. Despite the overlapping occupations, the evaluation of professional and 
technocratic job experience depends on two components: (1) main career patterns 
by assessing the length of work experience94; and (2) tenure in industry, engineering 
                                                        
94 In the empirical analyses of elite transformation, Li and Bachman (1989: 75) and 
Zang (1993: 797-798; 1999: 107) examine career patterns by studying the frequency 
and length of job experience. This study partly follows this assessment of career 
patterns and makes slight refinements. From the established leadership datasets in 
this thesis, the main career pattern of provincial leaders refers to the specific 
occupational experience with the longest seniority by comparing the length of 
tenures with varied occupations.  However, the scope of observation periods 
extends from the entry into labor force to the career exit or to 2013 as for the 
current leaders. Hence, for the current provincial leaders, there is little difference 
between main career patterns throughout their careers and those prior to taking the 
provincial leadership posts. For the former provincial leaders, the difference 
between the two possibly become apparent because at least five or ten years of 
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and economics for ten years or longer. In addition to technocrats, this section adopts 
the definition derived from Zang (1993: 788). Bureaucrats are regarded as “state or 
party cadres who have worked in the government system, the party hierarchy, mass 
organizations, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), or other agencies.” In addition, 
they are in no case trained in technocratic majors.  
 
At the empirical level, out of 9,814 event-history observations, provincial leaders 
trained in technocratic majors are composed of 55.44% of the total provincial 
leadership group (Table 38). In particular, provincial leaders studying engineering 
constitute 38.22% of the total. In the realm of humanities and social sciences, the 
major field of economics and finance receives greater attention among political 
elites at the provincial level, taking 12.10%. The technically trained elites provide a 
noticeably larger proportion of the 1990-2013 provincial chiefs than those studying 
humanities and social sciences.  
  
Table 38 Academic Majors of Chinese Provincial Leaders, 1990-2013 
 Obs. Percent 
    Technocratic Major   
Physics/Chemistry/Biology/Geology/Mathematics 863 11.05 
Engineering 2984 38.22 
Agriculture 364 4.66 
Medical Science 117 1.50 
    Subtotal 4328 55.44 
    Humanities & Social Sciences   
Philosophy 210 2.69 
Economic/Finance 945 12.10 
Legal Studies/Political Science 583 7.47 
Education 57 0.73 
Literature/Linguistics 958 12.27 
History 227 2.91 
Management 58 0.74 
                                                                                                                                                              
working experience as party or government cadres are added to their tenure. Even 
though some of them have assumed professional occupations for many years, they 
are likely to be considered as career bureaucrats rather than technocrats. The 
proportion of technocratic elites may be underestimated. To improve the accuracy 
and adequacy of statistical analyses, this section looks at both main career patterns 
and work experience as technical expertise in industry, engineering and economics. 
Those working in these specialized areas for ten years or longer are also regarded as 
potential technocrats.  
 
 
203 
    Subtotal 3038 38.91 
    Unknown 441 5.65 
    Total 7807 100.00 
Source: Author’s database. 
 
The technocratic major is merely one of the necessary prerequisites for analyzing 
technocratic leadership. With reference to the definition of technocrats mentioned 
previously, the next critical step is to classify and examine career patterns. 
Technocrats generally have career experience in industry, engineering and 
economics. As shown in Table 39, only 15.77% of elites are recruited into provincial 
leadership as professional specialists in industry, engineering and economic planning. 
In sharp contrast, a large number of career bureaucrats conspicuously come to 
power, taking 64.32% of the total provincial leaders. Noteworthy is party workers 
account for 52.45%, whereas government administrators only take 8.63%. To take 
insight into the tenures in industry, finance and engineering respectively, provincial 
leaders with ten-year tenure or longer provide 21.98% in industry, 10.76% in finance 
and 0.92% in engineering. Taking both the main career patterns and job tenures in 
professional occupations together, 32.26% of provincial leaders work as industrial 
managers, engineers or economic planners.  
 
Table 39 Main Career Patterns of Chinese Provincial Leaders, 1990-2013 
 Obs. Percent 
Party Work 5147 52.45 
Government Administration 847 8.63 
Mass Organization 251 2.56 
Military 67 0.68 
    Subtotal 6312 64.32 
Industry 865 8.81 
Engineering 90 0.92 
Economic/Finance 593 6.04 
    Subtotal 1548 15.77 
Education 658 6.70 
Police/Court 101 1.03 
Personnel/Organization 144 1.47 
Resource/Environment 364 3.71 
Propaganda/Media 133 1.36 
Others 554 5.64 
    Total 9814 100.00 
Source: Author’s database. 
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By considering both the technocratic majors and the relevant career patterns, 
technocrats account for 20.13% of the 1990-2013 provincial leaders. Among these 
technocratic elites, 73.84% acquire professional titles, such as professors, engineers 
and the like. In addition to the professional competency and specialization 
experience, technocrats in China’s provincial politics simultaneously cultivate 
political credentials and significant work experience in party or government 
hierarchies. For example, 97.62% of technocrats are CCP members. Those with CCP 
seniority for over 20 years make up 83.15% of the provincial leaders with CCP 
membership. Nearly all the technocrats are engaged in party affairs and government 
administration. Accordingly, in addition to technical expertise, the recruitment of 
technocrats in reforming China is constrained by political orthodoxy, ideological 
conformity and administrative competence.  
 
From a historical point of view, there was a fluctuating increase in the technocratic 
ratio, from 26.21% in 1990 to 32.79% in 1996 (Figure 29). From 1997 onward, the 
proportion of technocrats continuously and notably diminished from 32.54% in 1997 
to 9.13% in 2013. In this regard, the decline of technocratic leadership at the 
provincial level is straightforward and well understood (Li, 2012a: 7-9). By contrast, 
the fluctuating increase in the proportion of technocrats was accompanied by a 
fluctuating decrease in the proportion of career bureaucrats from 1990 to 1997. As 
illustrated in Figure 29, the ratio of bureaucrats started to provide 34.46% in 1990 
with a small drop to 28.25% in 1993. Thereafter, the percentage of career 
bureaucrats slightly rose to 30.25% in 1994 and was reduced to 26.67% in 1996 and 
26.68% in 1997. The small fluctuation over the period of 1990-1997 was followed by 
a consecutive ten-year slow increase from 29.07% in 1998 to 44.59% in 2007. 
Thereafter, the percentage of career bureaucrats slowly reached a peak value of 
45.13% in 2010 and modestly decreased to 37.32% in 2013. By comparing 
technocrats and bureaucrats in provincial politics from 1990 to 2013, the number of 
career bureaucrats dramatically exceeds that of technocrats during the period of 
1990-1991 and from 2000 onwards. The rise of technocratic leadership was 
discernible in the 1990s, particularly from 1992 to 1999. Overall, the 1990-2013 
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provincial leadership was distinctively characterized by the alliance of technocrats 
and career bureaucrats coupled with a decline in technocracy and an increase in 
bureaucratic leadership.  The chapter of conclusions will summarize the 
demographic characteristics, human capital and social capital of both technocrats 
and bureaucrats for further comparisons.   
 
 
Figure 29 Technocrats and Career Bureaucrats in Provincial Leadership, 1990-2013 
 
To conclude, despite the preponderance of provincial leaders trained in science and 
engineering, it is far away from realizing the dominance of technocrats in reforming 
China. In reality, the 1990-2013 provincial elite transformation has turned away from 
the technocratic leadership. It has alternatively moved toward the bureaucratic-
technocracy with a relative dominance of career bureaucrats since 2000.  
 
5.5 Conclusion 
 
The preceding sections have already addressed four central issues regarding human 
capital of Chinese provincial leaders from 1990 to 2013. Before embarking on a 
comprehensive and empirical analysis of education and work experience, this 
chapter rests on an important question as a starting point. That is, why is it 
necessary to differentiate full-time formal education from final educational degrees? 
 
 
206 
The findings in this chapter, on one hand, point to “the educational advancement 
fever” and particularly the prevalence of part-time education for provincial elites, 
and, on the other hand, the suspicion of the quality of part-time education. 
Consequently, this chapter draws on the independent analysis of formal and final 
education along with their comparison.  
 
This chapter approaches the in-depth analysis of formal education in the history of 
educational reforms in China. For example, in terms of formal educational levels, the 
proportions of college-educated leaders grew remarkably during the periods of 
1990-1999 and 2011-2013. By examining the years of college entry, the growing 
educational credentials in provincial leadership is fundamentally in accord with two 
waves of educational expansions in the 1950s and in the late 1970s after the CR.  
Conversely, a reduction in the share of college-educated leaders from 2000 to 2010 
is the consequence of disrupting educational systems in the turbulent decade of the 
CR. As to the major area of study, provincial leaders tended to study science and 
engineering majors from 1990 to 2005. After 2005, more provincial leaders 
preferred humanities and social sciences. Returning to the Chinese history of higher 
education, the 1952 faculty restructuring produces lasting effects on the 15-year 
predominance of leaders majoring science and engineering in provincial politics 
during the period of 1990 and 2013.  
 
The analysis of final education places considerable emphasis on the influence of 
part-time education and party-school education. In the first place, the historical 
changes in final educational levels show a continuing increase in provincial leaders 
with college education. This observation largely stems from the growing role of 
education in leadership selection, interconnected alumni networks and the “tricky” 
alliance of politics and educational institutions. In the second place, since 2000, 
academic disciplines of humanities and social sciences have been predominantly 
favored in final educational attainment. It is argued that the training of humanities 
and social sciences entails better matches of political elites to leadership roles and 
governance. Its flexibility of lecturing and assignments fits more readily into the 
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schedules of provincial leaders. In addition, receiving higher education from party 
schools improves the probability of studying humanities and social sciences.  
 
Along with the separate investigation of formal and final education, this chapter 
proceeds to undertake a dynamic analysis of educational advancement by looking at 
educational histories of provincial leaders. Provincial leaders experiencing education 
changes were largely born in the 1950s. They grew up and received basic education 
prior to the CR. They experienced a life transition from school to work in the context 
of the CR chaos. A large number of them returned to school in the late 1970s when 
the college entrance examinations resumed in 1977. They were encouraged to 
promote educational achievement in their formative years in response to the 
universalistic criteria of upward mobility. Overall, they witnessed the shifting state 
policies. Their life courses were significantly affected by these policies, such as the 
initiation of the CR, the reopening of universities and the resumption of college 
entrance examinations after the CR, and the strengths of higher education in 
attaining elite status in the mid 1990s. In this sense, the empirical assessment of 
education changes to a certain degree shows the extent to which the shifting state 
policies and major historical events affected life chances of provincial leaders, 
particularly the 1950s birth cohort.   
 
In Section 5.3, evidence on work experience shows that the leadership group under 
study in this thesis largely entered labor force in the course of the CR. They started 
their political careers shortly after the CR. With respect to the seniority in public 
service, there was a decrease in the average seniority in the 1990s, followed by a 
steady increase since 2000.  The declining public service seniority is attributed to the 
fact that elites with a long tenure with the SOEs were recruited into provincial 
leadership from 1990 to 1999.  
 
Based on the previous education analysis, Section 5.4 goes a step further to evaluate 
the extent to which technocracy affects provincial politics. It provides a general 
account of the current scholarly debate over technocracy or political technocracy in 
contemporary China. The historical changes in the ratio of technocratic elites are 
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traced through analyzing the percentage of provincial leaders with technocratic 
specialty and lengthy seniority in professional occupations. The empirical findings 
offer compelling evidence to support political technocracy thesis rather than the 
technocracy paradigm. The reasons for this are twofold. One is the fact that career 
bureaucrats profoundly outnumbered technocrats from 2000 onwards. Strikingly, 
bureaucrats were over twice as many as technocrats during the period of 2004-2012. 
Noteworthy is that the number of bureaucrats was 5.28 times that of technocrats in 
2012. The other is that an overwhelming majority of technocrats joined the CCP and 
similarly worked as party workers and government cadres for decades. In a broader 
sense, these technocratic elites can be considered as career bureaucrats as well.  
 
To summarize, based on the above statistical results, the accumulation of human 
capital reflects the changing nature of leadership cohorts. There exists a clear-cut 
dividing line between provincial leaders in the 1990s and those since 2000. The 
former provincial leadership group came from the birth cohorts of the 1930s and the 
1940s. They grasped the unique opportunity for full-time college education in the 
1950s when the reforms of educational expansion and faculty restructuring were 
introduced. A high proportion of them were trained in technocratic majors and 
worked as industrial managers, economic planners and engineers in the SOEs after 
college graduation. Their tenure in party or government organizations was relatively 
short. In sharp contrast, the leadership cohort of the 1950s comprises a large share 
of provincial leaders since 2000. The CR was launched during their adolescence. As 
summarized earlier, the life chances of the leadership cohort of the 1950s were, to a 
considerable extent, affected by the outbreak of the CR. They are labeled as “the lost 
generation” (Bonnin, 2006: 245, 266-267). After studying human capital of provincial 
leaders, the analytic focus of Chapter 6 will be on the accumulation of social capital 
in the workplaces.  
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Chapter 6 Social Capital of Chinese Provincial Leaders 
 
This thesis aims to analyze the effects of human capital and social capital on elite 
mobility in Chinese provincial politics. Chapter 5 has already described both the 
educational attainment and work experience for Chinese provincial leaders from 
1990 to 2013. Chapter 6 directs the analysis towards their social capital accumulated 
from formal work relationships and occupational trajectories. As introduced 
previously in Chapter 3, social capital is assessed by the characteristics of social 
network available for political elites, namely network size, network diversity and 
upper reachability. Specifically, according to Chapter 3 on research methodology, the 
number of network size varies with the changes in workplaces, occupations and the 
occupational upgrading from the non-leadership post to the leadership post. 
Network diversity is contingent upon the number of career patterns, such as party 
work, government administration, industry, economics/finance and so on. Upper 
reachability in this thesis is interested in whether or not provincial leaders acquire 
secretary experience or work as CC members or alternate members. It captures two 
different dimensions of the upper reachable social resources. One is the full position 
at one level higher than the administrative rank occupied by provincial leaders for 
those without secretary experience. This is defined as the regular contacts in Section 
6.2.3. The other is the administrative rank of the superiors for those who work as 
secretaries or the state-leader level accessible for the CC members and the alternate 
members. The above assessment sharpens the operationalization of social capital as 
an emerging research concept.  
 
By quantitatively evaluating social capital, this chapter is organized into two parts. In 
the first place, Section 6.1 takes a descriptive look at the historical trends of social 
capital for the Chinese provincial leaders during the period of 1990-2013. This 
empirical assessment exclusively focuses on network size and network diversity only. 
Along with the longitudinal analysis, the specific leadership cases are further 
examined with respect to the maximum and minimum values of the network 
formation. The composition of upper reachability is not investigated in this section 
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because all the provincial chiefs are assumed to have access to the highest echelons 
in power. The value of upper reachability is alike for the leadership group at either 
the vice-provincial/ministerial level or provincial/ministerial level. In terms of the 
operational definition of upper reachability, the upper reachable administrative rank 
is the state-leader level for provincial chiefs under study.  
 
In Section 6.2, research attention is shifted away from the description of social 
capital possessed by four types of the provincial top leaders. Instead, it turns to the 
dynamic analysis of the processes of accumulating social capital across 
administrative ranks. It asks an important research question. That is, how did the 
average social capital change with the administrative ranks from the section-head 
level to the state-leader level? The answers to this question are concerned with the 
variations in social capital along political elites’ elevation to the top leadership 
position.  
 
It is important to mention here that, the concluding remarks of the whole thesis will 
further discuss the empirical analysis of social capital in this chapter. Regarding the 
operational definition and the measurement strategies as noted earlier in both 
Chapter 3 and the foregoing paragraphs, social capital under study here centers on 
the specific capital developed from formal career histories and work connections. In 
this sense, to a considerable extent, human capital and social capital are overlapping 
and closely intertwined.  
 
6.1 Social Capital of Chinese Provincial Leaders 
 
6.1.1 Network Size 
 
As explained in Chapter 3, network size indicates the number of social networks 
accessible from the formal work contacts. As to the operational measurement, 
network size increases with the changes in localities, organizations and occupations 
along with the occupational upgrading from the non-leadership position to the 
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leadership position. Based on 9,814 life-history entries, as a whole, the average 
social network size is 14.50 (Table 40). There are the most provincial leaders with the 
network size of 13, accounting for 9.38% of the total. The value of network size 
ranges from 4 to 39 for all the provincial leaders from 1990 to 2013.  
 
The network size of four types of provincial leaders is compared on five descriptive 
statistics in Table 40, including mean, standard deviation, mode, minimum and 
maximum. The average network size is 18.73 for party secretaries, 16.41 for 
provincial governors, 15.37 for deputy secretaries and 12.93 for vice governors. It 
could be concluded with confidence that network size is positively correlated to the 
political power and the hierarchical levels: the more powerful the political officials, 
the larger the network size. This conclusion also applied to the basic statistics of 
mode. The values that occur with the highest frequency are 16 for party secretaries 
(10.77%), 14 for provincial governors (10.24%), 13 for deputy secretaries (11.01%) 
and 11 for vice governors (10.67%). Regarding the standard deviation, there is the 
most variability and dispersion in network size for party secretaries and the least 
variability for deputy secretaries.  
 
Table 40 Network Size of Chinese Provincial Leaders, 1990-2013 
Title Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Mode Min Max 
Party Secretary 891 18.78 4.84 16 8 39 
Provincial Governor 908 16.41 4.36 14 6 34 
Deputy Secretary 2869 15.37 4.00 13 6 32 
Vice Governor 5146 12.93 4.05 11 4 35 
Total 9814 14.50 4.54 13 4 39 
Source: Author’s database. 
 
The following analysis provides vivid examples of the provincial leaders standing at 
the extreme ends of the network-size spectrum before leaving the corresponding 
office as provincial chiefs (Table 41). In terms of party secretary, the largest value for 
network size is 39 and the smallest is eight. For instance, Chen Mingyi (陈明义), 
former party secretary of Fujian, is the only provincial party secretary with a network 
size of eight. Chen developed social ties from his career experience in Shanghai Jiao 
Tong University, Fisheries College of Jimei University, Fujian Provincial Science & 
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Technology Commission and provincial leadership roles as vice governor, party 
secretary and minister of Organization Department in Fujian Province. The sparse 
social network is primarily attributed to Chen’s 18-year seniority in universities and 
the higher hierarchical level assumed upon the organizational entry of public service 
(i.e., the deputy-bureau/director level). Chen rarely experienced job transitions 
throughout his career. By 2000 when serving as party secretary, Chen only had 
worked in two different provinces (i.e., Shanghai and Fujian) and experienced job 
mobility from education, technology, government administration, personnel 
management to party affairs. In sharp contrast, Xu Guangchun (徐光春), former 
party secretary of Henan, had the largest network size of 39. His wide-ranging social 
network partly results from the frequent job shifts across four provinces (i.e., Beijing, 
Anhui, Shanghai and Henan) and across twelve career patterns as specified in Table 
41. The typical example is Xu’s job moves within Xinhua News Agency during the 
period of 1979-1991, from branch offices of Anhui, Shanghai to Beijing in turn. 
Moreover, it also results from the concurrent positions held by Xu. For instance, Xu 
became bureau director of State Administration of Press, Publication, Radio, Film 
and Television while concurrently working for the Propaganda Department of the CC 
of the CCP (below in short, the Central Propaganda Department) as vice minister. 
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Table 41 Selected Examples of Provincial Leaders with the Largest and the Smallest Network Size, 1990-2013 
 Party Secretary Governor Deputy Secretary Vice Governor 
 
Chen Mingyi 
Xu 
Guangchun 
Abdul'ahat 
Abdulrixit 
Zhao Zhihao 
Ma 
Qingsheng 
Zhao Zhihao Chen Kangfu 
Zhuo 
Kangning 
1. Network Size 
 8 39 6 34 6 32 4 35 
2. Job Mobility Across Provinces 
 
Shanghai, 
Fujian 
Beijing, 
Anhui, 
Shanghai, 
Henan 
Xinjiang Shandong Guangxi Shandong Shandong Hunan 
3. Job Mobility Across Career Patterns 
 5 12 5 7 3 7 3 11 
Party Work Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Government 
Administration 
Y  Y Y  Y Y Y 
Industry  Y     Y  
Engineering        Y 
Economics   Y Y  Y  Y 
Education Y   Y Y Y   
Culture  Y       
Technology Y        
Mass Organization  Y      Y 
Audit/Supervision  Y       
Police/Court  Y  Y  Y  Y 
Military  Y  Y  Y   
Agriculture  Y      Y 
Civil Affairs        Y 
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Research   Y      
Personnel 
Management 
Y    Y    
Resource/Environment  Y       
United-Front Work        Y 
Transportation  Y       
Propaganda  Y  Y  Y  Y 
Rural Work        Y 
People’s Congress  Y Y      
Source: Author’s database. 
Note: “Y” indicates that provincial leaders have worked in a specific career pattern.  
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For provincial governors, former vice chairman of CPPCC, Abdul'ahat Abdulrixit (阿不
来提•阿不都热西提) followed fairly straightforward career paths that created the 
smallest network size of six. He maintained his professional career in Xinjiang Survey 
& Design Institute of Civil Engineering for 18 years. He was transferred to the 
Planning Commission of Xinjiang as vice director and party secretary from 1983 to 
1991. Abdul'ahat Abdulrixit took up the office of vice chairman of Xinjiang in August 
1991 and deputy party secretary and chairman of Xinjiang in 1993. Overall, he 
remained working in Xinjiang and experienced five distinctive career patterns of 
party work, government administration, research (particularly in civil engineering), 
economics and PPC in Xinjiang. By comparison, despite the work location limited to 
Shandong Province, Zhao Zhihao (赵志浩) acquired the largest network size of 34 
among provincial governors from 1990 to 2013. Zhao is also ranked as first among 
deputy secretaries regarding the accumulation of network size. His dense social 
network is the mixed result of the following occupational attributes: (1) the early 
career start at the age of 15 working for the National Salvation Union in Longdong 
District of Huang County and later working as a tax collector in Luanjiakou Office of 
Yantai Customs; (2) diverse career patterns including party and government work, 
economics, education, police and military affairs as well as propaganda; (3) the 
occupational ascend in politics from the grassroots level to the provincial/ministerial 
level; and (4) the concurrent leadership responsibilities, e.g., simultaneously working 
as deputy party secretary, vice governor and director of Commission for Economic 
Restructuring from 1988 to 1989.   
 
For deputy party secretaries, Ma Qingsheng (马庆生), former deputy party secretary 
of Guangxi had the smallest network size of six whereas Zhao Zhihao (赵志浩) 
obtained the largest social network as noted above. Ma spent 27 years in 
Agricultural College of Guangxi and made an important career change from the 
educational realm to the political arena. Ma started his political career by working as 
minister of Guangxi Organization Department in 1992. He was elected deputy party 
secretary and simultaneously appointed as president of party school in Guangxi. The 
limited social connections ultimately stems from the attachment to the same 
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workplace in Guangxi and the lengthy seniority in education as a late career starter 
in politics.  
 
In terms of provincial vice governors, Chen Kangfu (陈抗甫), former vice governor of 
Shandong, possessed the smallest network size of four. Chen worked in Qingdao 
Hongqi Chemical Factory for 15 years from 1963 to 1978 and 18 years in Bureau of 
Petroleum and Chemical Engineering in Shandong from 1978 to 1996. In this regard, 
Chen devoted most of the career life to petroleum and chemical technology as a 
professional. It is not until 1996 that he came to administrative power and worked as 
vice governor at the age of 55. Being a non-CCP member, Chen only engaged in party 
affairs while taking up the leading post of vice chairman of the Central Committee of 
the Jiusan Society (九三学社)95. Given little job mobility, Chen developed dense 
network ties from the professional career line and little involvement in politics and 
government administration. In contrast to Chen, at the other extreme, Zhuo 
Kangning (卓康宁), former vice governor of Hunan, had the largest social network of 
35. Zhuo entered the workforce as a local rank-and-file cadre after graduating from 
Cili Middle School in Hunan. He climbed up the political hierarchy step by step and 
enjoyed frequent job reassignments across eleven distinctive career patterns. On 
average, it merely took 15.72 months for each job transfer in Zhuo’s career 
trajectory. To mention only a few, Zhuo had worked for CCYL of Cili County, 
Propaganda Department and United-Front-Work Department of Changde 
Prefecture, Rural Work Office of the Provincial Committee of the CCP in Hunan, 
General Office of Provincial Government and so on.  
 
As revealed in the above introduction, what is noteworthy is that provincial leaders 
with lengthy tenure in the professional career lines mostly have sparse network ties.  
The possible explanations are twofold. On one hand, as to the early professional 
career paths, this group of professionals-turned-politicians generally enjoys career 
                                                        
95 The Jiusan Society was founded in 1945. It is one of the eight legally recognized 
minor democratic parties in China for the political alliance, cooperation and 
participation. Members of the Jiusan Society are largely recruited from the 
professionals in the fields of science and technology.  
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stability for decades regarding both the low rates of job mobility and few changes in 
workplaces. There is little doubt that they largely remain in the similar occupation 
for years as experts. More importantly, professional career lines are structured in 
relatively flat organizations compared to the party and government hierarchies96. 
Therefore, the expansion of social connections is hindered. Consider Zhou Tienong (
周铁农), former vice chairman of CPPCC as an example. Zhou’s network size during 
the period of 1960-1983 is three given the internship as a tutor in Harbin Institute of 
Technology and the work experience in Yanshan University from tutor to associate 
professor as well as deputy director of Teaching and Researching Section. In sharp 
contrast, the extension of social networks rapidly accelerated and rose to 13 since 
1983 when Zhou became vice mayor of Qiqihar. On the other hand, as to the 
occupational transitions towards political or administrative elite status at midcareer, 
their political careers generally seem to be straightforward in line with the 
professional backgrounds. A majority of them consistently take charge in the 
corresponding functional divisions. A typical example is Liu Qi (刘淇), former 
Politburo member. Liu worked for Ministry of Metallurgical Industry as minister in 
1993 after serving in Wuhan Iron and Steel Company for 25 years. By considering the 
above explanations, among the provincial leaders from 1990 to 2013, professionals-
turned-politicians are inclined to acquire narrow social networks.  
 
From a historical point of view, there were minor fluctuations in the average 
network size from 1990 to 1999, that is, between 13.01 and 13.86 (Figure 30). The 
network size for the post-2000 Chinese provincial leaders was extended to 16.51 in 
both 2010 and 2013. The peak value of 16.59 emerged in 2012. To take insight into 
the stories behind these historical changes, two interesting findings need to be 
                                                        
96 Take academic jobs as an example.  The academic ranks in Chinese universities 
simply consist of four tiers, namely tutors (助教), lecturers (讲师), associate 
professors (副教授) and professors (教授). In terms of the measurement of network 
size as noted previously, the accumulation of network ties is hampered because it by 
no means depends on the occupational elevation in the above-mentioned tiers. 
Alternatively, it depends on the workplace mobility and career transitions from non-
leadership posts to leadership posts (i.e., department heads, faculty deans and 
presidents of universities).  
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highlighted. First, the relatively sparse social network of provincial leaders 
throughout the 1990s could be partly explained by recruiting long-tenured elites in 
the SOEs into the authority positions in Chinese politics. At the empirical level, by 
comparing provincial leaders during the periods of 1990-1999 and 2000-2013, the 
former leadership group has 37.23% of provincial leaders working in the SOEs for ten 
years or more whereas the latter has 23.09%. In terms of the seniority in universities, 
there is little difference between two groups. To be specific, the corresponding 
proportions of provincial leaders with seniority in universities for over ten years are 
9.17% in the 1990s and 7.62% from 2000 to 2013. As argued above, such 
professional occupational histories as serving in the SOEs, universities and the like 
are more likely to enhance career stability and thereby restrict the accumulation of 
social networks.  
 
Second, the incremental progress of institutionalization in the cadre exchange 
system is partly responsible for the modest increase in network size for the post-
2000 provincial leadership.  Specifically, it is concretely stipulated four major ways of 
job exchanges for political leaders at the deputy-division-head level or above: (1) job 
exchanges to the grassroots-level leadership experience for over two years; (2) job 
exchanges across leadership positions at the same administrative rank; (3) job 
replacements into different workplaces; and (4) serving out of birthplace for such 
leadership positions as audit/supervision, personnel management, budgeting and 
police business97. All these measures effectively facilitate networking activities. 
                                                        
97 For more details, please refer to the following regulations on cadre exchanges: 
News of the Communist Party of China, 1990. “zhonggong zhongyang guanyu shixing 
dang he guojia jiguan lingdao ganbu jiaoliu zhidu de jueding” (CCP’s Decisions on 
Exchange Systems for Party and State Leading Cadres, 中共中央关于实现党和国家
机关领导干部交流制度的决定) [Online]. (Updated 07 July 1990) Available at: 
http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/64162/71380/71387/71591/4855056.html [accessed 
03 Jan 2015]; News of the Communist Party of China, 1999. “dangzheng lingdao 
ganbu jiaoliu gongzuo zanxing guiding” (Interim Provisions on Exchange Work for 
Party and Government Leading Cadres, 党政领导干部交流工作暂行规定) [Online]. 
(Updated 22 April 1999) Available at: 
http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/64162/71380/71382/71480/4854009.html [accessed 
03 Jan 2015]; Xinhuanet, 2006. “dangzheng lingdao ganbu jiaoliu gongzuo guiding” 
(Provisions on Exchange Work for Party and Government Leading Cadres, 党政领导
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Political elites are more likely to get acquainted with new colleagues and develop a 
broad range of network contacts. By and large, the more job mobility, the wider 
network sizes developed.  
 
 
Figure 30  Network Size of Chinese Provincial Leaders, 1990-2013 
 
To summarize, the ordering of the average network size is consistent with the level 
of elite status and the distribution of political power for four types of provincial top 
leaders. This section has provided specific examples of provincial leaders with the 
most sparse and dense social networks. On this basis, it could be inferred that the 
lengthy tenure in professional career lines to a certain extent hampers the rapid 
increase in network contacts. From a longitudinal perspective, the average network 
size of the provincial leaders in the 1990s yields a relatively stable pattern. This is 
partially contingent upon the elite recruitment from the professional career lines. By 
comparison, the growing trend of network ties from the formal work experience is 
potentially associated with the institutionalization of the cadre exchange mechanism 
since the late 1990s.   
 
6.1.2 Network Diversity 
 
                                                                                                                                                              
干部交流工作规定 ) [Online]. (Updated 06 August 2006) Available at: 
http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2006-08/06/content_4926453.htm [accessed 03 
Jan 2015]. 
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Along with network size, the empirical assessment of network diversity exclusively 
centers around the number of career patterns provincial leaders have experienced. 
On average, network diversity is 5.89 for all the Chinese provincial leaders from 1990 
to 2013 (Table 42). By comparing four types of provincial leadership, similar to the 
above finding on network size, the ordering of the average network diversity 
corresponds to political power and authority positions. Specifically, social network is 
the most diverse for party secretaries (7.05) on average and the least diverse for vice 
provincial governors (5.55). Moreover, the corresponding figures are 6.18 for 
provincial governors and 6.04 for deputy party secretaries. With respect to the 
ranges of network diversity, network diversity available for party secretaries ranges 
from 3 to 13. For the remaining three leadership groups, this dimension exhibits the 
same pattern. That is to say, the minimum network diversity is two and the 
maximum is 12.  
 
Table 42 Network Diversity of Chinese Provincial Leaders, 1990-2013 
Title Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Mode Min Max 
Party Secretary 891 7.05 2.03 6 3 13 
Provincial Governor 908 6.18 1.75 5 2 12 
Deputy Secretary 2869 6.04 1.69 5 2 12 
Vice Governor 5146 5.55 1.66 5 2 12 
Total 9814 5.89 1.77 5 2 13 
Source: Author’s database. 
 
Table 43 shows a detailed summary of provincial leaders with the least diverse social 
network. Two intriguing characteristics are discernible. One is the career progression 
exclusively confined to such leading positions as party or government leaders. This 
pattern rarely occurs to the sample of provincial leaders from 1990 to 2013 under 
study. The other is the converging professional or functional experience for years 
that limits the complexity of occupational histories. To be specific, a unique case for 
the first pattern is Guo Gengmao (郭庚茂), current party secretary of Henan. Guo 
embarked on his political career by serving as a party cadre in Chengguan and Baiya 
People’s Communes, Hebei during the period of 1975-1982. He moved up along 
hierarchically ordered positions step by step within the party apparatus or the 
government bureaucracy, namely from the county level, the prefectural level, the 
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municipal level to the provincial level. In this light, based on the career trajectories 
before 2013, Guo’s network diversity was peculiar to career patterns of party affairs 
and government administration. The third career pattern of People’s Congress was 
added to the existing two career lines when Guo was subsequently promoted to 
party secretary and chairman of People’s Congress in Henan in 2013.  
 
In terms of the second pattern, this group of provincial leaders experienced job shifts 
along the same career line for decades. For instance, Jia Zhijie (贾志杰), former party 
secretary of Hubei, had a major career transition directly from the SOE to the high-
status position within the party hierarchy. Jia stayed working in Lanzhou 
Petrochemical Machinery Factory for 23 years. His network diversity was only two 
while assuming the leadership post of deputy secretary in Gansu in 1983. The similar 
career path occurred to Huo Ronghua (霍荣华) and Chen Chuanping (陈川平). Huo 
was appointed as vice provincial governor of Jilin after 25-year working in Jilin 
Chemical and Industrial Company. Chen occupied the leading post of vice governor 
in Shanxi after serving in Taiyuan Iron & Steel Company for 26 years. In addition, it is 
noteworthy that the network diversity also turned out to be two for Zhou Yongkang (
周永康), former member of the 17th Politburo Standing Committee, on the position 
of party secretary of Sichuan in 1999. Zhou’s main career patterns were restricted to 
party work and natural resources despite the multiple job moves across Daqing Oil 
Field, Liaohe Petroleum Exploration Bureau, Ministry of Petroleum Industry, the 
China’s National Petroleum Corporation and Ministry of Land and Resources.  
 
Table 43 Selected Examples with the Minimum Network Diversity, 1990-2013 
Name Career Pattern Highlight of Work Experience 
1. Party Secretary 
Guo Gengmao 
Party work, government 
administration, PPC 
Step-by-step political mobility from 
the grassroots level 
He Guoqiang 
Party work, government 
administration, industry 
Industry: 1967/09-1986/03, 1991/02-
1996/10 
Jia Zhijie 
Party work, government 
administration, industry 
Industry: 1960/09-1983/03 
Wang Lequan 
Party work, government 
administration, CCYL 
CCYL: 1982/03-1986/09 
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Wen Shizhen 
Party work, government 
administration, industry 
Industry: 1965/08-1985/06 
Zhou Yongkang 
Party work, government 
administration, resource 
Resource: 1967/09-1999/12 
2. Provincial Governor 
Guo Gengmao 
Party work, government 
administration 
Step-by-step political mobility from 
the grassroots level 
3. Deputy Secretary 
Liang Guoying Party work, military Military: 1955/07-1983/09 
4. Vice Governor 
Chen Chuanping 
Government 
administration, industry 
Industry: 1982/08-2008/04 
Du Yijin 
Government 
administration, education 
Education: 1958/10-1988/03 
Huo Ronghua 
Government 
administration, industry 
Industry: 1966-1991 
Li Lanfang 
Government 
administration, agriculture 
Agriculture: 1965-1984 
Li Lihui 
Government 
administration, finance 
Finance: 1977/02-2002/09 
Zhang Rongming 
Government 
administration, industry 
Industry: 1968/06-1984/12 
Zhang Taolin 
Government 
administration, research 
Research: 1989/12-1999/09 
Source: Author’s database. 
 
In contrast to the minimum network diversity shown in Table 43, Table 44 provides 
the typical examples of provincial leaders with the most social network diversity. 
Concretely, Ji Bingxuan (吉炳轩), current vice chairman of NPC and former party 
secretary of Heilongjiang, possessed the network diversity of 13. Provincial leaders 
with the network diversity of 12 are Ruan Chongwu (阮崇武) (former governor of 
Hainan), Sun Gan (孙淦) (former deputy secretary of Guizhou) and Ma Junqing (马俊
清) (current vice governor of Jilin). How could the high network diversity of these 
provincial leaders be explained? Possible answers are virtually rooted in the career 
trajectories. First, frequent job changes at early and mid career substantially 
promote the growth of career patterns and network diversity. Consider Ma Junqing (
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马俊清) as an example. Ma became an agricultural laborer among millions of sent-
down youth after graduating from Jilin University with an economic management 
degree in 1975. He received six job moves within five years between 1978 and 1983, 
accordingly working in Huaide Shipping & Transport Company, Labor Bureau in 
Huaide County, Production Safety Administration Office of Huaide Government, 
General Office of Huaide County CCP, Policy Research Office of CCP and CCYL in 
Huaide. Ma was subsequently promoted to secretary of CCYL and director of 
Propaganda Department in Huaide County during the period of 1983-1985. By 
examining Ma’s career trajectories, the specific career patterns for the first ten years 
comprise agriculture, party work, transportation, social welfare, government 
administration, public policy, mass organization and propaganda. Ma’s network 
diversity in the formative years of 1975-1985 is thus eight.  
 
Second, in addition to the multiple job assignments for fast job movers as noted 
above, the concurrent posts are another important reason for developing diverse 
social networks for provincial leaders. For instance, Ruan Chongwu (阮崇武) 
simultaneously assumed the leading posts of deputy secretary, vice mayor and 
director of Municipal Planning Commission in Shanghai in 1983. This work 
experience generates social connections in the realms of party affairs, government 
administration and economic management. Another example is Ji Bingxuan (吉炳
轩). Ji’s concurrent jobs from 2003 to 2008 included vice minister of Central 
Propaganda Department, head of General Office of the Central Guidance 
Commission on Building Spiritual Civilization coupled with member of the Central 
Leading Group for Taiwan Affairs, the Central Coordination Group for Hong Kong and 
Macau Affairs, the Central Leading Group for Propaganda and Ideological Work, the 
Central Leading Group for Maintaining Stability, the Rural Work Leading Group of the 
CCP, the Central Coordination Group for Human Resources, the State Informatization 
Leading Group and the Central Leading Group for Cultural System Reform. In this 
regard, Ji’s 2003-2008 formal work connections readily produce network diversity 
across seven domains of propaganda, foreign affairs, culture, police business and 
social stability, rural work, personnel and information management.  
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Table 44 Selected Examples with the Maximum Network Diversity, 1990-201398 
Career Pattern Ji Bingxuan Ruan Chongwu Sun Gan Ma Junqing 
Party work Y Y Y Y 
Government 
administration 
Y Y Y Y 
Economic/finance  Y Y  
Education Y  Y Y 
Mass organization Y Y Y Y 
Police affairs Y Y Y Y 
Military Y Y Y Y 
People's Congress Y Y   
Agriculture  Y Y Y 
Research  Y Y  
Propaganda Y   Y 
Social welfare  Y  Y 
Technology  Y Y  
Foreign affairs Y Y   
Culture Y    
Information Y    
                                                        
98 The event-history entries for each provincial leader are on the yearly basis. The 
coding of network diversity focuses on how many career patterns provincial leaders 
have experienced on any of the four leadership posts. However, network diversity 
may be overestimated when provincial leaders leave the office of party secretaries, 
provincial governors, deputy secretaries or vice governors and obtain the other 
authority positions of a different career pattern in the same year. For example, Ruan 
Chongwu (阮崇武) worked as party secretary of Hainan between 1993 and 1998. In 
March 1998, Ruan was assigned to Standing Committee member of NPC. Therefore, 
in developing the event-history observational record and coding the network 
diversity for Ruan Chongwu (阮崇武) in 1998, the career pattern of NPC was taken 
into consideration and contributed to the network diversity in 1998. However, the 
specific career history of NPC should be removed in tracing the network diversity 
Ruan had accumulated by 1998 when Ruan still worked as party secretary of Hainan 
before being recruited into NPC. To look at the overall provincial leadership dataset, 
this overestimation issue is effectively controlled and the resulting statistical errors 
are reduced because of the following facts: (1) a certain number of provincial leaders 
are incumbents so that the influence of later career histories is still obscured; (2) the 
job changes across different career patterns probably occur in different years; and 
(3) if still remaining in public service, political elites, by and large, turn to CPPCC, NPC 
or PPC in the same year while stepping down from the provincial leadership posts. 
However, a large number of them have already worked in CPPCC, NPC or PPC in their 
early or mid career. It is also possible that the career experience in CPPCC, NPC or 
PPC appears to be concurrent jobs for political elites on the provincial leadership 
posts as summarized in the leadership biographies. In this sense, the career 
trajectories after leaving the office of provincial leadership make little difference to 
the coding of network diversity.  
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Rural Work Y    
Personnel 
management 
Y    
Public policy    Y 
CPPCC   Y  
Audit/supervision   Y  
Engineering    Y 
Transportation    Y 
Total 13 12 12 12 
Source: Author’s database. 
Note: “Y” indicates that provincial leaders have worked in a specific career pattern.  
 
By examining the historical trends of network diversity in provincial politics, Figure 
31 illustrates the relative stability in network diversity between 1990 and 1999 and 
the slow growth from 2000 onwards. Provincial leaders in the 1990s generally have 
less diverse networks than those in the post-2000 era. The network diversity is 5.42 
for the former group on average and 6.17 for the latter. The average network 
diversity slightly fluctuated between 5.25 and 5.60 over the period from 1990 
through 1999. The first decade of the 21st century witnessed a small increase in 
network diversity from 5.53 to 6.45 in Chinese provincial leadership. The only 
exception during this period is a minor drop from 6.45 in 2007 to 6.43 in 2008. The 
peak value of 6.58 appeared in 2010, followed by a small decline to 6.49 in 2013.  
 
 
Figure 31 Network Diversity of Chinese Provincial Leaders, 1990-2013 
 
How then does one explain the finding that social network was less diverse for 
provincial leaders in the 1990s than those in later years?  The possible answer is 
rooted in the recruitment of elites with lengthy tenure in industry into the very apex 
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of provincial politics. According to Table 45, 43.52% of the 1990-1999 provincial 
leaders work in the industry domain whereas political elites with industry experience 
account for 36.60% of the 2000-2013 provincial leadership. As for the leadership 
group acquiring industry experience and coming to prominence in the 1990s, 66.42% 
started working with industry in the 1950s and 1960s. This finding is closely related 
to the CCP’s initiatives to nurture industrial experts and engineers in early years of 
P.R.C. as mentioned previously in Chapter 4 and 5.  
 
How could the occupational attainment in industry lead to the limited network 
diversity of provincial leaders in the 1990s as measured in this chapter? The 
explanations are twofold. First, the average industry tenure is five years longer for 
provincial leaders with industry experience in the 1990s than those in later years 
(179.37 months versus 123.16 months). To a greater extent, such long seniority 
induces the relative job stability within the career pattern of industry and in turn 
restricts the accessibility of primary social contacts to the industry domain. 
Empirically, provincial leaders working in the industry-specific SOEs provide 94.18% 
of provincial leaders in the 1990s and 92.61% from 2000 to 2013. Within the SOEs, 
network diversity is largely confined to industry only. It is occasionally extended to 
personnel, party work or mass organization if the elites obtain such management 
posts as director of organization department, secretary in the party system or CCYL. 
With only a few exceptions, however, network diversity substantially increases with 
the attainment of multiple management posts. The typical example is Gu Jinchi (顾
金池), former party secretary of Gansu and Liaoning. Gu entered Beijing Machine 
Factory as a worker in 1947. He became secretary of CCYL in Beijing No.1 Machine 
Tool Works in the 1950s and moved ahead to deputy party secretary and head of 
Organization Department there in 1961. Gu accordingly developed social ties in the 
career patterns of industry, party work, mass organization and personnel 
management.  
 
Second, the above-noted lengthy tenure in industry is mostly accompanied by the 
late entry into public service. 60.48% of the 1990-1999 provincial leaders with 
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industry experience assume the leading posts at the deputy-bureau/director level or 
above upon the entry into party or government organizations. Given the short 
tenure in public service, their career trajectories tend to be straightforward. They 
rarely get ahead along the power hierarchy step by step from the grassroots level. 
They are less likely to hold concurrent jobs. As latecomers in political mobility 
competitions, instead, this elite group is inclined to occupy the industry-related 
positions in the functional divisions or leadership posts within the municipal 
governments or party apparatus. As a result, they develop constrained social 
networks from a limited number of career patterns, which apparently hampers the 
expansion of network diversity. As a telling example, Jia Zhijie (贾志杰) rose to 
power as deputy secretary of Gansu in 1983 after serving in Lanzhou Petrochemical 
Machine Factory for 23 years. Three years later, Jia became deputy party secretary 
and provincial governor in Gansu. In 1992, he was transferred to Hubei as deputy 
secretary and provincial governor and further promoted to party secretary in 1993. It 
is well observed that Jia’s social contacts from career experience are limited to 
industry, party work and government administration.  
 
Overall, the preceding analysis is interested in interpreting the historical changes in 
network diversity by comparing the leadership group in the 1990s with that from 
2000 to 2013. It is important to highlight the possible explanations for the relatively 
low network diversity for provincial leaders in the 1990s, namely the large-scale 
selection of elites with lengthy industry tenure and their consequential late political 
career start.  
 
Table 45 Provincial Leaders with Industry Experience, 1990-2013 
 1990-1999 2000-2013 
Industry experience 
% Having industry experience 43.52 36.60 
SOE experience   
% Having SOE experience 94.18 92.61 
Year of working in industry 
Average seniority for leaders with industry experience 
(in months) 
179.37 123.16 
Entry into the industry domain 
% Starting working in industry in the 1950s and 1960s 66.42 28.70 
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Entry into public service   
% At the deputy-bureau/director level or above 60.48 38.18 
Source: Author’s database. 
 
To summarize the above empirical assessment of network diversity for provincial 
leaders, the average network diversity is 5.89 for provincial leaders over the period 
of 1990-2013. As to four types of leadership groups, the ordering of network 
diversity reflects the hierarchy of political power and elite status, that is, party 
secretaries, provincial governors, deputy secretaries and vice governors in turn. 
From a longitudinal perspective, the composition of network diversity yields a stable 
presence in the 1990s and a small increase since 2000. It is argued that the long 
seniority in the industry domain and the late entry into party or government systems 
lead to the limited job mobility across different career patterns and the relative low 
network diversity in the 1990s.   
 
6.2 Social Capital across Administrative Ranks 
 
Section 6.1 has already explicated the network transformation of provincial leaders. 
The subsequent examination in Section 6.2 is directed toward the process of 
accumulating social capital across distinctive administrative ranks by analyzing 
33,557 event-history observations for 1,260 provincial leaders99. In line with the 
measurement strategy specified in Chapter 3, social capital is embedded in the 
structure of social networks developed from work contacts. Each subsection, thus, 
commences with drawing a general picture of how network size, network diversity 
or upper reachability varies with occupational upgrading along the hierarchy from 
                                                        
99 Section 6.1 has analyzed the network characteristics of 1,891 provincial leaders on 
the basis of 9,814 event-history entries. Provincial leaders appear more than once if 
they could be categorized into four types of provincial chiefs over the period of 
1990-2013. Different from the empirical analysis in Section 6.1, Section 6.2 gives 
special attention to the network transformation over the entire career histories. In 
this regard, the quantitative study of the entire career histories has taken into 
account the job shifts across different provincial leadership positions or across 
different provinces. Therefore, the double-counting cases are eliminated from the 
provincial leadership database under study in Section 6.2. Section 6.2 focuses on 
1,260 provincial leaders rather than 1,891.  
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the section-head level to the state-leader level. On this basis, this section looks more 
specifically at the extent to which social capital increases at each administrative rank 
by comparing the average social capital between two adjacent levels. It attempts to 
ground the dynamic analysis of network transformation in the context of career 
trajectories.  
 
6.2.1 Network Size  
  
As shown in Table 46, it is well recognized that network size increases with career 
progression across administrative ranks, that is, the higher the administrative rank, 
the larger the network size. The average network size ranges from 5.08 at the 
section-head level to 22.23 at the state-leader level. It is easy to understand the 
expansion of social networks in career advancement because of the occurrence of 
job placements. As introduced in Chapter 3, network size is measured through the 
number of formal social contacts developed in the career trajectories. It grows with 
the occupational transitions across different workplaces and organizations along 
with the changes in occupational status from non-leadership posts to leadership 
positions.  
 
Table 46 Network Size across Administrative Ranks, 1990-2013 
Administrative Rank Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Section-Head Level 959 5.08 2.16 1 15 
Deputy-Division-Head Level 2289 6.09 2.37 2 18 
Division-Head Level 2655 7.39 2.77 2 21 
Deputy-Bureau/Director Level 4575 8.71 3.20 2 24 
Bureau/Director Level 6246 11.07 3.72 2 31 
Vice-Provincial/Ministerial Level 11912 13.22 4.10 4 35 
Provincial/Ministerial Level 4270 17.43 4.43 6 39 
Vice-State-Leader Level 533 18.40 4.47 11 32 
State-Leader Level 118 22.23 5.53 15 33 
Total 33557 11.67 5.12 1 39 
Source: Author’s database. 
 
Further insights are gained into the specific examples of provincial leaders with the 
largest and smallest social networks at each administrative rank. There exist some 
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overlapping cases for varying administrative ranks. For instance, Zhao Zhihao (赵志
浩) developed large-scale work interactions and multiplex social networks at the 
section-head level, the deputy-division-head level and the division-head level. As 
indicated in Section 6.1.1, the growth of social connections potentially depends on 
the following occupational characteristics: (1) whether political elites have early 
career start in labor force or in public service; (2) whether they move across diverse 
career patterns; (3) whether they change jobs rapidly; (4) whether they obtain 
multiple concurrent posts; or (5) whether they get ahead step by step from the 
bottom. Table 47 shows provincial leaders in possession of the largest social network 
at each hierarchical level. It provides supporting evidence in favor of the earlier 
summary formulated in Section 6.1.1. Specifically, in terms of the empirical findings 
in Table 47, provincial leaders with the maximum social networks largely entered the 
workforce during their formative years, younger than 20 years old. The number of 
their career paths widely ranges from 6 to 12. A vast majority of them frequently 
changed jobs, each within two years on average. 
 
Along with provincial leaders with dense social networks, Table 48 exemplifies those 
with the smallest networks. Their sparse networks yield some interesting findings on 
career background traits, which is similar to what has been observed in Section 6.1.1. 
In the first place, it is possible for provincial leaders to directly attain the low-ranking 
elite status at the section-head level upon the labor force entry. In this case, their 
network diversity is as small as one at the section-head level. For example, Tomur 
Dawamat (铁木尔•达瓦买提), former chairman of Xinjiang and vice chairman of 
NPC, became a peasant farmer at youth. He was subsequently elected township 
head in Toksun at a critical juncture of Xinjiang’s liberation. In the second place, 
more importantly, as analyzed before, the professional career experience, such as 
working in universities, research institutes or SOEs, drastically impedes the increase 
in social contacts. This gives rise to the limited network size at the deputy-division-
head level or above. The typical examples are Jin Yinhuan (金银焕), Wang Lixia (王莉
霞), Qian Qi’ao (钱其璈), Chen Kangfu (陈抗甫), Abdul’ahat Abdulrixit (阿不来提•
阿不都热西提), Zhou Tienong (周铁农) and Wu Bangguo (吴邦国) who developed 
 
 
231 
the minimum network size. To be specific, for instance, Qian Qi’ao (钱其璈), former 
vice mayor of Tianjin, is the political elite with the smallest social network at the 
bureau/director level. Qian had worked in Nankai University for 25 years. He was 
assigned to director of Higher Education Bureau in Tianjin in 1983. In this sense, it is 
from such organizations as Nankai University and Higher Education Bureau that 
Qian’s social ties were generated. His career pattern is merely restricted to 
education.  
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Table 47 Selected Examples with the Maximum Social Network at Each Administrative Rank, 1990-2013 
Rank Name Network Size Age1 Age2 Career Pattern Job Duration 
Section-Head Level Zhao Zhihao 15 15 15 6 22.27 
Deputy-Division-Head Level Zhao Zhihao 18 15 15 6 22.94 
Division-Head Level Zhao Zhihao 21 15 15 7 25.06 
Deputy-Bureau/Director Level Zhuo Kangning 24 18 18 10 12.92 
Bureau/Director Level Mao Weiming 31 21 35 8 11.77 
Vice-Provincial/Ministerial Level Zhuo Kangning 35 18 18 12 16.20 
Provincial/Ministerial Level Xu Guangchun 39 25 51 12 13.38 
Vice-State-Leader Level Zhang Qingli 32 20 25 9 16.03 
State-Leader Level Xi Jinping 33 16 26 7 16.27 
Source: Author’s database. 
Note: Age1=the age of entering labor force; Age2=the age of entering public service; job duration is measured in months.  
 
Table 48 Selected Examples with the Minimum Social Network at Each Administrative Rank, 1990-2013 
Rank Name Network Size Age1 Age2 Career Pattern Job Duration 
Section-Head Level Tomur Dawamat 1 23 23 1 NA 
Deputy-Division-Head Level Jin Yinhuan 2 22 23 2 6.50 
Division-Head Level Wang Jialiao 2 20 21 2 6.00 
Deputy-Bureau/Director Level Wang Lixia 2 24 36 1 72.00 
Bureau/Director Level Qian Qi’ao 2 25 50 1 150.00 
Vice-Provincial/Ministerial Level Chen Kangfu 4 22 37 3 99.00 
Provincial/Ministerial Level Abdul'ahat Abdulrixit 6 23 41 4 56.50 
Vice-State-Leader Level Zhou Tienong 11 22 45 5 40.64 
State-Leader Level Wu Bangguo 15 26 42 5 28.27 
Source: Author’s database. 
Note: Age1=the age of entering labor force; Age2=the age of entering public service; job duration is measured in months. 
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The forgoing paragraphs have sketched the basic characteristics of network size in 
the political hierarchy. The following pages pose another crucial research question—
To what extent does network size increase at each administrative rank? Before 
answering this question, it is important to bear in mind that, the above empirical 
analysis of the average network size across administrative ranks is drawn from 
33,557 event-history observations. In the provincial leadership dataset, the network 
size of provincial leaders is in the person-year structure and is thus reported on the 
yearly basis. The network size at the upper level is the cumulative total number of 
network size at the lower levels. One of the prominent examples is Xi Jingping (习近
平), current president of P.R.C. (Table 49). Xi had the same network size of four at 
the section-head level for each year between 1979 and 1982 by considering his work 
experience as sent-down youth and party branch secretary in Yanchuan coupled 
with a personal secretary to Geng Biao (耿飚) in General Office of State Council and 
CMC. This network size of four was accumulative over the specific period of 1969-
1982.  
 
However, to examine the increase in network size, the following analysis will focus 
on the final network size at each administrative rank and compares the difference 
between two adjacent ranks. The difference in the final network size is equal to the 
number of job assignments occurring to the relatively higher rank. In this way, the 
comparison of this difference looks into how often political officials change jobs 
across administrative ranks. Again, in the present example, as illustrated in Table 49, 
Xi was promoted to the deputy-bureau/director level by assuming the leadership 
position of vice mayor of Xiamen in 1985. His network size during the period of 
1985-1988 turned out to be eight, which is also Xi’s final network size at the deputy-
bureau/director level. Xi subsequently stayed at the bureau/director level for five 
years. Based on Xi’s biography, this period of career histories is divided into two 
major parts. One is that Xi obtained party secretary of Ningde and simultaneously 
worked as the first party secretary of PLA in Ningde from 1988 to 1990. The other is 
that from 1990 to 1993, Xi advanced to party secretary of Fuzhou with the 
concurrent posts of chairman of MPC, the first party secretary of PLA, president of 
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municipal party school and president of Minjiang Vocational University in Fuzhou. To 
sum up, Xi’s network size was ten during the period of 1988-1990 and rose to 14 
between 1990 and 1993. Xi’s final network size was thus 14 at the bureau/director 
level. By comparing the between-level difference, Xi’s network size increases by six 
from the deputy-bureau/director level to the bureau/director level. In another 
sense, Xi had a total of six job assignments at the bureau/director level.  
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Table 49 Career Histories and Network Size of Xi Jinping, 2013 
Administrative Rank 
Network 
Size 
Year Work Experience 
Not in public service 2 1969-1975 
Sent-down youth and party branch secretary at an agricultural commune, 
Yanchuan County, Shaanxi 
Section-Head Level 4 1979-1982 Secretary of General Office of CMC and General Office of the State Council 
Deputy-Division-Head Level 5 1982-1983 Deputy party secretary, Zhengding County, Hebei 
Division-Head Level 7 1983-1985 
Party secretary of Zhengding County, 1st political commissar and party secretary of 
Chinese People's Armed Police Force, Zhengding County, Hebei 
Deputy-Bureau/Director Level 8 1985-1988 Vice mayor, Xiamen City, Fujian 
Bureau/Director Level 14 
1988-1990 
Party secretary of Ningde Prefecture, 1st party secretary of PLA, Ningde Prefecture, 
Fujian 
1990-1993 
Party secretary of Fuzhou City, chairman of MPC, 1st party secretary of PLA, 
president of municipal party school, president of Minjiang Vocational University, 
Fuzhou City, Fujian 
Vice-Provincial/Ministerial 
Level 
17 
1993-1995 
Member of Fujian Provincial Party Committee, party secretary of Fuzhou City, 
chairman of MPC, 1st party secretary of PLA, Fuzhou City, Fujian 
1995-1996 
Deputy party secretary of Fujian, party secretary of Fuzhou, chairman of MPC, 1st 
party secretary of PLA, Fuzhou City, Fujian 
1996-1999 
Deputy party secretary of Fujian, 1st political commissar of Fujian Reserve Artillery 
Division, Fujian; alternate member of the 15th CC 
Provincial/Ministerial Level 27 
1999-2000 
Deputy party secretary and acting governor of Fujian, deputy director of Nanjing 
National Defense Mobilization Committee, director of Fujian National Defense 
Mobilization Committee, 1st political commissar of Fujian Reserve Artillery Division 
2000-2002 
Deputy party secretary and governor of Fujian, deputy director of Nanjing National 
Defense Mobilization Committee, director of Fujian National Defense Mobilization 
Committee, 1st political commissar of Fujian Reserve Artillery Division 
2002-2002 Deputy party secretary and acting governor of Zhejiang, deputy director of Nanjing 
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National Defense Mobilization Committee, director of Zhejiang National Defense 
Mobilization Committee 
2002-2003 
Party secretary and acting governor of Zhejiang, 1st secretary of Zhejiang Military 
District, deputy director of Nanjing National Defense Mobilization Committee, 
director of Zhejiang National Defense Mobilization Committee 
2003-2007 
Party secretary of Zhejiang, chairman of PPC, 1st secretary of Zhejiang Military 
District 
2007-2007 Party secretary of Shanghai, 1st secretary of Shanghai Garrison 
State-Leader Level 33 
2007-2008 
Politburo member of the CCP Standing Committee, secretary of the Secretariat of 
the CC, president of Central Party School 
2008-2010 
Politburo member of the CCP Standing Committee, secretary of the Secretariat of 
the CC, vice president of the P.R.C., president of Central Party School 
2010-2012 
Politburo member of CCP Standing Committee, secretary of the Secretariat of CC, 
vice president of the P.R.C., vice chairman of CMC of the CCP and the P.R.C., 
president of Central Party School 
2012-2013 
General secretary of the CC, chairman of CMC of the CCP, vice president of the 
P.R.C., vice-chairman of CMC of the P.R.C. 
2013-
present 
General secretary of the CC, chairman of CMC of the CCP, president of the P.R.C., 
chairman of CMC of the P.R.C. 
Source: Author’s database. 
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Based on the above clarifications, Table 50 shows the average network expansion at 
each administrative rank from the deputy-division-head level to the state-leader 
level. By and large, the increase in network size is in an ascending order of lower 
levels, middle levels and higher levels. The only exception is a considerably slackened 
increase of 2.65 at such a high ranking as the vice-state-leader level, which will be 
discussed later. To look at the network transformation across administrative ranks, 
specifically, network size slightly increases by 1.57 at the deputy-division-head level 
and 1.44 at the division-head level. In sharp contrast, the most significant growth 
occurs at the vice-provincial/ministerial level. That is to say, social network expands 
by 3.80 for political elites at this tier on average. In addition, the top political leaders 
at the provincial/ministerial level and the state-leader level also have a profound 
network increase by 3.45 and 3.25, respectively. Network size modestly increases at 
the deputy-bureau/director level and the bureau/director level. The corresponding 
figures are 2.12 and 2.82.  
 
Table 50 The Increase in Network Size at Each Administrative Rank, 1990-2013 
Administrative Rank Obs. Increase in Network Size 
Deputy-Division-Head Level 246 1.57 
Division-Head Level 530 1.44 
Deputy-Bureau/Director Level 728 2.12 
Bureau/Director Level 947 2.82 
Vice-Provincial/Ministerial Level 1133 3.80 
Provincial/Ministerial Level 450 3.45 
Vice-State-Leader Level 81 2.65 
State-Leader Level 16 3.25 
Total 4131 2.78 
Source: Author’s database. 
 
It should be noted that the increase in network size virtually touches on the number 
of job changes at a given hierarchical level. It could be inferred from the above 
empirical findings that provincial leaders are more likely to experience job changes 
or hold concurrent posts at the higher administrative ranks than the lower ones. Or 
rather, career mobility and the consequential increase in network size become more 
salient at the bureau/director level or above. As a matter of fact, political leaders at 
the higher administrative ranks remain at the helm of party apparatus or 
governments. They take on enhanced leadership responsibilities. It is expected that 
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their career backgrounds become more diversified and multifaceted at the upper 
tiers. Consider the specific example of Xi Jinping (习近平). It is not until at the 
bureau/director level or above that Xi changed workplaces and organizations at the 
same administrative rank and simultaneously obtained multiple leadership positions. 
As illustrated in Table 49, Xi developed sparse social connections from the relative 
career stability at the deputy-bureau/director level or below in the early life course. 
Accordingly, network size increases slightly at those lower hierarchical levels. 
Nevertheless, Xi’s social networks grow remarkably at the bureau/director level or 
above because of rapid career transfers and a range of concurrent jobs (Table 49). 
Take Xi’s career histories at the provincial/ministerial level as an example. He moved 
across the provinces of Fujian, Zhejiang and Shanghai. He assumed elite positions 
with two or three concurrent jobs at each career interval. His career patterns involve 
party work, government administration, military and People’s Congress. His network 
size, thereby, increases by ten, namely from 17 at the vice-provincial/ministerial 
level to 27 at the provincial/ministerial level. Based on the above empirical findings 
and the typical example of Xi, it is well observed that job changes are more likely to 
occur at the higher administrative rank, which accordingly produces the substantial 
growth in social network.  
 
Next, it is important to investigate the timing of elite status attainment at each 
administrative rank for the 1990-2013 provincial leaders under study. This issue is 
critical because the odds of job mobility do not differ by administrative ranks only. 
Alternatively, they possibly depend on whether or not the institutionalization of 
cadre exchange system is adopted and promoted. That is to say, the more 
observable increase in network size at the higher tier could be induced by either the 
higher probability of job transfers at the bureau/director level and above as analyzed 
previously, or the initiation of the cadre exchange system. The following empirical 
evidence pertaining to the timing of attaining the administrative ranks will support 
the latter argument. Based on the provincial leadership dataset, a vast majority of 
provincial leaders from 1990 to 2013 stayed at the deputy-bureau/director level or 
below from the 1970s through the 1990s. In comparison, they obtained the elite 
positions from the bureau/director level to the provincial/ministerial level in the 
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1990s and particularly in the 2000s. They came to political prominence at the vice-
state-leader level and the state-leader level from the 2000s onward. In short, 
provincial leaders over the period of 1990-2013 were more likely to occupy the 
higher-status positions at the bureau/director level or above after the late 1990s, 
when the institutionalization of the cadre exchange system was initiated. This robust 
empirical finding reinforces the argument in Section 6.1.1 that the institutionalized 
mechanism of cadre exchanges indeed imposes considerable influence on career 
moves and the consequential increase in network size.   
 
On a final note, as stated before, the network size roughly grows by over three at the 
vice-provincial/ministerial level or above, aside from an increase of only 2.65 at the 
vice-state-leader level. How could one explain the exceptional network accumulation 
at the vice-state-leader level? Political leaders for the most part stay at the vice-
state-leader level by holding such posts as vice president, vice premier, vice 
chairman of CPPCC or NPC, Politburo member, state councilor, member of the 
Secretariat of the CC, and president of the SPC100.  The career trajectories and 
changes in network size exhibit two distinctive patterns for this leadership group. On 
one hand, political leaders at the vice-state-leader level develop extensive social 
                                                        
100 Chapter 3 has provided specific illustrations by linking the leadership positions to 
the corresponding administrative ranks.  Provincial leaders obtain the vice-state-
leader level if working as politburo member, state councilor, member of secretariat 
of the CC, secretary of the CCDI, secretary of CPLC, vice president or vice premier of 
the P.R.C., vice chairman of NPC, CPPCC or CMC, president of the SPC, procurator-
general of the SPP and the like. However, provincial leaders from 1990 to 2013 
merely remain at the vice-state-leader level by serving as vice president, vice 
premier, vice chairman of CPPCC or NPC, Politburo member, state councilor, 
member of the Secretariat of the CC and president of the SPC.  Out of 81 provincial 
leaders who get promoted the vice-state-leader level, 26 of them have obtained 
more than one of these top leadership positions. There are also 26 provincial leaders 
who currently obtain the vice-state-leader level. In terms of the number of provincial 
leaders on each leadership position, 28 leaders worked as vice chairmen of CPPCC 
and 18 as vice chairmen of NPC. 38 provincial leaders took up the post of Politburo 
members and seven became state councilors. Eleven provincial leaders served at the 
Secretariat of the CC and eight got promoted to vice premiers. Only Zhou Qiang (周
强), former party secretary of Hunan, becomes president of the SPC and Li Yuanchao 
(李源潮), former party secretary of Jiangsu, eventually advanced to the post of vice 
president of the P.R.C. 
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connections from their work experience as Politburo members. They tend to serve 
as members of Secretariat of the CC or vice premier simultaneously or subsequently, 
such as Li Zhanshu (栗战书) and Hui Liangyu (回良玉).  As promising top leaders, not 
surprisingly, they are likely to occupy multiple leading posts, such as minister of the 
Central Propaganda Department, minister of Public Security Bureau and deputy 
secretary of CPLC. At the empirical level, out of 38 provincial leaders working as 
Politburo members, 73.68% take up multiple prominent positions (28 cases). As one 
of the specific examples, Li Yuanchao (李源潮) was concurrently posted as Politburo 
member, member of the Secretariat of the CC and minister of the Central 
Organization Department between 2007 and 2013. He eventually came to power as 
vice president of the P.R.C. in 2013. Consequently, such occupational histories at the 
vice-state-leader level contribute four social ties to Li’s accessible networks.  
 
On the other hand, it could be argued that the status attainment of vice chairman of 
CPPCC or NPC to a greater extent leads to the comparatively reduced increase in 
network size at the vice-state-leader level. 45 out of 81 provincial leaders become 
highly placed in the power hierarchy as vice chairmen of CPPCC or NPC, such as Xu 
Kuangdi (徐匡迪) (vice chairman of the 11th CPPCC) and Yan Juanqi (严隽琪) (vice 
chairwoman of the 11th and 12th NPC). This is a single leadership position attained at 
the vice-state-leader level for 28 leaders. Their career background at this tier is 
overwhelmingly straightforward. In other words, a single job reassignment simply 
leads to a one-point increase in their network size. This potentially undermines the 
remarkable expansion of social networks for top leaders at the very pinnacle of 
political power in China. As a result, the increase in network size at the vice-state-
leader level seems to be less pronounced than that at the other higher 
administrative ranks, namely the vice-provincial/ministerial level, the 
provincial/ministerial level and the state-leader level.  
 
To summarize some of the highlights in this section, first, the average network size at 
each administrative rank grows with the hierarchical levels. Second, by studying the 
difference in network size between two adjacent levels, the average increase in 
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network size is more significant at the higher administrative ranks than the lower 
levels. One plausible explanation is that the process of accumulating social ties varies 
modestly depending on administrative ranks. Political elites probably have access to 
more extensive social networks at the upper tiers because of the higher likelihood of 
frequent job mobility and concurrent posts. Another possible explanation is that the 
institutional mechanism of cadre exchanges accounts for the more striking network 
expansion at the bureau/director level or above. By identifying the timing of 
obtaining specific hierarchical levels, a broad majority of provincial leaders from 
1990 to 2013 occupied the bureau/director level or above from the 1990s onward, 
when the institutionalization of the cadre exchange system began to sprout. Finally, 
the increase in network size is 2.65 at the vice-state-leader level on average, as 
compared to more than three at such higher tiers as the vice-provincial/ministerial 
level, the provincial/ministerial level and the state-leader level. The slackened 
network growth stems from the restricted job placement as vice chairman of CPPCC 
or NPC.  
 
Along with the in-depth examination of network size across administrative ranks in 
Section 6.2.1, Section 6.2.2 and 6.2.3 will proceed to a brief analysis of network 
diversity and upper reachability in the course of elite mobility.  
 
6.2.2 Network Diversity 
 
For provincial leaders from 1990 to 2013, the average network diversity yields the 
same positive association with the administrative ranks as the network size (Table 
51). That is, social network for political elites becomes increasingly diverse along the 
political mobility from the section-head level to the state-leader level. The average 
network diversity ranges from 3.31 at the section-head level to 7.42 at the state-
leader level. This finding is definite and well understood regarding the cumulative 
effect of career trajectories and the associated social capital as indicated in Section 
6.2.1. There exists a viable possibility that the prior career patterns seem to be 
increasingly complex and multidimensional when provincial leaders move ahead 
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from the bottom to the top. As a result, the average network diversity grows with 
career progression. It is, however, significant to point out that, despite the 
discernible growing trend, the average network diversity varies slightly across 
administrative ranks.  
 
Table 51 Network Diversity across Administrative Ranks, 1990-2013 
Administrative Rank Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Section-Head Level 959 3.31 1.22 1 9 
Deputy-Division-Head Level 2289 3.57 1.33 1 9 
Division-Head Level 2655 4.02 1.43 1 9 
Deputy-Bureau/Director Level 4575 4.31 1.55 1 10 
Bureau/Director Level 6246 5.06 1.64 1 12 
Vice-Provincial/Ministerial Level 11912 5.72 1.69 2 12 
Provincial/Ministerial Level 4270 6.76 1.90 2 14 
Vice-State-Leader Level 533 7.14 1.83 3 13 
State-Leader Level 118 7.42 1.62 5 11 
Total 33557 5.22 1.92 1 14 
Source: Author’s database.  
 
In terms of the ranges of network diversity at each administrative rank, provincial 
leaders with the most or the least diverse social network are somewhat overlapping 
across administrative ranks. For example, the diversity of Zhuo Kangning’s (卓康宁) 
social network diversity is conspicuously ranked the highest from the section-head 
level to the deputy-bureau/director level and at the vice-provincial/ministerial level.  
He Ting (何挺) is the provincial leader who possesses the least diverse networks over 
five administrative ranks from the section-head level to the bureau/director level. In 
addition, there is an overlap between the typical examples with the maximum 
network diversity among four types of provincial leadership groups as stated in 
Section 6.1.2 and those at each administrative rank in Section 6.2.2101. This section 
                                                        
101 To exemplify provincial leaders with the maximum network diversity, Section 
6.1.2 focuses on the career histories and network diversity of Ji Bingxuan (吉炳轩), 
Shi Zongyuan (石宗源), Ruan Chongwu (阮崇武), Sun Gan (孙淦), Ma Junqing (马俊
清), Zhang Jiuhan (张九汉) and Zhuo Kangning (卓康宁). In Section 6.2.2, those with 
the maximum network diversity across hierarchical levels are respectively Zhuo 
Kangning (卓康宁) from the section-head level to the deputy-bureau/director level, 
Ma Junqing (马俊清) at the bureau/director level, Ma Junqing (马俊清), Zhang 
Jiuhan (张九汉) and Zhuo Kangning (卓康宁) at the vice-provincial/ministerial level, 
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gives little attention to the political elites having the most diverse networks because 
their occupational histories and the characteristics of social network have been 
mostly delineated in Section 6.1.2. Alternatively, it will provide an overview of the 
leadership cases with the minimum network diversity.  
 
The minimum diversity remains one at the bureau/director level or below whereas 
turns out to be two for political leaders at both the vice-provincial/ministerial level 
and the provincial/ministerial level. Besides, the corresponding figures are three at 
the vice-state-leader level and five at the state-leader level. Overall, noteworthy is 
the vice-provincial/ministerial level as a dividing line. Below the vice-
provincial/ministerial level, a vast majority of provincial leaders held the network 
diversity of one by remaining in the same career line and working in the functional 
divisions, particularly in the economic realm. For instance, Chen Rongkai (陈荣凯), 
current vice governor of Fujian, climbed from a rank-and-file cadre to deputy 
director by serving in the Division of Budgeting, Fujian Department of Finance. Thus, 
Chen developed social contacts in the same organization and through a single career 
pattern of finance/economics from the section-head level to the deputy-
bureau/director level. 
 
In comparison, the minimum network diversity increases to two at the vice-
provincial/ministerial level. As illustrated in Table 52, there are a total of 25 political 
leaders with the network diversity of two at this tier. They mostly advanced to the 
vice-provincial/ministerial level by taking up the offices of deputy party secretary of 
the provincial CCP, provincial vice governor or provincial party committee 
member102. They could be categorized into three leadership groups regarding their 
specific career patterns. The first group includes 19 political elites. They had the past 
                                                                                                                                                              
Linghu An (令狐安) at the provincial/ministerial level, Ji Bingxuan (吉炳轩) at the 
vice-state-leader level and Jia Qinglin (贾庆林) and Wang Qishan (王岐山) at the 
state-leader level.  
102 As exceptional cases, six political leaders moved to this level by working as deputy 
director in the provincial/ministerial-level organizations, such as National Science & 
Technology Commission, General Office of the State Council, Ministry of Coal and 
Petroleum, Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Light Industry and CCYL.  
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professional experience in a single career pattern. Their network diversity consists of 
party work or government administration coupled with one professional career 
pattern, such as industry, education, economics, engineering and the like. Consider 
the previous example of Du Yijin (杜宜瑾). Du was attached to the career pattern of 
education by working in Anhui Normal University, Anhui University and Anhui 
Provincial Education Commission. He was appointed as vice governor of Anhui and 
came to the vice-provincial/ministerial level in 1988. Du’s network diversity at this 
tier amounts to two, namely education and government administration in this 
regard.  
 
The second group is four political elites who experienced step-by-step political 
mobility from the grassroots level to the vice-provincial/ministerial level. Their 
career patterns are limited to party work and government administration. The 
remaining three political elites constitute the third group that is different from the 
former two groups. Specifically, Ma Qingsheng (马庆生) was attached to Agricultural 
College of Guangxi before working as provincial party committee member and 
director of provincial Organization Department. As a result, his career patterns 
include education and personnel management. Xiao Jie (肖捷) remained in the 
career pattern of finance/economics by serving in Ministry of Finance. As vice 
minister of Finance, Xiao was selected as vice chairman of the Red Cross Society of 
China. Therefore, Xiao’s network diversity covers finance/economics and mass 
organization. The last example is Yuan Chunqing (袁纯清), who started his career as 
a policeman and entered the CCYL as a rank-and-file cadre after graduating from 
Peking University. Yuan held the vice-provincial/ministerial post by working as 
secretary of Central Secretariat of the CCYL. In this sense, Yuan’s network diversity is 
police business and mass organization.  
 
Table 52 The Minimum Network Diversity At the Vice-Provincial/Ministerial Level, 
1990-2013 
Name Network Diversity 
An Qiyuan Resource, party work 
Chen Chuanping Industry, government administration 
Du Yijin Education, government administration 
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Guo Gengmao Party work, government administration 
Guo Shuyan Research, government administration 
He Guoqiang Industry, party work 
Huo Ronghua Industry, government administration 
Jia Zhijie Industry, party work 
Li Bingjun Industry, government administration 
Li Lanfang Agriculture, government administration 
Li Lihui Economic, government administration 
Liang Guoying Military, party work 
Ma Qingsheng Education, personnel management 
Mao Dehua Research, government administration 
Meng Qiliang Party work, government administration 
Ni Tianzeng Engineering, government administration 
Tomur Dawamet Party work, government administration 
Wang Jintang Resource, party work 
Wang Jun Resource, party work 
Xiao Jie Economic, mass organization 
Xiao Zuofu Party work, government administration 
Xu Rongkai Industry, party work 
Yuan Chunqing Police business, mass organization 
Zhang Rongming Industry, government administration 
Zhang Taolin Research, government administration 
Source: Author’s database.  
 
To go a step further, this part replicates the prior examination of the growth of 
network size in Section 6.2.1. It analyzes the average increase in network diversity at 
each administrative rank from deputy-division-head level to the state-leader level. 
The empirical results in Table 53 show that network diversity increases by 
approximately 0.50 at each lower tier from the deputy-division-head level to the 
deputy-bureau/director level. At the upper tiers, social networks become more 
diverse at each level. The increase in network diversity fluctuates between 0.80 and 
1.18 at the bureau/director level or above. Altogether, these findings imply that the 
career mobility across varying career patterns is more apparent at the higher 
administrative ranks as compared to that at the lower levels.  
 
Table 53 The Increase in Network Diversity at Each Administrative Rank, 1990-2013 
Administrative Rank Obs. Increase in Network Diversity 
Deputy-Division-Head Level 246 0.48 
Division-Head Level 530 0.49 
Deputy-Bureau/Director Level 728 0.57 
Bureau/Director Level 947 0.83 
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Vice-Provincial/Ministerial Level 1133 1.18 
Provincial/Ministerial Level 450 1.17 
Vice-State-Leader Level 81 0.80 
State-Leader Level 16 1.00 
Total 4131 0.86 
Sources: Author’s database. 
 
To sum up, this section offers a brief account of network diversity across 
administrative ranks for the 1990-2013 provincial leaders.  First, there is an 
increasing pattern of the average network diversity along the political ladder from 
the section-head level to the state-leader level—the higher administrative rank, the 
more diverse social networks. Second, with regard to the political leaders with the 
minimum network diversity at each hierarchical level, the section stresses that they 
started to move across different career patterns at the vice-provincial/ministerial 
level. They possessed the minimum network diversity of two at this level. Most of 
them worked with such career patterns as party work or government administration 
along with one professional career pattern. Finally, the average diversity increase at 
each administrative rank is more evident at the upper tiers than that at the lower 
tiers.  
 
6.2.3 Upper Reachability 
 
This section provides only a snapshot of upper reachability across administrative 
ranks. As stated in Chapter 3, to develop the provincial leadership dataset over the 
period of 1990-2013, upper reachability is measured by the highest administrative 
rank accessible for political elites. The upper reachable work contacts could be 
separated into three groups, namely the lower contacts, the regular contacts and the 
higher contacts. The regular contacts are in accord with the superior-subordinate 
relationships, following the chain of command within the hierarchical structure. In 
operational term, the regular contacts refer to the full positions at one level above 
the administrative rank of political leaders. For example, it is assumed in this thesis 
that the superiors at the provincial/ministerial level are readily accessible for the 
political elites at the bureau/director level. If the political elites are successfully 
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linked to the work connections above the regular contacts, they are grouped into 
those with the higher contacts. Conversely, if the highest position available is below 
the regular contacts, it is regarded as the lower contacts. As for the above-
mentioned three groups, an overwhelming majority of political elites maintains 
regular contact with superiors at each administrative rank. A very small percentage 
develops social connections with the lower contacts. Notwithstanding, this thesis is 
interested in the effect of upper reachability on elite upward mobility. The 
underlying assumption is that the social contacts of higher status and prestige play a 
more crucial and positive role in elite upward mobility.  
 
The descriptive analysis in this section, therefore, is concerned with the proportion 
of higher contacts rather than the specific best possible hierarchical level of social 
contacts at each administrative rank. It thus seeks to address a specific research 
question—To what extent do provincial leaders access to higher contacts? As shown 
in Table 54, political elites who interact with higher contacts account for 10.95% at 
the section-head level. Compare the leadership group of full titles and deputy titles 
adjacently, such as the deputy-division-head level vis-à-vis the division-head level 
and the deputy-bureau/director level vis-à-vis the bureau/director level. Provincial 
leaders at full positions are more likely to access to higher contacts. Empirically, 
political elites reaching higher contacts produce 8.70% at the division-head level 
whereas 6.77% at the deputy-division-head level. Those with higher contacts 
constitute 3.43% at the bureau/director level as compared to 1.22% at the deputy-
bureau/director level. Furthermore, compare the political leaders at the full 
positions only. There is a reduction in the percentage of political elites with higher 
contacts. With reference to the operational definition of upper reachability as 
articulated in Chapter 3, it could be inferred that political elites of full leadership 
titles are more inclined to work as secretaries, CC members or alternate CC members 
than those at the deputy positions.  
 
According to Table 54, political elites have no higher contact at the vice-
provincial/ministerial level or above. This is because political leaders at these upper 
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tiers undoubtedly stay in regular contact with the paramount leaders at the state-
leader level, based on the way of measuring upper reachability.  
 
Table 54 Upper Reachability across Administrative Ranks, 1990-2013 
Administrative Rank Obs. Higher Contact Percent 
Section-Head Level 959 105 10.95 
Deputy-Division-Head Level 2289 155 6.77 
Division-Head Level 2655 231 8.70 
Deputy-Bureau/Director Level 4575 56 1.22 
Bureau/Director Level 6246 214 3.43 
Vice-Provincial/Ministerial Level 11912 0 0.00 
Provincial/Ministerial Level 4270 0 0.00 
Vice-State-Leader Level 533 0 0.00 
State-Leader Level 118 0 0.00 
Total 33557 761 2.27 
Source: Author’s database.  
 
6.3 Conclusion 
 
This chapter has delineated the characteristics of social capital for Chinese provincial 
leaders from 1990 to 2013. It is organized around two sections. One is the historical 
change in social capital for four types of provincial leaders. The other is the variation 
in social capital across distinctive administrative ranks. The whole empirical study of 
social capital is grounded in the configuration of social networks and the 
occupational pathway. It focuses on such dimensions of social capital as network 
size, network diversity and upper reachability.  
 
Section 6.1 provides insight into the transformation of network size and network 
diversity during the career intervals of obtaining provincial leadership positions. The 
empirical findings of network size and network diversity share similar patterns. For 
example, the ordering of both the average network size and network diversity 
conforms to the ordering of political authority and power. In terms of the specific 
examples with the minimum network size or diversity, the dramatic effect of 
professional experience is observable. It has been argued in the preceding sections 
that the professionals-turned-politicians tend to have narrow network size and 
limited network diversity. They largely remain in the same professional career line 
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and experience career stability for decades. Accordingly their job histories are likely 
to be straightforward. As to the typical cases with the maximum network size or 
diversity, the attainment of concurrent positions leads to the increase in network 
size and diversity. Noteworthy is that fast job changers inevitably develop extensive 
and dense social connections but unnecessarily have diverse networks.  
 
In the longitudinal examination in Section 6.1, the historical trend of both network 
size and network diversity in the 1990s modestly deviates from that in the post-2000 
era. Both network size and network diversity display a relatively steady presence in 
the 1990s whereas present a mild growth after 1999.  To go a step further, the 
narrow network size and the low network diversity in the 1990s are the result of 
selecting professionals and specialists into the political leadership groups at all 
hierarchical levels. The growing trend of network size and network diversity since 
2000 deeply originates from the institutionalization of the cadre exchange 
mechanism. Beginning in the late 1990s, the far-reaching effects of this important 
policy are to promote elite mobility and potentially facilitate their network 
expansion.    
 
Section 6.2 investigates the process of social capital accumulation throughout the 
entire career histories for the 1990-2013 provincial leaders. Likewise, the changes in 
network size and network diversity across administrative ranks show a similar 
picture. On one hand, both the average network size and network diversity grows 
along the political mobility from the section-head level to the state-leader level. On 
the other hand, either network size or network diversity increases more substantially 
at each administrative rank for the upper tiers than the lower tiers. In terms of the 
above empirical findings, Section 6.2 proposes two general explanations. First, it has 
been argued that both network size and network diversity differ by administrative 
ranks per se. Political elites at higher ranks are more inclined to experience frequent 
job transfers and simultaneously hold multiple posts because of their increasing 
roles in politics and administration. Second, the between-level difference in network 
size or network diversity becomes more evident in the context of cadre exchange 
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institutions. This is evidenced by the fact that the attainment of higher 
administrative ranks mostly occurred in the late 1990s and in the post-2000 era.  
 
To look at the empirical findings in both Section 6.1 and 6.2, how could the similar 
evolution of network size and network diversity be accounted for? The answer is 
rooted in the operational definition and measurement in Chapter 3. Network 
diversity basically depends on job mobility across distinct career patterns, while 
network size varies with the changes in workplaces, occupational positions, career 
patterns and the like. This implies that network size probably expand with the 
increase in network diversity. As a consequence, network size and network diversity 
are somewhat interrelated.   
 
In addition to network size and network diversity, Section 6.3 briefly introduces the 
accessibility of resource-rich social contacts. Political elites at the division-head level 
are more likely to reach higher contacts than those at the deputy-division-head level. 
Likewise, political elites with higher contacts provide a higher proportion of the total 
leaders at the bureau/director level than at the deputy-bureau/director level. To 
look at the full positions only, the percentage of political elites with higher contacts 
declines with the career progression.  
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Chapter 7 Political Upward Mobility of Chinese Provincial 
Leaders 
 
This chapter will explore the political mobility for 1,891 Chinese provincial leaders 
from 1990 to 2013. The promotion-relevant information is neatly compiled in the 
person-year structure and readily available in the current provincial leadership 
dataset, such as the particular year and age at promotion, the duration time at the 
prior administrative rank and the promotion outcome. Such career data decomposes 
the duration time at each administrative rank, uncovers upward trajectories for 
provincial leaders under study and helps to answer for how long provincial leaders 
stay at the same administrative rank and at what ages they move ahead towards a 
higher-ranked position.  
 
Based on these empirical data, the following analysis is divided into two major parts. 
Section 7.1 focuses on the time points of promotion and starts by asking two basic 
research questions—At what age did political officials get promoted along the 
hierarchical ladder? For how long have they stayed at the prior administrative rank 
at promotion?  To answer the first question, Section 7.1.1 directly turns to the 
occurrence of promotion events at the respective administrative ranks under study. 
The second question is addressed differently in Section 7.1.2 by considering the 
duration time between two successive promotion events. This section primarily 
grounds the answer to the second question in the step-by-step promotion 
mechanism. It brings substantial attention to the leadership cases that assume the 
leading positions at two adjacent hierarchical levels. However, the entry level in 
public service drops out from the study because the duration time here exclusively 
refers to political mobility within the party or government systems, rather than the 
career transition from the non-public service to public service. In addition, Section 
7.1.3 moves on to outline the exceptional cases with the leapfrog promotion and 
briefly examine at what administrative rank the leapfrog promotion occurs.  
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Section 7.2 specifies four critical issues related to the adoption of the life table 
method, namely the selection of the observational records, the estimated bias 
resulting from the elimination of the censored observations, the observed 
promotion outcomes derived from the retrospective career data and the selection of 
administrative ranks of interest. More importantly, Section 7.2 raises a further 
research question—What is the chance of promotion over time? To answer this 
question, Section 7.2 describes the process of upward mobility by computing the life 
tables and plotting the survival functions across administrative ranks. The life table 
technique is a straightforward descriptive method for identifying the duration 
distribution. As a starting point, the observation periods are split into smaller career 
intervals of twelve months in this section. As primary statistical outputs, the 
probability of promotion occurring at the end of each year is estimated, coupled 
with the proportion of the leadership sample staying at the same administrative 
rank. Besides, the cumulative promotion rates are generated. Consistent with the 
duration analysis in Section 7.1.2, the analysis of the political mobility process in 
Section 7.2 is situated in the step-by-step promotion context. There is an underlying 
assumption that political officials experiencing promotion are at risk of advancing to 
the next hierarchical level. It should therefore be noted that the above statistical 
procedure is based on the leadership sample with career experience at two adjacent 
hierarchical levels. In other words, the occurrence of the promotion event and the 
tenure at the adjacently lower level are observed at the respective hierarchical levels 
under study. For instance, to look at the process of advancing to the deputy-division-
head level, political officials are selected only if they have worked at the section-
head level and successively climbed to the deputy-division-head level. Besides, the 
leadership cases with the leapfrog promotion are eliminated from the study, e.g., 
promotions from the deputy-section-head level to the deputy-division-head level, or 
from the section-head level to the division-head level. Consider the promotion from 
the deputy-section-head level to the deputy-division-head level as a specific example 
of the leapfrog promotion. If the observations related to this leapfrog promotion 
were included in the life table analysis, they would be censored in the life table of 
the upward mobility towards the section-head level. This is because political officials 
in the leapfrog have no promotion to the section-head level when the observation is 
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terminated. After removing the leapfrog promotion, there is no censored 
observation included in analyzing the course of political mobility at each 
administrative rank in Section 7.2.  
 
7.1 Upward Mobility across Administrative Ranks 
 
This section touches upon the average age for provincial leaders at promotion in the 
course of upward mobility in Section 7.1.1. Section 7.1.2 examines the waiting time 
at the previous administrative rank before reaching the respective hierarchical 
levels. For analytical purposes, Section 7.1.1 is based on a larger leadership sample 
because the central concern in this subsection is the occurrence of promotion events 
irrespective of either the type or the timing of promotions occurring. Therefore, 
Section 7.1.1 takes into consideration the ages of political officials with the leapfrog 
promotion coupled with the ages of the newcomers upon the entry into public 
service. By comparison, as mentioned earlier, Section 7.1.2 exclusively focuses on 
the step-by-step promotion events, analyzing the record of the political officials 
working at two successive administrative ranks and omitting the records of leapfrog 
promotions or the origin status in civil service. To supplement, Section 7.1.3 
empirically assesses the occurrence of leapfrog promotions throughout political 
careers.  
 
7.1.1 The Age at Promotion 
 
The average ages for provincial leaders grow with the bottom-up career progression. 
According to Table 55, the average ages range from 29.11 at the section-head level 
to 61.52 at the state-leader level. Consider the age distribution across administrative 
ranks for the 1990-2013 provincial leaders. Approximately a half of provincial leaders 
get promoted between the ages of 26-31 at the section-head level, 27-33 at the 
deputy-division-head level, 31-37 at the division-head level, 37-42 at the deputy-
bureau/director level, 40-46 at the bureau/director level, 45-51 at the vice-
provincial/ministerial level and 54-59 at the provincial/ministerial level. As to the 
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ages at promotion at the vice-state-leader level, conspicuously, 12.15% of political 
officials are aged 59 and 12.62% have reached the age of 62. At the state-leader 
level, the top leaders aged 64 produce 29.31% and those aged 66 account for 
20.69%.  
 
Table 55 Average Age at Promotion for Chinese Provincial Leaders, 1990-2013 
Administrative Rank Obs. Average Age 
at Promotion 
Age of Ineligibility 
for Promotion 
Section-Head Level 443 29.11 40 
Deputy-Division-Head Level 924 32.20 45 
Division-Head Level 1008 35.22 50 
Deputy-Bureau/Director Level 1486 38.90 52 
Bureau/Director Level 1638 42.90 55 
Vice-Provincial/Ministerial Level 1879 48.30 58 
Provincial/Ministerial Level 1038 55.33 63 
Vice-State-Leader Level 214 59.59 67 
State-Leader Level 58 61.52 67 
Source: Author’s database.  
Kou, C.W. & Tsai, W.H., 2014. “Sprinting with Small Steps” Towards Promotion: 
Solutions for the Age Dilemma in the CCP Cadre Appointment System. The China 
Journal, 71, 153-171.  
Note: The rightmost column is drawn from the finding of Kou and Tsai(2014)103.  
 
As compared to the ages of ineligibility for promotion, the 1990-2013 provincial 
leaders, as competitive political players, have striking age advantages at every 
administrative rank. They are early starters in each stage of their political careers. In 
particular, the discrepancy between the average age at promotion and the upper 
age limits for promotion seems to be more pronounced at the lower administrative 
ranks. Specifically, the ages at promotions are ten years younger than the ages of 
                                                        
103 The age of ineligibility for promotion has been explicitly promulgated in the 
formal legislative guidelines in some regions or implicitly put into practice in 
appointing and selecting cadres. Despite possibly slight differences in upper age 
limits, Kou and Tsai (2014: 157) state the ages of ineligibility are 40 for cadres at the 
deputy-section-head level and at the section-head level, 45 at the deputy-division-
head level, 50 at the division-head level, 52 at the deputy-bureau/director level, 55 
at the bureau/director level, 58 at the vice-provincial/ministerial level, 63 at the 
provincial/ministerial level, 67 at the vice-state-leader level and at the state-leader 
level. The age requirements at promotion were also identified according to the 2009 
survey organized by People’s Tribune. More details refer to: Du, F.J., 2009. “Shitu 
‘tianhuaban’” (A Career Under the “Glass Ceiling”, 仕途“天花板”), Renmin luntan 
(People’s Tribune), 23, 17.  
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ineligibility from the section-head level to the bureau/director level. This observation 
suggests the possibility that the political officials in question successfully break 
through the age dilemma by rapid promotions at the bureau/director level or below 
(Kou & Tsai, 2014: 159)104.  
 
Furthermore, the age advantage is the most significant at the division-head level, 
namely 14.78 years. That is to say, political officials get ahead at age of 35.22 on 
average, whereas cadres aged 50 at this rank generally become ineligible for further 
advancement. Interestingly, according to the 2009 survey organized by People’s 
Tribune in China, it is at the division-head level that there exist the most cadres who 
become trapped under career ceiling and stay on the lower posts105. One of the 
possible explanations for the emergence of “ceilinged cadres” (tianhuaban ganbu, 天
花板干部) is the upper age limitation as a major hindrance to upward mobility. 
Turning to the earlier finding, in sharp contrast, the 1990-2013 provincial leaders 
                                                        
104 Chien-wen Kou and Wen-Hsuan Tsai (2014) point out the age dilemma by 
comparing the discrepancy between the age of ineligibility for promotion and the 
expected age at promotion under the regulated tenure. The expected age at 
promotion is calculated by assuming that a cadre aged 30 obtains Deputy Section 
Head and successfully gets promoted after fulfilling each office of term for 5 years. 
Under this step-by-step promotion mechanism, the expected ages at promotion 
accordingly start at 30 at the deputy-section-head level with an addition of 5 for 
every promotion. It is important to note that the age of ineligibility is equal to the 
expected age at promotion at the bureau/director level. Thereafter, political officials 
are likely to be confronted with the age dilemma above the bureau/director level 
where the expected age at promotion is larger than the age of ineligibility for 
promotion. On this basis, Kou and Tsai (2014: 159) observe that “to resolve this 
predicament, cadres must steer their career into the fast lane and accrue as large an 
age advantage as possible before getting caught on the horns of the age dilemma at 
the rank of Bureau Director”.  
105  People’s Tribune organized the survey in 2009 by conducting the online 
questionnaire of 7,869 network users, the paper questionnaire of 280 cadres and 
interviews of 32 heads of the Organization Department and 130 party cadres and 
government officials. The sample size is totally 8,311. In terms of the empirical 
findings, 64% of the participants indicate that there are the most ceilinged cadres at 
the division-head level, whereas 12% choose the bureau/director level, 3% the 
provincial/ministerial level and 18% select ‘others’. More details refer to: Du, F.J., 
2009. “Shitu ‘tianhuaban’” (A Career Under the “Glass Ceiling”, 仕途“天花板”), 
Renmin luntan (People’s Tribune), 23, 17.  
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circumvent the ceiling effect at this crucial juncture of career advancement. They 
retain massive competitive advantages in the later years of political careers.  
 
With the occupational upgrading to the vice-provincial/ministerial level or above, the 
age advantage becomes less noticeable. After seeking rapid promotions at the lower 
levels, a large number of political officials tend to remain on the higher-ranking 
positions for a longer tenure, which will be reconfirmed in Section 7.1.2. In this way, 
part of the age advantage is transformed into diverse work experience at the higher 
levels and social interactions with upper echelons.  
 
To summarize, it is well-defined that the average age at promotion increases with 
the hierarchical levels in the career progression. This subsection has drawn a 
comparison between the average age at promotion and the upper age limits for 
promotion at each administrative rank. On the basis of the discrepancy between 
these two ages, it has pointed out that the age advantages become less pronounced 
for provincial leaders at the upper levels than at the lower levels.  
 
7.1.2 The Duration at the Prior Administrative Rank at Promotion 
 
In parallel to the above introduction of the average age at promotion, Section 7.1.2 
examines the duration time at the prior administrative rank before promotion. As 
shown in Table 56, the average tenure at the previous rank is roughly three or four 
years when cadres climb high to the bureau/director level or below. It takes longer 
for the promotion events occurring at the vice-provincial/ministerial level or above. 
This is consistent with the finding of the reduced age advantage at higher levels in 
Section 7.1.1. Most strikingly, political officials stay at the vice-provincial/ministerial 
level for 8.60 years before advancing to the provincial/ministerial level. A broad 
majority of them are likely to serve a five-year term at least at the upper levels 
without interruption106.  
                                                        
106 Chapter 4 has already introduced the legislative guidelines regarding the length of 
term and its term integrity. The typical example is “Interim Provisions on the Term of 
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The relative lengthy duration at the higher levels could be explained by the 
combination of the exceedingly limited vacant positions and the increasingly 
important role played by the political officials at the higher levels.  As to the former, 
there is little doubt that the prospective P.R.C. leaders should wait longer for their 
advancement opportunities in the fierce mobility competition.  As to the latter, for 
top leadership selection, the CCP constructs a pool of talented candidates. The CCP 
nurtures these candidates and improves the job-person matches by assigning them 
to different leadership posts and localities. The duration time grows with job 
reassignments at the same rank. For example, out of 1,891 provincial leaders, the 
proportions with lateral transfers across provinces are 37.82% for party secretaries, 
11.00% for provincial governors, 26.64% for deputy secretaries and 5.89% for vice 
governors. The resulting tenure is 8.60 years at the vice-provincial/ministerial level 
and 7.50 years at the provincial/ministerial level.  
 
Table 56 Average Tenure at the Prior Administrative Rank at Promotion, 1990-2013 
Administrative Rank Obs. Average Tenure at the 
Prior Administrative Rank 
at Promotion 
Section-Head Level 255 42.64 
Deputy-Division-Head Level 397 41.15 
Division-Head Level 738 45.27 
Deputy-Bureau/Director Level 926 43.92 
Bureau/Director Level 1386 51.88 
Vice-Provincial/Ministerial Level 1637 64.30 
Provincial/Ministerial Level 1026 103.20 
Vice-State-Leader Level 210 89.98 
State-Leader Level 47 75.36 
Source: Author’s database.  
Note: The average tenure is measured in years.  
 
The specific distribution of the duration time at the prior rank will be formulated 
later in Section 7.2. Alternatively, this subsection proceeds to shed light on four 
                                                                                                                                                              
Office for Party and Government Leading Cadres” in 2006 (dangzheng lingdao ganbu 
zhiwu renqi zanxing guiding, 党政领导干部职务任期暂行规定). It is stipulated that 
each term of office is subject to five years and should be completed without 
interruption for party and government leaders.  
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possible factors contributing to the lengthy career episodes. Firstly, job 
reassignments at the same administrative rank account for the increase in the 
duration time107. For instance, according to the 1999 and 2006 regulations on cadre 
exchanges, job exchanges, particularly lateral transfers, are introduced for the 
following purposes: (1) better job-person matches; (2) improving leadership ability 
and professional expertise; and (3) rule of avoidance108. Typically, cadres at the 
deputy-division-head level or above should accept job exchanges if they have served 
on the same post or remained at the same rank in the same locality for ten years. In 
addition, as stipulated in Article 7 of the “Regulations on Selecting and Appointing 
Party and Government Leading Cadres” (dangzheng lingdao ganbu xuanba renyong 
gongzuo tiaoli, 党政领导干部选拔任用工作条例), cadres should obtain more than 
two positions at the prior rank before advancing to the deputy-division-head level or 
above109. Therefore, the tenure increases with the within-rank job reassignments. 
                                                        
107 It has been widely believed that for how long cadres should wait for the next 
promotion virtually depends on the number of promotional opportunities coupled 
with the job-cadre matches and the competitive advantage maintained. However, 
the analysis of such factors should be located in a much broader framework. For 
example, it will present an evolutionary picture of the vacant positions across 
different ranks over time in the Chinese bureaucracies. Or it will look into the 
leadership characteristics of those who fail in each mobility competition. Such 
analysis is beyond the scope of this thesis and beyond its capability because this 
thesis merely focuses on human capital and social capital of the 1990-2013 
provincial leaders. Instead of taking a closer look at the above factors, this 
subsection turns to the within-rank job exchanges that essentially stem from the 
above factors.  
108 News of the Communist Party of China, 1999. “dangzheng lingdao ganbu jiaoliu 
gongzuo zanxing guiding” (Interim Provisions on Exchange Work for Party and 
Government Leading Cadres, 党政领导干部交流工作暂行规定) [Online]. (Updated 
22 April 1999) Available at: 
http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/64162/71380/71382/71480/4854009.html [accessed 
03 Jan 2015]; Xinhuanet, 2006. “dangzheng lingdao ganbu jiaoliu gongzuo guiding” 
(Provisions on Exchange Work for Party and Government Leading Cadres, 党政领导
干部交流工作规定 ) [Online]. (Updated 06 August 2006) Available at: 
http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2006-08/06/content_4926453.htm [accessed 03 
Jan 2015]. 
109 Xinhua Net, 2002. “dangzheng lingdao ganbu xuanba renyong gongzuo tiaoli” 
(Regulations on Selecting and Appointing Party and Government Leading Cadres, 党
政领导干部选拔任用工作条例) [Online]. (Updated 09 July 2002) Available at: 
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Noteworthy here is the career move from the CCYL route to local leadership. To 
guarantee the leadership vitality, the CCYL imposes strict age restrictions on cadre 
appointments110. The CCYL cadres are transferred to the equivalent rank in the 
regular party or government systems as getting older. The tenure at this rank 
accordingly increases. To provide a specific example, Bayanqolu (巴音朝鲁), current 
deputy secretary and governor of Jilin, stayed in the CCYL route for ten years. He 
successively climbed the hierarchical ladder within the CCYL from the deputy-
bureau/director level to the vice-provincial/ministerial level. In 1998, Bayanqolu (巴
音朝鲁 ) became executive secretary of the Secretariat of the CCYL Central 
Committee and chairman of the All-China Youth Federation. Three years later, he 
was transferred out of the CCYL route and laterally reassigned to vice governor of 
Zhejiang. In December 2003, he was elected Zhejiang Party Standing Committee 
member and party secretary of Ningbo. In 2010, Bayanqolu (巴音朝鲁) was 
transferred to Jilin as deputy party secretary after working in Zhejiang for nine years. 
He rose to chairman of Jilin Provincial CPPCC in 2011 and obtained the 
provincial/ministerial level. He was subsequently appointed deputy party secretary 
and governor of Jilin in 2013. To summarize, at the vice-provincial/ministerial rank, 
Bayanqolu (巴音朝鲁) experienced critical job reassignments from the leading 
positions in the CCYL to local leadership in Zhejiang and Jilin. His duration at the vice-
provincial/ministerial level amounts to 13 years, namely three years as a notable 
CCYL cadre and ten years as a top leader in the party or government system. 
 
Secondly, the duration of waiting time at a given rank grows with the career 
transitions from the civil service systems to the non-public organizations, such as the 
                                                                                                                                                              
http://news.xinhuanet.com/ziliao/2003-01/18/content_695422_1.htm [accessed 03 
March 2015].  
110 The notable regulation on the age limits for CCYL cadres was promulgated in 
1982, that is, “The CCP Central Organization Department Forwards CCYL Central 
Secretariat’s Opinions on Age Issues of Leading CCYL Cadres at All Ranks” (zhonggong 
zhongyang zuzhibu zhuanfa tuan zhongyang ‘guanyu geji tuanwei lingdao ganbu 
nianling wenti de yijian’, 中共中央组织部转发团中央“关于各级团委领导干部年
龄问题的意见”).  
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SOEs or universities111. As stressed previously, the duration time in this chapter is 
measured by the interval between two adjacent administrative ranks. Under this 
circumstance, political officials temporarily stay out of the rank system in the civil 
service. They instead work in the non-public organizations and subsequently return 
to the administrative career line. The seniority in the non-public organizations is 
added to the tenure at the lower rank. Consider Cheng Weigao (程维高), former 
party secretary of Hebei, as an example. In 1965, Cheng was reassigned to head of 
Changzhou Tractor Factory from the division-head rank, then director of Changzhou 
Municipal Party Committee Office in Jiangsu. Seven years later, he was transferred 
to Shanghuang Coal Mine in Changzhou and worked there for five years. Between 
1977 and 1980, Cheng occupied the leading posts of deputy director of Changzhou 
Planning Commission and director of Changzhou Construction Committee. In 1980, 
he was promoted to the deputy-bureau/director level as vice mayor and deputy 
secretary of Changzhou. Cheng’s tenure in the SOEs ultimately contributes a total of 
twelve years to the duration at the division-head rank.  
 
Thirdly, the duration increases by considering the length of time spent in full-time 
schooling after public service entry. In line with the method of evaluating the 
duration time in this chapter, the year of schooling is incorporated into the tenure at 
the specific administrative rank before exit from public service. Among 1,891 
provincial leaders from 1990 to 2013, 9.97% prefer to suspend their political career 
and pursue the full-time educational advancement (188 cases). After earning an 
educational degree, they resume their leadership posts. Nearly all of them improve 
educational credentials to some college or above. The average length of full-time 
study is 2.60 years. It is important to indicate that such educational advancement 
mostly occurs below the vice-provincial/ministerial level. As stated above, the tenure 
                                                        
111 The reverse is the career transition from non-public organizations to the civil 
service system.  However, this career transition makes little difference in the growth 
of duration time. In other words, the tenure in the non-public organizations is 
eliminated from the duration analysis. This is due to the way of defining the 
observation period and of evaluating the duration time. Specifically, as indicated in 
Chapter 3, the starting point of the observation period for elite mobility is the point 
of origin in the civil service system. In addition, the duration time in this chapter is 
measured by the interval between two adjacent administrative ranks.  
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at the lower ranks is merely three or four years. The addition of 2.60 years makes a 
significant difference to the duration time at a specific rank. A typical example is Xie 
Kangsheng (谢康生), former deputy secretary of Hunan. Xie held the post of deputy 
secretary of Hunan Provincial CCYL in 1982. He experienced a transition from work 
to school and studied in Hunan Normal University from 1983 to 1985. After 
graduation, he was appointed deputy director of Hunan Agriculture Department. As 
a result, the continuing educational experience contributes two years to Xie’s seven-
year at the deputy-bureau/director level.  
 
Lastly, the outbreak of the CR discontinued the cadres’ political careers. A large 
number of cadres were expelled from their posts. The career interruption in the CR 
era lengthens the tenure at the related ranks where they stayed before reluctantly 
leaving office. For provincial leaders from 1990 to 2013, 12.67% entered public 
service prior to the CR (239 cases). In particular 5.09% stepped down from their 
posts during the CR (96 cases), for the most part below the deputy-bureau/director 
level. The average length of disrupted careers is 1.77 years. For instance, Ma 
Zhongchen (马忠臣), former party secretary of Henan, started to occupy the deputy-
division-head level in 1966, working as deputy party secretary of Tai’an County in 
Shandong. From February 1967 to May 1970, he was expelled and sent to work on 
the farm. Fortunately, Ma returned to power in 1970. He was selected as Tai’an 
County Standing Committee member and deputy director of Production Office of 
Tai’an Revolutionary Committee. In 1976, he got promoted from deputy secretary of 
Tai’an County to party secretary of Zhangqiu County at the division-head level. In 
terms of the above-noted career trajectories, Mao stayed for ten years at the 
deputy-division-head level where his political career was disrupted for three years.   
 
To sum up, this subsection has observed the longer tenure at the prior 
administrative rank for promotions at the upper levels than at the lower levels. It has 
also explained the ways in which the career duration increases at a given 
administrative rank. On one hand, the factor of within-rank job exchanges is closely 
associated with the balance of the vacant positions available and the cadre 
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management and training strategies.  In such pyramid-shaped organizational 
hierarchy as Chinese party and government systems, the higher level the political 
officials stay at, the less promotional opportunities they have, the more fierce 
mobility competition they are confronted with. This means that a large number of 
political officials are expected to wait for a promotion chance for a long time at the 
same rank and experience job reassignments at that rank. Or through job exchanges, 
they become more matched to the leadership posts at the higher levels and 
therefore seize the promotional opportunity.  On the other hand, the remaining 
three factors statistically result from the measurement of the duration time in this 
thesis. In other words, the length of time for a temporary transfer out of public 
service is added to the duration time at the specific rank before leaving office, such 
as the career transition towards the non-public organizations, the continuing 
education or the career disruption in the CR era.  
 
 7.1.3 The Leapfrog Promotion 
 
The preceding subsections are concerned with the step-by-step promotion regarding 
the age and the duration time. Section 7.1.3 sketches the basic characteristics of the 
leapfrog promotion. Out of 1,891 provincial leaders, 23.06% leapfrog their way up 
the promotion ladder (436 cases). 393 provincial leaders only experience one 
leapfrog promotion and 43 leaders have two. For the 479 observations of leapfrog 
promotions, 68.68% occurred in the 1980s (329 cases) when the CCP embarked on 
the leadership rejuvenation by recruiting young cadres, as formulated in Chapter 4. 
In terms of the administrative rank, a vast majority of leapfrog-promotion events 
occur from the deputy-division-head level to the vice-provincial/ministerial level. In 
particular, 32.15% of the leapfrog promotion events occur at the deputy-
bureau/director level (154 cases) and 22.34% at the vice-provincial/ministerial level 
(107 cases).  
 
7.2 Life Tables of Political Upward Mobility 
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This section will delineate how provincial leaders from 1990 to 2013 advance to the 
provincial leadership positions from the lower levels. To this end, it will develop a 
dynamic account of how promotion chances change over time and conduct an 
independent analysis on promotion at each administrative rank. The research 
interest in this section is “time to promotion events”. The study of political mobility 
is placed in the context of the step-by-step promotion. It differs from the promotion 
models in Chapter 8, which will be further discussed in the next chapter. As 
described in Chapter 3, in addition to the step-by-step promotions, the promotion 
models are extensively concerned with the leapfrog promotions and the entry into 
public service.  
 
With respect to the political mobility process, the questions of interest in this section 
are questions like: What is the probability of upward mobility at each administrative 
rank if the political officials are eligible for promotion? How many of them remain at 
the same rank without promotion during a given career interval? How many of them 
get promoted? When do 50% of the political officials successfully get promoted to 
the succeeding higher level? To answer all these questions, the life table method is 
ideally suited to such a dynamic analysis. In this statistical technique, the pertinent 
information on two essential variables is gathered, namely the promotion outcome 
at a given administrative rank and the career duration at its prior rank. The career 
duration is divided into smaller intervals of twelve months. On this basis, the life 
table analysis provides a rigorous summary of such a large sample as the provincial 
leadership dataset, including the number of promotion events, the proportion 
remaining at the same rank, the proportion being promoted coupled with the 
cumulative proportion of experiencing career advancement at a given career 
interval. More importantly, the survival curve for each administrative rank is plotted 
as a step function and the median survival time is computed.   
 
7.2.1 The Life Table Method 
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Before a closer look at the political mobility process, several clarifications pertaining 
to the life table method are worth examining here. The first issue is the selection of 
the observational records for promotion at each administrative rank of interest. As 
mentioned before, this section exclusively focuses on the step-by-step political 
mobility. Similar to the duration analysis in Section 7.1.2, the observational records 
are thus derived from the provincial leadership dataset if they have career 
experience at two adjacent levels. The career experience in public service is recorded 
and followed until political officials successfully become provincial chiefs. Each 
career interval extends from the timing of obtaining the lower rank up to that of 
being promoted to the adjacent higher level. It is assumed that political officials are 
eligible to advance to the succeeding higher level after obtaining a given 
administrative rank. For example, to examine the promotion at the deputy-division-
head level, those with work experience at both the section-head level and the 
deputy-division-head level constitute the observational records. The life table is 
computed on the basis of the promotion status at the deputy-division-head level and 
the tenure at the section-head level. The selection of observational records takes no 
account of leapfrog promotions and the entry status at a given rank. Thus, it is 
important to note that, although the above selection of observational records is 
somewhat arbitrary and may bias the estimated promotion probability, it is in line 
with the step-by-step promotion, which will be explained below.  
 
The second issue is to discuss the possible bias in results after eliminating the 
observations out of the step-by-step promotion. The exceptional cases in political 
mobility—for example, the occurrence of leapfrog promotions or the entry into 
public service—are excluded in the life table analysis of promotion at each rank. The 
former refers to the upward mobility from the lower level to the higher but not 
adjacent level. The promotion at the rank between these two levels no longer 
occurs. The latter reflects the life transition from the full-time study to public service 
or the career transition from the SOEs or universities to public service. Consider once 
again the promotion at the deputy-division-head level as an example. In the step-by-
step promotion mechanism, those working at the section-head level are eligible for 
promotion at the deputy-division-head level. By comparison, in the leapfrog 
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promotion, what is different is that political officials working at the section-head 
level are not promoted at the deputy-division-head level. They instead advance to 
the rank higher than the deputy-division-head level. In addition, a number of 
political officials directly obtain the deputy-division-head level upon the public 
service entry. Is there any variance in estimates of promotion rates by taking into 
account the above-noted exceptional cases in leadership promotion?  
 
On one hand, in estimating the duration distribution and promotion chances at the 
deputy-division-head level, those without promotion at this rank in leapfrog are 
originally withdrawn from the study and censored in the life table. In this regard, the 
proportion of promotion is expected to decline in the presence of these censored 
observations112. Furthermore, the influence of the leapfrog promotion can be 
understood from a different perspective. In the study of promotion proportions at 
the destination rank higher than the deputy-division-head level, the promotion 
occurs. The promotion rates increases with the inclusion of such leapfrog 
promotions as compared to those under the step-by-step promotion mechanism113. 
                                                        
112 In the life table method, the number of not experiencing promotion at the 
interval start time (t) and the number of observations exposed to promotion risk will 
change by considering the effect of these censored observations. The number 
exposed to risk (Rt) is equal to the number of surviving cases (St) minus one half of 
the number of censored observations (Wt). That is, Rt =St-Wt/2. The promotion 
probability (Pt) is the number of promotion events (dt) divided by the number 
exposed to risk (Rt). It is computed using the formula: Pt =dt/Rt where Rt =St-Wt/2. 
That is to say, the promotion of probability is computed using the formula: Pt =dt/(St-
Wt/2). After removing the censored observations, the number of promotion events 
(dt) remains the same. However, the number of exposed to risk (R’t) is equal to the 
number of surviving cases (S’t), using the formula R’t =St-Wt. In this case, the 
promotion probability is calculated as:  P’t =dt/S’t where S’t =St-Wt. By comparison, 
the proportion of promotion in the presence of censored observations is smaller 
than the proportion without censored observations. In terms of the promotion at 
the deputy-division-head level, as indicated in Section 7.1.3, there are 50 political 
officials free of promotion at this rank and leapfrogging their way up to the division-
head level.  
113 In examining the promotion rates at the destination level in leapfrog, the rate of 
not experiencing promotions (Qt) is computed by using the formula: Qt =St/Rt. Under 
the step-by-step promotion mechanism, the number of leapfrog promotions (Lt) is 
omitted from the study. Therefore, the rate of not experience promotions (Q’t) is 
computed by using the formula: Q’t =S’t/R’t where R’t =Rt-Lt. In both cases, the 
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On the other hand, the promotion occurs if political officials enter public service by 
obtaining the deputy-division-head level. The incorporation of these observational 
records leads to the increase in the promotion rate. At the empirical level, 148 
provincial leaders started their political career by assuming the deputy-division-head 
rank, producing 27.16% of promotion rate at the interval start time (i.e., time 
zero)114. Nevertheless, returning to the principal research purpose, this section 
focuses on how provincial leaders climb the political ladder from one rank to 
another. The events of public service entry are inherently beyond the scope of the 
political mobility analysis. Besides, as outlined in Chapter 6, the leapfrog promotion 
is exceptional in political mobility and merely provides a small share of promotion 
events at each rank. Consequently, despite the possible bias in estimating promotion 
rates, only the step-by-step promotion events are selected as the observational 
records in developing life tables. 
 
The third issue is that the promotion status is well defined. This section analyzes the 
retrospective career data of provincial leaders from 1990 to 2013. These political 
leaders are considered as political winners who have risen to prominence in 
provincial politics. Given both, the promotion outcomes are definite at 
administrative ranks lower than the last observed rank. Or rather, party secretaries 
and provincial governors are assumed to attain promotions at the 
provincial/ministerial rank or below after working in party or government systems. 
Similarly, deputy party secretaries and vice governors presumably get promoted at 
the vice-provincial/ministerial rank or below. Under the step-by-step promotion 
mechanism, there are no censored observations in the separate analysis of the 
promotion rates at each level lower than the last observed rank. The reasons for this 
                                                                                                                                                              
number of not experiencing promotion remains the same. As a result, the rate of not 
experience promotion with the leapfrogs is lower than that in the step-by-step 
promotion. Besides, the promotion rate is equal to one minus the proportion of not 
experiencing promotion. Therefore, the promotion rate is expected to rise by 
considering the leapfrog promotions.  
114 The number of observational records is 397 under the step-by-step political 
mobility. The total number of observational records will increase to 447 by 
incorporating 148 provincial leaders obtaining the deputy-division-head level as their 
start level in public service.  
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are threefold. Firstly, as stated previously, either the leapfrog promotion or the 
public service entry is eliminated from the political mobility analysis. Secondly, 
according to the above-mentioned selection of observational records, those with 
unknown promotion status at the end of the career interval are excluded in the 
study. Lastly, the life table analysis of political mobility is based on the retrospective 
career data for promotion at each rank of interest. Only those having successfully 
advanced to provincial leadership positions and having complete career-history data 
are included in the study. To put it differently, there exists no possibility that 
provincial leaders drop out of the study for reasons of resignation, criminality or 
death before the observation period ends.  
 
The final issue is the selection of administrative ranks of interest. This section 
focuses on the political mobility from the deputy-division-head level to the 
provincial/ministerial level. It is important to emphasize that the provincial 
leadership dataset contains a complete sample of provincial leaders from 1990 to 
2013, as introduced in Chapter 3. The primary concern of this section is to examine 
the political mobility process of this leadership group. In other words, it simply takes 
insight into how these leaders come to power in provincial politics from the lower 
levels step by step. Attempts to generalize from the resulting promotion rates of 
provincial leaders must be cautious. In terms of selecting the administrative ranks of 
interest, the promotion at the section-head level or below is not investigated here 
because of the missing data on career histories.  As to the promotion at the vice-
state-leader level and the state-leader level, a very small number of provincial 
leaders succeed in the promotion competition for national power. In sharp contrast, 
as late career starters or late public service entrants, quite a number of the 
provincial leaders had failed to achieve promotion at these two levels by the end of 
the observation period. These leaders are considered to be censored if taken into 
account in the life table method. The crude removal of these observations is 
expected to generate the significant estimated bias. As a result, this section will 
focus the life table analysis on the changes in promotion rates from the deputy-
division-head level to the provincial/ministerial level.  
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7.2.2 Promotion to the Deputy-Division-Head Level 
 
The following subsections will provide the life tables on the career progression 
towards the ranks from the deputy-division-head level to the provincial/ministerial 
level. Before presenting the empirical results, three highlights are worth mentioning 
here. First, the promotion rates are computed on the basis of the duration time at 
the prior rank. The duration time at each rank is subdivided into smaller fixed 
intervals in units of months. Each small interval lasts 12 months in this political 
mobility analysis. This primarily depends on the total duration time at each rank. The 
total duration time ranges from 17 years to 30 years from the section-head level to 
the vice-provincial/ministerial level. It is meaningful to describe the promotion 
dynamics and examine the variations in the promotion rate for every year by 
identifying 12 months as each interval. Second, it is critical to clarify that political 
officials are considered to “survive” or be “alive” if not experiencing promotions. 
Reversely, they are considered to be “dead” once the terminal events of promotion 
occur. Therefore, the parameter of “the cumulative proportion surviving at end of 
interval” represents the cumulative proportion of not experiencing promotions. It is 
equivalent to the probability of surviving at the most recent interval multiplied by 
that for all the previous intervals. Noteworthy is that the cumulative promotion rate 
of interest is accordingly equal to one minus the cumulative proportion surviving. 
Finally, the median survival time is calculated, indicating the time point at which half 
of the political officials have experienced upward mobility and half of the officials 
remain at the same rank without any promotion. In addition, the survival curve gives 
pertinent information on how the cumulative proportion of surviving changes with 
the passage of the career duration time.  
 
Table 57 shows the life table on the upward mobility from the section-head level to 
the deputy-division-head level. There are a total of 397 provincial leaders under 
study. They raise their administrative rank to the deputy-division-head level within 
22 years. It is illustrated in the life table that 33 political officials successfully get 
promoted within the first year. They could be regarded as the strongest political 
competitors and the fastest runners from the section-head level to the deputy-
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division-head level. For instance, Miu Ruilin (缪瑞林), former vice governor of 
Jiangsu, was appointed section head in the Agriculture Division of Jiangsu Provincial 
Agriculture Department from September 1989 to August 1990. After working at the 
section-head level for eleven months, Miu received a rapid promotion and became 
deputy head in this division.  
 
By looking at the changes in the promotion rate during the career interval of 22 
years, the promotion rate at the beginning of the 12th month is 8.31%. The five-year 
cumulative promotion rate is 77.83%. By Year 10, the cumulative promotion rate has 
risen to 97.98%. Political officials working at the section-head level tend to get ahead 
towards the deputy-division-head level within the first seven years. The cumulative 
promotion rate amounts to approximately 96.47%. In particular, the number of 
promotion events occurring is conspicuous at Year 2, Year 3 and Year 4. The 
corresponding figures are 96 at Year 2, 88 at Year 3 and 54 at Year 4. Moreover, the 
survival curve for calculating the promotion rates is shown in Figure 32. According to 
the survival curve, there are few political officials staying at the section-head level 
after seven years. 
 
The median survival time is 33.48 months. This means that 50% of the political 
officials remain serving at the section-head rank approximately in the past three 
years. If the political officials fail to get ahead in the first three years, to a certain 
degree, they are disadvantageously positioned in the promotion to the deputy-
division-head level.  
 
Table 57 The Life Table on Promotion to the Deputy-Division-Head Level, 1990-2013 
Interval 
Start 
Time 
Number 
Entering 
Interval 
Number of 
Terminal 
Events 
Proportion 
Terminating 
Proportion 
Surviving 
Cumulative 
Proportion 
Surviving at 
End of Interval 
Cumulative 
Promotion 
Rate at End 
of Interval 
0 397 33 0.08 0.92 0.92 8.31% 
12 364 96 0.26 0.74 0.68 32.49% 
24 268 88 0.33 0.67 0.45 54.66% 
36 180 54 0.30 0.70 0.32 68.26% 
48 126 38 0.30 0.70 0.22 77.83% 
60 88 25 0.28 0.72 0.16 84.13% 
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72 63 22 0.35 0.65 0.10 89.67% 
84 41 27 0.66 0.34 0.04 96.47% 
96 14 3 0.21 0.79 0.03 97.23% 
108 11 3 0.27 0.73 0.02 97.98% 
120 8 3 0.38 0.63 0.01 98.74% 
132 5 0 0.00 1.00 0.01 98.74% 
144 5 2 0.40 0.60 0.01 99.24% 
156 3 0 0.00 1.00 0.01 99.24% 
168 3 0 0.00 1.00 0.01 99.24% 
180 3 0 0.00 1.00 0.01 99.24% 
192 3 0 0.00 1.00 0.01 99.24% 
204 3 0 0.00 1.00 0.01 99.24% 
216 3 1 0.33 0.67 0.01 99.50% 
228 2 0 0.00 1.00 0.01 99.50% 
240 2 0 0.00 1.00 0.01 99.50% 
252 2 2 1.00 0.00 0.00 100.00% 
Source: Author’s database. 
Note: 1. The median survival time is 33.48 months. 
2. The career interval is measured in months.  
3. No observation is withdrawn from the study during the interval. 
4. The number of entering the interval is equal to the number exposed to risk.  
 
 
Figure 32 Survival Curve of Promotion to the Deputy-Division-Head Level, 1990-2013 
 
7.2.3 Promotion to the Division-Head Level 
 
Table 58 illustrates the upward mobility from the deputy-division-head level to the 
division-head level. In the life table, 738 provincial leaders have work experience at 
both ranks. It takes less than 29 years for all of them to attain the promotional 
opportunity. According to Table 58, 34 political officials win the early promotion 
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round within the first year. The promotion rate is 4.61% at the end of the first year. 
For example, former deputy party secretary of Henan, Ye Dongsong (叶冬松), was 
promoted from deputy head to head of Policy and Regulation Division in Anhui 
Provincial Bureau of Geology and Mineral Resources in 1991. Before this promotion, 
Ye worked at the deputy-division-head level for five months during the period of July 
1991 and December 1991. Another example is Lei Yulan (雷于蓝), former vice 
governor of Guangdong. Lei got into the fast track along the pathway of the CCYL. 
After working as deputy secretary for seven months only, she occupied the leading 
posts of secretary of the Foshan Municipal CCYL and chairman of the All-China Youth 
Federation in Foshan.  
 
By comparing the first-year promotion rate, the proportion of promotion events 
occurring is smaller for advancing to the division-head level than to the deputy-
division-head level. With respect to the changes in the promotion rate, the five-year 
cumulative promotion rate is 75.75%. The ten-year cumulative promotion rate is 
95.53%. As illustrated in Figure 33, the cumulative promotion rate grows by 22.35% 
in the second year, 21.55% in the third year, 16.94% in the fourth year. From the 
longitudinal perspective, the number of promotion events increase sharply to 165 at 
Year 2, 159 at Year 3 and 125 at Year 4. Since Year 5, there has been a modest 
decrease in the number of promotion events occurring. There are merely three 
political officials without upward mobility after Year 15.  
 
The median survival time is 37.06 months. Similar to the promotion towards the 
division-level, 50% of political officials have experienced promotions in the past 
three years.  
 
Table 58 The Life Table on Promotion to the Division-Head Level, 1990-2013 
Interval 
Start 
Time 
Number 
Entering 
Interval 
Number of 
Terminal 
Events 
Proportion 
Terminating 
Proportion 
Surviving 
Cumulative 
Proportion 
Surviving at 
End of Interval 
Cumulative 
Promotion 
Rate at End 
of Interval 
0 738 34 0.05 0.95 0.95 4.61% 
12 704 165 0.23 0.77 0.73 26.96% 
24 539 159 0.29 0.71 0.51 48.51% 
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36 380 125 0.33 0.67 0.35 65.45% 
48 255 76 0.30 0.70 0.24 75.75% 
60 179 52 0.29 0.71 0.17 82.79% 
72 127 38 0.30 0.70 0.12 87.94% 
84 89 27 0.30 0.70 0.08 91.60% 
96 62 21 0.34 0.66 0.06 94.44% 
108 41 8 0.20 0.80 0.04 95.53% 
120 33 13 0.39 0.61 0.03 97.29% 
132 20 5 0.25 0.75 0.02 97.97% 
144 15 7 0.47 0.53 0.01 98.92% 
156 8 3 0.38 0.63 0.01 99.32% 
168 5 2 0.40 0.60 0.00 99.59% 
180 3 0 0.00 1.00 0.00 99.59% 
192 3 1 0.33 0.67 0.00 99.73% 
204 2 0 0.00 1.00 0.00 99.73% 
216 2 0 0.00 1.00 0.00 99.73% 
228 2 0 0.00 1.00 0.00 99.73% 
240 2 0 0.00 1.00 0.00 99.73% 
252 2 0 0.00 1.00 0.00 99.73% 
264 2 0 0.00 1.00 0.00 99.73% 
276 2 0 0.00 1.00 0.00 99.73% 
288 2 0 0.00 1.00 0.00 99.73% 
300 2 0 0.00 1.00 0.00 99.73% 
312 2 0 0.00 1.00 0.00 99.73% 
324 2 0 0.00 1.00 0.00 99.73% 
336 2 2 1.00 0.00 0.00 100.00% 
Source: Author’s database. 
Note: 1. The median survival time is 37.06 months. 
2. The career interval is measured in months.  
3. No observation is withdrawn from the study during the interval. 
4. The number of entering the interval is equal to the number exposed to risk.  
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Figure 33 Survival Curve of Promotion to the Division-Head Level, 1990-2013 
 
7.2.4 Promotion to the Deputy-Bureau/Director Level 
 
This subsection attempts to examine the career advancement from the division-head 
level to the deputy-bureau/director level. Above all, the pertinent observational 
records under consideration are drawn from the promotion outcomes and tenure at 
the division-head level for 926 provincial leaders. For this leadership group, the 
maximum tenure at the division-head level is 17 years. Table 59 presents the life 
table on the duration distribution and the resulting promotion rates. The life table 
shows that there are a total of 74 political officials promoted at the end of the first 
year. The corresponding promotion rate is 7.99%. For example, Wang Yang (汪洋), 
current Politburo member and vice premier, stayed at the division-head level as 
head of the Propaganda Department in the Anhui Provincial CCYL from October 1982 
to August 1983. It takes only ten months for Wang to receive a promotion to the 
deputy-bureau/director level as deputy secretary of the Anhui Provincial CCYL. As 
another example, Wan Qingliang (万庆良), former vice governor of Guangdong, 
became the Meizhou Municipal Standing Committee member after serving as party 
secretary of Jiaoling County in Guangdong for six months.   
 
With the passage of the duration time at the division-head level, the number of 
promotion events increases from 74 at Year 1 to 178 at Year 2. It reaches the peak 
value of 193 at Year 3. After three years, the number of political officials with 
upward mobility yields a continuing decrease until all the leaders are successfully 
promoted. With regard to the cumulative promotion rates, the proportion of 
promotion is 75.81% in the past five years and 97.30% in the past ten years. Political 
officials under study are inclined to gain better political careers towards the deputy-
bureau/director level within the first nine years, approximately 96.54%. As 
illustrated in Figure 34, the increase in the cumulative promotion rates is the most 
pronounced at Year 3, approximately 20.85%.  
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The median survival time is 37.43 months. Similar to the promotion at the division-
head level, 50% of political officials have experienced upward mobility in the past 
three years.  
 
Table 59 The Life Table on Promotion to the Deputy-Bureau/Director Level, 1990-
2013 
Interval 
Start 
Time 
Number 
Entering 
Interval 
Number of 
Terminal 
Events 
Proportion 
Terminating 
Proportion 
Surviving 
Cumulative 
Proportion 
Surviving at 
End of Interval 
Cumulative 
Promotion 
Rate at End 
of Interval 
0 926 74 0.08 0.92 0.92 7.99% 
12 852 178 0.21 0.79 0.73 27.21% 
24 674 193 0.29 0.71 0.52 48.06% 
36 481 151 0.31 0.69 0.36 64.36% 
48 330 106 0.32 0.68 0.24 75.81% 
60 224 72 0.32 0.68 0.16 83.59% 
72 152 49 0.32 0.68 0.11 88.88% 
84 103 41 0.40 0.60 0.07 93.30% 
96 62 30 0.48 0.52 0.03 96.54% 
108 32 7 0.22 0.78 0.03 97.30% 
120 25 7 0.28 0.72 0.02 98.06% 
132 18 7 0.39 0.61 0.01 98.81% 
144 11 2 0.18 0.82 0.01 99.03% 
156 9 0 0.00 1.00 0.01 99.03% 
168 9 2 0.22 0.78 0.01 99.24% 
180 7 2 0.29 0.71 0.01 99.46% 
192 5 1 0.20 0.80 0.00 99.57% 
204 4 4 1.00 0.00 0.00 100.00% 
Source: Author’s database. 
Note: 1. The median survival time is 37.43 months. 
2. The career interval is measured in months.  
3. No observation is withdrawn from the study during the interval. 
4. The number of entering the interval is equal to the number exposed to risk.  
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Figure 34 Survival Curve of Promotion to the Deputy-Bureau/Director Level, 1990-
2013 
 
7.2.5 Promotion to the Bureau/Director Level 
 
Table 60 describes the promotion dynamics from the deputy-bureau/director level 
to the bureau/director level. At the beginning of the duration time at the deputy-
bureau/director level, 1,386 political officials are at risk of being promoted to the 
bureau/director level. In the first year, approximately 7.94% of them experience 
upward mobility (110 cases). Among them, consider Wang Rulin (王儒林), current 
party secretary of Jilin, and Yang Jing, current secretary of the Secretariat of the CC 
and state councilor, as examples. Wang was elected deputy secretary of Jilin 
Provincial CCYL in November 1986. It takes nine months for Wang to get ahead 
towards secretary of Jilin Provincial CCYL from the deputy position. As another 
example, Yang Jing (杨晶) also received a critical job move from the deputy-
bureau/director level to the bureau/director level. More specifically, Yang worked as 
deputy director of Bureau of Statistics in Inner Mongolia for seven months before 
getting ahead. He was subsequently transferred to director of Inner Mongolia’s 
Tourism Administration in June 1992.  
 
At the end of the second year, the number of promotion events has a conspicuous 
growth to 206. As depicted in Table 60, it reaches the peak value of 226 at Year 3 
and starts to drop slowly. At the beginning of Year 14, there are only 18 political 
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officials who remain free of career progression to the bureau/director level. The 
first-year promotion rate is 7.94% as outlined above. The five-year cumulative 
promotion rate is 63.42%. 95.17% of political officials have attained the promotional 
chances in the past ten years. Strikingly, the first eight years is the time period with 
the massive promotion events occurring. That is, 88.82% of political officials enjoy 
occupational upgrading within the first eight years. The survival curve in Figure 35 
draws a clear picture of the upward mobility competition, showing the relative 
significant increase in the cumulative promotion rates from Year 2 to Year 6.  
 
The median survival time is 46.12 months. One half of the political officials is 
positioned advantageously in the promotion competition at the deputy-
bureau/director rank and ultimately receives promotions within the four years.  
 
Table 60 The Life Table on Promotion to the Bureau/Director Level, 1990-2013 
Interval 
Start 
Time 
Number 
Entering 
Interval 
Number of 
Terminal 
Events 
Proportion 
Terminating 
Proportion 
Surviving 
Cumulative 
Proportion 
Surviving at 
End of Interval 
Cumulative 
Promotion 
Rate at End 
of Interval 
0 1386 110 0.08 0.92 0.92 7.94% 
12 1276 206 0.16 0.84 0.77 22.80% 
24 1070 226 0.21 0.79 0.61 39.11% 
36 844 179 0.21 0.79 0.48 52.02% 
48 665 158 0.24 0.76 0.37 63.42% 
60 507 157 0.31 0.69 0.25 74.75% 
72 350 106 0.30 0.70 0.18 82.40% 
84 244 89 0.36 0.64 0.11 88.82% 
96 155 56 0.36 0.64 0.07 92.86% 
108 99 32 0.32 0.68 0.05 95.17% 
120 67 23 0.34 0.66 0.03 96.83% 
132 44 12 0.27 0.73 0.02 97.69% 
144 32 14 0.44 0.56 0.01 98.70% 
156 18 6 0.33 0.67 0.01 99.13% 
168 12 2 0.17 0.83 0.01 99.28% 
180 10 1 0.10 0.90 0.01 99.35% 
192 9 0 0.00 1.00 0.01 99.35% 
204 9 3 0.33 0.67 0.00 99.57% 
216 6 2 0.33 0.67 0.00 99.71% 
228 4 0 0.00 1.00 0.00 99.71% 
240 4 2 0.50 0.50 0.00 99.86% 
252 2 0 0.00 1.00 0.00 99.86% 
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264 2 0 0.00 1.00 0.00 99.86% 
276 2 1 0.50 0.50 0.00 99.93% 
288 1 0 0.00 1.00 0.00 99.93% 
300 1 0 0.00 1.00 0.00 99.93% 
312 1 0 0.00 1.00 0.00 99.93% 
324 1 0 0.00 1.00 0.00 99.93% 
336 1 0 0.00 1.00 0.00 99.93% 
348 1 0 0.00 1.00 0.00 99.93% 
360 1 1 1.00 0.00 0.00 100.00% 
Source: Author’s database. 
Note: 1. The median survival time is 46.12 months. 
2. The career interval is measured in months.  
3. No observation is withdrawn from the study during the interval. 
4. The number of entering the interval is equal to the number exposed to risk.  
 
 
Figure 35 Survival Curve of Promotion to the Bureau/Director Level, 1990-2013 
 
7.2.6 Promotion to the Vice-Provincial/Ministerial Level 
 
The career-history data is available for 1,637 provincial leaders who get ahead step 
by step from the bureau/director rank to the vice-provincial/ministerial rank. The 
maximum tenure at the bureau/director rank is 318 months. As illustrated in Table 
61, there are only 79 political officials moving up to the vice-provincial/ministerial 
rank within the first year. For instance, Wang Lequan (王乐泉), former Politburo 
member and party secretary of Xinjiang, stayed at the bureau/director level for only 
ten months. Wang served as party secretary of Liaocheng Prefecture in Shandong 
from April 1988 to February 1989, before being appointed vice governor of 
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Shandong. Another example is Wang Zhongyu (王忠禹), former vice chairman of the 
CPPCC. Wang was promoted to Jilin Provincial Standing Committee member after 
working as director of Bureau of Light Industry for eight months.  
 
As shown in both Table 61 and Figure 36, the promotions are more likely to occur 
during the period between Year 2 and Year 8. At the empirical level, out of 1,637 
political officials under study, 75.32% receive rapid promotions. Most strikingly, 
there are the most political officials advancing to the vice-provincial/ministerial rank 
at the end of the third year (219 cases). To supplement, it is interesting to note that 
the number of promotion events exhibits a slight drop from 219 at Year 3 to 172 at 
Year 4, followed by a slight increase to 204 at Year 5. In sharp contrast, few political 
officials remain at the same rank after working at the bureau/director level for 14 
years. Moreover, to look at the changes in the promotion rates with the passage of 
duration time, the first-year proportion of promotion is 4.83%. The five-year 
cumulative promotion rate is 50.21% and the ten-year cumulative proportion is 
90.35%.   
 
The median survival time is 59.79 months. That is to say, one half of political officials 
have been promoted in the last five years. This suggests that political officials are 
likely to advance to the vice-provincial/ministerial level after serving one term of 
office at the bureau/director level.  
 
Table 61 The Life Table on Promotion to the Vice-Provincial/Ministerial Level, 1990-
2013 
Interval 
Start 
Time 
Number 
Entering 
Interval 
Number of 
Terminal 
Events 
Proportion 
Terminating 
Proportion 
Surviving 
Cumulative 
Proportion 
Surviving at 
End of Interval 
Cumulative 
Promotion 
Rate at End 
of Interval 
0 1637 79 0.05 0.95 0.95 4.83% 
12 1558 148 0.09 0.91 0.86 13.87% 
24 1410 219 0.16 0.84 0.73 27.24% 
36 1191 172 0.14 0.86 0.62 37.75% 
48 1019 204 0.20 0.80 0.50 50.21% 
60 815 190 0.23 0.77 0.38 61.82% 
72 625 157 0.25 0.75 0.29 71.41% 
84 468 143 0.31 0.69 0.20 80.15% 
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96 325 97 0.30 0.70 0.14 86.07% 
108 228 70 0.31 0.69 0.10 90.35% 
120 158 48 0.30 0.70 0.07 93.28% 
132 110 49 0.45 0.55 0.04 96.27% 
144 61 21 0.34 0.66 0.02 97.56% 
156 40 16 0.40 0.60 0.01 98.53% 
168 24 7 0.29 0.71 0.01 98.96% 
180 17 8 0.47 0.53 0.01 99.45% 
192 9 2 0.22 0.78 0.00 99.57% 
204 7 0 0.00 1.00 0.00 99.57% 
216 7 2 0.29 0.71 0.00 99.69% 
228 5 3 0.60 0.40 0.00 99.88% 
240 2 0 0.00 1.00 0.00 99.88% 
252 2 0 0.00 1.00 0.00 99.88% 
264 2 0 0.00 1.00 0.00 99.88% 
276 2 1 0.50 0.50 0.00 99.94% 
288 1 0 0.00 1.00 0.00 99.94% 
300 1 0 0.00 1.00 0.00 99.94% 
312 1 1 1.00 0.00 0.00 100.00% 
Source: Author’s database. 
Note: 1. The median survival time is 59.79 months. 
2. The career interval is measured in months.  
3. No observation is withdrawn from the study during the interval. 
4. The number of entering the interval is equal to the number exposed to risk.  
 
 
 Figure 36 Survival Curve of Promotion to the Vice-Provincial/Ministerial Level, 
1990-2013 
 
7.2.7 Promotion to Provincial/Ministerial Level 
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Table 62 provides the life table on the upward mobility from the vice-
provincial/ministerial level to the provincial/ministerial level. The occurrence of 
promotion events for 1,026 provincial leaders is examined. The promotion to 
provincial/ministerial level exhibits a different pattern. The promotion dynamics 
across administrative ranks will be compared later in Section 7.2.8. Returning to the 
promotion to the provincial/ministerial level, rarely do provincial leaders at the vice-
provincial/ministerial level get ahead within the first year, approximately 0.78%. 
Consider Li Ziqi (李子奇) and Quan Shuren (全树仁) as examples. Li was elected 
deputy party secretary and vice governor of Gansu in October 1982. Five months 
later, he became party secretary of Gansu in March 1983. Similarly, Quan worked as 
Liaoning Provincial Standing Committee member and acting director of Organization 
Department for five months. In March 1983, he experienced a promotion to the 
provincial/ministerial rank as provincial governor and party secretary in Liaoning.  
 
With respect to the cumulative promotion rate, only 15.98% of provincial leaders 
have assumed the leading posts at the provincial/ministerial level in the past five 
years and 67.15% in the past ten years. In terms of the number of promotion events, 
the peak value of 140 arises as late as Year 10. There is a slow increase in the 
number of promotion events occurring before Year 10 and a slow decline after Year 
10. As shown in Figure 37, the significant increase in the cumulative proportion rate 
emerges between the sixth year and the eleventh year, accounting for 61.11%. In 
comparison, few promotion events occur after Year 19.  
 
The median survival time is 104.40 months.  50% of the provincial leaders have won 
out in the political mobility and sit at the apex of the provincial power hierarchy in 
the past nine years. The median survival time for the promotion to the 
provincial/ministerial level is roughly twice of that for the promotion at the prior 
level.  
 
Table 62 The Life Table on Promotion to the Provincial/Ministerial Level, 1990-2013 
Interval 
Start 
Number 
Entering 
Number of 
Terminal 
Proportion 
Terminating 
Proportion 
Surviving 
Cumulative 
Proportion 
Cumulative 
Promotion 
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Time Interval Events Surviving at 
End of Interval 
Rate at End 
of Interval 
0 1026 8 0.01 0.99 0.99 0.78% 
12 1018 25 0.02 0.98 0.97 3.22% 
24 993 40 0.04 0.96 0.93 7.12% 
36 953 32 0.03 0.97 0.90 10.23% 
48 921 59 0.06 0.94 0.84 15.98% 
60 862 94 0.11 0.89 0.75 25.15% 
72 768 76 0.10 0.90 0.67 32.55% 
84 692 95 0.14 0.86 0.58 41.81% 
96 597 120 0.20 0.80 0.46 53.51% 
108 477 140 0.29 0.71 0.33 67.15% 
120 337 102 0.30 0.70 0.23 77.10% 
132 235 64 0.27 0.73 0.17 83.33% 
144 171 60 0.35 0.65 0.11 89.18% 
156 111 37 0.33 0.67 0.07 92.79% 
168 74 32 0.43 0.57 0.04 95.91% 
180 42 15 0.36 0.64 0.03 97.37% 
192 27 6 0.22 0.78 0.02 97.95% 
204 21 8 0.38 0.62 0.01 98.73% 
216 13 4 0.31 0.69 0.01 99.12% 
228 9 4 0.44 0.56 0.00 99.51% 
240 5 1 0.20 0.80 0.00 99.61% 
252 4 1 0.25 0.75 0.00 99.71% 
264 3 1 0.33 0.67 0.00 99.81% 
276 2 0 0.00 1.00 0.00 99.81% 
288 2 1 0.50 0.50 0.00 99.90% 
300 1 0 0.00 1.00 0.00 99.90% 
312 1 0 0.00 1.00 0.00 99.90% 
324 1 0 0.00 1.00 0.00 99.90% 
336 1 0 0.00 1.00 0.00 99.90% 
348 1 1 1.00 0.00 0.00 100.00% 
Source: Author’s database. 
Note: 1. The median survival time is 104.40 months. 
2. The career interval is measured in months.  
3. No observation is withdrawn from the study during the interval. 
4. The number of entering the interval is equal to the number exposed to risk.  
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 Figure 37 Survival Curve of Promotion to the Provincial/Ministerial Level, 
1990-2013 
 
7.2.8 Summary 
 
The foregoing subsections have given a clear quantitative picture of upward mobility 
at each administrative rank for Chinese provincial leaders from 1990 to 2013. Table 
63 in this subsection summarizes the promotion dynamics and compares such 
parameters as the cumulative promotion rates, the median survival time and the 
year with the most promotion events. As illustrated in Table 63, there are two 
distinct patterns in terms of duration distribution and promotion rates.  
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Table 63 Promotion Dynamics across Administrative Ranks for Provincial Leaders, 1990-2013 
Promotion to:  Number 
Entering 
Interval 
The First-Year 
Promotion Rate 
The Five-Year 
Cumulative 
Promotion Rate 
The Ten-Year 
Cumulative 
Promotion Rate 
Median 
Survival Time 
Year with the Most 
Promotion Events 
Deputy-Division-Head Level 397 8.31% 77.83% 97.98% 33.48 Year 2 
Division-Head Level 738 4.61% 75.75% 95.53% 37.06 Year 2 
Deputy-Bureau/Director Level 926 7.99% 75.81% 97.30% 37.43 Year 3 
Bureau/Director Level 1386 7.94% 63.42% 95.17% 46.12 Year 3 
Vice-Provincial/Ministerial Level 1637 4.83% 50.21% 90.35% 59.79 Year 3 
Provincial/Ministerial Level 1026 0.78% 15.98% 67.15% 104.40 Year 10 
Source: Author’s database. 
Note: The median survival time is measured in months.
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First, provincial leaders are faster runners in upward mobility competitions at the 
lower ranks than at the higher ranks. The finding is evidenced by the growth in the 
median survival time. To be specific, 50% of the political officials receive the step-by-
step promotions to the deputy-bureau/director level or below within the first three 
years. It seems, however, more difficult for political officials to attain the promotion 
chances towards the bureau/director level or above. Empirically, 50% of the political 
officials have experienced the step-by-step promotions in the past four years while 
working at the deputy-bureau/director level. Furthermore, it takes five years for 
political officials to ultimately climb to the vice-provincial/ministerial level and nine 
years to the provincial/ministerial level.  
 
Second, provincial leaders are more likely to receive rapid promotions to the deputy 
positions than to the succeeding full positions. The supporting evidence comes from 
the comparison of the cumulative promotion rates. According to Table 63, the first-
year promotion rate, the five-year and the ten-year cumulative promotion rates are 
all smaller for the career advancement to the division-head level than to the deputy-
division-head level. This finding also applies to the comparison between the 
promotion to the bureau/director level and the deputy-bureau/director level. So 
does the comparison between the provincial/ministerial level and the vice-
provincial/ministerial level.  
 
Before closing this subsection, it is significant to underline the promotion to the 
provincial/ministerial level. It differs enormously from the promotions to the 
previous levels. It is straightforward from the life table in Section 7.2.7 and the 
comparison in Table 63 that political leaders at the vice-provincial/ministerial level 
tend to wait for a far longer time before moving to the next administrative rank. 
Only a small number of them get promoted within five years. In other words, a large 
number of them serve more than one term of office at the vice-provincial/ministerial 
rank. There are the most promotion events occurring at Year 10. Such patterns of 
the promotion to the provincial/ministerial level bear useful implications for 
understanding the mobility competition towards the summit of the pyramid-shaped 
political hierarchy. For one thing, given the above statistical data regarding the 
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career duration time before advancing to the provincial/ministerial level, political 
selection at the vice-provincial/ministerial level or above is characterized by 
leadership stability and term integrity. For another thing, climbing to the 
provincial/ministerial level probably depends more upon the vacant positions 
available in the upper echelon than the accumulation of personal resources. On one 
hand, political leaders at the vice-provincial/ministerial level tend to share similar 
human capital and social capital. According to the empirical results in Chapter 5 and 
6, they are largely college graduates and have comparable public service seniority. 
They have relative dense and diverse social networks after a sequence of promotions 
and job rotations. They develop worked-related or personal contacts with national 
leaders. On the other hand, the upward mobility towards the pinnacle of power 
becomes tougher because there exist a very small number of vacant positions that 
are generally open during the extraordinary period of provincial leadership 
reshuffling every five years. Given both, for the most part, political leaders at the 
vice-provincial/ministerial level have no choice but to wait and stay at the same level 
until the leadership positions at the higher rank are available.  
 
7.3 Conclusion 
 
This chapter has provided an insightful account of how provincial leaders from 1990 
to 2013 rise to prominence step by step in Chinese politics. It has analyzed the 
general characteristics of leadership promotion in Section 7.1, such as the ages at 
promotion and the tenure at each rank. The administrative ranks of interest are the 
section-head level or above. To go a step further, Section 7.2 delineates the changes 
in promotion chances across career intervals. The administrative ranks of interest 
here extend from the deputy-division-head level to the provincial/ministerial level.  
 
Section 7.1.1 has pointed out the growth of the average age at promotion with the 
bottom-up occupational upgrading. Strikingly, the average age is compared to the 
age of ineligibility for promotion. The discrepancy between the two seems to be 
more discernible at the lower ranks than at the upper levels. On one hand, the age 
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advantage at the lower ranks is massive. This finding implies that provincial leaders 
receive more rapid promotions while working at the bureau/director level or below. 
On the other hand, the declining age advantage suggests the possibility that 
provincial leaders tend to acquire longer tenure at the vice-provincial/ministerial 
level or above, which is confirmed in Section 7.1.2. They are likely to be confronted 
with the more fierce mobility competition. They tend to wait longer for the 
availability of vacant leadership positions. At the same time, the lengthy tenure at 
the upper levels enables the political leaders to achieve diverse work experience and 
receive job exchanges at the same rank.  
 
Section 7.1.2 gives special attention to the average tenure at the prior administrative 
rank at promotion. It takes a shorter time for provincial leaders to work at the 
previous rank before climbing to the bureau/director level or below than to the vice-
provincial/ministerial level or above. On this basis, Section 7.1.2 links the lengthy 
career tenure to the within-rank job reassignments per se along with the research-
defined measurement of the tenure in this chapter. In addition to the step-by-step 
promotion analysis in the preceding subsections, Section 7.1.3 outlines the 
occurrence of the leapfrog promotion. Provincial leaders tend to leapfrog their way 
in the race for promotion in the 1980s or to the deputy-bureau/director level.  
 
The examination of the average tenure in Section 7.1.2 offers a general account of 
the upward mobility process. Section 7.2 presents a detailed picture of the duration 
distribution and the corresponding cumulative promotion rates by employing the life 
table method. The empirical results show that provincial leaders are more likely to 
receive rapid promotions at the lower levels than at the upper levels. They move 
ahead faster to the deputy positions than to the succeeding full positions. Another 
important finding arises from the life table analysis that the promotion dynamics to 
the provincial/ministerial level yields a disparate pattern. Provincial leaders 
experience rapid promotions and strive for age advantages within the first five years 
while serving at the bureau/director level or below. The survival curves decrease 
steeply in the first five years for the upward mobility to these hierarchical levels.  
However, there are only a very small proportion of provincial leaders to the 
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provincial/ministerial level in the first five years. Instead, there is a significant 
increase in the promotions occurring between Year 6 and Year 11.  
 
Based on all the empirical findings, it is reasonable to draw two conclusions at the 
end of this chapter. First, within the party apparatus and government hierarchies, a 
majority of provincial leaders are undoubtedly fast runners in the political upward 
mobility at each administrative rank. Second, the waiting time at the prior rank and 
the promotion rate differ among this provincial leadership group.  With reference to 
these variations, an intriguing question arises: What factors affect promotion 
outcomes for provincial leaders? Chapter 8 will provide satisfactory answers to this 
question.  
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Chapter 8 Promotion Dynamics of Provincial Leaders: The 
Effects of Human Capital and Social Capital 
 
This chapter will explore how human capital and social capital affect promotion 
outcomes of Chinese provincial leaders from 1990 to 2013. It will take a step further 
to specify how the promotion mechanisms evolve over three historical periods and 
across varying administrative ranks. As indicated at the very beginning of this thesis, 
the research purpose is to examine the role played by human capital and social 
capital in the political upward mobility. This chapter will perform a separate 
empirical study pertaining to the effect of either capital on promotion outcomes. As 
a starting point, this chapter will restate the relevant hypotheses formulated in 
Chapter 2 and test these hypotheses in the following sections.  
 
H1a: Overall, educational levels are an important promotion criterion. Political 
officials with higher educational credentials are more likely to get promoted.  
H1b: Overall, educational levels are significantly associated with upward mobility 
across three historical periods.  
H1c: Educational levels are significantly associated with upward mobility across 
administrative ranks. 
H1d: The role of educational levels in the rank-specific promotion dynamics differs 
over three historical periods.  
H1e: Academic majors significantly affect political upward mobility across three 
historical periods or across administrative ranks.  
H1f: Public service seniority imposes significant impact on political upward mobility 
across three historical periods or across administrative ranks. 
H2a: Overall, social capital is an important promotion criterion and is significantly 
related to political upward mobility. 
H2b: Overall, the significant effect of social capital persists across three historical 
periods. 
H2c: The significant effect of social capital persists across administrative ranks. 
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H2d: The significant effect of social capital in the rank-specific promotion dynamics 
persists across three historical periods.  
 
The preceding chapters have already painted a true picture of the provincial 
leadership characteristics regarding demographic attributes, human capital, social 
capital coupled with the process of political mobility. According to the existing 
findings, the above characteristics present a discernible time-varying or rank-varying 
pattern. For example, as pointed out in the longitudinal study in Chapter 5, the 
proportion of college-educated provincial leaders increases substantially over time. 
A broad majority of provincial leaders raise their educational levels to some college 
at the deputy-bureau/director level or below. They are inclined to improve the 
educational credentials to a master’s degree or a doctorate between the deputy-
bureau/director level and the vice-provincial/ministerial level. In terms of social 
capital, as analyzed in Chapter 6, there was a relative stability in both network size 
and network diversity in the 1990s. From 2000 onwards, the growth in network size 
and network diversity has been well observed. In addition, the average network size 
and network diversity grow with the career progression from the section-head level 
to the state-leader level. Based on the historical changes and the inter-rank 
variations in the leadership characteristics, it is significant to investigate the effects 
of historical periods and administrative ranks on the promotion returns to human 
capital and social capital.  
  
In the following, this chapter begins by describing the statistical procedures to 
identify the effect of human capital or social capital on upward mobility. After 
introducing four steps of the promotion dynamics analysis in Section 8.1.1, Section 
8.1.2 will outline the identification of the reference groups in the promotion 
analyses related to human capital. Section 8.1.3 will redirect attention to the data 
structure and the statistical techniques adopted which have been formulated in 
details in Chapter 3. Section 8.2 and Section 8.3 proceed to test the hypotheses and 
present the specific promotion models by evaluating the effects of human capital 
and social capital, respectively. Section 8.4 will conclude with confidence that both 
human capital and social capital play crucial roles in the career advancement for the 
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1990-2013 provincial leaders. Besides, the impacts of historical periods and 
administrative ranks are clearly observable in the promotion dynamics.   
 
8.1 Overview of the Promotion Dynamics Analysis 
 
This section is based on the detailed introduction of research methods and statistical 
techniques in Chapter 3. It will draw a general picture of how the promotion models 
are developed in Section 8.1.1. On this basis, Section 8.1.2 will explain how the 
relationship between promotion and human capital is operationalized. For example, 
to examine the career rewards for academic majors, how are the event-history 
observations screened from the overall leadership sample? How do the reference 
groups of educational levels change accordingly? Section 8.1.3 will overview the 
samples for the promotion dynamics analysis and the process of data analysis that 
has been already introduced in Chapter 3.  
 
8.1.1 Four-Step Statistical Procedures 
 
This chapter will independently assess the career returns to human capital and social 
capital. For this purpose, it will be organized into two major parts, namely the 
correlation of either human capital or social capital to the leadership promotion 
outcomes. In each part, the empirical analysis proceeds in four steps. First, the 
overall promotion model is developed through pooling all the event-history 
observations together. This overall model exclusively focuses on the occurrence of 
upward mobility and the possible promotion predictors. It takes no account of where 
and when the promotion event ultimately occurs. It attempts to ask whether human 
capital or social capital is significantly associated with promotion outcomes as a 
whole. Or rather, the following specific issues are addressed in the first step. Are 
political officials with higher educational levels more likely to get ahead? Do political 
officials benefit more in career advancement from studying natural science and 
engineering than humanities and social sciences? How important is the accumulation 
of social capital for political officials who strive to climb high in the power hierarchy?  
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On the basis of the overall model in the first step, the second step is to examine the 
period effect and the changes in the opportunity structure, asking how the overall 
model changes across three historical periods.  In the provincial leadership dataset, 
all the event-history observations are separated into three subsets regarding the 
year of staying in the political mobility competition under study. To be specific, this 
chapter is interested in the continuities and changes in the promotion dynamics for 
Chinese provincial leaders prior to the Jiang period, in the Jiang period and the Hu 
period. To operationalize, this chapter identifies the pre-Jiang era as the period 
before 1990, the Jiang era as the period of 1990-2002, and the Hu era as 2003-2013. 
Three conspicuous turning points in the P.R.C. history arise from the national 
leadership transitions in 1989, 2002 and 2012. Specifically, Jiang rose to power as 
General Secretary of the CCP Central Committee in June 1989 and chairman of the 
CMC in November 1989, which marks the emergence of the third leadership 
generation in Chinese politics. In November 2002, Jiang handed over to his 
successor, Hu Jintao, the post of General Secretary. In November 2012, Xi Jinping 
took over Hu’s paramount power and was elected General Secretary of the CCP 
Central Committee.  
 
Based on the above-mentioned watersheds of the CCP’s power succession, it should 
be emphasized here that, in the strict sense, the Hu era is expected to extend from 
2003 until 2012. The period of 2012-2013 is the transition period from the Hu era to 
the Xi era. Accurately, the Year 2013 is the starting point of the Xi period, namely the 
rise of the fifth leadership generation. However, it is classified into the Hu’s era in 
this thesis. This is because the observations of 2013 produce only 2.32% of the total 
event-history entries (777 cases). To simplify, this thesis places the study of the 
promotion dynamics under Hu over the period of 2003-2013, which invites further 
discussions in the concluding chapter. At the empirical level, out of 33,223 
observations with known demographic information and career histories, 28.13% are 
well suited to the promotion dynamics analysis before the Jiang period, 41.52% in 
the Jiang era and 30.35% in the Hu era.  
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The interest in the first two steps is limited to whether or not the political officials 
get promoted. In considering where the promotion event occurs, the latter two 
steps look more closely at the career trajectories across administrative ranks. They 
give special attention to the inter-rank variations in the promotion dynamics. They 
pose intriguing questions of whether and to what extent human capital and social 
capital affect upward mobility over varying stages of political careers.  
 
Therefore, the third step is to independently examine the promotion dynamics at 
each rank, ranging from the deputy-division-head level to the vice-state-leader level. 
The rank-specific promotion dynamics are interested in the pathways of 
occupational advancement for the 1990-2013 provincial leaders at every crucial 
juncture in their political careers. Noteworthy here is that the promotion dynamics 
at the state-leader level drops out from this study for at least two reasons. On one 
hand, in the highly stratified hierarchical structure, a very small number of political 
leaders are eligible to enter the mobility competition towards the state-leader level. 
In the 1990-2013 provincial leadership dataset, only 579 event-history observations 
are selected to analyze the career advancement to the state-leader level. In another 
sense, out of 1,260 provincial leaders, only 6.67% constitute the dwindling pool of 
eligible leaders for these top leadership positions (84 cases). On the other hand, an 
extremely limited number of political leaders are eventually posted at the apex of 
the power structure. Promotions to the state-leader level could be regarded as rare 
events. The proportion of promotion events occurring is small. As for the 1990-2013 
provincial leaders, only 16 win out in the political mobility as the most influential 
ruling elite in China. To summarize, the small sample and the rare event occurrences 
are likely to decrease the statistical power and increase the estimation errors in 
developing the promotion model at the state-leader level. Chapter 3 has indicated 
that the logistic regression analysis will be employed to analyze the promotion 
dynamics at each rank. Nonetheless, at the state-leader level, the number of 
observations in question is so small that the biased logit coefficients and large 
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standard errors are produced115. This is why the promotion dynamics at the state-
leader level is omitted from the separate logistic model in the third step. Before 
moving to the fourth step, it is worth mentioning that the leadership group at the 
state-leader level is highly homogeneous. All of these powerful leaders are male 
leaders with the CCP membership. They are all Han Chinese serving outside their 
home provinces. They are all college graduates and establish close work connections 
at the top of the power center in China.  
 
The fourth and final step is to independently develop the promotion models at each 
rank over three historical periods. First and foremost, this part devotes little 
attention to the promotion dynamics at the highest two ranks (i.e., the vice-state-
leader level and the state-leader level) for the similar reasons as noted in the third 
step. That is to say, concerning the reasonable sample size and the model accuracy, 
the logistic models for these two ranks fail to provide sufficient statistical power for 
the highly robust predictions of promotion outcomes. Instead, the concern in this 
part is with the promotion dynamics from the deputy-division-head level to the 
provincial/ministerial level before and during the Jiang period. In addition, this part 
throws light on the promotion determination models at the vice-
provincial/ministerial level and provincial/ministerial level under Hu.  
 
                                                        
115 The sample size in the logistic regression analysis is of statistical complexity. 
There are flourishing debates and rules of thumb on this issue. For example, some 
statisticians are concerned with the sample size per se. They indicate that the 
relationship between the outcome variable and the predictors may be spurious 
because it is possibly attributable to the random variation. Others focus on the ratio 
of the observations or the events to the predictor variables. For instance, Knapp and 
Campbell-Heider (1989: 640) point out that “having a sample size that is too small 
relative to the number of variables can decrease power and lead to ‘over-fitting’”. 
Vittinghoff & McCulloch (2007: 710) show that “increasing bias and variability, 
unreliable confidence interval coverage, and problems with model convergence as 
events per predictor variable (EPV) declined below 10 and especially below five, 
leading to the reasonable conclusion that results should be cautiously interpreted 
with less than 10 EPV”. Returning to the promotion model at the state-leader level, 
EPV is only 1.45 for the human capital analysis where there are 11 predictor 
variables and 1.78 for the social capital analysis with 9 predictor variables. In the 
logistic model for the state-leader level, most of the logit coefficients are either 
extremely large or equal to zero.  
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Why are the administrative ranks below the vice-provincial/ministerial level 
eliminated in analyzing the promotion dynamics during the Hu period? The answers 
to this question are twofold. First, the provincial leadership dataset in this thesis is 
exclusively derived from the biographic data of provincial leaders from 1990 to 2013. 
Furthermore, the Hu era is defined as the period between 2003 and 2013. Regarding 
the distribution of provincial leaders over historical periods, there is no provincial 
leader who worked at the deputy-division-head level or the division-head level 
during the Hu era and successfully assumed the provincial leadership posts between 
1990 and 2013. This empirical finding is in accord with the institutionalized political 
mobility process that has been gradually structured and reinforced in the Hu era. As 
pointed out in Chapter 4, this institutionalization is characterized by the step-by-step 
promotion and the integrity of the five-year term. Within such institutional 
arrangements, political officials rarely obtain three or four promotions within ten 
years, namely from the outset of the Hu period in 2003 to the endpoint of the 
observation period in 2013116. Second, in terms of the promotion models under Hu, 
there are 9 event-history observations available for the empirical analysis at the 
deputy-bureau/director level and 347 observations at the bureau/director level. As 
to the former, obviously, the sample size is too small. Thus the study of the 
promotion dynamics at the deputy-bureau/director level is precluded. As to the 
latter, with a small sample, the promotion models pertaining to human capital fail to 
generate accurate estimations. This is because the reference groups of the 
educational level comprise scarce observations117. In other words, there are only two 
observations with the educational level of high school or below and one observation 
with some college. Therefore, the final step is to compare the promotion dynamics 
at the vice-provincial/ministerial level and the provincial/ministerial level across all 
three historical periods. In terms of the promotion dynamics below these two levels, 
only those before and during the Jiang era are presented and compared.  
 
                                                        
116 Three or four promotions refer to the political mobility process from the deputy-
division-head level or the division-head level to the vice-provincial/ministerial level.  
117  Section 8.1.2 will explain the identification of the reference categories in 
analyzing the correlation between promotion and human capital.  
 
 
295 
8.1.2 Clarifications on the Promotion Analyses Related to Human Capital 
 
After a detailed look at the four steps of the promotion analyses, this subsection will 
turn to clarify the promotion models pertaining to human capital118. As mentioned in 
Chapter 3, the variables of educational levels and academic majors are selected to 
evaluate the effect of educational credentials on upward mobility. Both of these 
predictors are categorical variables. Specifically, the educational levels consist of 
high school or below, some college, a bachelor’s degree, a master’s degree and a 
doctorate. The academic majors are divided into no academic major, science and 
engineering and humanities and social sciences. In this thesis, to gauge the payoffs 
to educational levels, the educational level of high school or below becomes the 
reference category in this study. The promotion models compare the effect of higher 
education against that of high school or below.  
 
However, the promotion analysis related to academic majors is not as 
straightforward as the study of promotion and educational levels. To examine the 
contribution of academic majors, the central issues that need to be addressed are as 
follows: (1) Is there a relationship between upward mobility and the educational 
training in natural science and engineering or humanities and social sciences? (2) If 
there is a relationship, how strong is it? (3) Are political officials majoring in science 
and engineering more likely to get ahead than those trained in humanities and social 
sciences? In terms of all these research questions, only the observations coded as 
science and engineering along with humanities and social sciences are screened in 
order to assess the effect of academic disciplines. In other words, the observations 
without academic disciplines are omitted. In the provincial leadership dataset, those 
with the educational credential of high school or below are considered to have no 
specialty119. In this regard, to look at the effect of academic majors, the promotion 
                                                        
118 The issue of defining reference groups arises in the promotion analyses pertaining 
to human capital rather than those related to social capital. The primary reason for 
this is that all three variables of social capital (i.e., network size, network diversity 
and upper reachability) are continuous variables.   
119 In the Chinese educational system, the compulsory basic education includes 
primary school and junior middle school. After the completion of junior middle 
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determination models will remove the observations receiving the educational level 
of high school or below and having no specialty. The reference category of academic 
majors is defined as natural science and engineering. The promotion models 
compare the impact of humanities and social sciences against that of natural science 
and engineering.  
 
To summarize, the results of promotion and human capital are presented in two 
separate models. The first model merely shows the effect of educational levels. As 
introduced previously, all the observations are pooled together and the reference 
group is high school or below. The second model looks at the effects of both 
educational levels and academic majors. Based on the above clarifications, only the 
observations with the educational level of some college or above ideally fit the 
second model. Therefore, the reference group of educational levels turns out to be 
some college, rather than high school or below.  
 
8.1.3 Data Analysis 
 
The promotion dynamics analysis in this chapter draws on 33,557 event-history 
observations in the Chinese provincial leadership dataset. In line with the method of 
                                                                                                                                                              
school, students can prefer to pursue either general senior middle school or the 
vocational and technical education. For the educational training in primary school, 
junior middle school and general senior middle school, the courses provided include 
Chinese, Mathematics, Chemistry, Physics, English and the like. With a very small 
number of selective courses, students in the same grade are required to take all the 
compulsory courses without exception. They are not required to be trained by 
specialties at these basic educational levels. On the contrary, the vocational and 
technical education provides employment-oriented training and specialties. As to 
the higher education (i.e., some college, a bachelor’s degree, a master’s degree and 
a doctorate), students can select particular fields of study, such as computer science, 
sociology and medical science. Returning to the provincial leadership dataset, only a 
small number of provincial leaders receive vocational education and most 
information of academic disciplines for such education is missing. The vocational 
education is classified into the category of high school or below. Regarding the 
coding of academic disciplines, when a political official receive the educational level 
of high school or below, he or she is expected to have no academic major.   
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selecting observations in Chapter 3, Table 64 shows the numbers of event-history 
observations selected for developing the promotion models.  
 
Table 64 Samples for Promotion Dynamics Analysis, 1990-2013 
 Pre-Jiang Era Jiang Era Hu Era Total 
Overall 9345 13794 10084 33223 
Deputy-Division-Head Level 1396 168 0 1564 
Division-Head Level 2396 630 0 3026 
Deputy-Bureau/Director Level 2420 1514 9 3943 
Bureau/Director Level 2793 2714 347 5854 
Vice-Provincial/Ministerial Level 1891 3973 1887 7751 
Provincial/Ministerial Level 1225 5154 5847 12226 
Vice-State-Leader-Level 282 1747 2357 4386 
State-Leader Level 19 191 369 579 
Source: Author’s database. 
Note: 1. The samples in the first row are intended for developing the overall model. 
The samples in the rightmost column are collected for the inter-rank promotion 
dynamics analyses. The remaining samples are adopted for exploring the promotion 
dynamics across three historical periods.  
2. Table 64 shows the sample sizes primarily for the promotion analyses pertaining 
to educational levels and social capital. The selected samples for the analysis of 
academic majors are not specified in this table. Instead, they are given in the 
following specific promotion models related to academic majors.  
 
In the event-history analysis as introduced in Chapter 3, the observations are 
organized in the person-year structure. It is worth mentioning that the selection of 
observations across administrative ranks here somewhat differs from that for the 
life-table analysis of political mobility in Chapter 7. As stated in Chapter 7, the 
political mobility analysis is based on the step-by-step promotion mechanism. The 
leapfrog promotions and the public service entry are omitted in the life-table 
analysis but included in the promotion dynamic analyses in this chapter. This is 
because it remains to be seen in Chapter 8 whether human capital or social capital 
contributes to the status attainment in the power hierarchy. More importantly, the 
empirical analyses in Chapter 8 compare the possession of human capital or social 
capital for political officials remaining at the same rank and those getting promoted. 
Therefore, of particular interest is the career duration from the first year at the 
specific rank until the year when the next promotion occurs. In addition, the entry 
level in public service is also under consideration. The promotion dynamics analyses 
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give little attention to whether the political leaders advance their political careers 
step by step, in a leapfrog fashion or as a starting level in public service, which has 
been already explained in Chapter 7.  
 
For the purpose of data analysis, the analytic technique of generalized estimating 
equations is employed in order to develop the overall promotion models related to 
human capital and social capital, respectively. This technique is also applied to the 
overall promotion analyses over three historical periods. Besides, this chapter 
exploits the conventional logistic regression analysis to investigate the promotion 
dynamics across administrative ranks. In each promotion dynamics, the predictors in 
the first model are limited to the demographic variables. With regard to the impact 
of human capital, the second model is concerned with the relationship between 
promotion, demographic attributes and educational levels. The effect of academic 
major is added to the third model relative to the second model. In terms of the 
impact of social capital, the first model is alike as compared to that in the promotion 
analyses related to human capital. The second model focuses on the effect of 
demographic attributes and three parameters of social capital. The following 
sections will delineate the promotion dynamics for Chinese provincial leaders by 
considering the effects of human capital and social capital. Section 8.2 and 8.3 
merely show the empirical findings derived from the promotion models. The 
concluding remarks of this chapter will summarize the major empirical findings, 
interpret the results and give possible explanations.  
 
8.2 Promotion Models and Human Capital 
 
Four fundamental issues concern the political career returns to human capital and 
their historical evolutions in this section. First, is there a significant relationship 
between political upward mobility and human capital? Second, to what extent does 
this promotion determination dynamics evolve across historical periods? Third, to 
what extent does the impact of human capital on the promotion rates vary across 
administrative ranks? Fourth and finally, to what extent do the rank-specific 
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promotion determination dynamics change over time? To address these issues, this 
section examines the changes in the relationship between upward mobility and 
human capital both in all years and during different historical periods. Besides, it 
takes insight into the inter-rank variations in the promotion determination models.  
 
8.2.1 The Overall Promotion Model and Human Capital 
 
To estimate the overall promotion model, this section focuses on how human capital 
affects the promotion rates in all years. Hypothesis H1a, H1e, H1f describe the 
significantly positive correlation between human capital and promotion as a whole. 
In terms of the payoffs to educational credentials, as shown in Table 65, Model 2 
compares the effects of higher education on upward mobility against that of high 
school or below. As compared to the educational level of high school or below, the 
attainment of some college, a bachelor’s degree and a master’s degree significantly 
improves the promotion rates in the political mobility competition. In particular, 
political officials who receive a bachelor’s degree are most likely to get ahead. 
Empirically, the promotion rate increases by 21.4% for political officials with a 
bachelor’s degree relative to those with high school or below. However, having a 
doctorate makes little difference in climbing up the political ladder.  
 
Model 3 is concerned with upward mobility for political officials with some college or 
above. As compared to those with the educational level of some college, the 
occupational rewards for a bachelor’s degree or a master’s degree are negligible. 
Strikingly, having a doctorate imposes a significantly negative effect on the 
occurrence of promotion events, which will be further discussed later. In other 
words, the promotion rate for political officials with a doctorate decreases by 15.8% 
as compared to those receiving the educational level of some college. This finding is 
somewhat at odds with the argument that higher educational credentials confer 
greater advantage in career advancement.  
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In addition to the effects of educational levels, the promotion outcomes are by no 
means attributable to academic majors. As illustrated in Table 65, there is no 
empirical evidence on the variations in the promotion dynamics between political 
officials trained in science and engineering and those studying humanities and social 
sciences. In this sense, the above finding contradicts Hypothesis H1e.  
 
According to the above empirical findings, the role of educational levels should be 
cautiously interpreted in the overall promotion model. It substantively depends on 
the way in which the reference category is selected. The results in Model 2 show the 
positive impact of higher education except for a doctorate.  In another sense, 
political officials with high school or below are positioned disadvantageously in 
upward mobility as compared to those with some college, a bachelor’s degree and a 
master’s degree. However, the career returns to higher educational levels disappear 
in Model 3 where the educational level of some college is identified as the reference 
group. All these findings merely provide partial support to Hypothesis H1a that 
higher educational levels lead to higher promotion probabilities. The following 
empirical evidence to some degree attenuates the favorable effects of education in 
Hypothesis H1a: (1) there is no significant difference in the promotion rate between 
political officials with a doctorate and those with high school or below; (2) Having a 
doctorate exerts a significantly negative impact on the promotion rate as compared 
to some college; (3) There is no significant variation in the promotion rate among 
political officials obtaining some college, a bachelor’s degree and a master’s degree.  
 
Overall, with respect of the overall promotion model, it could be concluded that 
receiving some college seems to be a baseline meritocratic criterion in leadership 
selection. It is imperative for political officials to improve educational credentials to 
some college before receiving further promotions. Nevertheless, after obtaining 
some college, education no longer functions as a strong determinant in political 
upward mobility regarding both educational levels and specialties.  
 
Table 65 GEE Estimates of the Overall Promotion Model and Human Capital, 1990-
2013 
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Covariates Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Intercept 1.011*** 0.962*** 1.288*** 
Gender -0.119** -0.122** -0.108** 
Ethnicity 0.069+ 0.066 0.052 
Native Leaders 0.054* 0.059* 0.051* 
CCP Members -0.028 -0.073 -0.076 
Age -0.048*** -0.050*** -0.053*** 
Public Service Seniority -0.034*** -0.032*** -0.034*** 
Education    
Some College -- 0.162** -- 
B.A. -- 0.214*** 0.054 
M.A. -- 0.152** 0.006 
Ph.D. -- -0.008 -0.158** 
Humanities and Social Sciences -- -- 0.012 
Number of Events 5292 5292 4610 
Number of Cases 33223 33223 29473 
Log-Likelihood 26739.436 26719.196 23360.220 
Source: Author’s database. 
Note: “Male” is the reference category for gender, “ethnic minorities” for ethnicity, 
“outsiders” for native leaders and “non-CCP members” for CCP membership. In 
Model 2, “high school or below” is the reference category for education. In Model 3, 
“some college” is the reference category for education and “science and 
engineering” is the reference category for academic majors. 
*** p<0.001; ** p<0.01; * p<0.05; + p<0.055. 
 
Human capital in this thesis is evaluated along the dimensions of educational 
credentials and career experience in public service. Table 65 shows the significant 
influence of public service seniority in the political upward mobility process. 
Consistent with Hypothesis H1f, political officials with a longer tenure in public 
service are less likely to move ahead. That is to say, for every one-year increase in 
the public service seniority, there is approximately 3.4% decrease in the promotion 
chances.  
 
To look at the effects of demographic attributes, as a whole, as compared to male 
leaders, female leaders are less likely to move up a bureaucratic ladder. In terms of 
provincial origins, working experience in native provinces increases the promotion 
rates relative to serving as outsiders in other provinces. Similar to public service 
seniority, age significantly and negatively affects the promotion outcomes. Both of 
these variables are regarded as a proxy of time, which has been mentioned in 
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Chapter 3. In addition, the ethnic status and the CCP membership impose no 
significant effect on upward mobility.  
 
8.2.2 The Overall Promotion Model, Human Capital and the Historical 
Contexts 
 
Based on the overall promotion model in Section 8.2.1, Section 8.2.2 will examine its 
historical changes by dividing the event-history observations into three longitudinal 
subsets. The empirical results are illustrated in Table 66 and used for identifying 
whether Hypothesis H1b, H1e and H1f are supported regarding the significantly 
overall effect of human capital on upward mobility over time.  Concerning the effect 
of educational degrees, there is only one significant association between promotion 
and educational levels, which emerges prior to the Jiang period. That is, as compared 
to high school or below, the attainment of a bachelor’s degree accounts for a 22.1% 
increase in the promotion rate before 1990. However, there exist no marked 
variations in the promotion opportunities by comparing the attainment of high 
school or below with some college, a master’s degree and a doctorate. In the pre-
Jiang period, the rewards for education (i.e., both educational levels and specialties) 
are negligible in the promotion model where the educational level of some college is 
conceived as the reference category.  During both the Jiang period and the Hu 
period, education ceases to be a powerful predictor of the promotion chances, 
whatever reference group of educational levels is selected (i.e. high school or below 
and some college).  
 
The above empirical findings provide weak support to Hypothesis H1b. The crucial 
role of a bachelor’s degree in upward mobility is discernible in the overall model 
before 1990. However, the assumption regarding the significant effect of 
educational levels under Jiang and Hu is refuted by the above-mentioned promotion 
dynamics analyses.  
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Table 66 GEE Estimates of the Overall Promotion Model and Human Capital, by Periods, 1990-2013 
Covariates Pre-Jiang Period (Before 1990) Jiang Period (1990-2002) Hu Period (2003-2013) 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 
Intercept 0.075 0.023 0.269 1.530*** 1.512*** 1.568*** 1.933*** 1.413** 1.564*** 
Gender -0.209** -0.200* -0.230* -0.116 -0.114 -0.098 0.107 0.093 0.092 
Ethnicity 0.120* 0.114* 0.142* 0.067 0.065 0.038 -0.085 -0.091 -0.088 
Native Leaders 0.015 0.042 0.029 0.027 0.026 0.025 0.164** 0.156** 0.147** 
CCP Members -0.164 -0.161 -0.183 -0.278*** -0.273*** -0.277** -0.025 -0.066 -0.071 
Age -0.016*** -0.020*** -0.022*** -0.055*** -0.055*** -0.055*** -0.077*** -0.076*** -0.075*** 
Public Service Seniority -0.043*** -0.038*** -0.045*** -0.029*** -0.029*** -0.030*** -0.009* -0.008* -0.009* 
Education 
         Some College -- 0.102 -- -- 0.060 -- -- 0.242 -- 
B.A. -- 0.221*** 0.110 -- -0.005 -0.064 -- 0.478 0.248 
M.A. -- 0.185 0.058 -- -0.001 -0.061 -- 0.549 0.308 
Ph.D. -- 0.188 0.020 -- 0.094 0.034 -- 0.411 0.173 
Humanities and Social 
Sciences -- -- 0.068 -- -- 0.009 -- -- 0.052 
Number of Events 2419 2419 1827 2100 2100 2014 773 773 769 
Number of Cases 9345 9345 6649 13794 13794 12895 10084 10084 9929 
Log-Likelihood 10365.358 10357.199 7576.836 11017.792 11020.924 10523.653 5173.173 5173.770 5140.705 
Source: Author’s database. 
Note: “Male” is the reference category for gender, “ethnic minorities” for ethnicity, “outsiders” for native leaders and “non-CCP members” for 
CCP membership. In Model 2, 5 and 8, “high school or below” is the reference category for education. In Model 3, 6 and 9, “some college” is 
the reference category for education and “science and engineering” is the reference category for academic majors.  
*** p<0.001; ** p<0.01; * p<0.05; + p<0.055. 
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This subsection looks at the influence of specialty on promotion under different 
historical contexts. As reported in Table 66, no differences in the promotion 
opportunities are found between political officials trained in natural science and 
engineering and those majoring in humanities and social sciences. This finding denies 
Hypothesis H1e.  
 
Along with the effect of educational attainment, the statistical analysis in this 
subsection provides additional empirical evidence in support of Hypothesis H1f. 
Public service seniority is significantly and negatively associated with the promotion 
chances across three historical periods. Noteworthy is that the strength of the 
relationship between public service tenure and promotion rates decline over time. 
That is, for every one-year increase in the public service tenure, there is a 4.3% 
decrease in the promotion rate before the Jiang period, 2.9% under Jiang and 0.9% 
under Hu.  
 
In terms of the demographic attributes, four interesting findings are shown in Table 
66. First, before 1990, male leaders are positioned more advantageously to compete 
for promotion opportunities than female leaders. At the empirical level, as 
compared to male leaders, the promotion rate for female leaders decreases by 
around 20%. Second, again, for the leadership selection in the pre-Jiang era, the 
origin of ethnic minorities places the political officials at a disadvantage in the course 
of career progressions. Third, during the Hu period, the promotion rate significantly 
depends on whether political officials serve as native leaders or outsiders.  Those 
serving in their home provinces have an approximately 16.4% increase in the 
promotion rate as compared to the outsiders. Lastly, for all three historical periods, 
age is consistently regarded as a negative predictor of upward mobility. In the GEE 
analysis, the strength of the correlation between age and promotion rates is the 
strongest under Hu and the weakest before the Jiang period.  
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8.2.3 The Rank-specific Promotion Models and Human Capital 
 
Section 8.2.3 extends the overall promotion model by analyzing the effect of human 
capital at each administrative rank. Hypothesis H1c, H1e and H1f show the 
relationships between human capital and promotion across administrative ranks. 
The rank-specific logistic models are shown in Table 67. The effects of educational 
levels can be summarized into three important points. First, as compared to high 
school or below, the attainment of higher education exerts significant impacts on 
upward mobility. More importantly, these effects persist across varying 
administrative ranks. Political officials tend to be rewarded for having higher 
educational credentials in the career advancement towards most administrative 
ranks except for the provincial/ministerial level. To be specific, receiving the 
education of some college and a master’s degree is significantly and positively 
associated with the odds of being promoted to the deputy-division-head level. For 
the promotion towards the division-head level, only does the attainment of a 
master’s degree conspicuously improves the likelihood of upward mobility. 
Empirically, political officials who earn a master’s degree are 1.85 times more likely 
to get promoted. For the promotion to both the deputy-bureau/director level and 
the bureau/director level, the promotion rewards are striking for all the advanced 
educational degrees, including some college, a bachelor’s degree, a master’s degree 
and a doctorate. Besides, in the process of advancing to the vice-
provincial/ministerial level, political leaders with a doctorate is 1.67 times more 
likely to move ahead than those with high school or below. However, relative to high 
school or below, receiving the educational level of some college, a bachelor’s degree 
or a master’s degree leads to no significant variations in the promotion chances. For 
the occupational ascendency towards the vice-state-leader level, earning the 
educational degree of some college makes little difference. In sharp contrast, 
receiving the educational levels higher than some college induces a marked increase 
in the promotion rates.  
 
Second, along with the above favorable effects of education on promotion, the 
contrasting effect of educational levels occurs to the upward mobility towards the 
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provincial/ministerial level. In other words, the promotion chances are constrained 
by the attainment of a bachelor’s degree and a master’s degree relative to high 
school or below. The odds ratio of 0.615 indicates that political officials with a 
bachelor’s degree are 0.62 times less likely to obtain the high-status positions at the 
provincial/ministerial level than those with high school or below. In addition, those 
earning a master’s degree are 0.63 times less likely to get promotions.  
 
The above observations are based on the logistic regression analyses with high 
school or below as the reference group. The final point centers on the payoffs to 
educational levels relative to some college. The significant impacts of educational 
levels merely occur to the promotion towards the deputy-bureau/director level, the 
bureau/director level and the vice-provincial/ministerial level. That is, political 
officials substantially benefit from the attainment of a master’s degree and a 
doctorate in the mobility competitions. Nevertheless, at these three ranks, there is 
no variation in the promotion rate between the political officials having some college 
and those with a bachelor’s degree.  
 
To conclude, in the logistic models with high school or below as the reference 
category, educational levels play a continuing and salient role in upward mobility 
across administrative ranks. By looking into the odds ratios of all the significant 
predictions for the promotion to the same rank, the career returns to higher 
educational levels are largely greater than those to lower educational levels. The 
only exception is that the career returns to a bachelor’s degree are smaller than 
those to the educational level of some college. With some college as the reference 
group, having a master’s degree or a doctorate is strongly related to upward mobility 
from the deputy-bureau/director level to the vice-provincial/ministerial level. 
However, the role of some college is not distinct from that of a bachelor’s degree in 
affecting the promotion outcomes. Overall, all the above findings provide strong 
support to Hypothesis H1c that the significant relationship between promotion and 
educational levels holds across ranks.  
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In contrast to the effect of educational levels, as reported in Table 67, the promotion 
rate by no means relies on academic majors. Consistent with the overall promotion 
model, the rank-specific models exhibit no significant differences in promotion 
chances between political officials majoring in science and engineering and those 
studying humanities and social sciences. There is a lack of empirical evidence 
supportive of Hypothesis H1e.  
 
As another dimension of human capital, public service seniority is significantly and 
negatively related to upward mobility from the deputy-division-head level to the 
vice-provincial/ministerial level. For the promotions towards these ranks, the longer 
tenure political officials have in the party apparatus or the government 
organizations, the less likely they are to get ahead. In this regard, Hypothesis H1f 
receives limited support from the rank-specific promotion dynamics analyses in this 
subsection.  
 
Along with the above specification regarding the role of human capital, Table 67 
demonstrates the relationship between demographic characteristics and promotion. 
First, the positive relationship between age and upward mobility is statistically 
significant from the deputy-division-head level to the provincial/ministerial level. 
Second, as compared to male leaders, female leaders are more likely to climb to the 
deputy-division-head level. Notwithstanding, they are less likely to occupy the high-
status positions at the bureau/director level and the provincial/ministerial level. 
Third, the promotion rate seems to be smaller for native leaders than those serving 
outside home provinces at the vice-provincial/ministerial level and the 
provincial/ministerial level. Finally, in terms of the promotion towards the vice-state-
leader level, political leaders from ethnic minorities or those without the CCP 
membership are favored in the mobility competition. On the contrary, the CCP 
membership accrues a career advantage for advancing to the leading posts at the 
division-head level, the bureau/director level and the provincial/ministerial level.  
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Table 67 Logistic Models on Human Capital and Upward Mobility across Administrative Ranks, 1990-2013 
Covariates Deputy-Division-Head Level Division-Head Level Deputy-Bureau/Director Level 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 
Constant 0.021*** 0.022*** 0.024*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.006*** 0.004*** 0.002*** 0.003*** 
Age 1.134*** 1.121*** 1.133*** 1.101*** 1.097*** 1.094*** 1.144*** 1.141*** 1.144*** 
Gender 1.778* 1.861** 2.265** 0.997 0.980 0.930 1.127 1.144 1.177 
Ethnicity 0.979 0.989 1.085 0.948 0.934 0.987 0.895 0.880 0.993 
Native Leaders 0.898 0.940 1.051 1.163 1.161 1.149 0.836* 0.865 0.894 
CCP Members 0.921 0.893 0.777 2.573** 2.592** 2.749** 0.979 1.117 1.241 
Public Service Seniority 0.939*** 0.951*** 0.953** 0.968*** 0.973** 0.967** 0.954*** 0.965*** 0.971*** 
Education 
         Some College -- 1.744** -- -- 1.253 -- -- 1.503** -- 
B.A. -- 1.279 0.745 -- 1.080 0.878 -- 1.402** 0.915 
M.A. -- 2.440** 1.434 -- 1.850** 1.461 -- 2.491*** 1.683** 
Ph.D. -- -- -- -- 1.981 1.486 -- 5.628*** 3.962*** 
Humanities and Social 
Sciences -- -- 1.135 -- -- 1.119 -- -- 0.857 
Number of Cases 1564 1564 1038 3026 3026 2260 3943 3943 3160 
Overall Percentage 65.3 65.7 61.5 78.2 78.1 76.5 76.7 76.8 74.5 
 
(Table 67 continued) 
Covariates Bureau/Director Level Vice-Provincial/Ministerial Level Provincial/Ministerial Level 
 
Model 10 Model 11 Model 12 Model 13 Model 14 Model 15 Model 16 Model 17 Model 18 
Constant 0.000**** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 
Age 1.136*** 1.136*** 1.136*** 1.181*** 1.185*** 1.184*** 1.053*** 1.054*** 1.050*** 
Gender 0.743* 0.683** 0.663** 1.098 1.100 1.056 0.667* 0.671* 0.688 
Ethnicity 0.917 0.881 0.948 0.883 0.849 0.853 1.130 1.165 1.129 
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Native Leaders 0.930 0.942 0.949 0.833** 0.831** 0.855* 0.660*** 0.642*** 0.619*** 
CCP Members 3.054*** 3.760*** 3.839*** 0.824 0.926 0.956 4.756*** 4.797*** 4.660*** 
Public Service Seniority 0.991* 0.997 0.999 0.985*** 0.985*** 0.987** 1.010 1.008 1.008 
Education 
         Some College -- 1.581** -- -- 0.756 -- -- 0.753 -- 
B.A. -- 1.576** 1.004 -- 0.969 1.248 -- 0.615* 0.773 
M.A. -- 2.741*** 1.743*** -- 1.051 1.406** -- 0.626* 0.831 
Ph.D. -- 4.125*** 2.648*** -- 1.669** 2.226*** -- 0.635 0.820 
Humanities and Social 
Sciences -- -- 0.999 -- -- 0.884 -- -- 0.863 
Number of Cases 5854 5854 5095 7751 7751 7223 12226 12226 11530 
Overall Percentage 82.6 82.4 81.4 84.2 84.3 84.1 96.3 96.3 96.4 
 
(Table 67 continued) 
Covariates Vice-State-Leader Level 
 
Model 19 Model 20 Model 21 
Constant 0.801 0.143 0.340 
Age 0.983 0.990 0.994 
Gender 1.719 1.727 1.808 
Ethnicity 0.572 0.499* 0.404** 
Native Leaders 0.778 0.819 0.713 
CCP Members 0.121*** 0.124*** 0.129*** 
Public Service Seniority 0.992 1.000 0.995 
Education 
   Some College -- 2.251 -- 
B.A. -- 3.326+ 1.439 
M.A. -- 4.012* 1.760 
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Ph.D. -- 4.722* 2.022 
Humanities and Social 
Sciences -- -- 1.036 
Number of Cases 4386 4386 3871 
Overall Percentage 98.2 98.2 98.0 
Source: Author’s database. 
Note: “Male” is the reference category for gender, “ethnic minorities” for ethnicity, “outsiders” for native leaders and “non-CCP members” for 
CCP membership. In Model 2, 5, 8, 11, 14, 17 and 20, “high school or below” is the reference category for education. In Model 3, 6, 9, 12, 15, 
18 and 21, “some college” is the reference category for education and “science and engineering” is the reference category for academic majors.  
*** p<0.001; ** p<0.01; * p<0.05; + p<0.055. 
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8.2.4 The Rank-specific Promotion Models, Human Capital and the Historical 
Contexts 
 
This subsection gains further insights into the historical comparisons of the rank-
specific promotion dynamics. In particular, the promotion dynamics before and 
during the Jiang period could be compared on six logistic models on leadership 
promotion across administrative ranks. On this basis, it attempts to examine 
whether the promotion dynamics change over time and test Hypothesis H1d on the 
evolving role of human capital in the rank-specific promotion dynamics.  
 
Promotion dynamics before 1990. Table 68 reveals the inter-variations in the effect 
of human capital prior to the Jiang period. In terms of educational levels, as 
compared to high school or below, the effect of some college gains significance in 
the positive direction on the upward mobility towards the deputy-division-head level 
and the bureau/director level. The empirical finding in Table 68 indicates that 
political officials with some college are 1.70 times more likely to advance to the 
deputy-division-head level and 1.60 times more likely to obtain the bureau/director 
rank. For the promotion to the other ranks, having the educational level of some 
college makes no significant difference in promotion. In addition, there are no 
striking variations in the promotion dynamics between political officials with high 
school or below and those with a bachelor’s degree, a master’s degree or a 
doctorate. Furthermore, neither the specialty of natural science and engineering nor 
humanities and social sciences is the important prerequisite for leadership selection 
across administrative ranks, which is consistent with the above findings on the effect 
of academic majors. In consequence, before 1990, the investment in higher 
education does not necessarily lead to political power, high status and prestigious 
jobs in Chinese politics.  
 
Table 68 provides further empirical evidence on the effect of public service seniority 
on promotion before 1990. Likewise, the promotion rate tends to be reduced with 
the duration of career experience in public service from the deputy-division-head 
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level to the vice-provincial/ministerial level. This significant correlation disappears 
for the promotion towards the provincial/ministerial level. This finding, to a 
considerable degree, conforms to the inter-rank variations in the extent to which 
public service seniority affects upward mobility in Section 8.2.3.  
 
In terms of the demographic attributes, age imposes a consistently significant and 
positive impact on promotion across administrative ranks before the Jiang period. As 
compared to male leaders, female leaders are more likely to obtain the positions at 
the deputy-division-head level and at the vice-provincial/ministerial level. The 
significantly negative effect of gender on upward mobility is limited to political 
officials with some college or above. It is important to note that female leaders are 
0.53 times less likely to serve at the bureau/director level than male leaders. In 
terms of the political credentials, the CCP membership is rewarded in career 
advancement to the division-head level and the bureau/director level.  
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Table 68 Logistic Models on Human Capital and Upward Mobility across Administrative Ranks Prior to the Jiang Period, Before 1990 
Covariates Deputy-Division-Head Level Division-Head Level Deputy-Bureau/Director Level 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 
Constant 0.022*** 0.023*** 0.022*** 0.002*** 0.003*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 
Age 1.132*** 1.124*** 1.143*** 1.109*** 1.113*** 1.114*** 1.145*** 1.143*** 1.145*** 
Gender 1.739* 1.797* 2.178* 1.224 1.187 1.116 1.180 1.204 1.284 
Ethnicity 0.983 0.994 1.088 0.869 0.858 0.927 0.841 0.841 0.969 
Native Leaders 0.950 0.983 1.107 1.296* 1.245 1.233 0.797* 0.812 0.824 
CCP Members 0.859 0.821 0.647 3.477** 3.329** 4.245** 1.913 1.871 2.593* 
Public Service Seniority 0.935*** 0.942*** 0.938*** 0.963*** 0.960*** 0.950*** 0.938*** 0.942*** 0.946*** 
Education 
         Some College -- 1.695* -- -- 1.094 -- -- 1.221 -- 
B.A. -- 1.196 0.700 -- 0.826 0.766 -- 1.131 0.871 
M.A. -- 2.804 1.653 -- 1.682 1.467 -- 1.515 1.228 
Ph.D. -- -- -- -- 0.000 0.000 -- -- -- 
Humanities and Social 
Sciences -- -- 1.180 -- -- 1.128 -- -- 0.781 
Number of Cases 1396 1396 882 2396 2396 1666 2420 2420 1724 
Overall Percentage 66.4 66.8 63.5 81.4 81.4 80.4 79.3 79.2 75.9 
 
(Table 68 continued) 
Covariates Bureau/Director Level Vice-Provincial/Ministerial Level Provincial/Ministerial Level 
 
Model 10 Model 11 Model 12 Model 13 Model 14 Model 15 Model 16 Model 17 Model 18 
Constant 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Age 1.139*** 1.137*** 1.130*** 1.161*** 1.162*** 1.169*** 1.170*** 1.168*** 1.149*** 
Gender 0.592 0.574 0.527* 1.875* 1.884* 1.406 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Ethnicity 0.790 0.787 0.899 0.831 0.845 0.932 0.811 0.812 1.316 
 
 
314 
Native Leaders 0.888 0.892 0.890 0.743 0.735 0.816 1.031 1.054 1.142 
CCP Members 6.967** 6.733* 5.792* 1.250 1.259 1.260 -- -- -- 
Public Service Seniority 0.982** 0.985* 0.985 0.974*** 0.970*** 0.962*** 1.011 1.013 1.015 
Education 
         Some College -- 1.599* -- -- 0.796 -- -- 0.866 -- 
B.A. -- 1.276 0.788 -- 0.770 0.972 -- 1.123 1.200 
M.A. -- 1.377 0.865 -- 0.562 0.647 -- 0.762 0.731 
Ph.D. -- 0.000 0.000 -- -- -- -- 0.000 0.000 
Humanities and Social 
Sciences -- -- 0.947 -- -- 1.135 -- -- 0.862 
Number of Cases 2793 2793 2130 1891 1891 1483 1225 1225 887 
Overall Percentage 86.8 86.8 85.7 87.1 87.3 87.2 94.9 94.9 95.4 
Source: Author’s database. 
Note: “Male” is the reference category for gender, “ethnic minorities” for ethnicity, “outsiders” for native leaders and “non-CCP members” for 
CCP memership. In Model 2, 5, 8, 11, 14, 17 and 20, “high school or below” is the reference category for education. In Model 3, 6, 9, 12, 15, 18 
and 21, “some college” is the reference category for education and “science and engineering” is the reference category for academic majors. 
*** p<0.001; ** p<0.01; * p<0.05; + p<0.055. 
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Promotion dynamics under Jiang. Table 69 is concerned with the promotion 
dynamics across administrative ranks under Jiang. The way in which educational 
levels affect the promotion opportunities exhibits a striking pattern. That is to say, 
on one hand, the significant correlation merely exists in the attainment of such 
graduate education as a master’s and a doctoral degree. On the other hand, political 
officials benefit from the graduate education in the career advancement towards the 
particular ranks from the deputy-bureau/director level to the vice-
provincial/ministerial level. To be specific, as compared to high school or below, the 
promotion rate at the deputy-bureau/director level increases by over two times as a 
result of receiving a master’s degree and over six times for earning a doctorate. For 
the promotion to the bureau/director level, only obtaining a doctoral degree yields a 
discernible influence relative to high school or below. At the empirical level, the 
political officials with a doctorate are 2.01 times more likely to advance to the 
bureau/director level. As compared to the educational level of some college, there is 
no significant relationship between a bachelor’s degree and promotion across 
administrative ranks. However, the attainment of a master’s degree or a doctorate 
considerably improves the promotion chances from the deputy-bureau/director 
level to the vice-provincial/ministerial level.  
 
Along with the educational degrees obtained, undoubtedly, academic disciplines 
bear no significant relationship to upward mobility across all administrative ranks for 
political officials during the Jiang era. This data analysis result is in line with all the 
findings pertaining to the impact of specialties on promotion as analyzed before.  
 
Regarding the career history in public service, despite the significant and negative 
effect of public service seniority on promotion before 1990, a conflicting finding 
emerges in the promotion dynamics under Jiang. Interestingly, the length of time 
working in public service exerts no observable effect on the promotion chances over 
varying administrative ranks from 1990 to 2002.  
 
In terms of the demographic characteristics, four important points are worth 
mentioning here. First, age imposes a continuing and positive impact on upward 
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mobility across different administrative ranks under Jiang. The older political officials 
become, the more likely they are to receive further promotions across ranks. 
Second, as compared to male leaders, female leaders are placed disadvantageously 
in competing for the leadership positions at the division-head level and the 
bureau/director level. Third, during the Jiang period, native leaders are less likely to 
occupy the authority positions at such upper ranks as the vice-provincial/ministerial 
and the provincial/ministerial level than those serving out of home provinces. Finally, 
the CCP membership appears to be a salient predictor of upward mobility towards 
the division-head level, the bureau/director level and the provincial/ministerial level 
between 1990 and 2002. In another sense, as compared to non-CCP members, CCP 
members are more likely to be selected into the full positions instead of the deputy 
positions at the above-mentioned ranks.  
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Table 69 Logistic Models on Human Capital and Upward Mobility across Administrative Ranks during the Jiang Period, 1990-2002 
Covariates Deputy-Division-Head Level Division-Head Level Deputy-Bureau/Director Level 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 
Constant 0.000*** 0.000** 0.001** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.002*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 
Age 1.280*** 1.263*** 1.237** 1.123*** 1.122*** 1.117*** 1.162*** 1.167*** 1.164*** 
Gender 2.216 2.294 2.259 0.510* 0.505* 0.502* 0.874 0.917 0.925 
Ethnicity 1.334 1.273 1.289 1.191 1.196 1.117 1.099 1.072 1.132 
Native Leaders 0.555 0.599 0.660 0.958 0.998 0.980 0.902 0.935 0.954 
CCP Members 2.052 1.811 1.755 2.586* 2.582* 2.491* 0.671 0.771 0.786 
Public Service Seniority 1.021 1.049 1.032 0.988 0.992 0.985 0.991 1.011 1.010 
Education 
         Some College -- 0.909 -- -- 0.943 -- -- 1.637 -- 
B.A. -- 0.907 1.012 -- 1.178 1.270 -- 1.730 1.039 
M.A. -- 1.132 1.206 -- 1.032 1.079 -- 3.258*** 1.958** 
Ph.D. -- -- -- -- 1.338 1.373 -- 7.384*** 4.398*** 
Humanities and Social 
Sciences -- -- 1.088 -- -- 1.120 -- -- 0.921 
Number of Cases 168 168 156 630 630 594 1514 1514 1427 
Overall Percentage 63.1 65.5 64.7 68.9 68.4 67.7 73.4 73.6 73.2 
 
(Table 69 continued) 
Covariates Bureau/Director Level Vice-Provincial/Ministerial Level Provincial/Ministerial Level 
 
Model 10 Model 11 Model 12 Model 13 Model 14 Model 15 Model 16 Model 17 Model 18 
Constant 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
Age 1.143*** 1.152*** 1.155*** 1.185*** 1.197*** 1.189*** 1.105*** 1.104*** 1.100*** 
Gender 0.655* 0.652** 0.642** 0.839 0.871 0.867 0.626 0.612 0.551 
Ethnicity 0.971 0.932 0.959 1.005 0.980 0.948 1.213 1.212 1.093 
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Native Leaders 0.953 0.943 0.933 0.787* 0.794* 0.791* 0.612** 0.599** 0.601** 
CCP Members 3.937*** 4.405*** 4.546*** 1.263 1.373 1.399 18.848** 18.399** 18.620** 
Public Service Seniority 0.990 0.996 0.996 0.990 0.993 0.996 1.012 1.009 1.012 
Education 
         Some College -- 0.823 -- -- 0.680 -- -- 1.378 -- 
B.A. -- 0.944 1.163 -- 0.958 1.333 -- 1.063 0.713 
M.A. -- 1.381 1.687** -- 1.176 1.721** -- 1.015 0.757 
Ph.D. -- 2.091* 2.581*** -- 1.690 2.444*** -- 0.671 0.470 
Humanities and Social 
Sciences -- -- 1.048 -- -- 0.849 -- -- 0.731 
Number of Cases 2714 2714 2620 3973 3973 3857 5154 5154 4867 
Overall Percentage 79.8 79.9 79.9 85.2 85.3 85.3 96.4 96.4 96.5 
Source: Author’s database. 
Note: “Male” is the reference category for gender, “ethnic minorities” for ethnicity, “outsiders” for native leaders and “non-CCP members” for 
CCP membership. In Model 2, 5, 8, 11, 14, 17 and 20, “high school or below” is the reference category for education. In Model 3, 6, 9, 12, 15, 
18 and 21, “some college” is the reference category for education and “science and engineering” is the reference category for academic majors.  
*** p<0.001; ** p<0.01; * p<0.05; + p<0.055. 
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Promotion dynamics under Hu. As mentioned in Section 8.1.1, the promotion 
dynamics analysis during the Hu period is different from the above analyses before 
and during the Jiang period. In other words, the former is confined to the 
promotions towards the vice-provincial/ministerial level and provincial/ministerial 
level while the latter focuses on the promotion models across six ranks from the 
deputy-division-head level to the provincial/ministerial level. Table 70 presents the 
logistic models under Hu. It is important to note that neither educational levels nor 
academic majors are significantly associated with the odds of being promoted. In 
addition, when controlling for the demographic variables only, the significant 
relationship between public service seniority and promotion is found at the vice-
provincial/ministerial level. However, after holding both the demographic variables 
and education constant, the above significant relationship is lost at this rank. This 
may be explained by the potential correlation between public service seniority and 
education, which is not going to be discussed in this thesis but deserves further 
research attention in the future.  
 
With respect to the demographic attributes, the significant effect of age is observed 
in the career advancement towards the vice-provincial/ministerial level. Empirically, 
when age grows by one year, the odds ratio of promotion is 1.21 times as large. 
Regarding the influence of provincial origins, native leaders are 0.56 times less likely 
to move ahead towards the provincial/ministerial level than outsiders. Besides, as a 
proxy of political capital, the CCP membership exhibits contrasting effects on 
promotion. That is to say, as compared to non-CCP members, political officials with 
CCP membership are less likely to occupy the leading post at the vice-
provincial/ministerial level while more likely to serve at the provincial/ministerial 
level.  
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Table 70 Logistic Models on Human Capital and Upward Mobility across Administrative Ranks during the Hu Period, 2003-2013 
Covariates Vice-Provincial/Ministerial Level Provincial/Ministerial Level 
 
Model 13 Model 14 Model 15 Model 16 Model 17 Model 18 
Constant 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.004*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 
Age 1.207*** 1.213*** 1.211*** 1.020 1.028 1.028 
Gender 1.199 1.200 1.248 0.909 0.914 0.912 
Ethnicity 0.746 0.731 0.715 1.100 1.110 1.122 
Native Leaders 0.930 0.949 0.959 0.565*** 0.564*** 0.557*** 
CCP Members 0.414*** 0.481** 0.526** 2.767** 2.761** 2.636* 
Public Service Seniority 0.984* 0.985 0.987 1.010 1.010 1.011 
Education 
      Some College -- 0.575 -- -- 0.937 -- 
B.A. -- 0.322 0.535 -- 0.914 0.973 
M.A. -- 0.283 0.490 -- 1.182 1.260 
Ph.D. -- 0.449 0.767 -- 1.115 1.187 
Humanities and Social Sciences -- -- 0.786 -- -- 1.003 
Number of Cases 1887 1887 1883 5847 5847 5776 
Overall Percentage 79.8 79.7 80.0 96.4 96.4 96.4 
Source: Author’s database. 
Note: “Male” is the reference category for gender, “ethnic minorities” for ethnicity, “outsiders” for native leaders and “non-CCP members” for 
CCP membership. In Model 2, 5, 8, 11, 14, 17 and 20, “high school or below” is the reference category for education. In Model 3, 6, 9, 12, 15, 
18 and 21, “some college” is the reference category for education and “science and engineering” is the reference category for academic majors.  
*** p<0.001; ** p<0.01; * p<0.05; + p<0.055. 
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To summarize, the above robust findings permit the conclusions as to the historical 
changes in how the attainment of educational levels contributes to promotion. This 
lends substantial support to Hypothesis H1d. First, the investment in the educational 
degree of some college is necessary and fundamental before the Jiang period. This is 
evidenced by the significantly positive impact of some college on upward mobility 
towards to the deputy-division-head level and the bureau/director level as 
compared to high school or below. However, aside from this significant relationship, 
there exists no discernible variation in the promotion chances for political officials 
receiving a bachelor’s degree, a master’s degree and a doctorate relative to those 
without college education. In addition, all these advanced educational degrees fail to 
reach significance for the promotions across administrative ranks as compared to 
some college. Before the Jiang period, the improvement of educational levels does 
not necessarily result in the better promotion opportunities in the mobility 
competition.  
 
Second, graduate education plays a decisive role in leadership selection during the 
Jiang period. One of the most important findings is that the attainment of a master’s 
degree or a doctorate significantly improves the likelihood of being selected into the 
leadership positions from the deputy-bureau/director level to the vice-
provincial/ministerial level as compared to some college. Moreover, political officials 
with a master’s or a doctoral degree have a higher promotion probability to the 
deputy-bureau/director level than those with high school or below. For advancing to 
the bureau/director level, a doctorate significantly yields a better career return than 
high school or below.  
 
Finally, concerning the promotion dynamics towards the vice-provincial/ministerial 
level and the provincial/ministerial level over time, the dependence of upward 
mobility on educational levels is negligible before the Jiang period and in the Hu era. 
During the Jiang period, there exists the only significant relationship between 
educational levels and promotion. That is, for the promotion towards the vice-
provincial/ministerial level, political officials with a master’s or a doctoral degree are 
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more likely to get ahead than those with some college. Nonetheless, the 
improvement of educational levels still makes little difference in the promotion 
chances at the provincial/ministerial level under Jiang.  
 
8.2.5 Summary 
 
The preceding subsections have examined the promotion-human capital linkages in 
the Chinese context. As to the impact of educational levels, Section 8.2.1 has 
developed the overall promotion model by pooling all the event-history observations 
together. This model ignores the particular administrative ranks where promotion 
events occur.  Based on the overall model, the career rewards for higher education 
against high school or below have been well observable except for having a 
doctorate. As compared to some college, interestingly, there is an apparent 
reduction in the promotion rate due to receiving a doctorate.  
 
In Section 8.2.2, classifying all the event-history observations into three historical 
periods allows a closer look at the historical evolution of the overall promotion 
models. The results show the positive effect of educational levels on upward 
mobility prior to the Jiang period only. What should be emphasized is that this effect 
is restricted to the attainment of a bachelor’s degree relative to high school or below. 
From a longitudinal perspective, the significant influence of education fails to hold 
during the Jiang period and the Hu period.    
 
Section 8.2.3 specifies the rank-specific promotion models. The way in which 
educational levels contribute to promotion differs in accordance with the selection 
of the reference category. As compared to high school or below, the leadership 
upward mobility depends heavily on the improvement of educational levels across 
all administrative ranks. However, as compared to some college, the significant 
correlation arises at the middle ranks from the deputy-bureau/director level to the 
vice-provincial/ministerial levels.  
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Section 8.2.4 puts the rank-specific promotion models in a historical perspective. 
Apparently, the role of educational levels in leadership upward mobility evolves over 
time. On one hand, the above promotion dynamics analyses arrive at distinctive 
conclusions as to whether educational levels affect promotion outcomes. For 
example, before 1990, having the educational level of some college leads to a 
significant increase in the promotion rate as compared to high school or below. By 
comparison, graduation education (i.e., a master’s degree and a doctorate) imposes 
a positive impact on upward mobility under Jiang relative to some college. During 
the Hu period, education no longer functions as a reliable predictor of promotions to 
the particular administrative ranks under study. On the other hand, the above 
historical comparisons of promotion models present somewhat different empirical 
findings regarding at which administrative rank the educational effect reaches 
statistical significance. For example, before 1990, the pivotal role of educational 
levels is found for the promotion at such a lower rank as the deputy-division-head 
level and such a middle rank as the bureau/director level. During the Jiang period, 
the attainment of higher educational degrees appears to be an important asset for 
upward mobility towards the middle ranks from the deputy-bureau/director level to 
the vice-provincial/ministerial level.  
 
In addition to educational levels, the foregoing promotion analyses pertaining to 
human capital shed important light on the impacts of academic majors and public 
service seniority. In all the promotion analyses in Section 8.2, political officials 
studying science and engineering are consistently not distinguished from those 
trained in humanities and social sciences. With respect to public service seniority, in 
most instances, it is negatively correlated to upward mobility. Exceptionally, the lack 
of the significant effect is observed for the promotions to the provincial/ministerial 
level and the vice-state-leader level in the rank-specific promotion analyses coupled 
with the promotion to the provincial/ministerial level before 1990 and all the 
promotion models across ranks under both Jiang and Hu.  
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8.3 Promotion Models and Social Capital 
 
In parallel to the human capital-oriented promotion models in Section 8.2, the 
research interest in Section 8.3 will be directed towards the association between 
social capital and upward mobility. The analytic strategies in this section are similar 
to the four-step analyses in Section 8.2. What is distinct from the promotion 
dynamics analyses in relation to human capital is that the predictors of interest (i.e., 
three measures of social capital) are continuous variables. Thus, the issue of 
selecting the reference category no longer arises in the social capital-oriented 
promotion models. In addition, the effects of a very small number of demographic 
variables change after the measures of human capital or social capital enter the 
promotion models. Section 8.2 has already provided the interesting findings 
concerning the effects of leadership demographic attributes. Therefore, Section 8.3 
restricts the empirical analyses to the role of social capital only.  
 
8.3.1 The Overall Promotion Model and Social Capital 
 
Hypothesis H2a depicts the association of social capital with promotion outcomes. 
Table 71 shows the overall promotion model by analyzing the role of social capital in 
the process of leadership selection as a whole. In brief, all three parameters of social 
capital are significantly correlated to upward mobility. To be specific, the predictors 
of network size and upper reachability exhibit a significantly positive impact on 
upward mobility whereas the variable of network diversity is significantly and 
negatively associated with career advancement. At the empirical level, for every 
one-point increase in the network size, the promotion rate increases by 2.5%. When 
the upper reachability is raised by one unit (one level), there is a 19.3% increase in 
the promotion probability. By comparison, the promotion rate declines by 4.3% for 
every additional point on network diversity (one category of career pattern). The 
statistical summary in Table 71 lends strong support to Hypothesis H2a.  
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The following subsections will perform dynamic analyses with respect to the 
relationship between social capital and promotion. After presenting all the pertinent 
empirical findings, the concluding chapter will attempt to interpret the promotion 
models related to both human capital and social capital and give possible 
explanations behind these results.  
 
Table 71 GEE Estimates of the Overall Promotion Model and Social Capital, 1990-
2013 
Covariates Model 1 Model 2 
Intercept 1.011*** 0.555*** 
Gender -0.119** -0.123* 
Ethnicity 0.069+ 0.070 
Native Leaders 0.054* 0.096** 
CCP Members -0.028 -0.097 
Age -0.048*** -0.077*** 
Public Service Seniority -0.034*** -0.036*** 
Social Capital 
  Network Size -- 0.025*** 
Network Diversity -- -0.043*** 
Upper Reachability -- 0.193*** 
Number of Events 5292 5292 
Number of Cases 33223 33223 
Log-Likelihood 26739.436 26540.244 
Source: Author’s database. 
Note: “Male” is the reference category for gender, “ethnic minorities” for ethnicity, 
“outsiders” for native leaders and “non-CCP members” for CCP membership. 
*** p<0.001; ** p<0.01; * p<0.05; + p<0.055. 
 
8.3.2 The Overall Promotion Model, Social Capital and the Historical 
Contexts 
 
Hypothesis H2b is related to the historical evolution of the overall effect of social 
capital on political upward mobility. Table 72 develops a historical account of the 
role of social capital in the overall promotion model. Social capital yields somewhat 
different patterns for the promotion dynamics across three historical periods, which 
could be summarized into three points. First, with regard to network size, the 
significantly positive relationships are observed during the Jiang period and the Hu 
period. The predictor of network size imposes a more pronounced effect on upward 
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mobility under Hu than that under Jiang. In other words, when network size is 
expanded by one point, the promotion probability increases by 2.7% under Jiang and 
6.0% under Hu.  
 
Second, it is only during the Jiang period that network diversity reaches statistical 
significance in the promotion analysis. This significant relationship tends to be 
negative, indicating that the promotion possibilities are hindered by the expansion 
of network diversity. Political officials working in a wide range of career patterns are 
less likely to get promoted during the Jiang era. The specific empirical finding in 
Table 72 shows that the corresponding promotion rate declines by 4.7% for every 
one-point increase in network diversity.  
 
Finally, considering the continuing significant effects across three historical periods, 
the variable of upper reachability seems to be a robust predictor. By quantifying the 
magnitude of historical differences, it is straightforward that the effect of upper 
reachability increases over time. Specifically, every one-point increase in upper 
reachability results in an 8.1% increase in the odds of promotion before the Jiang 
period, 32.1% under Jiang and 62.5% under Hu.  
 
One apparent conclusion could be derived from the above historical comparisons 
regarding the effect of social capital on political career advancement. That is to say, 
the marked influence of social capital persists in the promotion dynamics across 
three historical periods, which strongly supports Hypothesis H2b. However, it is 
critical to note that three measures of social capital are weighed differently from a 
historical point of view.  
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Table 72 GEE Estimates of the Overall Promotion Model and Social Capital, by Periods, 1990-2013 
Covariates Pre-Jiang Period (Before 1990) Jiang Period (1990-2002) Hu Period (2003-2013) 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Intercept 0.075 -0.035 1.530*** 0.515** 1.933*** -2.876*** 
Gender -0.209** -0.234** -0.116 -0.067 0.107 0.164 
Ethnicity 0.120* 0.133* 0.067 0.047 -0.085 -0.102 
Native Leaders 0.015 0.022 0.027 0.110* 0.164** 0.364*** 
CCP Members -0.164 -0.231 -0.278*** -0.425*** -0.025 -0.149 
Age -0.016*** -0.030*** -0.055*** -0.098*** -0.077*** -0.122*** 
Public Service Seniority -0.043*** -0.044*** -0.029*** -0.033*** -0.009* -0.013** 
Social Capital 
      Network Size -- 0.012 -- 0.027*** -- 0.060*** 
Network Diversity -- -0.008 -- -0.047** -- -0.028 
Upper Reachability -- 0.081*** -- 0.321*** -- 0.625*** 
Number of Events 2419 2419 2100 2100 773 773 
Number of Cases 9345 9345 13794 13794 10084 10084 
Log-Likelihood 10365.358 10352.126 11017.792 10855.441 5173.173 5006.785 
Source: Author’s database. 
Note: “Male” is the reference category for gender, “ethnic minorities” for ethnicity, “outsiders” for native leaders and “non-CCP members” for 
CCP membership. 
*** p<0.001; ** p<0.01; * p<0.05; + p<0.055. 
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8.3.3 The Rank-specific Promotion Models and Social Capital 
 
Section 8.3.3 delineates the effects of social capital on promotion across 
administrative ranks and tests Hypothesis H2c as to how the career rewards for 
social capital change in the rank-specific promotion dynamics. The major empirical 
findings from Table 73 allow the conclusion regarding the importance of social 
capital in the determination of upward mobility across administrative ranks. The only 
exception is that social capital imposes no significant effect on the promotion to the 
vice-provincial/ministerial level, which weakens Hypothesis H2c. In the following 
paragraphs, this subsection looks into the specific statistical results.  
 
In terms of network size, political officials, for the most part, benefit conspicuously 
from expanding their social networks in advancing political careers across 
administrative ranks. The only exception is that network size imposes no significant 
effect on the promotion to the vice-provincial/ministerial level. With regard to 
network diversity, only does the career advancement towards the deputy-
bureau/director level depend on how many patterns of career experience political 
officials have. Empirically, when network diversity increases by one point, political 
officials are 82.2% as likely to get ahead. As to upper reachability, as mentioned in 
Chapter 6, the highest rank accessible is the state-leader level for political officials 
staying at the vice-provincial/ministerial level or above. Thus, in the rank-specific 
promotion analyses, the study of the relationship between upper reachability and 
promotion is limited to the promotions towards the bureau/director level or below. 
For all the promotions from the deputy-division-head level to the bureau/director 
level, the effect of upper reachability, without exception, reaches statistical 
significance in the positive direction. Political officials are positioned advantageously 
in the race for promotion if they are able to access to the high-status political leaders 
as secretaries. The higher-status leaders the political officials can develop work 
interactions with, the more likely they are to move ahead. Based on the above 
important results, Hypothesis H2c is moderately supported.  
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Another finding worth noting here is that the effects of social capital seem to be 
stronger on the promotion to the deputy positions than to the full positions one 
level higher. At the empirical level, for every one-point increase in network size, the 
promotion rate increases by 14.1% towards the deputy-division-head level whereas 
11.0% towards the division-head level. The corresponding figures are 13.6% towards 
the deputy-bureau/director level and 6.7% towards the bureau/director level. 
Regarding upper reachability, if the highest possible administrative rank accessible 
increases by one hierarchical level, political officials are 5.93 times more likely to 
advance to the deputy-division-head level whereas 1.25 times to the division-head 
level. They are 14.56 times more likely to assume the leadership positions at the 
deputy-bureau/director level while 1.96 times at the bureau/director level.  
 
 
 
330 
Table 73 Logistic Models on Social Capital and Upward Mobility across Administrative Ranks, 1990-2013 
Covariates Deputy-Division-Head Level Division-Head Level Deputy-Bureau/Director Level Bureau/Director Level 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
Constant 0.021*** 0.000*** 0.005*** 0.001*** 0.004*** 0.000*** 0.000**** 0.000*** 
Age 1.134*** 1.064** 1.101*** 1.088*** 1.144*** 1.128*** 1.136*** 1.124*** 
Gender 1.778* 2.654** 0.997 0.995 1.127 2.575*** 0.743* 0.762* 
Ethnicity 0.979 0.637* 0.948 0.837 0.895 0.448*** 0.917 0.889 
Native Leaders 0.898 1.120 1.163 1.142 0.836* 1.463** 0.930 0.947 
CCP Members 0.921 0.483 2.573** 1.999* 0.979 0.574 3.054*** 2.654*** 
Public Service Seniority 0.939*** 0.926*** 0.968*** 0.955*** 0.954*** 0.937*** 0.991* 0.981*** 
Social Capital 
        Network Size -- 1.141** -- 1.110*** -- 1.136*** -- 1.067*** 
Network Diversity -- 0.957 -- 1.023 -- 0.822** -- 1.048 
Upper Reachability -- 5.930*** -- 1.245*** -- 14.562*** -- 1.956*** 
Number of Cases 1564 1564 3026 3026 3943 3943 5854 5854 
Overall Percentage 65.3 92.7 78.2 78.3 76.7 93.1 82.6 82.6 
 
(Table 73 continued) 
Covariates Vice-Provincial/Ministerial Level Provincial/Ministerial Level Vice-State-Leader Level 
 
Model 9 Model 10 Model 11 Model 12 Model 13 Model 14 
Constant 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000 0.801 0.288 
Age 1.181*** 1.075*** 1.053*** 1.046*** 0.983 0.977 
Gender 1.098 0.771 0.667* 0.804 1.719 2.362* 
Ethnicity 0.883 0.809 1.130 0.958 0.572 0.473* 
Native Leaders 0.833** 1.559** 0.660*** 0.691** 0.778 0.899 
CCP Members 0.824 0.204*** 4.756*** 2.671** 0.121*** 0.080*** 
Public Service Seniority 0.985*** 0.978* 1.010 0.989+ 0.992 0.976* 
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Social Capital 
      Network Size -- 1.051 -- 1.171*** -- 1.128*** 
Network Diversity -- 1.035 -- 0.956 -- 1.019 
Upper Reachability -- -- -- -- -- -- 
Number of Cases 7751 7751 12226 12226 4386 4386 
Overall Percentage 84.2 97.0 96.3 96.3 98.2 98.2 
Source: Author’s database. 
Note: “Male” is the reference category for gender, “ethnic minorities” for ethnicity, “outsiders” for native leaders and “non-CCP members” for 
CCP membership. 
*** p<0.001; ** p<0.01; * p<0.05; + p<0.055. 
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8.3.4 The Rank-specific Promotion Models, Social Capital and the Historical 
Contexts 
 
Section 8.3.4 is interested in comparing the occupational returns to social capital in 
the rank-specific promotion dynamics across three historical periods. Consistent with 
the historical comparisons of the promotion dynamics in Section 8.2.4, the 
administrative ranks of interest extend from the deputy-division-head level to the 
provincial/ministerial level in this subsection. The findings in this section are shown 
for testing Hypothesis H2d on comparing the role of social capital in the ran-specific 
promotion dynamics from a longitudinal perspective.  
 
Promotion dynamics before 1990. Table 74 summarizes the promotion dynamics 
before the Jiang period. One conclusion is drawn from the empirical findings in Table 
74. That is, upward mobility is significantly related to at least one of three 
parameters of social capital across most administrative ranks. However, the 
dependency of promotion on social capital is negligible towards the vice-
provincial/ministerial level.  
 
As shown in Table 74, empirically, a one-point increase in network size strikingly 
improves the promotion rate by approximately 14% for the promotions to the 
deputy-division-head level and to the division-head level. The corresponding figure is 
20% for the occupational ascendency to the deputy-bureau/director level and 9.7% 
to the provincial/ministerial level. Nevertheless, the significant linkage of promotion 
to social capital is reduced to the non-significant level for upward mobility towards 
the bureau/director level and the vice-provincial/ministerial level.  
 
In terms of network diversity, it functions as a powerful predictor of upward mobility 
towards the deputy-bureau/director level before 1990. For every one-point increase 
in network size, political officials are 82.4% as likely to get ahead. Regarding the 
promotions to the other ranks, network diversity is unrelated to the odds of upward 
mobility. Despite statistical non-significance, according to the logistic coefficients, 
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network diversity yields a positive effect on the promotions to the full positions and 
a negative effect to the deputy positions.  
 
Alongside network size and network diversity, before the Jiang period, upper 
reachability is significantly and negatively related to upward mobility from the 
deputy-division-head level to the bureau/director level. However, noteworthy is the 
distinction in the strength of the relationship between promotion and upper 
reachability between ranks. To be specific, the social contacts with the higher-status 
political leaders are more likely to foster the political upward mobility towards the 
deputy positions than to the full positions at the adjacent higher levels. For example, 
for every one-point increase in the highest rank accessible, political officials are 5.62 
times more likely to obtain the posts at the deputy-division-head level whereas 
merely 1.25 times more likely to move ahead towards the division-head level.  
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Table 74 Logistic Models on Social Capital and Upward Mobility across Administrative Ranks Prior to the Jiang Period, Before 1990 
Covariates Deputy-Division-Head Level Division-Head Level Deputy-Bureau/Director Level Bureau/Director Level 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
Constant 0.022*** 0.000*** 0.002*** 0.000*** 0.002*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
Age 1.132*** 1.067** 1.109*** 1.095*** 1.145*** 1.146*** 1.139*** 1.128*** 
Gender 1.739* 2.650** 1.224 1.218 1.180 3.157* 0.592 0.590 
Ethnicity 0.983 0.598* 0.869 0.700* 0.841 0.263*** 0.790 0.796 
Native Leaders 0.950 1.168 1.296* 1.202 0.797* 0.999 0.888 0.912 
CCP Members 0.859 0.448 3.477** 2.640* 1.913 0.704 6.967** 6.439* 
Public Service Seniority 0.935*** 0.920*** 0.963*** 0.943*** 0.938*** 0.899*** 0.982** 0.977** 
Social Capital 
        Network Size -- 1.144** -- 1.142*** -- 1.200*** -- 1.029 
Network Diversity -- 0.976 -- 1.072 -- 0.824* -- 1.058 
Upper Reachability -- 5.618*** -- 1.254** -- 20.068*** -- 2.386*** 
Number of Cases 1396 1396 2396 2396 2420 2420 2793 2793 
Overall Percentage 66.4 92.3 81.4 81.3 79.3 93.6 86.8 87.0 
 
(Table 74 continued) 
Covariates Vice-Provincial/Ministerial Level Provincial/Ministerial Level 
 
Model 9 Model 10 Model 11 Model 12 
Constant 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000 0.000 
Age 1.161*** 1.044 1.170*** 1.120** 
Gender 1.875* 0.504 0.000 0.000 
Ethnicity 0.831 0.495 0.811 0.801 
Native Leaders 0.743 0.466* 1.031 0.858 
CCP Members 1.250 0.321 -- -- 
Public Service Seniority 0.974*** 0.999 1.011 0.989 
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Social Capital 
    Network Size -- 1.013 -- 1.097* 
Network Diversity -- 0.909 -- 1.091 
Upper Reachability -- -- -- -- 
Number of Cases 1891 1891 1225 1225 
Overall Percentage 87.1 96.3 94.9 94.7 
Source: Author’s database. 
Note: “Male” is the reference category for gender, “ethnic minorities” for ethnicity, “outsiders” for native leaders and “non-CCP members” for 
CCP membership. 
*** p<0.001; ** p<0.01; * p<0.05; + p<0.055. 
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Promotion dynamics under Jiang. Table 75 is concerned with how social capital 
affects upward mobility during the Jiang period. As to the occupational attainment at 
the division-head level and the vice-provincial/ministerial level, none of three 
parameters of social capital displays significant linkages. In sharp contrast, social 
capital plays a crucial role in the promotions across the other administrative ranks. In 
the following, the major findings regarding the discernible effects of social capital 
are summarized in three respects.  
 
First, network size makes a marginal contribution to career advancement at the 
middle and higher ranks, namely the promotions towards the deputy-
bureau/director level, the bureau/director level and the provincial/ministerial level. 
If network size is raised by one point, the increase in the promotion rate at the 
above-mentioned ranks fluctuates between 10.8% and 18.1%.  
 
Second, the way in which network diversity affects upward mobility under Jiang is 
similar to that prior to the Jiang period. Consistently, it is at the deputy-
bureau/director level that political officials with diverse social networks are less 
likely to obtain leadership positions. Consider the non-significant effect of network 
diversity on the promotions to the other administrative ranks. The effect of network 
diversity seems to be positive on the upward mobility to the full positions at the 
lower and middle ranks while negative on the career advancement to the deputy 
positions. However, diverse social networks impose a positive, but not statistically 
significant impact on the promotion to the vice-provincial/ministerial level whereas 
exert a negative effect on the upward mobility to the provincial/ministerial level.  
 
Finally, similar to the promotion dynamics prior to the Jiang era, upper reachability 
yields a continuing and strong effect during the Jiang period on the career 
advancement to the deputy-division-head level, the deputy-bureau/director level 
and the bureau/director level. Typically, for every one-point increase in upper 
reachability, political officials are 9.61 times more likely to be recruited to the 
deputy-division-head level and 11.03 times to the deputy-bureau/director level. In 
this regard, the career achievement at the lower and middle ranks during the Jiang 
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period is considerably determined by the accessibility of the highest possible 
administrative ranks. 
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Table 75 Logistic Models on Social Capital and Upward Mobility across Administrative Ranks during the Jiang Period, 1990-2002 
Covariates Deputy-Division-Head Level Division-Head Level Deputy-Bureau/Director Level Bureau/Director Level 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
Constant 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.004*** 0.003*** 0.002*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
Age 1.280*** 1.085 1.123*** 1.111*** 1.162*** 1.131*** 1.143*** 1.130*** 
Gender 2.216 2.745 0.510* 0.502* 0.874 1.950* 0.655* 0.693* 
Ethnicity 1.334 2.077 1.191 1.210 1.099 0.830 0.971 0.906 
Native Leaders 0.555 0.865 0.958 0.994 0.902 2.115*** 0.953 0.917 
CCP Members 2.052 1.114 2.586* 2.216 0.671 0.394+ 3.937*** 2.868*** 
Public Service Seniority 1.021 0.999 0.988 0.987 0.991 0.997 0.990 0.983* 
Social Capital 
        Network Size -- 1.406 -- 1.046 -- 1.108* -- 1.129*** 
Network Diversity -- 0.959 -- 1.015 -- 0.832* -- 1.014 
Upper Reachability -- 9.613*** -- 1.082 -- 11.030*** -- 1.519** 
Number of Cases 168 168 630 630 1514 1514 2714 2714 
Overall Percentage 63.1 95.2 68.9 67.6 73.4 91.9 79.8 80.2 
 
(Table 75 continued) 
Covariates Vice-Provincial/Ministerial Level Provincial/Ministerial Level 
 
Model 9 Model 10 Model 11 Model 12 
Constant 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000 
Age 1.185*** 1.042+ 1.105*** 1.092*** 
Gender 0.839 0.942 0.626 0.824 
Ethnicity 1.005 0.897 1.213 0.946 
Native Leaders 0.787* 2.076** 0.612** 0.586** 
CCP Members 1.263 0.200* 18.848** 11.193* 
Public Service Seniority 0.990 0.971* 1.012 0.992 
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Social Capital 
    Network Size -- 1.032 -- 1.181*** 
Network Diversity -- 1.122 -- 0.944 
Upper Reachability -- -- -- -- 
Number of Cases 3973 3973 5154 5154 
Overall Percentage 85.2 97.0 96.4 96.4 
Source: Author’s database. 
Note: “Male” is the reference category for gender, “ethnic minorities” for ethnicity, “outsiders” for native leaders and “non-CCP members” for 
CCP membership. 
*** p<0.001; ** p<0.01; * p<0.05; + p<0.055. 
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Promotion dynamics under Hu. The study of the promotion dynamics under Hu 
focuses on such higher administrative ranks as the bureau/director level or above. 
The social capital measures of interest are primarily network size and network 
diversity in the promotion analyses during the Hu period.  
 
As reflected in Table 76, network size turns out to be the only reliable predictor of 
promotion, rather than network diversity. Specifically, if network size is expanded by 
one point, there is a 17.1% increase in the promotion rate to the 
provincial/ministerial level. Along with network size, the correlation between 
upward mobility and network diversity fails to reach statistical significance at the 
administrative ranks in question. 
 
In summary, the above historical comparisons demonstrate the continuities and 
changes in the career returns to social capital. They reveal the historical persistence 
in the occupational rewards for social capital on one hand and the absence of the 
effect of social capital on the promotions to specific administrative ranks on the 
other. Given both, Hypothesis H2d ultimately receives moderate empirical 
confirmation. Specifically, considering the continuities, for the most part, social 
capital is consistently responsible for political upward mobility over time. First, both 
network size and upper reachability are considered as salient determinants in the 
promotion models before and during the Jiang era. Their pronounced effects have 
been found repeatedly on the career advancement to most administrative ranks. 
Second, diverse social networks place political officials at a marked disadvantage in 
the race for promotion to the deputy-bureau/director level before and during the 
Jiang period. Finally, none of the social capital measures is significantly correlated to 
the promotion towards the vice-provincial/ministerial level over all three historical 
periods. 
 
In addition, the minor differences in the career rewards for social capital are 
observed. For example, the role of social capital is ignored in the upward mobility to 
the division-head level during the Jiang period. The promotion to the 
bureau/director level can be attributed to network size during the Jiang period 
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rather than before 1990. Besides, upper reachability is significantly and positively 
related to the occupational ascendency to the division-head level before the Jiang 
era rather than during the Jiang period.  
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Table 76 Logistic Models on Social Capital and Upward Mobility across Administrative Ranks during the Hu Period, 2003-2013 
Covariates Vice-Provincial/Ministerial Level Provincial/Ministerial Level 
 
Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Constant 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.004*** 0.000 
Age 1.207*** 1.330*** 1.020 1.021 
Gender 1.199 0.361* 0.909 1.062 
Ethnicity 0.746 1.779 1.100 0.992 
Native Leaders 0.930 7.632*** 0.565*** 0.634** 
CCP Members 0.414*** 0.203 2.767** 1.354 
Public Service Seniority 0.984* 0.906** 1.010 0.995 
Social Capital 
    Network Size -- 1.047 -- 1.171*** 
Network Diversity -- 0.959 -- 0.993 
Upper Reachability -- -- -- -- 
Number of Cases 1887 1887 5847 5847 
Overall Percentage 79.8 98.0 96.4 96.4 
Source: Author’s database. 
Note: “Male” is the reference category for gender, “ethnic minorities” for ethnicity, “outsiders” for native leaders and “non-CCP members” for 
CCP membership. 
*** p<0.001; ** p<0.01; * p<0.05; + p<0.055. 
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8.3.5 Summary 
 
Section 8.3 has already formulated the impacts of social capital in the promotion 
determination models. With the minor exceptions, the empirical results provide 
strong supporting evidence to the social capital-related hypotheses. In terms of the 
overall promotion model in Section 8.3.1, both network size and upper reachability 
are transformed into the career advantage and remarkably increase the promotion 
rates. However, diverse social networks yield a reverse effect on political upward 
mobility. Among these three social capital measures, the reliance of promotion on 
the highest reachable administrative rank is the most pronounced.  
 
Section 8.3.2 has examined the historical trend of the overall promotion dynamics. 
There is little doubt that the importance of social capital persists across three 
historical periods. Before the Jiang period, the significantly positive correlation 
between promotion and upper reachability becomes apparent. During the Jiang 
period, upward mobility conspicuously depends on all the social capital measures. 
For the promotion dynamics under Hu, the predictors of network size and upper 
reachability contribute to the career success in the mobility competition.  
 
In Section 8.3.3, the strong linkage between upward mobility and social capital has 
been consistently recognized across most administrative ranks. Concerning the role 
of specific social capital measures, network size yields a continuing and positive 
effect on the elite status attainment across ranks except for the vice-
provincial/ministerial level. This means that political officials benefit from frequent 
job mobility across occupations, organizations or localities. In terms of network 
diversity, the significant correlation is confined to the career advancement to the 
deputy-bureau/director level. Those working in a broad variety of career patterns 
are less likely to obtain the leadership positions at this rank. The study of upper 
reachability draws a conclusion that the accessibility of social ties with higher status 
and prestige generates better career returns in the political upward mobility from 
the deputy-division-head level to the bureau/director level.  
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Section 8.3.4 has turned to a comparative analysis of the promotion dynamics across 
historical periods. The similar patterns are observed regarding how social capital 
affects upward mobility across administrative ranks over time.  
 
8.4 Conclusion 
 
This chapter has developed the promotion models by analyzing how human capital 
or social capital affects political upward mobility. The analyses pertaining to human 
capital and social capital are performed separately. The analytic strategies for 
examining the relationship between promotion and either capital strictly conform to 
the four-step data analyses. GEE is employed in the former two steps and logistic 
regressions in the latter two steps. The major empirical findings in this chapter are 
summarized in Table 77 and 78. The following paragraphs will overview the overall 
promotion model and the rank-specific promotion dynamics and provide further 
clarifications to interpret the results. Furthermore, although there is no enough 
space to explore how human capital and social capital are interplayed in the 
leadership promotion dynamics in this thesis, this section will be closed by providing 
very tentative findings by considering both human capital and social capital in the 
same promotion model in Table 79 and Table 80.  
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Table 77 Summary of the Effects of Human Capital on the Promotion Models for Chinese Provincial Leaders, 1990-2013 
 
Some 
College B.A. M.A. Ph.D. Major 
Public Service 
Seniority 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
GEE 
         Overall 0.162** 0.214*** 
 
0.152** 
  
-0.158** 
 
-0.034*** 
Pre-Jiang Period 
 
0.221*** 
      
-0.043*** 
Jiang Period 
        
-0.029*** 
Hu Period 
        
-0.009* 
  
Logistic Regression 
        Deputy-Division-Head  1.744** 
  
2.440** 
    
0.939*** 
Division-Head  
   
1.850** 
    
0.968*** 
Deputy-Bureau/Director  1.503** 1.402** 
 
2.491*** 1.683** 5.628*** 3.962*** 
 
0.954*** 
Bureau/Director 1.581** 1.576** 
 
2.741*** 1.743*** 4.125*** 2.648*** 
 
0.991* 
Vice-Provincial/Ministerial 
    
1.406** 1.669** 2.226*** 
 
0.985*** 
Provincial/Ministerial 
 
0.615* 
 
0.626* 
     Vice-State-Leader 
 
3.326+ 
 
4.012* 
 
4.722* 
       
Pre-Jiang Period 
         Deputy-Division-Head  1.695* 
       
0.935*** 
Division-Head  
        
0.963*** 
Deputy-Bureau/Director  
        
0.938*** 
Bureau/Director 1.599* 
       
0.982** 
Vice-Provincial/Ministerial 
        
0.974*** 
Provincial/Ministerial 
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Jiang Period 
         Deputy-Division-Head  
         Division-Head  
         Deputy-Bureau/Director  
   
3.258*** 1.958** 7.384*** 4.398*** 
  Bureau/Director 
    
1.687** 2.091* 2.581*** 
  Vice-Provincial/Ministerial 
    
1.721** 
 
2.444*** 
  Provincial/Ministerial 
          
Hu Period 
         Vice-Provincial/Ministerial 
        
0.984* 
Provincial/Ministerial 
         Source: Author’s database. 
Note: In Column 1, 2, 4, 6, the effect of educational levels is compared against the reference category of high school or below. In Column 3, 5,7, 
the effect of educational levels is compared against the reference category of some college.  
 
Table 78 Summary of the Effects of Social Capital on the Promotion Models for Chinese Provincial Leaders, 1990-2013 
 Network Size Network Diversity Upper Reachability 
 
10 11 13 
GEE 
   Overall 0.025*** -0.043*** 0.193*** 
Pre-Jiang Period 
  
0.081*** 
Jiang Period 0.027*** -0.047** 0.321*** 
Hu Period 0.060*** 
 
0.625*** 
  
Logistic Regression 
  Deputy-Division-Head  1.141** 
 
5.930*** 
Division-Head  1.110*** 
 
1.245*** 
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Deputy-Bureau/Director  1.136*** 0.822** 14.562*** 
Bureau/Director 1.067*** 
 
1.956*** 
Vice-Provincial/Ministerial 
   Provincial/Ministerial 1.171*** 
  Vice-State-Leader 1.128*** 
    
Pre-Jiang Period 
   Deputy-Division-Head 1.144** 
 
5.618*** 
Division-Head 1.142*** 
 
1.254** 
Deputy-Bureau/Director 1.200*** 0.824* 20.068*** 
Bureau/Director 
  
2.386*** 
Vice-Provincial/Ministerial 
   Provincial/Ministerial 1.097* 
    
Jiang Period 
   Deputy-Division-Head 
  
9.613*** 
Division-Head 
   Deputy-Bureau/Director 1.108* 0.832* 11.030*** 
Bureau/Director 1.129*** 
 
1.519** 
Vice-Provincial/Ministerial 
   Provincial/Ministerial 1.181*** 
    
Hu Period 
   Vice-Provincial/Ministerial 
   Provincial/Ministerial 1.171*** 
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Source: Author’s database.
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In the overall promotion model, both human capital and social capital indeed exert 
significant impacts on political upward mobility. With regard to educational levels, 
the results in Table 77 lead to a tentative conclusion that pursing higher education 
seems to be a good investment for political career advancement. For example, as 
compared to high school or below, the better career returns are observed to such 
higher education as some college, a bachelor’s degree and a master’s degree. This 
statistical result is consistent with the findings regarding education as a positively 
contributing factor in career advancement in the current academic literature on 
Chinese elite mobility (Lin, 2012; Shih, Adolph & Liu, 2012; Zang, 2001). Meanwhile, 
it denies the findings that receiving higher education makes little difference in career 
advancement (Huang, 2009; Zhang, 2014). However, the current results show that 
the key to political career success does not lie in pursing the educational degree as 
high as possible. This is evidenced by the negligible growth in career returns to a 
bachelor’s or a master’s degree relative to some college on one hand and a 
doctorate as a hindrance to career progression on the other. In terms of another 
measure of education, what specialty political officials study in higher education fails 
to yield a significant effect on political upward mobility. This finding is inconsistent 
with the observations from Lin (2012) and Zang (2001) that political leaders trained 
in science and engineering or those receiving college education in engineering and 
management from a key university are positioned advantageously in the race for 
promotion. To summarize the career rewards for education, what matters in 
occupational ascendency for provincial leaders is the educational degree obtained 
rather than the academic majors studied.  
 
Another parameter of human capital is public service seniority. In the overall 
promotion model, upward mobility negatively depends on for how long political 
officials serve in public service. That is to say, the longer the duration time in public 
service, the smaller the promotion probability.  
 
In terms of social capital, network size and upper reachability are significantly and 
positively associated with upward mobility whereas network diversity yields a 
negative effect. Political officials with large social networks or reaching higher-status 
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work contacts are positioned advantageously in the opportunity structure in Chinese 
politics. However, diverse social networks appear to be a barrier for provincial 
leaders in their course of advancing to the top. To put it differently, political officials 
benefit from extending work contacts by job mobility across localities, organizations 
or occupations or developing social ties with the upper echelons at the apex of the 
power hierarchy. Nonetheless, their political upward mobility is impeded by job 
mobility across a wide range of career patterns.  
 
In consequence, the overall picture presented by the above results shows that both 
human capital and social capital take on a central role in career advancement. 
However, since both the historical period effect and the rank effect are unexamined 
in this model, the above findings are tentative and deserve further investigation and 
comparison.  
 
In the rank-specific promotion models, human capital exerts a continuing and 
significant impact on leadership selection across administrative ranks. Alongside, the 
promotion returns to social capital are observable across ranks with the only 
exception for the promotion to the vice-provincial/ministerial level. Turning to the 
educational levels, political officials receiving higher education have striking career 
advantages over those with high school or below for promotions to most ranks. As 
the only exception, in the opposite direction, political officials with a bachelor’s or a 
master’s degree are less likely to get ahead towards the provincial/ministerial ranks 
than those with high school or below. This empirical observation awaits further 
statistical testing and exploration. As compared to the educational level of some 
college, one of the competitive advantages in political upward mobility lies in 
earning a master’s degree or a doctorate. The significant correlations occur to the 
promotions towards the middle and higher ranks ranging from the deputy-
bureau/director level to the vice-provincial/ministerial level. In summary, the 
decisive role of higher education receives strong empirical confirmation in the rank-
specific promotion models.  
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The above results provide satisfactory answers to the question of how the 
promotion to every administrative rank relies on educational attainment. From a 
different perspective, the findings below attempt to reveal the administrative ranks 
where the critical role of each educational level is observed. It is important to 
emphasize that the rewards for receiving a master’s degree persist across 
administrative ranks. With respect to the importance of higher education, the 
rewards for the educational degree of some college emerge from the promotions to 
the lower and middle ranks and those for a bachelor’s degree or a doctorate are 
found in the upward mobility towards the middle and higher ranks.  
 
Along with the examination of educational levels, the role of academic majors in the 
rank-specific promotion dynamics is the same as that in the overall promotion 
model. The preference of natural science and engineering or humanities and social 
sciences makes no difference in political upward mobility towards any rank. 
Furthermore, the negative effect of public service seniority reaches statistical 
significance on the occupational ascendency to the ranks from the deputy-division-
head level to the vice-provincial/ministerial level.  
 
In parallel to the human capital-related promotion analyses, the linkage between 
promotion and social capital is discernible across most administrative ranks. 
Network size makes a positive contribution to upward mobility across ranks except 
for the vice-provincial/ministerial level. Upper reachability turns out to be a reliable 
predictor for the promotions to the bureau/director level or below. In sharp 
contrast, the influence of network diversity is limited to the career advancement 
towards the deputy-bureau/director level. To summarize, the way in which each 
social capital measure affects upward mobility in the rank-specific promotion 
dynamics analyses is similar to that in the overall promotion model.   
 
To conclude, according to the findings from the rank-specific promotion dynamics, 
both human capital and social capital possessed play a salient role in upward 
mobility across administrative ranks. On this basis, this chapter takes a step further 
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to examine how the promotion dynamics evolve over time, particularly by 
comparing the promotion models before and during the Jiang period.  
 
On one hand, the historical persistence in the promotion dynamics is demonstrated 
by analyzing the contribution of academic majors and social capital to the promotion 
across ranks. The similar patterns have been captured in the rank-specific promotion 
models both before and during the Jiang period. First, academic majors have no 
significant correlation to upward mobility across ranks. Second, the effect of social 
capital is negiglible on the promotion to the vice-provincial/ministerial level. Third, 
diverse social networks lead to a small reduction in the promotion rate towards the 
deputy-bureau/director level. Finally, large social networks and social contacts with 
higher-status superiors improve the odds of being selected to the elite positions at 
most ranks. There exist small variations in the specific ranks where network size and 
upper reachability yield statistically positive effects on the promotion models before 
and under Jiang.  
 
On the other hand, historical changes are well observed as to the impacts of public 
service seniority and educational levels on the promotion dynamics before and 
during the Jiang period. To be specific, the negative influence of public service 
tenure is found in the promotion dynamics before Jiang while disappears during the 
Jiang period. In terms of educational levels, before the Jiang period, the favorable 
effect of receiving some college is confined to the career advancement towards the 
deputy-division-head level and the bureau/director level. Only the educational 
degree of some college can be converted into the competitive advantage in the 
political upward mobility before Jiang. The changes in the promotion opportunities 
by no means depend on the attainment of a bachelor’s degree, a master’s degree or 
even a doctorate. In sharp contrast, the educational level of some college no longer 
functions as a reliable predictor of leadership selection under Jiang. Nor does the 
attainment of a bachelor’s degree. Instead, a master’s degree or a doctorate is 
strongly favored in the upward mobility towards the middle and higher ranks from 
the deputy-bureau/director level to the vice-provincial/ministerial level during the 
Jiang period.  
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To summarize the historical continuities and changes in the promotion dynamics, the 
above findings arrive at a tentative conclusion. That is, to a considerable extent, the 
way in which human capital affects promotion differs enormously across historical 
periods. Nevertheless, the effects of social capital exhibit similar patterns in the 
promotion dynamics before and under Jiang.  
 
After presenting the summary of the promotion dynamics, three critical issues need 
to be clarified. The first issue is concerned with the political upward mobility in 
nature for the rank-specific promotion dynamics. All the event-history observations 
are derived from the leadership demographic characteristics, educational credentials 
and career trajectories of Chinese provincial leaders. The provincial leadership 
dataset consists of a complete sample of party secretaries, provincial governors, 
deputy party secretaries and vice governors from 1990 to 2013. The political upward 
mobility in this thesis is recorded on the basis of how individual provincial leaders 
climb the political ladder from the bottom to the top. It analyses the extent to which 
upward mobility depends on human capital or social capital across administrative 
ranks. The research subjects of interest in the rank-specific promotion models are 
limited to provincial leaders from 1990 to 2013. The events of interest are the 
occurrences of promotion at a given rank for provincial leaders only. Attempts to 
generalize the existing results to all the cadres must be very cautious for two 
reasons. One is the relative small sample as compared to a far broader cadre 
population at each rank. The other is that the sampling is not random and there is no 
doubt that the political officials under study eventually rise to the vice-
provincial/ministerial level or above because of the research interest in this specific 
provincial leadership group. As a result, the promotion analyses in this thesis pay 
close attention to how to become provincial leaders after a series of promotions 
instead of how to obtain the administrative rank for the general cadre population at 
each rank.  
 
Second, this chapter has undertaken the promotion analyses by evaluating the 
independent effects of human capital and social capital in Section 8.2 and 8.3, 
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respectively. Given the space limitations of this thesis, it leaves open the possibility 
of the interaction between human capital and social capital, which is of critical 
importance and warrants further exploration in the future. Thus, the promotion 
models are far from ideal because the observed effect of human capital in the above 
analyses possibly becomes negligible by controlling for the effect of social capital.  
 
Finally, what should be explicated is the overall promotion model. As stated 
previously, the overall promotion model shows little interest in the administrative 
rank where the promotion occurs. Consider the effect of public service seniority in 
Section 8.2.2 as an example. The overall promotion model shows that public service 
seniority is significantly and negatively related to upward mobility across three 
historical periods. In terms of the effect size, for every one-year increase in public 
service tenure, the promotion rate decreases by 4.3% before Jiang, 2.9% under Jiang 
and 0.9% under Hu. It is tempting to conclude that the extent to which the 
promotion rate is affected by public service seniority declines over time. However, 
this is not necessarily the case. In other words, the above differences are not 
necessarily attributed to the historical period effect. Instead, it may result from the 
rank effect. In the present example, the observations are not evenly distributed 
across administrative ranks during each historical period. A large number of the 
event-history observations for the overall promotion model before Jiang are related 
to the upward mobility towards the lower and middle ranks. As to the overall model 
under Jiang and Hu, the observations largely aim at the promotions to the higher 
rank. As indicated in Chapter 7, the median survival time is three or four years for 
the promotions to the lower and middle ranks. It ranges from six to nine years to the 
higher rank. It takes a shorter time for most provincial leaders to win early 
promotions at the lower and middle ranks. A one-year increase in the duration time 
at the prior rank is more likely to place them at a disadvantage in the promotions to 
the lower and middle ranks than to the higher rank. Therefore, the above-mentioned 
variations in the effects of public service seniority on promotion suggest either the 
historical period effect, or the rank effect, or both. This is also why the study of the 
rank-specific models across historical periods becomes important. 
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The above promotion analyses are interested in analyzing the extent to which 
political upward mobility depends upon human capital or social capital, respectively. 
It has been emphasized in Chapter 1 and will be restated in the final chapter that the 
research question of how human capital and social capital interrelate in the same 
promotion dynamics will remain unanswered in this thesis because of the word 
limits. However, the following pages of this section will tentatively present the 
overall promotion model and the rank-specific promotion model by simultaneously 
incorporating demographic attributes, human capital and social capital.  
 
Table 79 GEE Estimates of the Overall Promotion Model, Human Capital and Social 
Capital, 1990-2013 
Covariates Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Intercept 1.011*** 0.524*** 0.804*** 
Gender -0.119** -0.123* -0.094 
Ethnicity 0.069+ 0.076 0.042 
Native Leaders 0.054* 0.099** 0.089** 
CCP Members -0.028 -0.193** -0.207** 
Age -0.048*** -0.080*** -0.085*** 
Public Service Seniority -0.034*** -0.035*** -0.038*** 
Education    
Some College -- 0.119 -- 
B.A. -- 0.183** 0.070 
M.A. -- 0.018 -0.090 
Ph.D. -- -0.216** -0.332*** 
Humanities and Social Sciences -- -- 0.015 
Network Size -- 0.030*** 0.033*** 
Network Diversity -- -0.042*** -0.038** 
Upper Reachability -- 0.204*** 0.211*** 
Number of Events 5292 5292 4610 
Number of Cases 33223 33223 29473 
Log-Likelihood 26739.436 26500.364 23158.672 
Source: Author’s database. 
Note: “Male” is the reference category for gender, “ethnic minorities” for ethnicity, 
“outsiders” for native leaders and “non-CCP members” for CCP membership. In 
Model 2, “high school or below” is the reference category for education. In Model 3, 
“some college” is the reference category for education and “science and 
engineering” is the reference category for academic majors.  
*** p<0.001; ** p<0.01; * p<0.05; + p<0.055. 
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Table 80 Logistic Models on Human Capital, Social Capital and Upward Mobility across Administrative Ranks, 1990-2013 
Covariates Deputy-Division-Head Level Division-Head Level Deputy-Bureau/Director Level 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 
Constant 0.021*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.005*** 0.001*** 0.003*** 0.004*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
Age 1.134*** 1.070** 1.111*** 1.101*** 1.081*** 1.075*** 1.144*** 1.140*** 1.121*** 
Gender 1.778* 2.820** 3.042** 0.997 0.985 0.936 1.127 2.419** 2.352** 
Ethnicity 0.979 0.632* 0.734 0.948 0.830 0.890 0.895 0.437*** 0.444*** 
Native Leaders 0.898 1.089 1.280 1.163 1.153 1.127 0.836* 1.395* 1.439* 
CCP Members 0.921 0.444* 0.420* 2.573** 2.016* 2.139* 0.979 0.606 0.713 
Public Service Seniority 0.939*** 0.927*** 0.931** 0.968*** 0.961*** 0.955*** 0.954*** 0.933*** 0.939*** 
Education 
         Some College -- 1.354 -- -- 1.197 -- -- 1.432 -- 
B.A. -- 0.836 0.633 -- 1.135 0.984 -- 0.662* 0.468*** 
M.A. -- 2.716+ 1.977 -- 1.826** 1.549 -- 1.062 0.791 
Ph.D. -- -- -- -- 2.246 1.798 -- 1.341 1.042 
Humanities and Social 
Sciences -- -- 1.183 -- -- 1.092 -- -- 0.738 
Network Size -- 1.140** 1.171** -- 1.116*** 1.130*** -- 1.119** 1.126** 
Network Diversity -- 0.947 0.818* -- 1.012 1.008 -- 0.822** 0.827** 
Upper Reachability -- 5.941*** 4.626*** -- 1.227** 1.158* -- 15.046*** 13.932*** 
Number of Cases 1564 1564 1038 3026 3026 2260 3943 3943 3160 
Overall Percentage 65.3 92.7 91.4 78.2 78.1 76.5 76.7 93.3 92.4 
 
(Table 80 continued) 
Covariates Bureau/Director Level Vice-Provincial/Ministerial Level Provincial/Ministerial Level 
 
Model 10 Model 11 Model 12 Model 13 Model 14 Model 15 Model 16 Model 17 Model 18 
Constant 0.000**** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000 0.000 
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Age 1.136*** 1.123*** 1.119*** 1.181*** 1.086*** 1.076*** 1.053*** 1.039*** 1.031** 
Gender 0.743* 0.699** 0.685** 1.098 0.759 0.691 0.667* 0.814 0.823 
Ethnicity 0.917 0.853 0.901 0.883 0.743 0.778 1.130 0.971 0.952 
Native Leaders 0.930 0.960 0.966 0.833** 1.619** 1.948*** 0.660*** 0.670*** 0.679** 
CCP Members 3.054*** 3.238*** 3.314*** 0.824 0.309* 0.303* 4.756*** 2.524** 2.423* 
Public Service Seniority 0.991* 0.988* 0.988* 0.985*** 0.979* 0.977* 1.010 0.989* 0.991 
Education 
         Some College -- 1.614** -- -- 0.526 -- -- 0.815 -- 
B.A. -- 1.810*** 1.134 -- 0.797 1.372 -- 0.765 0.869 
M.A. -- 2.784*** 1.761*** -- 1.172 2.326** -- 0.551** 0.674* 
Ph.D. -- 4.392*** 2.792*** -- 3.530** 7.454*** -- 0.564* 0.674 
Humanities and Social 
Sciences -- -- 0.919 -- -- 0.624* -- -- 0.744* 
Network Size -- 1.077*** 1.095*** -- 1.034 1.050 -- 1.177*** 1.182*** 
Network Diversity -- 1.037 1.045 -- 1.032 1.048 -- 0.964 0.984 
Upper Reachability -- 1.875*** 1.768*** -- 50.438*** 63.255*** -- -- -- 
Number of Cases 5854 5854 5095 7751 7751 7223 12226 12226 11530 
Overall Percentage 82.6 82.5 81.5 84.2 97.0 97.0 96.3 96.3 96.4 
 
(Table 80 continued) 
Covariates Vice-State-Leader Level 
 
Model 19 Model 20 Model 21 
Constant 0.801 0.044+ 0.170 
Age 0.983 0.986 0.980 
Gender 1.719 2.344* 2.372* 
Ethnicity 0.572 0.401** 0.302** 
Native Leaders 0.778 0.964 0.875 
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CCP Members 0.121*** 0.081*** 0.079*** 
Public Service Seniority 0.992 0.985 0.986 
Education 
   Some College -- 2.398 -- 
B.A. -- 3.677* 1.368 
M.A. -- 4.119* 1.773 
Ph.D. -- 5.545* 2.292 
Humanities and Social 
Sciences -- -- 0.663 
Network Size -- 1.134*** 1.143*** 
Network Diversity -- 0.999 1.035 
Upper Reachability -- -- -- 
Number of Cases 4386 4386 3871 
Overall Percentage 98.2 98.2 98.0 
Source: Author’s database. 
Note: “Male” is the reference category for gender, “ethnic minorities” for ethnicity, “outsiders” for native leaders and “non-CCP members” for 
CCP membership. In Model 2, 5, 8, 11, 14, 17 and 20, “high school or below” is the reference category for education. In Model 3, 6, 9, 12, 15, 
18 and 21, “some college” is the reference category for education and “science and engineering” is the reference category for academic majors.  
*** p<0.001; ** p<0.01; * p<0.05; + p<0.055. 
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As compared to the overall promotion model related to human capital in Section 
8.2.1 and social capital in Section 8.3.1, the findings derived from Table 79 show that 
social capital, public service seniority and academic majors yield similar promotional 
returns when demographic attributes, human capital and social capital enter the 
overall promotion model at the same time. However, when controlling for social 
capital, the effects of educational level change modestly. To be specific, with high 
school or below as a reference category, the significant and positive effect of 
receiving some college and a master’s degree no longer exists whereas the influence 
of obtaining a doctorate becomes pronounced. 
 
Table 80 illustrates the rank-specific promotion dynamics by considering the role of 
demographic attributes, human capital and social capital. According to Table 80, the 
career returns to human capital are persistently observed in political upward 
mobility across varying administrative ranks when social capital is incorporated to 
the promotion model and vice versa. This finding is consistent with the independent 
promotion analyses in Section 8.2.3 and 8.3.3.  Furthermore, social capital and public 
service seniority contribute to political upward mobility across administrative ranks 
in a similar fashion. As compared to the rank-specific promotion dynamics in Section 
8.2.3, two important points pertaining to how educational levels and academic 
majors affect political career success are worth noting here. On one hand, when 
demographic variables and social capital are controlled for, the way in which the 
attainment of educational qualifications leads to career rewards conspicuously 
changes for the promotions towards the deputy-division-head level, the deputy-
bureau/director level and the provincial/ministerial level. On the other hand, the 
variable of academic majors exerts no significant effect in the rank-specific 
promotion models without social capital. By contrast, political officials majoring in 
science and engineering are more likely to get promoted towards the vice-
provincial/ministerial level and the provincial/ministerial level than those trained in 
humanities and social sciences.  
 
To summarize, Table 79 and Table 80 has captured both similarities and differences 
in how human capital and social capital are responsible for political career outcomes 
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after combining both capitals in the same promotion models.  It is tempting to 
postulate the interaction of human capital and social capital in the promotion 
dynamics. This is one of the primary research directions that require further testing 
and sophisticated statistical analyses in the future, which will be summarized in 
Chapter 9.       
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Chapter 9 Conclusions 
 
The central concern of this thesis is to explore the promotion dynamics and the role 
of human capital and social capital in political upward mobility for Chinese provincial 
leaders from 1990 to 2013. Chapter 2 has reviewed a substantial body of literature 
pertaining to how human capital and social capital contribute to status attainment 
and career mobility. On this basis, research gaps arise. There is a paucity of empirical 
studies that examine the effect of either capital on upward mobility for political 
elites, the changes in their occupational returns over different career stages, or the 
interrelationship between human capital and social capital.  Given the space 
limitations, this thesis has closed the first two research gaps and left the third issue 
unresolved.  
 
To satisfy such research purposes, this thesis has constructed a comprehensive 
Chinese provincial leadership dataset as explained in Chapter 3 with the detailed 
information on demographic attributes, educational backgrounds, political mobility 
processes and the timing of promotion event occurrences. The event-history analysis 
provides a methodological guide for generating rich quantitative data and 
developing promotion models.  On one hand, the leadership dataset records the life 
histories of 1,260 provincial leaders from 1990 to 2013, including 33,557 
observational records. This dataset is generally designed for the promotion analyses 
in Chapter 7 and 8. It contains the important information as to their career 
trajectories from the bottom to the top. It adequately shows the process of 
educational attainment, specific career experience and political upward mobility 
from the section-head level to the state-leader level in terms of both the event 
occurrences and their corresponding timing. On the other hand, to analyze the 
provincial leadership transformation from a longitudinal perspective, a leadership 
subset is derived from the above dataset. It differs from the overall dataset in two 
respects. In the first place, provincial leaders of interest in this thesis include party 
secretaries, governors, deputy party secretaries and vice governors. The possibility 
exists that individual provincial leaders obtain concurrent jobs or experience job 
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changes among the above-mentioned provincial leadership positions. In this sense, 
provincial leaders appear more than once in this subset. The number of provincial 
leaders accordingly increases to 1,891. In the second place, this subset merely 
focuses on the career experience as provincial party secretaries, governors, deputy 
party secretaries or vice governors. As a result, only 9,814 event-history entries are 
selected for describing the historical continuities and changes in the provincial 
leadership composition. This subset describes the specific occupational trajectories 
as provincial leaders and the educational experience during this period.  
 
Based on the Chinese provincial leadership dataset, this thesis has presented an 
evolutionary picture of political elite transformation, namely the demographic 
characteristics in Chapter 4, human capital in Chapter 5 and social capital in Chapter 
6. Chapter 7 has formulated the process of political upward mobility, showing the 
average age and the duration time at the prior rank at promotion along with the life 
tables of the promotion at each administrative rank. Chapter 8 has provided insights 
into the promotion dynamics by analyzing the independent effects of human capital 
and social capital on the upward mobility for the 1990-2013 provincial leaders. It has 
examined how the career rewards for either capital have changed across 
administrative ranks and how the promotion dynamics have evolved over time.  
 
After overviewing the preceding chapters, the concluding chapter will revisit the 
research questions raised at the very beginning of this thesis and show how the 
robust findings in each chapter answer these questions. The important data analysis 
results shed light on the fundamental facts on Chinese provincial leadership. In this 
final chapter, they can be summarized into three principal points in Section 9.1:  (1) 
The provincial leadership transformation is characterized by the alliance of 
technocrats and career bureaucrats; (2) provincial leaders are fast runners in the 
step-by-step upward mobility within the political hierarchy; and (3) the importance 
of human capital and social capital persists along the bottom-up occupational 
upgrading from the deputy-division-head level to the vice-state-leader level. This 
thesis will later conclude by discussing the contributions and limitations and 
suggesting the significant issues in the future research in Section 9.2.    
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9.1 Summary of Research Findings 
 
This section summarizes the major findings in the previous chapters. It is primarily 
divided into three parts, namely the provincial leadership transformation from 1990 
to 2013, the process of political upward mobility and the changes in the occupational 
returns to human capital and social capital. Each part begins by putting forth an 
important research question. The answers to all the three research questions can be 
integrated for the research purposes in this thesis, conducting a dynamic analysis of 
the elite formation of Chinese provincial leaders and their political upward mobility.  
 
Research Question One 
 
How has the provincial leadership composition evolved from 1990 to 2013 in terms of 
the demographic attributes along with the accumulation of human capital and social 
capital? 
 
This research question has been addressed in Chapter 4, 5 and 6. For example, after 
studying the demographic characteristics of provincial leaders, Chapter 4 has 
observed the stable age structure of this leadership group under the impact of the 
gradually institutionalized elite recruitment and political mobility. The leadership 
selection at the provincial level is still far away from achieving gender equality or 
proportional representation of ethnic minorities and non-CCP members. There has 
been a pronounced reduction in native party leaders in provincial politics over time. 
Chapter 5 has shown the increasing educational level and the prevalence of the on-
the-job educational advancement for provincial leaders from 1990 to 2013. In terms 
of academic disciplines, there has been a steady increase in provincial leaders 
trained in humanities and social sciences since 1990. Chapter 6 has presented the 
historical changes in the accumulated social capital and demonstrated a growing 
trend of the average network size and network diversity.   
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Based on all these empirical analyses in the foregoing chapters, the answer provided 
in this part will give an in-depth summary and take a closer look at the evolving 
patterns of leadership formation.  In brief, the provincial leadership transformation 
exhibits two distinctive patterns. The first salient pattern is the coexistence of career 
bureaucrats and technocrats coupled with the emerging technocratic leadership in 
the 1990s. The second one is the rise of career bureaucrats from 2000 onwards.  
 
In terms of the first pattern of leadership transformation, the proportions of career 
bureaucrats and technocrats in Chinese provincial politics has been presented in 
Chapter 5 by analyzing academic disciplines and career paths of provincial leaders. 
Although there were more career bureaucrats than technocrats in the first three 
years of the 1990s, the existing findings show the conspicuous emergence of the 
technocratic leadership during the period of 1993-1999. This technocratic leadership 
group in the 1990s shares similar educational and occupational experience. They 
were largely born during the period between 1940 and 1946 (64.50%) and 
completed the full-time courses for a bachelor’s degree (89.72%).  Most of them 
were admitted into universities before the outbreak of the CR, particularly from 
1958 to 1965 (70.88%). They were largely trained in applied science in the full-time 
college education (87.63%). Their educational attainment is in accord with the 
extraordinary educational expansion and educational reforms in the 1950s and the 
early 1960s. As shown in Chapter 5, this period witnessed the educational 
restructuring starting from the early 1950s and the consequential mushrooming of 
the science- and technology-oriented universities. The nationwide enrollment in the 
specialty of science and engineering dramatically increased.  
 
In the life transition from school to work, as college graduates, for the most part, the 
technocrats in the 1990s entered the labor force between 1962 and 1970 (78.30%). 
However, only 4.47% of them directly served in the party apparatus or the 
government bureaucracy after college graduation. In sharp contrast, an 
overwhelming majority of them were allocated to the SOEs as skilled workers or 
trained engineers. The average duration time in the SOEs is 16.15 years. Such career 
experience in the SOEs--for example, manufacturing, petrochemical industry and 
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coal mining--was consistent with their educational backgrounds. More importantly, 
the job allocation of college graduates was potentially rooted in the state 
redistributive institutions where the government administrations exercised rigid 
control over job assignments and resource mobilization. It assigned a highly trained 
labor force to the professional career lines for the national strategies of state 
building and industrialization from the 1950s through the mid 1960s.  
 
The impact of the CR on the life chances of the technocrats in the 1990s, to a larger 
degree, lies in their career transitions from the SOEs to public service in the 
aftermath of the CR, rather than the interruption of educational advancement or 
political career stagnation during the course of the CR. After the CR, the CCP strove 
to restore the sociopolitical order. One of the daunting challenges facing the newly 
rehabilitated central leaders was to bring the fresh blood into the leadership organs 
after the downfall of “the Gang of Four” (siren bang, 四人帮). As a result, a 
widespread leadership selection and personnel reshuffling took place in the party 
and government systems at all levels. For political stability, industrialization and 
economic development, the CCP placed emphasis on both party loyalty and 
professional competency in screening viable candidates for management positions. 
However, considerable difficulties arose from this selection criteria of “red and 
expert”. Specifically, hundreds of old veteran cadres were purged and removed from 
the authority posts in the turbulent years of the CR. This resulted in thousands of job 
openings and a high demand for party loyalists in the political hierarchies. In addition, 
the shutdown of schools and colleges during the CR gave rise to a desperate 
shortage of well-educated professional experts.  
 
In this context, engineers and managers working in the SOEs for decades became 
one of the major sources for political elite recruitment. On one hand, they were 
largely politically reliable because they passed the political screening before college 
entry. On the other hand, they received college education and remained attached to 
the professional career lines for years.  Thus, they came to power and constituted 
the leadership group of engineers-turned-politicians or technocrats in Chinese 
politics.  
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For the technocrats in the 1990s, their lengthy tenure in the SOEs leads to the 
corresponding short seniority in public service, as mentioned in Chapter 5. Their 
average age upon the public service entry is 37.87 years. Given the relatively simple 
career trajectories in the SOEs and the public service, they possessed limited social 
capital from formal work connections. Chapter 6 has observed smaller network size 
and less diverse social ties for technocrats in the 1990s.  
 
The emergent technocratic leadership in the 1990s was followed by a steady decline 
in the technocrats thereafter. The percentage of technocrats decreased from the 
peak value of 32.79% in 1996 to 7.85% in 2012 and 9.13% in 2013. By comparison, 
Chapter 5 has shown that the proportion of bureaucrats reached 31.37% in 2000, 
slowly climbed to 45.13% in 2010 and decreased to 37.32% in 2013. Along with the 
ups and downs of technocrats, the core feature of the leadership transformation 
since 2000 is the rise of career bureaucrats.  
 
The career bureaucrats from 2000 and 2013 mostly came from the birth cohorts 
from 1950 to 1957 (57.35%). The life journey of this leadership group is strongly 
shaped by ten years of turmoil and madness in the CR era.  Succinctly put, the CR 
directly affected the life chances of the bureaucrats since 2000 in the way of 
discontinuing their educational advancement and triggering their life transitions 
from school to work, and subsequently from work back to school. Most of them left 
school for work during the CR when schools and universities all over China were 
closed. They failed to attend universities or complete the full-time higher education 
as the technocrats in the 1990s did. Instead, they entered the workforce through 
working in the factories or on the farms, serving at the grassroots level, or engaging 
in the “send-down” campaigns over the course of the CR. Shortly after the CR, they 
continued education and took part in the college entrance examinations after 
working for several years. This ultimately resulted in a marked increase in the career 
bureaucrats enrolled in the full-time undergraduate courses in 1978. Meanwhile, the 
educational interruptions and temporary occupational experience during the CR led 
to a high proportion of the bureaucrats attending colleges beyond the normal age 
 
 
367 
for college admission. In terms of the specialty in the highest formal educational 
degree, career bureaucrats were likely to study literature/linguistics (23.60%), 
economics/finance (18.18%) and legal studies/political science (14.37%).  
 
As to the career trajectories, 32.01% of the career bureaucrats from 2000 to 2013 
preferred to serve in public service as a starting point of their careers or work as 
cadres once obtaining their highest formal educational degrees. This is strikingly 
different from the technocrats in the 1990s who were largely allocated to SOEs after 
completing formal schooling. The average age upon the public service entry for the 
bureaucrats since 2000 is 28.70 years, as compared to 37.87 years for the 
technocrats in the 1990. The relative early political career start possibly entailed a 
lengthy duration in public organizations as party workers or government 
administrators. Furthermore, as analyzed in Chapter 6, social networks of career 
bureaucrats since 2000 have increased and expanded modestly from the job 
transfers and career advancement step by step within the political hierarchies.  
 
Research Question Two 
 
How have provincial leaders from 1990 to 2013 advanced their careers step by step 
within the political hierarchies in terms of the average age and the average tenure at 
the previous rank at promotion? 
 
Chapter 7 has provided a quantitative assessment of political upward mobility for 
provincial leaders from 1990 to 2013. The major empirical findings consist of the 
average age at promotion and the average duration time at the prior rank on one 
hand, and the life-table analysis of leadership upward mobility on the other. All 
these analyses have presented the supporting evidence and reached consistent 
conclusions about the process of political elite mobility.  
 
First, provincial leaders are fast runners in political mobility competitions and they 
climb the political ladder faster at the lower administrative ranks than at the higher 
ranks. Chapter 7 has shown that the average age for provincial leaders grows with 
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the career progression from the section-head level to the state-leader level. It has 
further interpreted the results of the average age by comparing with the age of 
ineligibility for promotion. It is well observed that the age advantage seems to be 
more pronounced at the lower ranks than at the higher ranks. This observation is 
also supported by the empirical evidence of the average tenure and the median 
survival time across administrative ranks. Specifically, the duration time at the prior 
rank is longer at the upper levels than at the lower levels. Besides, the median 
survival time increases with the occupational upgrading from the deputy-division-
head level to the provincial/ministerial level. This means that 50% of the provincial 
leaders successfully get promoted to the lower ranks more rapidly than to the upper 
ranks.  
 
Second, in the course of political upward mobility, provincial leaders tend to wait 
longer before moving ahead to the full positions than to the deputy positions. The 
supporting evidence is derived from the average duration time at the prior rank and 
the cumulative promotion rates in the life table analysis. To be specific, Chapter 7 
has reported a longer tenure at the deputy positions than at the full positions for the 
promotions below the vice-state-leader level. Furthermore, the life table analysis has 
estimated the time to promotion events at every rank. The promotion rate tends to 
be higher at the deputy positions than at the succeeding full positions in terms of the 
first-year promotion rate, the five-year and the ten-year cumulative promotion rates.  
 
Another important finding in the life table analysis deserves mentioning here, 
namely the distinctive promotion pattern towards the provincial/ministerial level. As 
to the career advancement towards the ranks below the provincial/ministerial level, 
the cumulative promotion rates and the years with the most promotion events differ 
very slightly. Specifically, their five-year cumulative promotion rates are all more 
than 50% and their ten-year cumulative promotion rates are all more than 90%. It is 
at Year 2 that the most provincial leaders advance to the deputy-division-head level 
and the division-head level and at Year 3 to the deputy-bureau/director level, 
bureau/director level and the vice-provincial/ministerial level. However, the life 
table related to the promotion towards the provincial/ministerial level shows a 
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different picture. A large number of political leaders are inclined to stay at the vice-
provincial/ministerial level for a far longer period before the next promotion. This is 
evidenced by two basic facts. One is that the first-year promotion rate is only 0.78% 
and the five-year cumulative promotion rate is only 15.98% for advancing to the 
provincial/ministerial level. The other is that there are the most provincial leaders 
successfully rising to the provincial/ministerial level as late as Year 10.  
 
Research Question Three 
 
To what extent and in what way have human capital and social capital affected 
political upward mobility and are they rewarded differently in the promotion 
dynamics across administrative ranks? 
 
The promotion models in Chapter 8 have provided satisfactory answers to the above 
research question. The human capital analysis has focused on the roles of 
educational levels, academic majors and public service seniority in political upward 
mobility. The social capital analysis has given special attention to the impacts of 
network size, network diversity and upper reachability on leadership promotion 
outcomes. To begin with, this section restates the ongoing scholarly investigations 
pertaining to the role of education in the course of promotion and poses two 
important research issues in the current literature review. It draws insights from the 
promotion analyses in this thesis to answer these issues and enhance the 
understanding of how educational levels affect career upward mobility. Besides, this 
section further summarizes major findings drawn from Chapter 8 that strongly 
support that both human capital and social capital exert significant effects on 
upward mobility and yield discernible career rewards for provincial leaders from 
1990 to 2013. Furthermore, there are modest differences in the way in which human 
capital is rewarded in the promotion dynamics across administrative ranks. Despite 
the variations in the effect size, for the most part, social capital affects upward 
mobility across administrative ranks in a similar way.  
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The literature review in Chapter 2 has highlighted the controversy surrounding the 
occupational returns to education. It has raised two critical issues concerning the 
way in which education affects promotion. One is whether education functions 
primarily as a screening or filtering device in leadership selection or whether the 
significant effect of education on promotion persists over different career stages 
(Bills, 2003: 445-448; Hurley and Sonnenfeld, 1998: 174-175; Kerckhoff, Raudenbush 
and Glennie, 2001: 2; Sheridan, Slocum, Jr., and Buda, 1997: 374). The other is 
concerned with the possibility that different educational levels produce different 
promotion probabilities. It asks whether higher educational levels necessarily lead to 
better career rewards than lower educational levels. To put it differently, the second 
issue is also interested in whether there exists a baseline educational qualification in 
Chinese leadership selection. If this were true, the underlying reasoning is twofold. 
On one hand, the political officials with the baseline educational degree are more 
likely to move ahead than those without this degree. On the other hand, once the 
educational degree reaches this baseline, the further pursuit of higher educational 
degrees makes little difference in the promotion outcomes.   
 
In answering the first issue, the findings from the rank-specific promotion models in 
Chapter 8 have contradicted the assumption that education merely functions as a 
gatekeeper with an attenuating effect on career development after organizational 
entry. Rather, education is significantly linked to the promotion across 
administrative ranks from the deputy-division-head level to the vice-state-leader 
level. At each rank, the observable variations in the promotion rates are found 
between political officials with higher education and those with high school or below. 
To be specific, as a whole, higher education yields a favorable effect on leadership 
upward mobility at most administrative ranks. The sole exception is the promotion 
towards the provincial/ministerial level where higher education functions as a 
hindrance to career development. That is to say, as compared to high school or 
below, the attainment of a bachelor’s degree or a master’s degree decreases the 
promotion chance towards the provincial/ministerial level. To a large degree, this 
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finding is consistent with Bo’s observation (2002) on the negative correlation of 
college education and upward mobility for provincial leaders from 1949 to 1998120.  
 
Bo (2002: 115-117) provides the possible explanations for the above observation 
from the opportunity-cost theory and the preferences between generalists and 
specialists for the provincial leadership. As Bo points out (2002: 117), “as they had 
devoted their time and energy in their specialties, these provincial leaders might 
have lost opportunities to familiarize themselves with the local conditions of their 
provinces and with the operations of the bureaucratic systems”. In addition, 
provincial leaders without higher education tend to have an early career start, 
perform a wide variety of jobs, get acquainted with the functioning of political 
parties and government administrations, and eventually turn into generalists with 
general knowledge and diverse work experience. On the contrary, college graduates 
are largely specialized in knowledge and skills in terms of their academic training. 
Given the multifaceted leadership roles like party secretaries and governors as well 
as the multitasking jobs of governing vast administrative units like provinces, 
generalists are more favored than specialists in provincial politics (Bo, 2002: 115-
117). Thus, it is possible that provincial leaders with high school or below only are 
better matched to working as party secretaries or provincial governors and 
positioned advantageously in political upward mobility as compared to those with 
higher education. Although the above explanations are convincing, it still remains to 
be seen why the negative effect of education exists in the promotion towards the 
provincial/ministerial level while the reverse is true for advancing to the other ranks.   
                                                        
120 This thesis defines upward mobility as the movement from a lower administrative 
rank to a higher rank. However, along with the rank upgrading, the upward mobility 
in Bo’s study (2002) also includes the movement from a lower position to a higher 
position, such as job changes from the position of provincial governor to party 
secretary, from vice governor to standing members, and from standing members to 
deputy secretary. Bo (2002) evaluates the influence of education by simply dividing 
educational levels into college education and high school or below. In this thesis, 
education consists of five different educational levels, namely high school or below, 
some college, a bachelor’s degree, a master’s degree and a doctorate. Despite the 
distinctions of measuring education and upward mobility, it is informative and 
meaningful to compare the finding of Bo’s study and the data analysis results in this 
thesis.  
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To summarize the above highlights, after overviewing the role of education in the 
rank-specific promotion dynamics, it is reasonable to conclude that the notable 
effects of education on leadership promotion persist with the occupational 
upgrading from the lower ranks to the higher ones.  
 
After demonstrating the enduring impacts of education on promotions across 
administrative ranks, as noted previously, the second issue is related to whether an 
increase in educational levels is positively correlated to an increase in promotion 
rates. The answers to this issue should be understood cautiously in two respects. On 
one hand, the findings in Chapter 8 suggest that, with the same reference group (i.e., 
either high school or below, or some college), the investment of higher educational 
degrees does not necessarily result in higher promotion rates. For example, as to the 
promotion towards the deputy-division-head level, the attainment of some college 
or a master’s degree is better rewarded in political upward mobility than high school 
or below. However, earning a bachelor’s degree or a doctorate confers no career 
advantage over receiving the educational level of high school or below.  
 
On the other hand, it is only for the promotion towards the vice-state-leader level 
that higher educational levels induce higher promotion chances. As shown in 
Chapter 8, relative to high school or below, provincial leaders are 3.33 times more 
likely to get ahead for having a bachelor’s degree, 4.01 times for a master’s degree 
and 4.72 times for a doctorate. In this regard, as compared to high school or below, 
despite no significant promotional return to some college, the effect size still 
increases in an ascending order of a bachelor’s degree, a master’s degree and a 
doctorate. Besides, the analyses of promotions towards the middle ranks lend partial 
support to this observation. For example, as to the promotions towards the deputy-
bureau/director level and the bureau/director level, with high school or below as the 
reference group, receiving some college yields a higher promotion probability than 
earning a bachelor’s degree. However, what should be stressed is that the 
attainment of a master’s degree leads to a higher promotion probability than having 
some college or a bachelor’s degree. Obtaining a doctorate, in turn, results in a 
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higher promotion chance than having a master’s degree. For career advancement 
towards the vice-provincial/ministerial level, despite no variation in the promotion 
outcome between having some college and receiving a bachelor’s degree, as 
compared to some college, earning a doctorate, to a larger extent, affects upward 
mobility in the positive direction than having a master’s degree.  
 
To conclude, the above summary about the role of educational levels in the 
promotion dynamics of Chinese provincial leaders has revisited the research issues 
posed in the current literature review. It has given empirical confirmation to the 
career returns to different educational degrees. Along with educational levels, 
Chapter 8 has pointed out the negligible distinction in the promotion opportunity 
between political officials trained in science and engineering and those majoring in 
humanities and social sciences. As the third criterion of human capital, public service 
seniority in the rank-specific promotion models seems to be a significantly negative 
predictor of upward mobility towards both the lower and middle ranks.  
 
Alongside the importance of human capital, the promotion analyses in Chapter 8 
have emphasized the contribution of social capital, which could be summarized into 
three essential points. First, social capital functions as a robust predictor of upward 
mobility in both the overall promotion model and the rank-specific promotion 
dynamics. Stated concretely, network size is positively associated with promotions 
across most administrative ranks excluding the vice-provincial/ministerial level. 
Besides, upper reachability is a powerful determinant of career advancement 
towards the lower and middle ranks. The accessibility of work contacts at the higher 
ranks effectively facilitates career advancement.  
 
Second, for advancing to the lower and middle ranks, social capital, in the form of 
network size or upper reachability, exerts more favorable effects on deputy positions 
than the succeeding full positions. For example, for every one-point increase in both 
network size and the highest rank accessible, the likelihood of being promoted 
towards the deputy-division-head level increases more rapidly than towards the 
division-head level. Likewise, political officials benefit more from every additional 
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point on network size or upper reachability in the upward mobility towards the 
deputy-bureau/director level than towards the bureau/director level.  
 
Finally, the significant impact of network diversity is limited to the promotion 
towards the deputy-bureau/director level. Surprisingly, diverse social networks tend 
to hinder the career progression towards this rank, showing that job changes across 
varying career lines reduce the promotion rate. The finding as to the determinants of 
the upward mobility towards the deputy-bureau/director level is revealing. This 
implies that the effective way to improve the promotion rate towards this rank is to 
expand social networks by changing localities and jobs, to develop work connections 
with the high-status superiors or to restrict network diversity by changing jobs within 
a limited number of career lines.  
 
9.2 Concluding Remarks and Future Research 
 
The summary of the political elite study and the promotion analyses in this thesis 
leads to two far-reaching conclusions: (1) the individual life chances are significantly 
affected by the accumulation of personal resources, such as human capital and social 
capital; and (2) the individual life chances are vulnerable to the macro-sociopolitical 
transformation, particularly the state policy shifts. In terms of the former, the 
supporting evidence largely comes from the promotion analyses in Chapter 8. 
Human capital exclusively focuses on education and public service seniority. Social 
capital in this thesis refers to network characteristics, including network size, 
network diversity and upper reachability. In terms of the latter, the previous 
chapters have interpreted the data analysis results by considering the introduction 
of the specific institutional arrangements or the initiation of the major historical 
events. For example, the historical evolutions of the provincial leadership 
composition stem from the institutionalization of leadership selection and 
promotion since the 1990s, such as the regulations on age limits, educational 
requirements and cadre exchanges. The changes in the educational opportunities 
virtually depend upon the outbreak of the CR or the centralized educational 
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restructuring and expansions for state-building, industrial and economic 
development. The individual decisions on educational advancement are partly 
affected by the growing emphasis on higher education in political mobility 
competitions.  
 
After presenting the major findings, the following paragraphs turn to the 
contributions and limitations of this thesis as well as the future research directions. 
The contributions of this thesis are apparent. First, this thesis has traced the 
leadership generational changes since the reform era, which helps to analyze 
socioeconomic and macropolitical transformation in a broader framework of the 
party-state of China (Li, 2000: 37). It has delineated the demographic trends in 
provincial leadership that permits historical comparisons after the founding of the 
P.R.C. As noted in Chapter 1, this thesis has revealed who climbs to the top of 
hierarchy and how they are selected behind the scenes. More importantly, it has 
filled the research gaps regarding the lack of empirical studies on how human capital 
and social capital affect promotion for political leaders and how these promotion 
dynamics change over different career stages. It has extended the understanding of 
political upward mobility by taking rigorous insight into the promotion dynamics 
processes and analyzing how promotion dynamics differ by administrative ranks and 
by historical periods. In the existing literature on Chinese elite mobility, the standard 
solution for the rank-specific promotion analyses is to collect the career data for 
varying groups of political officials at the national, provincial, municipal or county-
level and focus on a single career interval for each political official while occupying 
the related position at the specific administrative rank under study (Landry, Lu & 
Duan, 2015). This thesis, to the best of knowledge, has produced the first promotion 
analysis from a dynamic perspective where the promotion models at different 
administrative ranks draw from the full upward trajectories for individual provincial 
leaders. It has examined how provincial leaders get ahead from a relatively low 
hierarchical level upon their entry into the political hierarchy. Such promotion 
analyses have revealed the changes in leadership selection criteria in Chinese politics. 
From another perspective, they have practical implications for political officials in 
China regarding how to design their career plans and how to invest their limited 
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resources (e.g., time, energy and money) in educational credentials and social 
networks.  
 
Second, it has sharpened the understanding of the operationalization of human 
capital and social capital in the promotion analyses in the Chinese context. The 
human capital analysis in this thesis contributes to the understanding of educational 
histories for provincial leaders by presenting the processes of educational 
advancement on both full-time and part-time bases. More importantly, this is the 
first empirical study to evaluate social capital for Chinese provincial leaders from a 
networking perspective. As noted at the very beginning of this thesis, the 
measurement of social capital here has broken away from the traditional assessment 
embedded in factional politics and interpersonal relationships that emphasize family 
connections and social contacts with superior leaders by sharing the same birthplace, 
college or work unit. Instead, social capital arising from formal work contacts in this 
thesis takes the form of network resources accessible and is measured by three 
network characteristics of network size, network diversity and upper reachability. In 
this way, social capital is closely related to career trajectories in a broader 
framework as opposed to family or social ties to top leaders. Thus, this thesis has 
presented a useful angle to examine social capital and its role in political elite 
mobility in China.  
 
Third, one of the substantial contributions of this thesis is to develop the most 
updated and comprehensive Chinese provincial leadership dataset with a vast 
abundance of person-year observations for Chinese elite studies. This dataset 
incorporates the leadership biographic information, educational histories and career 
trajectories for party secretaries, provincial governors, deputy party secretaries and 
vice governors from 1990 to 2013. Based on the statistical technique of event history 
analysis, this dataset comprises both the events of interest from a life course 
perspective and the corresponding timing of the event occurrences. For example, it 
has recorded the educational levels and academic majors for provincial leaders along 
with the year in which the educational degrees were awarded. Or it has traced the 
paths to the top in the political hierarchy for individual provincial leaders and the 
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year in which the promotion occurred towards a given administrative rank. Thus, this 
dataset allows a closer look at the provincial leadership transformation, the political 
upward mobility processes and the promotion dynamics. Building upon this dataset, 
the data analysis results can be interpreted from a historical point of view. In 
addition to the leadership dataset, this thesis has advanced the methodological 
approaches in the empirical studies of political mobility by adopting generalized 
estimating equations (GEE) and event history analysis (Bian, Shu & Logan, 2001; 
Huang, 2009; Li & Walder, 2001; Lin, 2013; Zhang, 2014; Zhao & Zhou, 2004; Zhou, 
2001, 2004) 121.  
 
Finally, this thesis has not only performed a dynamic analysis of political upward 
mobility across administrative ranks, but also undertaken a comparative study of the 
rank-specific promotion dynamics over time. It has contributed to the understanding 
of how human capital and social capital affect promotion within a broader 
framework of historical changes and persistence. For example, the role of 
educational levels in the political career advancement before the Jiang period is 
distinct from that during the Jiang period. Meanwhile, social capital yields a similar 
effect on the promotion dynamics before and under Jiang.  
 
Despite the above contributions, this thesis has several limitations. For example, the 
data analysis results drawn from this thesis should be cautiously generalized to a 
broader population. They are based on the biographic data of provincial leaders 
from 1990 to 2013. The promotion analyses aim at analyzing how this specific 
leadership group moves from the lower hierarchical levels to the higher levels. 
Therefore, the promotion model towards a given administrative rank reveals how 
provincial leaders got ahead towards this rank when they stayed at the lower level 
and were eligible for this promotion. The existing findings derived from the 
promotion models specifically for provincial leaders may be applied to central 
leaders who share the similar political movement below the vice-state-leader level 
                                                        
121 As explained in Chapter 3 and Chapter 8, GEE is exploited to develop the overall 
promotion model and the event history analysis is adopted for the rank-specific 
promotion models and the historical comparisons of these models.  
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and also obtain the leading posts at the vice-provincial/ministerial level and the 
provincial/ministerial level. Nevertheless, these findings do not in any case show 
how cadres at the lower level advance to this administrative rank in the mobility 
competition. As to the general cadres, it remains to be seen whether they could 
climb to the upper levels as high as the vice-provincial/ministerial level or the 
provincial/ministerial level. A number of them possibly stay at the lower ranks when 
they retire from the public service. Attempts to generalize the current promotion 
models of a restricted sample to a larger population must be very cautious. In 
addition, in developing the promotion models related to either human capital or 
social capital, the problem of multicollinearity arises when the independent variables 
are correlated. This thesis has not diagnosed this possible problem. Further research 
will be required to improve the model fit and the validity of statistical inferences.  
 
This thesis points the way towards new research directions for future empirical 
studies of political elite mobility. Above all, after analyzing the promotion dynamics 
in Chinese elite politics, a fundamental question arises from the current findings—
Are the promotion dynamics related to human capital and social capital universal or 
specific to Chinese political systems? This suggests the value of more research into 
the comparative study of promotion patterns and dynamics between the one-party-
state of China and the other countries or societies.  
 
As stressed at the beginning of this final chapter, there still remains a profound gap 
in knowledge in the current literature. More research attention should be directed 
towards how human capital and social capital interrelate in the promotion dynamics 
in the future. In addition, a mixed promotion model will be proposed to study the 
possible effects of human capital, social capital and economic performance. This will 
provide more plausible causal inferences and make contacts with the causal models 
in the current literature on Chinese elite mobility (Choi, 2012; Jia, Kudamatsu & Seim, 
2015; Lin, 2012; Shih, Adolph & Liu, 2012; Zhang, 2014). 
 
Besides, future research will draw on more refined measurements of predictor 
variables. For example, the effect of education can be assessed through identifying 
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the way in which the educational degrees are awarded. In this regard, future 
research will distinguish the full-time education from the on-the-job education, the 
education received in party schools from that in non-party schools, the education 
received in the elite universities from that in the ordinary universities. In terms of 
the career rewards for human capital, future research will go a step further to 
evaluate the effect of the distinctive career experience, such as working in the CCYL, 
the organization departments, propaganda departments, SOEs and universities. In 
terms of social capital, future research will further examine whether there are 
different career returns to different kinds of social ties and social networks (Zhang, 
2014). Along with three network-related measures in this thesis, the effects of social 
capital on promotion will be compared on such indicators of princeling status, and 
social ties arising from the past joint experience in birthplaces, educational 
institutions and workplaces (Choi, 2012; Feng, 2010; Li & Pye, 1992; Lin, 2012; Shih, 
Adolph & Liu, 2012; Tanner & Feder, 1993; Zeng, 2013; Zhang, 2014).  
 
Regarding whether the promotion models in this thesis are universal, more reliable 
assessments and insightful comparisons are to be called for from future researchers. 
For example, one of the primary research concerns in the future is to incorporate 
more political leaders in the current leadership dataset, such as vice ministers, 
ministers, vice chairman of PPC and Provincial CPPCC as well as the central leaders at 
the vice-state leader or above. Alongside the comparison of the promotion models in 
the political sphere, the promotion dynamics for political leaders could be further 
compared against those in the SOEs. Considering how to place the promotion 
analyses in a broader context of Chinese politics, further insights will be gained into 
the legitimacy in the Chinese party-state, the party-state and the individual life 
chances, the historical evolutions of the leadership selection criteria, the rise of the 
meritocratic bureaucracy and the large-scale institutional transformation throughout 
the political history of the P.R.C. To answer all these interesting research questions, 
future studies will rely on the multiple sources of evidence in both quantitative and 
qualitative studies.   
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